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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the effect of weather events, monetary policy, and financialization on 
changes in global inventory, futures prices, spot prices, futures returns, and producers’ equity 
returns of exchange-traded commodities. First, I investigate the relationship between 
temperature and precipitation anomalies on aluminium futures returns. Prior research only 
examines the effects of weather anomalies on soft commodities, although flooding, drought 
and temperature are also identified as disrupters to mining operations in both regulatory 
filings and media reports. However, I find no evidence of weather effects on aluminium 
futures returns. Instead, the evidence suggests that inventories provide enough buffer for 
weather events and that trading around such events is unlikely to yield abnormal returns.  
 Second, I investigate the relationships between metal futures returns and global 
monetary policy and demonstrate that a multiplier ratio created to proxy for market liquidity 
and the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy is positively related to the price of 
industrial metals. Contrary to prior research, there is little evidence of a relationship between 
real interest rates and industrial metals futures returns. These findings will enhance the ability 
of policymakers and other agents to determine whether the intended effects of quantitative 
easing are being transmitted to the markets.  
 Third, I investigate the role of financialization in shaping the relationship between non-
commercial speculation (hereinafter, speculation), trader concentration, and commodity 
futures returns. While prior studies variously find evidence of stabilising, reinforcing and 
destabilising effects of speculation upon returns, I show that speculation does not Granger-
cause futures returns but that there is evidence of reverse causality from futures returns to 
speculation. Additionally, commodity futures returns respond to the publication of open 
interest information. Overall, financialization reduces the power of individual traders to set 
futures prices in a concentrated commodity market. These findings support a policy 
approach aimed at enhancing transparency rather than adding regulatory controls.  
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“One of the funny things about the […] market is that every time one person buys, another sells, and both 
think they are astute.” 
– William Feather 
CHAPTER 1 THESIS INTRODUCTION 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
The history of commodity trading is as old as the civilisation of humankind. Clay tablets 
found by archaeologists in the region of ancient Mesopotamia suggest that derivative 
contracts on commodities were present during the reign of the Babylonian King Hammurabi 
around 1,780 BC (Nagarajan, 2011). Since then, global commodity markets have experienced 
ups and downs: some slow and steady, some fast and heavy. A prominent example of an 
early commodity speculation bubble is the boom and bust of the Dutch tulip mania in the 
1630s (Shiller, 2005). 
 While contracts for future delivery of commodities have long been available, the 
contracts were unstructured and trading the contracts was difficult. This changed with the 
establishment of the Dōjima Rice Exchange in the 18th century in Osaka, Japan, which 
became the world’s first modern organised futures exchange (Hamori et al., 2001). Despite 
facing difficulties during its early years of trading1, the Dōjima Rice Exchange introduced a 
standardised form of trading – the futures contract was born. Today, futures exchanges are 
the preferred choice to trade commodities.2 Because of the liquidity and transparency 
present on futures markets, futures serve as guidance for commodity-related businesses such 
as producers, consumers, and merchants (Black, 1976) and are a crucial tool for financial 
risk management for industries that are affected by commodity price fluctuations.  
 Characteristics such as perishability, the need for physical storage and delivery, restricted 
or localised availability, and the lack of dividend or interest yields distinguish commodities 
from asset classes such as stocks, bonds, and real estate. Since the rapid increase in the 
financialization of commodity markets since the early 2000’s, exchange-traded commodities 
                                                 
1 During its early years, the Japanese government, represented by the governor of Osaka, prohibited this form 
of trading as it was considered as form of gambling and price manipulation (Moss and Kintgen, 2009). 
2 For example, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Group handles well over 4 million commodity-related 
contracts worth billions of USD daily (CME Group, 2017a) or the London Metal Exchange (LME) with an 
annual trading volume of 12 trillion USD or 40 times global production (LME, 2016). 
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have experienced a drastic increase in financial demand and supply. As well as satisfying 
consumption demand, commodity investments are also used for diversifying portfolio risk 
(Sari et al., 2010; Roache and Rossi, 2010)3 and as an inflation hedge (Gorton and 
Rouwenhorst, 2006; Bampinas and Panagiotidis, 2015). Whereas the valuation of a 
company’s stock can be related to its expected future cash-flows, the equilibrium price of a 
commodity reflects current and future expectations regarding supply and demand. 
Ultimately, it is perceptions of the relative scarcity of the commodity in future that 
determines its monetary value today.  
 The evaluation of commodity markets has long been a cornerstone of academic 
research. The seminal work on the economics of exhaustible commodities and their 
relationship with real interest rates by Hotelling (1931), also known as Hotelling's rule, is 
among the first to show that producers’ can increase revenue by delaying the extraction of 
exhaustible goods if interest rates are low. Subsequent research by Working (1949) and 
Brennan (1958) evaluates and develops the theory on the supply of commodity storage and 
its relationship with the associated costs. Later, Working (1960), Johnson (1960), and 
Ederington (1979) measure and evaluate the performance of hedging and speculation on 
commodity markets to show that futures markets are useful to mitigate commodity price 
risk for hedgers. Black (1976) and Cox et al. (1981) investigate the relationship between 
forward and futures and formulate valuation models for commodities and other assets. 
Gibson and Schwartz (1990), Schwartz (1997; 1998), and Schwartz and Smith (2000) present 
quantitative one- and two-factor models to estimate commodity prices and, among others, 
Cortazar et al. (2013; 2015; 2016) provide improved versions of these earlier models. These 
estimation models typically assume that commodities follow the law of one price at the 
global level. Richardson (1978), Ardeni (1989), and Rogoff (1996) test the appropriateness 
of the law of one price and the purchasing power parity on commodity markets and show 
that the same commodities exhibit different prices in various locations and that there are 
limits to arbitrage.  
 Generally, global and particularly US-related macroeconomic variables are used to 
estimate commodity prices. Among others, Dornbusch (1987) examines the relationship 
                                                 
3 While several studies highlight that commodities are a useful tool to mitigate portfolio risk (Sari et al., 2010; 
Roache and Rossi, 2010), Olson et al. (2017) argue that commodities do not sufficiently hedge risk associated 
with the S&P 500 composite index, i.e. stock market risk.  
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between exchange rates and commodity prices. Frankel (1979) links exchange rates, 
monetary policy, and money supply and builds on the overshooting model by Dornbusch 
(1976) to show that commodity prices tend to overshoot beyond the long-term equilibrium 
(Frankel and Hardouvelis, 1985; Frankel, 1986) and are negatively correlated to money 
announcements (Frankel and Hardouvelis, 1985) and real interest rates (Frankel, 2006; 
2014)4. Global demand and supply also play a key role for the determination of commodity 
prices. Kilian (2009), Kilian and Murphy (2014), and Stuermer (2014) identify strong co-
movements between global demand and the global market prices of commodities and 
conclude that commodity prices are demand-driven in the long run.  
1.2  THESIS OBJECTIVES 
Although the research on commodity markets is constantly developing, important questions 
are still left unanswered. Changes in the volatility of global commodity prices because of 
increasingly integrated global commodity markets (Huchet-Bourdon, 2011), political 
instability in producing countries (Blas and Blair, 2011), and the increasing trade and 
consumption of commodities worldwide (Trade Map, 2016) are recent and important trends.  
These point to the need for an evaluation of these newly observed market phenomena, the 
identification and assessment of influential factors that have experienced less attention 
before5, and re-evaluation of existing studies. Thus, this thesis examines the effect of weather 
events, monetary policy, and financialization on changes in global inventory, futures prices, 
spot prices, futures returns, and producers’ equity returns of exchange-traded commodities. 
It sheds further light upon the factors that correlate with and drive commodity markets.  
 First, I examine the role of weather anomalies, based on both temperature and 
precipitation, on changes in global aluminium inventory and futures returns as well as on 
the equity returns of bauxite mining and aluminium producing companies. While it is known 
that climate change significantly affects agriculture in the US (Adams et al., 1990) and that 
the prices of agricultural goods, such as frozen concentrated orange juice, depend on weather 
events in production areas (Roll, 1984; Boudoukh et al., 2007), little is known about the 
                                                 
4 The significant negative relationship between real interest rates and annual log real commodity prices mostly 
applies to agricultural commodities. Most annual metals and crude oil prices are not significantly affected by 
the US real interest rate.  
5 This includes the relationship between weather anomalies and mining operations or the interactions between 
monetary policy, both conventional and unconventional, and global commodity prices.  
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relationship between weather events, their impact on the excavation and production of non-
ferrous metals, and thus their inventory and price. This is surprising, as non-ferrous metals 
provide a crucial underpinning of economic activity. For example, aluminium is a non-
ferrous metal that is widely used for construction, and its distinctive characteristics such as 
its light weight and easy usability make it an irreplaceable component in the automotive 
industry. With annual world aluminium production of around 57,500,000 metric tonnes in 
2015 (USGS, 2017), aluminium is one of the most diverse and widely used metals. Moreover, 
metal-producing corporations (BHP Billiton, 2015:236; Rio Tinto, 2016:14-15) and the 
media (Fogarty, 2011; Wallop, 2011; Hack, 2013; Platts Metals Daily, 2013; Sharma, 2014; 
Keenan and Stringer, 2016) highlight that weather events affect the excavation of bauxite, 
the main source of aluminium. Due to its economic significance, I contribute to closing this 
gap in the literature and evaluate the relationship between weather anomalies, i.e. abnormal 
temperature and precipitation, and changes in global aluminium inventory, futures returns, 
and the equity returns of bauxite mining and aluminium producing companies. In Chapter 
2, I develop daily global weather anomaly indices to track weather anomalies based on data 
from weather stations with the shortest possible distance to the individual bauxite mines 
that are spread around the globe. Afterwards, I test whether or not these weather anomalies 
significantly impact changes in global aluminium inventory, aluminium futures returns, and 
miners’ equity returns. 
 Second, I investigate the relationship between monetary policy and metal prices. This 
includes both conventional and unconventional monetary policy. While it is known that 
increases in real interest rates, particularly US real interest rates, significantly reduce real 
commodity prices (Frankel, 2006), it remains unclear how global real interest rates affect 
commodity prices in both in the long- and the short-term and if the magnitude of this impact 
depends on the market interventions introduced by central banks following the global 
financial crisis in 20086. Particularly for industrial metals and gold, a global approach might 
                                                 
6 As a response to the global financial crisis, central banks of economies such as the US and the Eurozone 
reduced their interest rates to counteract the economic downturn and support economic growth. Since then, 
nominal interest rates in those economies have been considerably low, with values ranging around zero percent 
and below. This led to an abundance of liquidity that may have altered the mechanism that underlies the 
inventory transmission channel and explains the transmission from real interest rates to commodity prices 
(please refer to Chapter 3 for a thorough discussion of monetary policy, transmission channels, interest rates, 
and market liquidity). It remains unclear whether this increase in economy-specific central bank induced 
liquidity has altered the mechanisms on global commodity markets and how markets may react once the central 
bank liquidity will be reduced.  
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be more fruitful than the focus on US markets in prior research. Although the US is still the 
largest single economy as of 2016, the arrival of Asian consumers led by China as the largest 
importer of coal and non-ferrous metals, with a share well above 40 percent (World Bank, 
2015; IMF, 2016) may alter the leading impact of the US on commodity market dynamics 
towards a more balanced global interaction. Paired with the global expansion in 
unconventional monetary policy and the reduction in nominal interest rates during the recent 
decade as a response to the GFC in 2008, I investigate the interaction of global industrial 
metal and gold prices, global monetary policy, and global trade in Chapter 3. I introduce a 
measure which uses information on central bank assets to proxy for global central bank 
market interventions and unconventional monetary policy, to measure the effectiveness of 
the latter, i.e. the absorption of unconventional monetary policy into the economy of the 
seven scrutinised economic areas. Moreover, I introduce a measure of global real interest 
rates, defined as the GDP-weighted real interest rate of the seven evaluated economies that 
account for 70 percent of world’s central bank assets or almost 24 percent of world GDP 
(Kuntz, 2016), to evaluate their effects on the prices of global industrial metals and gold.  
 Third, I scrutinise the interaction between non-commercial speculation, trader 
concentration, and commodity futures returns. While prior literature has investigated this 
relationship, the results are unclear. To identify a link between speculation and futures 
returns, prior research often uses direct measures of speculation paired with commodity 
futures open interest. It concentrates on the conditional mean and neglects the heterogeneity 
in the impact of non-commercial speculative open interest between quantiles of the 
commodity return distribution (e.g. Irwin and Sanders, 2010; Etienne et al., 2016). However, 
the mean analysis might hide valuable information that is crucial to understand the 
relationship between the main variables. First, commodity futures returns experience fat tails 
(Han et al., 2015; Nagayev et al., 2016). Thus, outliers disproportionally affect the mean. 
Second, the mean models assume that the relationship between commodity prices or returns 
and speculative open interest is constant. If speculative open interest provides reinforcing 
(e.g., Haase et al., 2016) or increasing (Basak and Pavlova, 2016) effects, one should be able 
to observe constant coefficients at the lower and upper quantiles of the return structure. 
However, if speculative open interest has a destabilising effect, as shown by Bosch and 
Pradkhan (2015) for precious metals prior to June 2006, one may observe negative 
coefficients on the left tail and positive coefficients on the right tail of commodity futures 
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returns. These effects may even accelerate at the extremes when momentum or predatory 
trading is present in the market.7 However, if speculative open interest has a stabilising effect 
(e.g., Kim, 2015; Brunetti et al., 2016) the coefficient should be positive on the left tail and 
negative on the right tail of commodity futures returns. Either way, the mean analysis 
conceals the real impact of the regressors on different quantiles of the dependent variable. 
Extreme events in financial markets have led to drastic price fluctuations during the last two 
decades. In Chapter 4, I contribute towards closing this gap by evaluating the interactions 
and Granger-causal relationships of excess non-commercial speculation, trader 
concentration, and a panel of ten commodity futures returns. Moreover, I investigate the 
transmission of these effects to futures returns via different transmission channels to shed 
further light on the difference between trading and information about trading and the 
transmission of such to commodity futures returns.  
1.3 THESIS OUTCOME 
The thesis begins with the evaluation of the role of global weather anomalies and their effect 
on bauxite mining operations to identify the response of global aluminium futures returns 
and inventory changes to weather anomalies, i.e. deviations from the normal value. Despite 
being one of the leading metals in construction, telecommunications, and the automotive 
industry, and having an annual production of around 57,500,000 metric tonnes of primary 
aluminium in 2015 (USGS, 2017) worth well above 100 billion USD8, aluminium has 
received relatively little attention in prior research. I close this gap by showing that 
precipitation anomalies, defined as the deviation from normal values over a span of 14 years 
and measured with a newly created weather anomaly index that combines global weather 
station data, significantly reduce global aluminium inventory. Moreover, I show that 
abnormal stock price returns of bauxite mining and aluminium producing companies are 
                                                 
7 While Bessembinder et al. (2014) find little significant evidence for predatory strategies present in the crude 
oil futures market but rather liquidity-supporting effects, research on momentum trading, i.e. trading on 
existing trends, indicates a tendency of overreaction in asset markets at long horizons (e.g. Hong and Stein, 
1999). Building on Moskowitz et al. (2012), I create a dummy that illustrates a 12-week time-series momentum 
strategy with a 1-week holding period, i.e. if the average return of the last 12 weeks is positive or zero, the 
dummy is 1 and if the average return of the last 12 weeks is negative, the dummy is set to 0. While the 
momentum dummy is negative and highly significant, i.e. at the 1 percent level, which suggests strong impact 
of momentum on the estimation of commodity futures returns, all variables of interest remain significant and 
with their respective signs as highlighted in the main analysis.  
8 This calculation is based on an annual production of 57,500,000 metric tonnes multiplied by an average price 
of 1,800 USD per metric tonne on the LME.  
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driven by temperature anomalies that are observed on the same day as the abnormal returns, 
temperature anomalies that have been captured during non-trading days, and multi-day 
temperature anomaly events. The implications and contributions to the literature are 
twofold. First, the limited significance of the findings on weather anomaly effects on 
aluminium futures returns and inventory changes suggest that, despite the high costs that 
weather events can impose on mining operations (cf. BHP Billiton, 2015), there is only a 
limited effect if any on exchange-traded aluminium futures returns. Thus, practitioners 
should not be overly concerned about the short-term effects of weather events on the global 
aluminium price as inventories seem to sufficiently buffer for these effects. Second, the 
novel method of combining global weather station-specific data equips other academics and 
practitioners with a means of evaluating weather effects for different applications. For 
example, one may think about calculating precipitation and temperature anomaly indices for 
large cities with high demand for industrial metals to estimate the effect of weather anomalies 
on the demand for these goods.  
 Second, I investigate the relationship between global monetary policy, both 
conventional and unconventional, market liquidity, and exchange-traded metal prices. Since 
the outbreak of the GFC in 2008, quantitative easing has gained substantial popularity 
among leading central banks. Because of these market interventions, the four largest central 
banks (PBOC, FED, BoJ, ECB) hold assets of more than 17.8 trillion USD which translates 
to roughly 70 percent of world’s central bank assets or almost 24 percent of world GDP 
(Kuntz, 2016). Despite this considerable share of the global financial markets, little research 
evaluates the impact of the monetary policy induced distortion in global liquidity on the 
price of gold and non-ferrous metals. Thus, I scrutinise the effects of monetary policy and 
the change in liquidity on exchange-traded base metal and gold prices. The evaluation goes 
beyond prior research and introduces a new measure, the global multiplier ratio, to proxy 
for global central bank market interventions and unconventional monetary policy. The 
multiplier ratio is calculated by dividing M2 by central bank assets for each economy. In a 
second step, the ratios for each economy are weighted by the size of the central bank assets 
to create a global measure. The global multiplier ratio has a positive and significant effect on 
the prices of industrial metals during the period surrounding the GFC and particularly on 
the price of copper. These findings are complemented by a newly created global real interest 
rates index which is not limited to US interest rates but also includes rates from other major 
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economies. While I find little significant evidence in favour of real interest rates affecting 
the estimation of non-ferrous metals prices, the findings for the gold price indicate otherwise 
and are in line with prior research for the US. The findings also suggest that the market’s 
ability to absorb central bank liquidity and translate it into economic growth appears to be 
more important than the level of global real interest rates for the estimation of industrial 
metal prices. Despite the limited significance of the results, the global multiplier ratio allows 
investors and academics to quickly and efficiently quantify the impact of global central bank 
market interventions and consider the associated effects on commodity prices in their 
models. With this measure, it is possible to investigate the extent to which the intended 
effects of quantitative easing, i.e. an increase in lending and thus market liquidity is 
transmitted to the markets. Moreover, the findings indicate that the global approach 
provides better estimates than the focus on US measures in prior research. For example, I 
show that the correlation of China’s real interest rate with industrial metal prices is stronger 
compared to the US real interest rate. These findings are fruitful for other academics who 
are interested in the analysis of monetary policy, as they highlight that future research should 
shift the focus from US markets towards a global approach. Although the US is still the 
largest single economy as of 2016, the arrival of Asian consumers led by China as the largest 
importer of coal and non-ferrous metals with a share well above 40 percent (World Bank, 
2015; IMF, 2016) may alter the leading impact of the US on commodity market dynamics 
towards a more balanced global interaction. Furthermore, researchers may gain from further 
use of the trade data employed in this study, which explains a considerable share of variations 
of the price of industrial metals and gold. These data are freely available and offered by the 
International Trade Centre, a joint agency of the World Trade Organization and the United 
Nations. Given that monetary policy, and particularly unconventional monetary policy since 
the GFC, deserves considerable attention, these results serve as a fresh reminder of the 
consequences of market interventions by central banks and their impact on areas that 
experience less attention in an inflation-targeting environment.  
 Third, I examine non-commercial speculation, trader concentration, and their 
explanatory power for the futures returns of a basket of ten commodities. Not only do I 
evaluate the mean impact of speculation and trader concentration but further extend prior 
research by analysing the varying impact of the regressors on different quantiles of the 
commodity futures return distribution. With this approach, it is possible to thoroughly 
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scrutinise the quantiles of commodity futures returns, including the extremes, to identify the 
nonlinear explanatory power of speculation and trader concentration. The quantile 
evaluation indicates that at the upper and lower quantiles of the distribution, speculation 
seems to stabilise the futures returns of a panel of ten commodities, by dampening them. 
Furthermore, when evaluating the commodities individually, the findings suggest that 
speculation has a stronger stabilising, i.e. positive, effect on the left tail of the futures return 
distribution, i.e. 5th to 50th quantile, only for soybeans and gold. For most other commodities, 
the results indicate a reinforcing relationship between speculation and futures returns, for 
both the mean and quantile regressions. Prior research is further extended by applying the 
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) adjusted Granger causality test to the heterogenous panel 
data. At this point, prior results are confounded by the finding that, in fact, futures returns 
Granger-cause non-commercial speculation. This is consistent with the idea that, beyond a 
certain point in the lower return quantiles, negative returns induce non-commercial 
speculators to buy futures, which thus dampens subsequent negative returns. Conversely, 
when prices rise beyond a certain point, i.e. in the upper return quantiles, non-commercial 
speculators sell their positions, which again dampens subsequent positive returns. In 
addition, the findings for the signalling effect, i.e. the effect of the information content of 
the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Commitment of Traders report, 
show that market participants use information on changes in non-commercial open interest 
once it is available and adjust their exposures accordingly. This effect is particularly evident 
when non-commercial speculation deviates from its expected value. In the end, the answer 
to the question of whether non-commercial speculation improves the estimation of 
commodity futures returns, would appear to be yes. The findings, however, also reveal that 
non-commercial speculation is unlikely to Granger-cause commodity futures returns. The 
implications and contributions to the literature that can be drawn from the fourth chapter 
are threefold. First, the obtained coefficients suggest that the impact of changes in open 
interest on futures returns is miniscule. For example, I show that for each 100,000 short 
contracts open interest by traders allocated to the managed money group (i.e. speculators), 
returns decrease by only 0.0034 percent. While still tiny, the impact of merchants’ open 
interest, i.e. traders who are primarily concerned with producing or consuming the 
commodities, is comparably much stronger (approximately four times9). Thus, the effect of 
                                                 
9 Please refer to Chapter 4.4.3 for more details.  
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non-commercial, i.e. speculative trading on futures returns is smaller than the effects 
stemming from commercial trading. Second, on a weekly basis, excess non-commercial 
speculation does not Granger-cause returns. That is, while changes in the futures price (i.e. 
returns) lead to changes in non-commercial open interest, there is no significant lagged 
impact of speculative trading on any of the ten tested commodity futures returns. These 
findings are important for regulators, investors, and other parties that are interested in the 
factors that influence commodity prices. Investors gain from these findings by realising that 
their actions, on a weekly basis, do not drive returns. Moreover, the results suggest that the 
poor reputation of speculation that has been painted by the popular media, and is deeply 
rooted in society, might be exaggerated and should be reviewed to draw a more accurate 
picture. That is, the negative connotation about the effect of speculation on society and its 
negative impact on economic health arguably overshadow its positive effects, such as the 
provision of liquidity, assisting the price discovery mechanism, reducing hedging costs, and 
better integrating commodity markets with other financial markets (Fattouh et al., 2012; 
Irwin and Sanders, 2012). Third, the findings suggest that futures markets react to 
information related to open interest once it becomes public. In particular, when excess non-
commercial speculation deviates from its expected value, one can observe a highly significant 
impact on futures returns. Instead of imposing new regulations on trading and position 
limits, regulators may consider adopting a more transparent, market-oriented approach. This 
could involve publishing daily reports of trading volumes and open interest and including 
the names of the trading parties. If more information is available, the impact of each 
publication is likely to be less.  
1.4 OUTLINE OF THESIS 
Chapter 2 evaluates the effect of weather events on the primary aluminium market. Chapter 
3 investigates global monetary policy, market liquidity, and their impact on exchange-traded 
metals. In Chapter 4, the relationship between non-commercial speculation, measured by 
the excess net long non-commercial open interest in US futures markets, and a range of 
agricultural, energy, and metal commodities is examined. Chapter 5 concludes, highlights 
limitations, and presents areas for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2 WEATHER EVENTS AND THE PRIMARY ALUMINIUM MARKET 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Global economic growth and the urbanisation of developing countries during the last 
century have fuelled the demand for commodities, including the growing thirst for non-
ferrous metals. For construction, telecommunication, the automotive industry, electricity, or 
any other industry that relies on the distinctive characteristics of non-ferrous metals such as 
their light weight, easy usability, and high electrical conductivity, these metals are an 
irreplaceable component10. With an annual world aluminium production of around 
57,500,000 metric tonnes in 2015 (USGS, 2017), aluminium is one of the most diverse and 
widely used metals. While only a fraction of this production is eventually sold on commodity 
exchanges for physically delivery11, the price that results from exchange trading serves as a 
benchmark for producers, merchants, and consumers. Thus, a relatively minor change in the 
price of the underlying commodity traded on an exchange can lead to severe implications 
for all financial and other business transactions linked to the commodity.  
 Despite their importance for the economy, little is known about the impact of 
environmental factors on the global inventory and price of exchange-traded aluminium. This 
is surprising, as metal-producing corporations (BHP Billiton, 2015:236; Rio Tinto, 2016:14-
15) and the media (Fogarty, 2011; Wallop, 2011; Hack, 2013; Platts Metals Daily, 2013; 
Sharma, 2014; Keenan and Stringer, 2016) highlight that weather events affect the excavation 
of bauxite, the main source of aluminium. Although research on soft commodities (e.g. Roll, 
1984; Boudoukh et al., 2007) has identified a significant link between weather events and 
futures returns, these results arguably do not generalise to base metals. While weather 
extremes can destroy crops and thus harm the seasonal yield, mining operations are only 
affected during weather extremes.  
                                                 
10 Contrary to agricultural commodities, metals are non-perishable and can therefore be stored for an unlimited 
time and relatively cheaply (unlike agricultural commodities, which may have to be cooled or require other 
specific storage conditions). This allows consumers, producers, and other market participants to store metals 
relatively cheaply whenever they expect prices to change in future to avoid unforeseeable price changes. 
Despite differences in the storability of commodities, I still expect metal prices to react to unexpected effects 
such as unpredicted or unpredictable weather events. That is, while the event itself might be predictable, the 
real impact on operations and thus output is not foreseeable. Thus, while I appreciate the difference in the 
storability of metals compared to agricultural commodities which can lead to a reduction in price volatility, I 
expect the price of both commodity groups to react to unexpected weather anomalies.  
11 For example, the LME states that 6 million tonnes of all commodities traded on the exchange have been 
delivered in and out in 2015 (LME, 2016). 
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 Evaluating the impact of weather anomalies on base metals is challenging because mines 
are often located in remote locations and the weather stations that measure temperature and 
precipitation are scarce. However, the global distribution of bauxite mines makes it possible 
to mitigate this bias as Australia, a country with accurate weather reporting, produces 
approximately 35 percent of global bauxite, which makes it the world’s largest producer of 
bauxite. Hence, in this study, I use aluminium as a representative of non-ferrous metals and 
evaluate the impact of temperature and precipitation anomalies on changes in the global 
inventory and the futures price. The study is complemented by an evaluation of weather 
anomalies on the equity price returns of major aluminium producing companies that operate 
some of the mines in the sample. The reason for this is twofold. First, prices are widely 
believed to incorporate all market forces including changes in inventory and global mine 
production. Likewise, commodity prices are often assumed to capture available market 
information, thus embodying the equilibrium between demand and supply. This study 
enables consumers to better understand the specific role played by extreme weather events 
on changes in aluminium inventory and price, allowing investors to better value their 
investments and financial institutions to create products to mitigate weather risks. To the 
best of my knowledge, this study is the first that evaluates the impact of temperature and 
precipitation anomalies on changes in the global futures price and the inventory of exchange-
traded aluminium. 
 It is found that precipitation anomalies significantly affect changes in the global 
inventory of exchange-traded aluminium. Particularly when precipitation anomalies occur 
on multiple days, the reducing effect on inventory changes is significant. In addition, on days 
when weather data are unavailable (for example, due to extreme weather), a significant 
reduction in inventory levels is observed. However, since 2009 there has been an oversupply 
of aluminium (Sanderson et al., 2016), and during this period the association of precipitation 
events with inventory levels has diminished. The effect of temperature anomalies is found 
to be non-significant for both aluminium inventory changes and futures returns. Moreover, 
mostly non-significant coefficients are found for the volatility of the two dependent 
variables. Unlike aluminium futures returns, the abnormal returns of an equally-weighted 
portfolio of bauxite mining and aluminium producing companies are found to be 
significantly driven by both temperature and precipitation anomalies. These findings 
confirm that the operators of mines in tropical and sub-tropical areas studied in this research 
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benefit from temperatures and rainfall below the usual levels but are negatively affected by 
anomalies higher than the expected levels. 
 The remainder of Chapter 2 is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review of 
prior research and highlights the motivation for this study. Subsequently, Section 2.3 
discusses the data collection and variable definition which is supplemented by the research 
methodology in Section 2.4. The empirical results are discussed and reported in Section 2.5 
and the study closes with the conclusion, a critical review of the findings, and potential areas 
for future research presented in Section 2.6.  
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is well known that unpredictable weather conditions influence the yield and thus market 
price of agricultural goods (Rankin, 2014). Weather risk, however, does not only impact 
agricultural production but impacts all commodity producing companies. Oil and gas (Yang 
et al., 2009) and mining companies (Locke et al., 2011; BHP Billiton, 2015) are affected by 
unpredictable weather disruptions and their impact is expected to increase in future 
(Mendelsohn et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2013). The inaccessibility of mining sites has a financial 
impact on commodity producing companies of several hundred million USD yearly (BHP 
Billiton, 2015:236) and therefore influences the value of these companies as well as the 
market price and market price volatility of the affected metals. 
 Prior literature offers extensive research on the relationships between weather, 
agricultural and energy commodity prices, and the stock market performance of the 
producers of such goods. Yet, little research examines the impact of weather on base metals. 
This is surprising, as researchers examining the climate impact on mining companies provide 
convincing evidence for the demand of such research (e.g. Hodgkinson et al., 2010; Loechel 
et al., 2013), as adverse weather events can severely influence mining operations. Besides the 
obvious consequences of extreme temperature and precipitation (e.g. droughts, floods, 
landslip, or overflowing of waste ponds (Hodgkinson et al., 2010) and bushfires (Garnaut, 
2011)), weather can lead to more complex problems. Garnaut (2011) argues that long-term 
hot temperatures lead to sub-tropical conditions that may cause a spread of tropical diseases. 
This increases the cost of maintaining a healthy and efficient labour force. Moreover, 
droughts can lead to adverse policy decisions such as limited access to fresh water or forced 
investment in desalinating seawater for their operations (Craze, 2015). This limits the 
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accessibility to fresh water and thus increases the production costs for mining companies. 
Anaman and Lellyett (1997) and Colls (1993) support these claims by providing evidence 
for the relationship of adverse weather events and mining operations and highlight the 
necessity of further research in this field. Finally, major mining companies such as BHP 
Billiton (2015), Rio Tinto (2015), and Norsk Hydro (2015) report the potential financial and 
operational impact of weather disruptions in their annual reports12. Although weather clearly 
increases the financial and operational risk of those companies13, they refrain from using 
weather derivatives due to several reasons. As little research on the hedging performance of 
weather derivatives for mining companies is available, prior findings related to agricultural 
commodities might partially explain this behaviour.  
 Despite the positive effect of weather derivatives on the financial performance of 
agricultural producers (Miranda and Glauber, 1997; Duncan and Myers, 2000; Brown and 
Kshirsagar, 2015) only few companies use weather derivatives. The reasons for this are 
fourfold. First, producers usually do not possess the financial knowledge to efficiently use 
financial products or are simply not familiar with them. Second, weather derivatives typically 
have a basis risk as the weather stations used for the measurement are not on the premises 
of the insurant but are stationed in a city nearby. Hence, a farmer might face strong rainfall, 
but the nearest weather station is not affected by it, which leads to uninsured production 
cuts. Third, weather derivatives, especially exchange-traded ones, only insure against general 
weather phenomena but do not cover producer-specific risks. Odening et al. (2007) find that 
                                                 
12 For example, BHP Billiton (2015) highlight in their annual report for the financial year of 2014 that “During 
2008, extreme weather across the central Queensland coalfields affected production from the BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance 
(BMA) and BHP Billiton Mitsui Coal (BMC) operations. The Group settled insurance claims in respect of the lost production 
and insurance claim income of US$210 million (after tax expense) was recognised in the year ended 30 June 2012.” Moreover, 
Rio Tinto (2015) highlight in their annual report for the financial year of 2014 that “In January 2014, all Pilbara 
coastal and some mine operations were suspended as a result of tropical cyclone Christine and heavy rainfall that continued into 
February. North America’s extreme weather in Q1 also significantly affected IOC’s production and shipments in the first half of 
2014.” Lastly, Norsk Hydro (2015) highlight in their annual report for the financial year of 2014 that “Costs 
associated with operating a mine may increase rapidly as a result of, among others, production interruptions or delays, […] and 
weather and other natural phenomena […].” and that “Some of our operations are located in close proximity to sizable 
communities. Major accidents due to human error, […] extreme weather or other natural disasters, could result in loss of life or 
extensive damage to the environment or communities. Such events could result in major claims, fines, penalties and significant 
damage to Hydro's reputation”. 
13 According to Anaman and Lellyett (1997), 85 percent of mining companies in Queensland, Australia use 
public weather data from the Bureau of Meteorology for their operational planning. This confirms that mining 
companies are well aware of the impact of weather on their operations. Furthermore, Hennessy et al. (2007) 
argue that the temperature in Australia has risen almost 1º Celsius during the last century. Moreover, the level 
of precipitation declined. Hennessy et al. (2007) show that these changes match with climate projections for 
the future. This indicates a supply risk on water for mining companies in the severely affected areas, as 
sufficient water supply is crucial for their operations. 
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less than 25 percent of wheat yields in Germany are explained by cumulative rainfall. Thus, 
producers’ yields are more likely to be affected by an individual mix of weather phenomena 
instead of the amount of sunshine, rainfall, or temperature. Fourth, while relatively higher 
risk can lead to higher risk premiums on weather derivatives, which partially explains the 
low acceptance of those products (Mahul, 1999; Duncan and Myers, 2000), regional 
separation, i.e. personalised or highly segregated areas, can help to reduce the risk and thus 
risk premiums on weather derivatives. This decreases the cost and threshold for producers 
to use such insurance products. However, due to the geographical concentration of mineral 
resources in often remote areas, this might not be possible for mining. Compared to farming 
and energy production, the locations of metal ores are limited and often remote. Mining 
companies must accept the given weather conditions in metal ore-rich areas instead of 
choosing the mining site. Based on the yearly production output of 2014 (USGS, 2015), 
Australia, Brazil, Guinea, India, and China represent primary mining countries for 
aluminium ores, i.e. bauxite. Overall, prior research highlights several reasons why 
commodity producers may stay away from weather derivatives to hedge their exposure to 
adverse weather. Although these products can reduce the financial distress for producers, 
the net effect of weather anomalies on the supply remains unchanged. That is, if weather 
events negatively affect the production and reduce the output, the supply will be reduced. 
This leads to a new equilibrium price on the market that may be partially compensated by 
existing inventory. Thus, one should still be able to observe the effect of weather anomalies 
on both inventory and price of the underlying commodity, regardless of whether or not 
weather events are hedged.  
 However, other factors can influence the observability of the effect of weather 
anomalies on the price of aluminium. First, one cannot obtain primary aluminium directly 
from the ground. Instead of mining the traded metal directly, the excavated ore needs 
chemical processing. The process begins with the extraction of bauxite from the mine which 
then passes through several refining steps that include storage and transportation, and finally 
ends with the storage of short-term supply in privately held or partially monitored 
warehouses by global exchanges such as the LME. These warehouses provide buffer stocks 
that may offset short-term losses in production. Thus, the supply of primary aluminium to 
the market might not be affected. Likewise, consumers may build private stocks to cater for 
short-term supply shocks. Second, secondary aluminium obtained from scrap can also be 
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used for consumption as aluminium is a fully recyclable metal (The Aluminium Association, 
2016a). This allows consumers and traders to switch between primary and secondary supply. 
Indeed, the secondary base metal market contributes 20 percent to the overall aluminium 
market (Bain 2013). Thus, environmental influences on the operations of miners may only 
partially influence market prices, as the demand for metals can be satisfied by secondary 
sources. A more efficient recycling policy of metals over time may reduce the dependence 
and demand for primary base metals. For now, this is not possible as the share of secondary 
aluminium is still comparably low and an increase in recycling needs new policies which 
must be implemented. As I am investigating the short-term, i.e. daily relationship between 
the variables, it is unlikely that changes in policy have any short-term effect. Moreover, 
although base metals are generally recyclable, one should bear in mind that these metals can 
only be recycled if they are no longer in use. As aluminium is vastly used for construction 
and telecommunication, the recyclable material may only be available after many years. 
According to The Aluminium Association (2016a), three-quarters of all aluminium produced 
is still in use. With a growing worldwide population and demand for faster 
telecommunication networks and housing, the demand for primary base metals will remain 
high (Bain, 2013). Third, the unlimited storability of base metals – with respect to the 
affiliated costs of storage – acts as a buffer for short-term disruptions in supply or demand. 
Compared to agricultural commodities, metals are not perishable. During times of low real 
interest rates, storing base metals becomes cheaper for investors (e.g. Frankel, 2006; Frankel 
and Rose, 2010). Hence, holding safety stocks can compensate for the potential risk of 
weather-influenced shortages in supply as consumers and traders can hold a specific 
equivalent of the required material and mitigate their price risk. However, this requires that 
the investor or buyer holds sufficient funds to trade and store the goods today, a strategy 
that has its own risk due to the unpredictability of both weather and prices. Investors might 
only realise the increase in prices once the mining output is affected and prices have been 
adjusted. Fourth, weather forecasts may significantly affect the commodity price before the 
actual event happens.14 According to the Met Office UK (2016), weather forecasts provide 
a relatively accurate short-term prediction which diminishes as the forecast horizon 
increases. Although weather itself cannot be mitigated, it is possible to increase resilience 
                                                 
14 The effect on the price might not be linked to the weather event itself but the deviation of the actual 
temperature or precipitation from its expected, i.e. forecasted value. As appropriate historical weather forecast 
information is scarce, it is not possible to calculate this deviation.  
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against likely but unpredictable adverse events. Dorfleitner and Wimmer (2010) show that 
weather forecasts significantly impact the price of temperature derivatives traded on the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange up to eleven days ahead. Although one might be tempted to 
expect a comparable impact on commodity prices, it must be borne in mind that reliable 
forecasts require adequate data. With limited accessibility and availability of weather station 
information near mining sites, a reliable weather forecast for these areas is difficult. Overall, 
one should not forget that markets continuously price in the influences of both expectations 
and the actual event. Thus, an unforeseeable impact on the supply should impact the price 
and inventory accordingly.  
 To the best of my knowledge, little research examines the influence of weather 
anomalies on the price and inventory of exchange-traded aluminium and the stock returns 
of aluminium producers. Weather events represent risk that is hard to diversify.15 While mine 
locations around the globe can help to minimise the risk for a company, it is not possible to 
fully mitigate the risk for the interruption-free supply of commodities. Only if one fully 
understands the impact of weather anomalies on the price and inventory of an exchange-
traded commodity, it is possible to mitigate investor-individual financial risk. The 
indispensable characteristics of aluminium for the transport, construction, or food 
processing industry paired with its economic impact of employing more than 155,000 
workers and generating more than 65 billion USD annually only in the US qualifies it as a 
crucial commodity for almost every consumer (The Aluminium Association, 2016a).  
 It is expected that absolute weather anomalies are inversely related to production 
output. Weather anomalies decrease the global supply, which reduces inventory and 
increases the market price. This study allows consumers to better understand changes in 
aluminium market prices and inventory and their causing factors, enables investors to 
adequately incorporate weather anomalies into their investment decisions, provides a basis 
for insurers and financial institutions to create financial products to mitigate potential risks, 
and helps policy makers to evaluate the correlation between climate change, market 
behaviour, and financial products available on the market to protect participants from 
potential fraud. With respect to the increasing influence of climate change on weather and 
                                                 
15 For example, bauxite mines are geographically concentrated in few locations globally. Australia, a country 
with accurate weather reporting, produces approximately 35 percent of global bauxite, which makes it the 
world’s largest producer of bauxite. 
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mining operations (Hodgkinson et al., 2010), the study provides new insight on the 
interaction of weather anomalies and the price and inventory of exchange-traded aluminium 
and tests the hypotheses: 
H1: Weather anomalies are inversely related to inventory.  
H2: Weather anomalies are positively related to aluminium futures prices. 
 By testing these two hypotheses, this study attempts to answer the research question: 
Do weather anomalies affect the returns and inventory of exchange-traded aluminium? 
2.3 DATA COLLECTION AND VARIABLE DEFINITION 
 DATA 
The analysis uses five primary sources of information: the Thomson Reuters database for 
financial and economic data (Datastream), the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Climate Data Center (NOAA), 
the US Geological Survey (USGS), and the annual reports of the bauxite mining and 
aluminium producing companies that operate the mines studied. First, I extract the London 
Metal Exchange (LME) 3-months aluminium futures daily price for the research period from 
1st January 2001 to 31st December 2014 from Datastream. Seventy-six percent of the global 
non-ferrous futures are transacted on the LME (2016). Following Frankel and Rose (2010), 
the United States Gross Domestic Product (US GDP) is used to deflate the market prices. 
Unlike other deflators such as the consumer price index (Svedberg and Tilton, 2006), the 
US GDP includes all consumption and investment from all individuals of a country and 
does not limit itself to a fixed basket of goods. As the total inventory of aluminium held by 
companies, investors, and countries is not publicly available, LME warehouse stocks are 
added to the dataset to proxy for global inventory. The LME organises, supervises, and 
regulates warehouses operated by subcontractors. Changes in aluminium stored in these 
warehouses illustrate a short-term change in supply and demand as market participants can 
sell or buy aluminium on the exchange that is stored in these warehouses. Due to the leading 
position of the LME in the non-ferrous market, the reported warehouse stocks are a 
reasonable proxy for global inventory.  
 Second, I add variables to control for influential factors on the market price and 
inventory. Overall, both are driven by four forces: the current supply, the expected future 
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supply, the current demand, and the expected future demand. All changes in the price will 
ultimately be the result of changes in at least one of these main factors. They, on the other 
side, are influenced by changes in various micro- and macroeconomic, technological, 
environmental, and other factors. I follow prior research and consider different proxies to 
incorporate those effects into the model. Contrary to Frankel and Rose (2010), I do not use 
the real global GDP to proxy for global demand or economic activity but the Baltic Dry 
index (BDI). While aluminium is widely used for construction, transport, and the electronics 
industry (Norsk Hydro, 2016), global GDP not only represents metals and metal-related raw 
materials but includes all goods traded globally. Furthermore, the World Bank reports global 
GDP only on a yearly basis. Instead, I follow Kilian (2009) and Kuralbayeva and Malone 
(2012) and consider an index that uses global shipping rates to proxy for global demand. 
This index, the BDI, focuses on raw materials shipped by sea, excludes other factors 
influencing global GDP, and is available daily. The BDI is provided by the Baltic Exchange 
in London and the data are captured from Datastream. 
 Additionally, the real interest rate, a measure of conventional monetary policy (Frankel 
and Rose, 2010), controls for cheap money in the market. Low real interest rates allow 
investors to physically store metals at a cheaper rate, which increases the inventory demand 
for aluminium.16 Furthermore, low real interest rates allow consumers of base metals to 
invest in their business, which will also increase the demand for those goods. Following 
Akram (2009), I use the USD 3-month deposit rate and the year-on-year US consumer price 
index (CPI) change to calculate the real interest rate. The source for these data is Datastream. 
The trade-weighted USD index, which measures the relative value of the USD compared to 
other currencies, controls for the foreign exchange (FX) impact. Most of the global 
exchange-traded commodities, including aluminium, are traded in USD. Therefore, the 
demand for raw materials not only depends on the USD price but also the converted price 
in the buyers’ currency. An increase in the relative value of the USD will therefore lead to a 
decrease in demand from countries with relatively weaker currency compared to the USD 
(Roache, 2008). As the daily data provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis show 
gaps throughout the research period, the arithmetic average of the preceding and succeeding 
trading day is used for days with missing data. Lastly, I add the S&P 500 composite index to 
                                                 
16 This transmission channel of conventional monetary policy is called inventory channel and is thoroughly 
discussed in Section 3.2.2. 
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control for equity market risk. I extract this data from Datastream. Except for a brief period 
during the global financial crisis in 2007-2008, Creti et al. (2013) find evidence for a positive 
correlation between the S&P 500 and aluminium returns.  
 Table 2.2 provides information on the financial and weather anomaly index variables 
used in this study. The 3,653 daily observations represent the research period between 1st 
January 2001 and 31st December 2014. The parameters in Table 2.2 are defined as: FP as the 
deflated 3-month futures aluminium price, IL as the LME inventory stocks that proxy for 
global inventory, EA as the Baltic Dry Index that proxies for global demand, RIR as the real 
interest rate, TWI as the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as the S&P 500 composite index, 
P for precipitation, T for temperature, WAI as the weather anomaly index, DoA for daily 
only Australia (i.e. only weather anomalies for Australian mines), mean for the arithmetic 
mean, median for the median, std. dev. for standard deviation, min for the minimum value 
of the time-series, max for the maximum value of the time-series, skew for skewness, kurt 
for kurtosis, and the test statistics of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) for unit-roots. 
PP test results are reported where deviations from the statistical significance of the ADF 
test statistic can be observed (in parentheses). The test statistics indicate unit roots for most 
of the variables except for the weather anomaly indices. Thus, I use the periodical 
logarithmic change, or first difference, to transform the data17. I use logarithmic changes 
when the time-series does not include negative numbers (e.g. futures time-series) and use 
first differences when negative and positive values are present in the time-series (e.g. real 
interest rate, which experiences positive and negative values thorough the research period). 
The extensions _r for log returns and _f for first differences indicate if and how the data are 
transformed to achieve stationarity of the time-series. Moreover, the distributions of the 
futures returns and changes in inventory indicate that the data are not normally distributed. 
However, as the data sample consists of 3,653 observations for each of the variables, I can 
reasonably assume that the central limit theorem applies (Brooks, 2008). The temperature 
anomaly index values are denoted in tenths of a degree Celsius and the precipitation anomaly 
index values are denoted in tenths of a mm. All other variables are in 100’s of a percent, 
except for skewness, kurtosis, and ADF.  
                                                 
17 Rt = ln(Pt / Pt-1) for logarithmic change and Rt = Pt - Pt-1 for first difference.  
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 In addition to the control variables in the model, other factors may influence the price 
and inventory of exchange-traded aluminium. This includes secondary aluminium, which 
requires only ten percent of the energy used to produce primary aluminium (The Aluminium 
Association, 2016b). Hence, an increase in energy costs may lead to a growing demand for 
secondary aluminium. Also, the price of a substitute of aluminium may incentivise 
consumers to change for cheaper industrial metals. However, this requires that the substitute 
provides comparable chemical characteristics and usability. I believe that these factors do 
not change the price in the short-term but may lead to a change in a mid- to long-term 
perspective and can therefore be neglected for this study. Third, I collect daily weather 
information from the NOAA. The NOAA provides the information per weather station. In 
this study, I focus on the average temperature and precipitation reported by weather stations 
with the nearest proximity to the eleven mines examined. The evaluation includes some of 
the largest bauxite mines and represent a total share of more than 40 percent of global 
bauxite excavation in 2014. As some weather stations report incomplete data for the overall 
research period, I use the available information from the nearest weather station that reports 
partial temperature or precipitation data and substitute missing values with the second 
nearest station data. If this information is not available, I use the next nearest station. 
Following New et al. (2000) and Harris et al. (2014), this procedure considers all mines up 
to a maximum distance of 1,200 kilometres for temperature and 450 kilometres for 
precipitation. I apply this algorithm until all necessary information is obtained, i.e. 
temperature and precipitation per individual mine throughout the whole research period.18 
This algorithm analyses, formats, and structures the data and substitutes missing values by 
weather information from the nearest weather station with available data for each individual 
day. This approach accounts for missing data and provides a more complete basis for the 
research. Table 2.1 lists the individual mines and the availability of the nearest weather 
station and presents the adjusted availability in percent after the calculations. The results in 
Table 2.1 show that the algorithm helps to close gaps and drastically reduces the percentage 
of missing weather data. 
                                                 
18 It must be highlighted that this decision might potentially bias the study. As harsh weather can be the reason 
for missing data, the missing information itself incorporates valuable information. However, this cannot be 
scrutinised, as the information is not available. In the robustness exercise, the potential impact of missing data 
is evaluated. 
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 Based on the data obtained from the NOAA, it is possible to build a weather index that 
allows me to evaluate the impact of weather. To do so, I transform the weather information 
into anomalies, i.e. calculate the daily deviation per mine from its normal value. Contrary to 
the method by the NOAA, which suggests using the 30-year average (NOAA, 2016a), I limit 
the calculation to the research period, i.e. the 14-year average to account for the mine-
specific weather measurements. As the availability of weather information per station 
changes each day, the 30-year average would draw on data from different weather stations 
to the 14-year average. Ultimately, I do not expect a significant difference between both 
periods. As I focus on strong deviations from the normal value, minor differences in the 
normal value are unlikely to influence the result. Following the calculation of the normal 
values, I calculate the absolute deviation to the actual measurement each day to determine 
anomalies. It is expected that strong deviations equally influence the production, regardless 
whether they are positive or negative. Moreover, using absolute deviations reduces the 
potential offset of positive and negative deviations among the eleven examined mines. 
Table 2.1: Substitution of Missing Daily NOAA Weather Information 
Mine Name 
Before 
substitution - 
temperature 
After 
substitution – 
temperature 
Distance to 
farthest 
weather 
station 
Before 
substitution - 
precipitation 
After 
substitution – 
precipitation 
Distance to 
farthest 
weather 
station 
Global share 
of 
production 
(in 2014) 
Boddington 0.00 100.00 32.0 km 82.38 100.00 18.3 km 8.12 
Huntly 0.00 100.00 45.1 km 77.72 100.00 16.3 km 9.83 
Willowdale 0.00 100.00 32.6 km 56.15 100.00 16.8 km 4.27 
Gove 99.98 100.00 139.4 km 99.86 100.00 9.3 km 2.79 
Weipa 0.00 100.00 157.2 km 99.34 100.00 9.4 km 11.22 
Trombetas 99.28 99.98 879.1 km 0.27 2.39 297.4 km 7.69 
Paragominas 98.57 99.98 780.8 km 63.15 71.31 296.9 km 4.36 
Juruti 99.28 99.98 887.1 km 0.27 2.39 277.3 km 2.05 
Boke 3.56 100.00 572.1 km 1.43 54.61 420.6 km 6.75 
Kindia 15.53 100.00 718.1 km 5.89 49.09 435.7 km 1.45 
Panchpatmali 98.85 99.97 227.8 km 41.95 50.60 227.8 km 2.92 
Average 46.82 99.99 406.5 km 48.04 66.40 184.2 km 61.45 
Notes: The table illustrates the availability of data in percent before and after I substitute missing values from the nearest available weather 
station by further distant data. All figures are shown in percentage if not stated otherwise. The figures represent the overall availability of 
data for the research period from 1st January 2001 to 31st December 2014. 
 WEATHER INDEX CREATION 
To combine the information of the mines studied, I build an index that weights the 
anomalies per day. Weighting the anomalies is necessary, as each mine has a different impact 
on the market supply. Mines with relatively higher supply to the market are expected to have 
a bigger impact on the dependent variables. To incorporate the relative strength of each 
mine, the yearly mine output in metric tonnes is used to calculate the weights 𝑤𝑖𝑡 for each 
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mine 𝑖 at time 𝑡. The annual reports from the mining companies that operate the mines 
provide this information on a yearly basis.19 In some cases, changing ownership of mines or 
inconsistent reporting leads to incomplete mine-specific data. Thus, the yearly gapless 
country-specific production output information for bauxite provided by the USGS (2015) is 
used to fill the gaps. The yearly country-specific production output information is allocated 
by using the reported mine-specific information from previous and succeeding years to 
calculate each individual mine’s share of the total production output for the country in which 
the mine is located. In a second step, the weather anomalies and weights are combined and 
form the weather anomaly indices for temperature and precipitation. The anomaly indices 
are calculated as:  
 
𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡 = ∑(|𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑛𝑖𝑡| ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑡−1)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (2.1) 
with 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡  as weather anomaly index, 𝑚𝑖𝑡 as the mine-specific temperature or precipitation 
observation each day, 𝑛𝑖𝑡 as the normal temperature or precipitation for each mine, and 
𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 as mine-specific weight for each mine 𝑖 at time 𝑡 − 1 with ∑𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 1 for each year.  
Table 2.2: Key Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Kurt Skew ADF 
FP_r -0.0030 1.3559 -8.2575 5.9153 5.5570 -0.2921 -63.312*** 
IL_r 0.0704 0.6206 -1.6041 10.9929 66.5107 5.5980 -40.752*** 
EA_r -0.0196 1.9681 -12.0718 13.6576 8.5791 0.0000 -20.780*** 
RIR_f -0.0007 0.0950 -0.8070 1.3234 34.1788 1.7566 -82.587*** 
TWI_r -0.0026 0.3022 -2.2975 1.7340 7.6776 -0.0006 -58.766*** 
SP500_r 0.0122 1.2519 -9.4695 10.9572 12.1134 -0.2016 -66.310*** 
P_WAI 54.6030 43.1645 1.8083 718.0309 36.8064 4.1596 -52.526*** 
T_WAI 15.0304 7.9139 1.3291 53.7853 5.0691 1.2785 -38.029*** 
P_WAI_DoA 40.0482 43.5311 1.0225 597.1161 27.5390 3.9641 -49.524*** 
T_WAI_DoA 18.0675 12.1938 0.4773 85.2049 5.5110 1.3897 -38.623*** 
Notes: This table provides information on the financial and weather anomaly index variables used in this study. With 3,653 daily 
observations representing the research period of between 1st January 2001 and 31st December 2014. In addition, the table provides 
information whether the data are stationary and needs transformation before I can use it for the study. I use the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron test (PP) to test for a unit root. As all variables except the weather anomaly indices are non-stationary, 
the transformed variables are reported. With _r for log returns and _f for first differences. The parameters are defined as: FP as the 
deflated 3-month futures aluminium price, IL as LME inventory stocks that proxy global inventory, EA as Baltic Dry Index that proxies 
global demand, RIR as real interest rate, TWI as the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as the S&P 500 composite index, P for precipitation, 
T for temperature, WAI as weather anomaly index, and DoA for daily only Australia. With the arithmetic mean (mean), the median, 
standard deviation (std. dev.), minimum value (min), maximum value (max), the skewness (skew), kurtosis (kurt), and the test statistics of 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) for unit-roots. PP test results are reported where deviations from the statistical significance of 
the ADF test statistic can be observed (in parentheses). The temperature anomaly index values are denoted in tenths of a degree Celsius 
and the precipitation anomaly index values are denoted in tenths of a mm. All other variables are in 100’s of a percent, except for skewness, 
kurtosis, and ADF. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. 
                                                 
19 The yearly output is taken as no daily, weekly, or monthly output information on mine level is available. 
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 In total, four weather anomaly indices are created. Two indices each for temperature 
and precipitation anomalies that either consider all eleven global bauxite mines or only the 
five mines located in Australia, which is the largest bauxite producing country (USGS, 2015). 
Table 2.2 provides information on the key statistics of the weather indices and other 
variables used in this study. For all weather indices at levels, the null hypothesis of a unit 
root at the 1 percent significance level can be rejected.  
2.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the econometric framework to evaluate the consequences of weather 
anomalies on the inventory and returns of exchange-traded aluminium. Roll (1984), who 
presents one of the seminal papers examining the impact of weather on frozen orange juice 
concentrate (FCOJ), uses a simple linear regression. Boudoukh et al. (2007), who revaluate 
the findings by Roll (1984), use a nonlinear regression model and provide evidence for a 
stronger relationship between similar variables. Boudoukh et al. (2007) further add that 
temperature only impacts the production of FCOJ once it reaches a specific threshold, which 
is 32 degree Fahrenheit (i.e. 0 degree Celsius). Temperature above this threshold, however, 
does not significantly influence the yield of FCOJ. Furthermore, the researchers argue that 
the intensity of temperature changes is not constant, i.e. a change of 5 degrees near the 
freezing point has a stronger impact on the yield than a change from 40 to 45 degrees 
Fahrenheit. Compared to Roll (1984), who suggests that weather has little influence on the 
price of FCOJ, Boudoukh et al.’s (2007) approach explains almost 50 percent of the return 
variation on days with temperature below the freezing point. While the 32 degree Fahrenheit 
threshold is suitable for agricultural products that are affected by freezing temperatures 
(Boudoukh et al., 2007), the question of a specific threshold temperature and precipitation 
for mining arises. Contrary to agricultural commodities, mining is less prone to weather 
influences. Yet, they are not immune, as history shows that persistent hot temperature or 
strong precipitation forces production stops (Hodgkinson et al., 2010). The challenging 
question is to determine the threshold temperature and precipitation as prior research gives 
little advice on such levels. Instead of a fixed threshold at a specific temperature or above a 
set level of rainfall, the deviation from the normal value that is used to calculate the weather 
anomaly indices provides a better approximation. With this approach, one can easily 
determine whether temperature and precipitation events are strongly deviating from their 
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normal values. The stronger the deviation, the more likely it is that the weather anomaly has 
a detrimental effect on the mining process.20 Building on Roll (1984), Hirshleifer and 
Shumway (2003), and Boudoukh et al. (2007), the ordinary least squares regression model 
can be written as:  
 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  (2.2) 
with 𝑅𝑡 as close-to-close log change of 𝐹𝑃𝑡 as futures price and 𝐼𝐿𝑡 as inventory, 𝛼 as 
intercept, 𝛽 as coefficients, 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡  as vector of weather anomaly index values for temperature 
or precipitation, 𝑋𝑡 as vector of controls with 𝑋𝑡 = [𝐼𝐿𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 +
𝑆𝑃500𝑡] for the analysis of 𝐹𝑃𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 = [𝐹𝑃𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 + 𝑆𝑃500𝑡] for the 
analysis of 𝐼𝐿𝑡, 𝐸𝐴𝑡 as economic activity (global demand), 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 as real interest rate, 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 
as the relative value of the USD compared to other currencies, 𝑆𝑃500𝑡 as control for equity 
market risk, and 𝜀𝑡 as error term. All variables are at time t. Robust standard errors 
(Huber/White/sandwich estimator) are used to control for heteroscedasticity.21  
 Furthermore, prior research argues that weather can influence the market price volatility 
of commodities (Fleming et al., 2006). In addition to changes in global inventory and price, 
their volatility is being evaluated. A GARCH (1,1) model as in Richards et al. (2004) and Shu 
and Hung (2009) is used. Although previous studies argue that alternative models to the 
GARCH (1,1) model provide more accurate estimates (McMillan and Speight, 2007), others 
argue that the GARCH (1,1) has good statistical power as it controls for time-varying 
volatility and incorporates heteroscedasticity (Hansen and Lunde, 2005). As I am mainly 
interested in the results for the coefficient 𝜏𝑚 and whether weather anomalies influence the 
volatility of inventory changes and aluminium futures returns, the standard GARCH model 
is sufficient for this exercise. The model can be written as: 
 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑚𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (2.3) 
                                                 
20 In addition, I add threshold dummy variables that measure the 90th and 95th quantile of anomalies to 
concentrate on the largest weather anomalies. While the significance of the weather anomaly indices diminishes 
in this scenario, the statistical significance of some dummy threshold variables can be observed. However, as 
the findings and significance are weak, I refrain from reporting these robustness evaluations separately.  
21 I also use Newey-West standard errors to further account for autocorrelation. The significance of the focus 
variables remains comparable to the results obtained with robust standard errors. 
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 ℎ𝑡
2 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾2ℎ𝑡−1
2 + 𝜏𝑚𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡 (2.4) 
with 𝑅𝑡 as close-to-close log change of 𝐹𝑃𝑡 as futures price and 𝐼𝐿𝑡 as inventory, 𝛼 as 
intercept, 𝛽 as coefficients, 𝑋𝑡 as vector of controls as in equation (2.2), 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡  as weather 
anomaly index for temperature or precipitation, and ℎ𝑡
2 as the conditional variance of 𝑅𝑡. 
2.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A key advantage of the daily analysis is the ability to evaluate the short-term relationships 
between the chosen variables. To estimate the effect of weather anomalies on changes in the 
aluminium futures price and inventory, I begin with the evaluation of the OLS estimations 
which are reported in Table 2.3.  
Table 2.3: Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
 Aluminium Futures Returns Inventory Changes 
 All Mines Australian Mines All Mines Australian Mines 
P_WAI 1.30e-06 2.05e-06 -4.44e-06** -1.63e-06 
 (4.53e-06) (4.15e-06) (1.94e-06) (1.86e-06) 
T_WAI 9.78e-06 1.91e-06 9.91e-06 1.08e-06 
 (2.64e-05) (1.70e-05) (1.42e-05) (9.35e-06) 
IL_r -0.0879** -0.0879**   
 (0.0348) (0.0348)   
FP_r   -0.0225** -0.0225** 
   (0.00946) (0.00947) 
EA_r -0.00431 -0.00440 0.00316 0.00264 
 (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.00482) (0.00484) 
RIR_f 0.00127 0.00127 -0.00160 -0.00161 
 (0.00219) (0.00219) (0.00167) (0.00167) 
TWI_r -1.631*** -1.631*** 0.00350 0.00250 
 (0.0820) (0.0820) (0.0498) (0.0499) 
SP500_r 0.174*** 0.174*** -0.00211 -0.00239 
 (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
Constant -0.000249 -0.000148 0.000796*** 0.000748*** 
 (0.000522) (0.000405) (0.000282) (0.000230) 
Observations 3,653 3,653 3,653 3,653 
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.182 0.003 0.001 
Notes: This table provides information about the results of the regression examining all mines in this study. The dataset consists of 3,653 
trading days between 1st January 2001 and 31st December 2014. The temperature anomaly values WAI are in tenths of degree Celsius and 
precipitation is in tenths of mm. The parameters are defined as: WAI as the anomaly weather index value with P_ for precipitation and 
T_ for temperature, IL_r as LME inventory, FP_r as aluminium futures price returns, EA_r as Baltic Dry Index, RIR_r as real interest 
rate, TWI_r as the trade-weighted USD index, and SP500_r as the S&P 500 index. With robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator) in parentheses. If the ADF test suggests a unit root, log changes or first difference are used to transform the time-series (_r 
indicating log returns, _f indicating first difference). * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for 
p<0.1.  
The model is defined as: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
with 𝛼 as intercept, 𝛽𝑚 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 as coefficients, 𝑅𝑡 as close-to-close log change of 𝐹𝑃𝑡 as futures price and 𝐼𝐿𝑡 as inventory, 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡  as vector of 
weather anomaly index values for temperature or precipitation, 𝑋𝑡 as vector of controls with 𝑋𝑡 = [𝐼𝐿𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 +
𝑆𝑃500𝑡] for the analysis of 𝐹𝑃𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 = [𝐹𝑃𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 + 𝑆𝑃500𝑡] for the analysis of 𝐼𝐿𝑡, 𝐸𝐴𝑡 as economic activity 
represented by the Baltic Exchange Dry Index, 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 as real interest rate, 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 as the relative value of the USD, 𝑆𝑃500𝑡 as parameter 
controlling for equity market risk, and 𝜀𝑡 as error term. All variables are at time t. Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator) are used to control for heteroscedasticity. 
While precipitation anomalies are negatively associated with inventory changes at the 5 
percent significance level, the magnitude of the coefficient is very small and there is no 
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evidence that futures returns are affected by precipitation anomalies. Moreover, temperature 
anomalies are non-significant for both inventory changes and futures returns. In a 
succeeding step, I reduce the number of examined mines from eleven to five key mines all 
located in two areas in Australia. As these five mines account for approximately 35 percent 
of global bauxite output in 2014, the evaluation of weather events in these areas limits the 
focus to a few locations that significantly contribute to the global output of the raw material 
bauxite and may help to reduce the potential bias stemming from global weather events. The 
columns named Australian mines in Table 2.3 illustrate the results. Weather anomalies 
appear to have no significant impact on futures returns and inventory changes. Despite 
reports by mining companies (Rio Tinto, 2016:14-15) and newspaper articles about 
production cuts (Wallop, 2011; Platts Metals Daily, 2013), the analysis cannot identify an 
observable impact of weather anomalies on futures returns. However, as the inventory 
changes are significantly affected by precipitation anomalies, the findings indicate that 
inventory stocks might buffer short-term production cuts so that these are not channelled 
through to prices. 
 A potential bias that may arise because of the chosen methodology is simultaneity bias. 
This bias describes an endogeneity issue in which an explanatory variable is correlated with 
the error term of the regression. More precisely, one may not be able to treat the independent 
variable as fully exogenous but must accept that the independent variable is endogenous. 
Instead of a unidirectional relationship from the independent variable to the dependent 
variable, the evaluated variables may indeed have a bidirectional relationship, which must be 
accounted for. As a result, the estimated coefficients are biased (Brooks, 2008). Particularly 
for the estimation of aluminium futures returns and inventory changes, which are both used 
as dependent and independent variables in the regression models, this bias might occur as 
price changes could trigger market participants to change their inventory holdings. Likewise, 
changes in inventory may lead to changes in the price. For example, increases in inventory 
demand may lead to an increase in demand overall. If the supply remains constant, this will 
increase the price of the underlying. To deal with simultaneity bias, I first drop the potentially 
affected variables to test if the other coefficient estimates, particularly the weather anomaly 
indices, remain constant. The results suggest that the effect of both precipitation and 
temperature anomalies on aluminium futures returns remain non-significant. Likewise, the 
results for inventory changes remain comparable to those reported in Table 2.3. Second, I 
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treat aluminium futures returns and inventory changes as endogenous variables and run a 
two-stage least squares regression (cf. Floyd, 2013). Building on Aldieri and Vinci (2017) and 
Boumparis et al. (2017), I use lagged versions of aluminium futures returns (for the 
estimation of inventory changes) and inventory changes (for the estimation of aluminium 
futures returns) at t-1 and t-2 as instrumental variables. While the Durbin score and the Wu-
Hausman test (H0 = variables are exogenous) are significant at the 1 percent significance 
level in all tested scenarios22, which suggests that it is appropriate to treat inventory changes 
and aluminium futures returns as endogenous variables, the coefficients for both weather 
anomaly indices remain non-significant for the estimation of aluminium futures returns. 
Moreover, while the coefficient of precipitation weather anomalies for the estimation of 
inventory changes slightly increases (from -4.44e-06 to -5.09e-06), its statistical significance 
reduces and only holds at the 10 percent level. Thus, after controlling for simultaneity bias, 
all weather anomaly index coefficients are not significant at the 5 percent level, which 
suggests that the estimation power of the weather anomaly indices is still non-significant for 
the estimation of both aluminium futures returns and inventory changes23.  
 THE LAGGED AND GROWING EFFECT OF WEATHER ANOMALIES 
Contrary to agricultural commodities, where freezing temperature can strongly harm the 
seasonal harvest, the effect of short-term weather anomalies on futures returns and 
inventory changes can only be observed if a) the weather anomalies are severe b) occur on 
the same day as the weather anomaly and c) mining operators are not able to compensate 
for short-term production cuts immediately after the weather event. Only if the production 
cuts remain for a longer period, i.e. comprise of multi-day events instead of single day 
occurrences24, it is expected that output targets are no met, which eventually affects the 
supply, inventory, and price of aluminium. Moreover, weather anomalies, and the bauxite 
                                                 
22 The Durbin score and the Wu-Hausman tests suggest that treating inventory changes and aluminium futures 
returns as endogenous variables is appropriate. The four tested scenarios are in line with Table 2.3, i.e. I test 
the effects of weather anomalies for all mines and Australian mines only on both aluminium futures returns 
and inventory changes.  
23 The OLS regression results without the inventory changes (for the estimation of aluminium futures returns) 
and aluminium futures returns (for the estimation of inventory changes) as independent variables and the two-
stage least squares results are available upon request.  
24 I further test the potential impact of the direction the weather anomaly, i.e. if it is a positive or negative 
deviation from the normal value. For both weather variables, the direction of the deviation, proxied by a 
dummy for the direction and a recalculation of the weather indices with positive and negative deviations, does 
not change the results.  
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mines studied, are spread throughout the globe. Thus, weather events in a certain area might 
occur during non-trading times and might not be reflected in the price on the same day. To 
test the potential impact of multi-day and time-varying effects of weather anomalies on the 
dependent variables, lags and leads of the weather variables and other new variables for the 
growing impact of weather anomalies, weather anomalies occurring during non-trading days, 
and the potential impact of missing weather information are added to the model. I begin 
with the introduction of two lags25, i.e. two trading days, of the dependent variable reported 
in Table 2.4, which tests whether the adjustment of the market price and inventory requires 
several days. For example, this might be due to different time zones or a time delay in the 
availability of information on the impact of the weather event on the production. Likewise, 
the leads of weather anomalies test whether upcoming weather anomalies (i.e. forecasts) 
have been incorporated into the price in advance of the event. With non-significant results 
for all lagged and lead weather variables, the introduction of lags and leads for the estimation 
of changes in the global price and inventory provides little additional support for both the 
overall sample of weather anomalies for all eleven and the five Australian mines. The reason 
for these findings might be twofold. First, since the GFC in 2008, global aluminium stocks 
rose drastically. Thus, the existing stocks might be sufficient to account for short-term losses 
in production. In support of this hypothesis, the results in Table 2.4 show that precipitation 
anomalies appear to significantly impact changes in global inventory. It must be noted that 
OLS and other linear regressions may show multicollinearity among the independent 
variables. According to Brooks (2008), an underlying assumption of OLS regression is that 
all independent variables are not correlated with each other. In this perfect scenario, adding 
or removing an explanatory variable from a model would not cause any changes in the 
coefficients of the other regressors. However, as most explanatory variables experience 
some sort of correlation with each other, it is necessary to assess how much they are 
correlated and to what extent this multicollinearity affects the estimated coefficients. To 
measure the degree of collinearity (cf. Fahrmeir et al., 2013), I follow Chen et al. (2014c) and 
use the variance inflation factor (vif)26. For all estimated models in Table 2.4, the mean vif 
is well below 1.2 with the highest values for the lagged temperature anomaly indices below 
1.5. These results suggest that little multicollinearity is present in the estimated models. 
                                                 
25 As the accuracy of weather forecasts decreases over time (Met Office UK, 2016), I limit the analysis to two 
lags. 
26 I use this test for possible collinearity for all other linear regressions in this thesis, too.  
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Moreover, to reduce the potential multicollinearity, I run the regressions with the individual 
lagged variables, i.e. I test for weather anomaly effects at each lag individually. Again, all 
coefficients and their respective significance remain as in Table 2.4. More importantly, the 
predominant non-significance of the weather anomaly indices remains after testing the 
estimation power of the lagged weather anomaly indices individually. 
Table 2.4: Lags and Leads of the Weather Variables 
 Aluminium Futures Returns Inventory Changes 
 Lags Leads Lags–AUS Leads–AUS Lags Leads Lags–AUS Leads–AUS 
P_WAI 1.16e-06 8.11e-07 1.78e-06 2.01e-06 -4.01e-06** -4.03e-06** -2.21e-06 -2.44e-06 
 (4.62e-06) (4.58e-06) (4.29e-06) (4.17e-06) (1.89e-06) (1.94e-06) (1.85e-06) (1.92e-06) 
L1.P_WAI 8.99e-07 1.20e-06 2.33e-06 -1.44e-06 -1.91e-06 -1.27e-06 2.51e-06 4.07e-06 
 (4.78e-06) (4.46e-06) (4.59e-06) (4.49e-06) (2.04e-06) (2.08e-06) (2.26e-06) (2.69e-06) 
L2.P_WAI 1.60e-06 1.55e-06 -4.17e-06 4.34e-06 -5.47e-07 -1.72e-06 9.79e-07 6.83e-07 
 (4.86e-06) (4.44e-06) (4.54e-06) (3.95e-06) (2.20e-06) (2.80e-06) (2.23e-06) (2.46e-06) 
T_WAI 2.54e-06 1.43e-05 -2.16e-06 3.65e-06 2.72e-06 2.06e-06 -1.28e-06 -2.79e-06 
 (2.94e-05) (2.98e-05) (1.88e-05) (1.92e-05) (1.46e-05) (1.39e-05) (9.25e-06) (9.22e-06) 
L1.T_WAI 1.10e-05 4.19e-06 7.31e-06 4.14e-06 7.00e-06 1.45e-05 1.81e-06 8.27e-06 
 (3.10e-05) (3.01e-05) (2.00e-05) (1.92e-05) (1.56e-05) (1.72e-05) (9.51e-06) (1.11e-05) 
L2.T_WAI 1.57e-05 -3.05e-05 5.65e-06 -2.06e-05 2.09e-05 7.02e-06 1.14e-05 -6.11e-07 
 (2.79e-05) (2.90e-05) (1.80e-05) (1.85e-05) (1.40e-05) (1.48e-05) (8.93e-06) (9.63e-06) 
IL_r -0.0881** -0.0872** -0.0878** -0.0878**     
 (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0348)     
FP_r     -0.0224** -0.0223** -0.0224** -0.0224** 
     (0.00945) (0.00948) (0.00947) (0.00948) 
EA_r -0.00419 -0.00483 -0.00418 -0.00468 0.00347 0.00352 0.00281 0.00311 
 (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.00482) (0.00484) (0.00484) (0.00490) 
RIR_f 0.00121 0.00121 0.00128 0.00125 -0.00157 -0.00159 -0.00159 -0.00163 
 (0.00219) (0.00219) (0.00219) (0.00218) (0.00167) (0.00167) (0.00167) (0.00167) 
TWI_r -1.633*** -1.630*** -1.631*** -1.630*** 0.00442 0.00177 0.00176 0.00346 
 (0.0822) (0.0818) (0.0822) (0.0817) (0.0497) (0.0498) (0.0497) (0.0499) 
SP500_r 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.174*** -0.000969 -0.00256 -0.00107 -0.00267 
 (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0120) 
Constant -0.000671 -4.58e-05 -0.000223 5.00e-06 0.000591 0.000734* 0.000432 0.000523 
 (0.000710) (0.000697) (0.000531) (0.000520) (0.000392) (0.000438) (0.000299) (0.000324) 
Observations 3,651 3,651 3,651 3,651 3,651 3,651 3,651 3,651 
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.182 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Notes: This table provides information about the results of the regression examining all mines in this study. The dataset consists of 3,653 
trading days between 1st January 2001 and 31st December 2014. The temperature anomaly values WAI are in tenths of degree Celsius and 
precipitation is in tenths of mm. The parameters are defined as: WAI as the anomaly weather index value with P_ for precipitation and 
T_ for temperature, L1. and L2. for lags at time t-1 and t-2 or leads at t+1 and t+2, AUS for Australia which limits the weather variables 
to the five Australian mines in this study, IL_r as LME inventory, FP_r as aluminium futures price returns, EA_r as Baltic Dry Index, 
RIR_r as real interest rate, TWI_r as the trade-weighted USD index, and SP500_r as the S&P 500 index. With robust standard errors 
(Huber/White/sandwich estimator) in parentheses. If the ADF test suggests a unit root, log changes or first difference are used to 
transform the time-series (_r indicating log returns, _f indicating first difference). * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, 
** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1.  
The model is defined as: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚.0𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚.1𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑚.2𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
with 𝛼 as intercept, 𝛽𝑚 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 as coefficients, 𝑅𝑡 as close-to-close log change of 𝐹𝑃𝑡  as futures price and 𝐼𝐿𝑡 as inventory, 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡  as vector of 
weather anomaly index values for temperature or precipitation, 𝑋𝑡 as vector of controls with 𝑋𝑡 = [𝐼𝐿𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 +
𝑆𝑃500𝑡] for the analysis of 𝐹𝑃𝑡  and 𝑋𝑡 = [𝐹𝑃𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 + 𝑆𝑃500𝑡] for the analysis of 𝐼𝐿𝑡, 𝐸𝐴𝑡 as economic activity 
represented by the Baltic Exchange Dry Index, 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 as real interest rate, 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 as the relative value of the USD, 𝑆𝑃500𝑡 as parameter 
controlling for equity market risk, and 𝜀𝑡 as error term. Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) are used to control 
for heteroscedasticity. 
 Second, a one-day observation of the weather anomalies might not be sufficient to 
evaluate their impact on the dependent variables as multi-day weather anomalies are 
necessary to significantly affect the mining. Therefore, four new variables that address these 
issues are added. First, a dummy variable that indicates whether 20 percent or more weather 
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data on each trading day are missing is added. As strong weather events might be the reason 
for the missing information, the variable reveals details on the relationship between missing 
weather information and the dependent variables. Second, a variable that shifts weather 
events on non-trading days within the 90th percentile of weather anomalies to the following 
trading day is added. Third, I calculate a variable that cumulates the strongest weather 
anomaly values in the 90th percentile of weather anomalies during times of multi-day events. 
Once the anomaly is below the 90th quantile threshold of weather anomalies, the calculation 
restarts at 0. Moreover, weather phenomena occur throughout the whole time, regardless of 
the trading hours of an exchange. As weekends and other non-trading days might influence 
returns once the exchange starts trading again, I accumulate the weather index values on 
non-trading days and shift them to the following trading day. With this approach, I test if 
returns react to strong weather anomalies that occur on non-trading days. Fourth, I calculate 
the moving average of anomaly index values of the trading day and the previous four days, 
which may include both trading and no-trading days. This variable combines the impact of 
a growing effect of weather anomalies and the effect of all weather anomalies throughout 
the research period on trading and non-trading days.  
 In Table 2.5, the numerical findings for the four new variables are presented. First, the 
missing weather data variable, which measures the availability of weather data throughout 
the research period, is only available for precipitation as temperature data are sufficiently 
available during the research period. The findings reveal a significant positive, i.e. increasing 
effect of missing precipitation data on both futures returns (10 percent significance level) 
and changes in inventory (1 percent significance level). Thus, not the data that is available 
but the data that is missing tells us that weather anomalies have, in fact, a significant positive 
association with the dependent variables. Second, weekend data, i.e. the evaluation of 
weather anomalies that are reported during non-trading days and are shifted to the following 
trading day, indicate a highly significant positive effect of temperature anomalies on changes 
in inventory. Third, the results for the growing anomaly index, i.e. an index that accumulates 
weather anomalies above a set threshold and is reset to zero once a value is below the 
threshold, and the growing anomaly index only for trading days add limited new insight to 
the previous findings as the coefficients for futures returns and inventory changes are non-
significant. The threshold defined as severe weather anomalies is set to the 90th percentile of 
weather anomalies. This follows the definition of the NOAA (2016b), which defines climate 
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extremes as the most unusual ten percent of weather events. In contrast, the fourth variable, 
which measures the average of the anomalies on the trading day and its four preceding days, 
indicates a significant negative association between precipitation anomalies and inventory 
changes. The significant coefficient confirms that multi-day precipitation anomalies are 
associated with declines in aluminium inventory stocks and that the effect is stronger than 
single-day precipitation anomalies.  
Table 2.5: New Variables 
 Aluminium Futures Returns Aluminium Inventory 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
P_Missing 
Weather 
0.00142*    0.00231***    
(0.000741)    (0.000417)    
T_Missing 
Weather -    -             
P_Weekend 
Data 
 -4.86e-06    -2.03e-06   
 (3.19e-06)    (1.29e-06)   
T_Weekend 
Data 
 -1.38e-05    2.32e-05***   
 (1.65e-05)    (8.75e-06)   
P_Growing 
Index 
  -1.26e-06    -5.61e-07  
  (3.12e-06)    (1.11e-06)  
T_Growing 
Index 
  -9.70e-06    7.07e-06  
  (8.38e-06)    (4.44e-06)  
P_Average of 5 
Days 
   -2.05e-06    -1.10e-05** 
   (8.91e-06)    (4.27e-06) 
T_Average of 5 
Days 
   1.54e-05    2.40e-05 
   (3.93e-05)    (1.82e-05) 
Observations 3,653 3,653 3,653 3,653 3,653 3,653 3,653 3,653 
Adjusted R2 0.183 0.183 0.182 0.182 0.014 0.004 0.002 0.003 
Notes: This table provides information about the results of the regression examining all mines in this study. The dataset consists of 3,653 
trading days between 1st January 2001 and 31st December 2014. The temperature anomaly values are in tenths of degree Celsius whereas 
precipitation is in tenths of mm. The parameters are defined as: P_ for precipitation and T_ for temperature, Missing Weather as dummy 
variable that indicates whether more than 20 percent of weather anomalies are missing throughout the research period, Weekend Data as 
weather anomaly within the 90th percentile that is reported during a non-trading day and then shifted to the following trading day, Growing 
Index as index value that accumulates weather anomalies that exceed the 90th percentile of anomalies and is reset to 0 once a value is 
outside the 90th percentile, and Average of 5 Days as a variable that measures the average weather anomaly index of the trading day itself 
and the four preceding trading and non-trading days. With robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) in parentheses. If 
the ADF test suggests a unit root, log changes or first difference are used to transform the time-series (_r indicating log returns, _f 
indicating first difference). * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. While the controls are 
included in the model, I refrain from reporting the controls coefficients. 
The model is defined as: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
with 𝛼 as intercept, 𝛽𝑚 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 as coefficients, 𝑅𝑡 as close-to-close log change of 𝐹𝑃𝑡  as futures price and 𝐼𝐿𝑡 as inventory, 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡  as one 
of the four new variables Missing Weather, Weekend Data, Growing Index, and Average of 5 Days, 𝑋𝑡 as vector of controls with 𝑋𝑡 =
[𝐼𝐿𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 + 𝑆𝑃500𝑡] for the analysis of 𝐹𝑃𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 = [𝐹𝑃𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 + 𝑆𝑃500𝑡] for the analysis of 
𝐼𝐿𝑡, 𝐸𝐴𝑡 as economic activity represented by the Baltic Exchange Dry Index, 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 as real interest rate, 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 as the relative value of the 
USD, 𝑆𝑃500𝑡 as parameter controlling for equity market risk, and 𝜀𝑡 as error term. All variables are at time t. Robust standard errors 
(Huber/White/sandwich estimator) are used to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 STRUCTURAL BREAK AND OVERSUPPLY 
Since the year 2009, the aluminium market experiences an ongoing oversupply (Sanderson 
et al., 2016). Thus, short-term influences on the supply of bauxite might be satisfied by the 
supply glut. To test this assumption, I apply the Chow break test (Chow, 1960) to equation 
(2.2), set the break to 30th June 2009, and concentrate on changes in inventory as the 
dependent variable. With a test statistic of 4.70 and a p-value of 0.00, the null hypothesis of 
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no structural change can be rejected. Once I drop the control variables from the model, the 
test statistic increases to 11.60 (p-value = 0.00).  
Table 2.6: Structural Break 
 Aluminium Futures Returns Aluminium Inventory 
 
01/01/2001 – 
30/6/2009 
01/07/2009 – 
31/12/2014 
01/01/2001 – 
30/6/2009 
01/07/2009 – 
31/12/2014 
P_WAI -4.62e-07 3.90e-06 -5.78e-06** -2.02e-07 
 (5.65e-06) (7.11e-06) (2.90e-06) (1.46e-06) 
T_WAI -2.60e-06 3.60e-05 1.11e-05 -1.73e-05 
 (3.22e-05) (4.53e-05) (1.97e-05) (1.21e-05) 
IL_r -0.0998*** -0.00968   
 (0.0371) (0.0749)   
FP_r   -0.0345** -0.000802 
   (0.0138) (0.00618) 
EA_r -0.00295 -0.00291 -0.00167 0.00512 
 (0.0187) (0.0144) (0.00897) (0.00384) 
RIR_f 0.00237 -0.00219 -0.00216 -0.000689 
 (0.00287) (0.00322) (0.00253) (0.00104) 
TWI_r -1.388*** -1.959*** -0.00699 0.0888* 
 (0.108) (0.128) (0.0726) (0.0466) 
SP500_r 0.139*** 0.246*** -0.00786 0.0252 
 (0.0229) (0.0358) (0.0143) (0.0212) 
Constant 4.77e-05 -0.000776 0.00131*** 0.000212 
 (0.000668) (0.000817) (0.000425) (0.000228) 
Observations 2,217 1,436 2,217 1,436 
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.284 0.003 0.005 
Notes: This table provides information about the results of the structural break regression examining all mines in this study. The dataset 
consists of 3,653 trading days between 1st January 2001 and 31st December 2014. The temperature anomaly values WAI are in tenths of a 
degree Celsius whereas precipitation is in tenths of a mm. The parameters are defined as: WAI as the anomaly weather index value with 
P_ for precipitation and T_ for temperature, IL_r as LME inventory, FP_r as aluminium futures price returns, EA_r as Baltic Dry Index, 
RIR_r as real interest rate, TWI_r as the trade-weighted USD index, and SP500_r as the S&P 500 index. With robust standard errors 
(Huber/White/sandwich estimator) in parentheses. If the ADF test suggests a unit root, log changes or first difference are used to 
transform the time-series (_r indicating log returns, _f indicating first difference). * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, 
** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1.  
The model is defined as: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
with 𝛼 as intercept, 𝛽𝑚 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 as coefficients, 𝑅𝑡 as close-to-close log change of 𝐹𝑃𝑡 as futures price and 𝐼𝐿𝑡 as inventory, 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡  as vector of 
weather anomaly index values for temperature or precipitation, 𝑋𝑡 as vector of controls with 𝑋𝑡 = [𝐼𝐿𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 +
𝑆𝑃500𝑡] for the analysis of 𝐹𝑃𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 = [𝐹𝑃𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 + 𝑆𝑃500𝑡] for the analysis of 𝐼𝐿𝑡, 𝐸𝐴𝑡 as economic activity 
represented by the Baltic Exchange Dry Index, 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 as real interest rate, 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 as the relative value of the USD, 𝑆𝑃500𝑡 as parameter 
controlling for equity market risk, and 𝜀𝑡 as error term. Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) are used to control 
for heteroscedasticity. 
In a second step, I limit the research period from 1st January 2001 to 30th June 2009 to focus 
on the pre-supply glut period and rerun the OLS regression model as in equation (2.2) for 
futures returns and changes in inventory. The results suggest that prior to mid-2009, 
precipitation significantly (5 percent level) reduced inventory. However, during the second 
sub-sample research period from 1st July 2009 to 31st December 2014, the significance of 
this effect diminishes. Thus, it is likely that the supply glut present in the aluminium market 
sufficiently compensates for short-term production cuts. Moreover, the interaction of 
inventory changes and futures returns switches with the growing supply glut in the market. 
While the relationship in the first subsample from 1st January 2001 to 30th June 2009 is highly 
significant (up to 1 percent level), it gets non-significant afterwards. Thus, the oversupply of 
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the market may not only have altered the interaction between weather anomalies and the 
dependent variables but also the interaction between the dependent variables.27 
 THE IMPACT OF NEWS 
To test the impact of reported weather phenomena during the research period (e.g. Wallop, 
2011; Sharma, 2014), I draw on the approach by Core et al. (2008) and Brutti and Sauré 
(2015) and search for news and articles available online by the Financial Times (ft.com) and 
Reuters (reuters.com) which are related to weather and bauxite mining. This analysis returns 
mixed results. Although various reports and articles examine the interaction between mining 
production and the weather, society, and the environment, only a few articles report specific 
news of weather and bauxite mines. In a second step, I extend the search for bauxite and 
weather-related news to local and specialist newspapers globally. In contrast to the first 
approach, this method produces far more results for the chosen search terms. However, the 
obtained articles are partially unrewarding. Although the search terms are mentioned in the 
articles, they are often not in context with the impact of weather phenomena on bauxite 
mining. To mitigate this bias, I take advantage of the options provided by the news search 
engine Nexis.com which enables limiting of the spacing between the words within the search 
term. Thus, it is possible to exclude articles that mention the search terms but are out of 
context. This search leads to a total of 103 articles published on 71 dates throughout the 
research period. While this restriction of the search might bias the analysis as it excludes 
potentially valuable information, the trade-off is necessary to ensure a target-oriented result. 
The publication dates of the articles show that most of the news articles are published during 
quarter two of each year (40 percent). Furthermore, most articles are published from 2011 
onwards (56 percent). The publication dates of the obtained news articles are set as event 
days. For changes in global inventory and futures returns the results indicate some 
statistically significant T-values throughout the research period. As the significant event days 
are limited for all three variables (i.e. only two to four significant event days), the results are 
                                                 
27 Another possible explanation for this behaviour is the decrease in interest rates after the global financial 
crisis in 2008. Since then, interest rates are at low levels. Low real interest rates increase the inventory demand 
for commodities (Frankel, 2006), which provide larger buffer stocks for short-term production losses. 
Moreover, low interest rates and regulation changes by the LME (Desai, 2016) allow market participants to 
shift to private warehouses that may offer cheaper and less regulated storage than the warehouses monitored 
by the LME.  
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rather random and should be taken with care. The findings remain comparable when the 
event window is extended to ±1 day.  
 WEATHER ANOMALIES AND THE REALISED VOLATILITY 
As a final exercise, I shift the focus from changes in global inventory and price to the 
volatility of such.  
Table 2.7: GARCH (1,1) Model 
   Aluminium Futures Returns Aluminium Inventory 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
M
ea
n
 E
q
u
at
io
n
 
P_WAI 3.68e-06   2.78e-06   
 (3.91e-06)   (2.43e-06)   
T_WAI 2.42e-05   -4.72e-06   
 (2.28e-05)   (1.73e-05)   
P_Missing Weather  0.00132**   0.000925  
  (0.000671)   (0.000841)  
P_Average of 5 Days   5.27e-07   6.21e-06 
   (7.77e-06)   (5.84e-06) 
T_Average of 5 Days   3.14e-05   0.000109* 
   (3.45e-05)   (5.80e-05) 
IL_r -0.0726** -0.0796** -0.0737**    
 (0.0310) (0.0311) (0.0309)    
FP_r    0.0228* 0.00638 0.0112 
    (0.0118) (0.0150) (0.0113) 
EA_r -0.000424 -0.000181 -0.000346 -0.00467 0.00700 0.00432 
 (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.00777) (0.0109) (0.00815) 
RIR_f 0.000456 0.000542 0.000500 -0.00174 0.000117 0.000943 
 (0.00240) (0.00240) (0.00241) (0.00139) (0.00159) (0.00159) 
TWI_r -1.461*** -1.462*** -1.462*** 0.0920* 0.0361 0.0784 
 (0.0887) (0.0897) (0.0888) (0.0513) (0.0638) (0.0511) 
SP500_r 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.180*** -0.0310*** -0.0249 -0.0207 
 (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0119) (0.0179) (0.0149) 
Constant -0.000711 -0.000258 -0.000645 2.56e-06 0.000139 -0.00181** 
 (0.000464) (0.000199) (0.000715) (0.000354) (0.000189) (0.000739) 
V
ar
ia
n
ce
 E
q
u
at
io
n
 
P_WAI 0.000763   -0.0116   
 (0.00481)   (0.0105)   
T_WAI 0.0248   -0.140   
 (0.0255)   (0.0977)   
P_Missing Weather  0.662   1.046  
  (0.437)   (0.906)  
P_Average of 5 Days   0.00316   0.00994* 
   (0.00748)   (0.00558) 
T_Average of 5 Days   0.0449   -0.0342 
   (0.0325)   (0.0804) 
Constant -13.75*** -13.28*** -14.21*** -10.76*** -12.81*** -13.03*** 
 (0.834) (0.473) (1.052) (1.008) (0.337) (1.011) 
A
R
C
H
 
T
er
m
s 
L.Arch 0.0402*** 0.0407*** 0.0395*** 0.827*** 0.598** 0.674*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0108) (0.0115) (0.318) (0.255) (0.212) 
L.Garch 0.949*** 0.947*** 0.950*** 0.571*** 0.599*** 0.596*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0157) (0.0609) (0.0738) (0.0541) 
Notes: This table provides information about the results of a GARCH (1,1) model examining all eleven mines in the study. The dataset 
consists of 3,653 trading days between 1st January 2001 and 31st December 2014. The data source is the NOAA daily dataset. The 
temperature anomaly values WAI are in tenths of a degree Celsius whereas precipitation is in tenths of a mm. The parameters are defined 
as: WAI as the anomaly weather index value with P_ for precipitation and T_ for temperature, Missing Weather as dummy variable that 
indicates whether more than 20 percent of weather anomalies are missing throughout the research period, Average of 5 Days as a variable 
that measures the average weather anomaly index of the trading day itself and the four preceding trading and non-trading days, IL_r as 
LME inventory, FP_r as aluminium futures price returns, EA_r as Baltic Dry Index, RIR_r as real interest rate, TWI_r as the trade-
weighted USD index, and SP500_r as the S&P 500 index. With robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) in parentheses. 
If the ADF test suggests a unit root, log changes or first difference are used to transform the time-series (_r indicating log returns, _f 
indicating first difference). * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. 
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I begin with the evaluation of the volatility of changes in global inventory reported in Table 
2.7. Contrary to the multi-day findings for precipitation on changes in global inventory, the 
effect on the volatility of inventory changes is non-significant. This equally applies to the 
missing weather data dummy and both weather anomaly indices. 
 ABNORMAL PRODUCER STOCK RETURNS 
The aluminium market is globally interconnected and thus represents the global equilibrium 
of all supply and demand to and from this market. While, it is expected that a local weather 
anomaly only slightly affects the global supply, the effect on the output and thus profit of 
the company that operates the mine is expected to be stronger. Thus, I shift the focus from 
the commodity itself to major aluminium mining and producing companies to evaluate the 
potential impact on their profit, which is proxied by their stock market performance. The 
share price of four major mining companies with substantial exposure in the examined 
locations build the basis for an equally-weighted abnormal log return index. Next, the 
potential impact of both weather anomaly indices and all other weather-related variables 
created for this study are tested. I use two different approaches to test for a potential impact 
of temperature and precipitation anomalies on the abnormal stock returns: an OLS 
regression model and the rank test. The research period runs from 1st January 2001 to 31st 
December 2014. I use daily close-to-close returns for Alcoa (now Arconic), Norsk Hydro, 
Rio Tinto, and BHP Billiton. The stock information is obtained from the following stock 
exchanges: Alcoa (New York Stock Exchange, NYSE), Norsk Hydro (Oslo Stock Exchange, 
Oslo Bors), Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton (Australian Securities Exchange, ASX). As market 
return, general stock indices on each market are chosen. That is, NYSE composite for Alcoa, 
OBX for Norsk Hydro, and ASX 200 for Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton. The 10-year US 
treasury bills rate is used as a proxy for the risk-free rate. All financial information is obtained 
from Datastream. The abnormal stock returns are calculated by deducting the estimated 
returns from the real returns of each individually stock. I manually calculate the time-varying 
betas 𝐵𝑖,𝑡  for the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) on a rolling 250-day basis.
28 The OLS 
regression model is defined as: 
                                                 
28 In addition to the CAPM model, I estimate a market model using OLS regression. The results for both 
techniques are comparable but the significance of the weather anomaly coefficients is lower for the market 
model.  
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 𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (2.5) 
 𝑆𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑[𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − E𝑅𝑖,𝑡]
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (2.6) 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ln (
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
) (2.7) 
 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖,𝑡(𝑅𝑀.𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) (2.8) 
𝐵𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖))(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑚))
0
𝑡=−250
∑ (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑚))2
0
𝑡=−250
 (2.9) 
with 𝑆𝑡  as close-to-close equally-weighted abnormal stock returns, 𝛼 as intercept, 𝛽 as 
coefficients, 𝑊𝑉𝑡 with 𝑊𝑉𝑡 = 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡 or 𝑊𝑉𝑡 = 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡 that represents the precipitation 
or temperature anomaly index 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡 = [𝑃_𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡 + 𝑇_𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡], the weather variables that 
either represent the growing interaction term, the shift of weather events on non-trading 
days to the following trading day, a dummy variable for missing weather information, or the 
average index value of the trading day itself and its four preceding days denoted as 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡 = [𝑃_𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝑃_𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇_𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡 +  
𝑃_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝑇_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝑃_𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑓 5 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝑃_𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
𝑂𝑓 5 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑡], 𝑋𝑡 as vector of controls with 𝑋𝑡 = [𝐹𝑃𝑡 + 𝐼𝐿𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡] with 
𝐹𝑃𝑡 as aluminium futures returns, 𝐼𝐿𝑡 as global aluminium inventory, 𝐸𝐴𝑡 as economic 
activity represented by the Baltic Exchange Dry Index, 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 as real interest rate, 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 as 
the relative value of the USD, 𝜀𝑡 as error term, 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 as estimated return, 𝑅𝑀.𝑡 as market 
return, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 as real return, 𝑟𝑓𝑡 as risk-free interest rate proxied by the 10-year US treasury 
bills29, and 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 as 250-day beta of stock 𝑖. All variables are at time t. Robust standard errors 
(Huber/White/sandwich estimator) are used to control for heteroscedasticity.  
 The descriptive statistics in Table 2.8 indicate positive abnormal returns during times 
of commodity price surges. Beginning with the financialization of commodity markets in the 
early 2000s and particularly from 2005 to mid-2006, the equally-weighted abnormal returns 
                                                 
29 In addition to the US interest rate, I use economy-specific, i.e. Norwegian and Australian, interest rate 
information to calculate the expected returns based on the CAPM. The results are comparable to those based 
on the US interest rate.  
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portfolio reports high abnormal returns that last until the outbreak of the GFC in 2008. 
Shortly after, i.e. mid-2009, the abnormal returns portfolio again reports positive abnormal 
returns that last until the second surge in commodity prices which ended in 2011. 
Table 2.8: Descriptive Statistics for Abnormal Stock Returns 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis ADF 
Alcoa 3653 -0.0004 0.0172 -0.1377 0.1676 0.0257 10.8819 -60.714*** 
Norsk Hydro 3653 -0.0001 0.0136 -0.1625 0.1503 -0.0071 18.0791 -64.811*** 
Rio Tinto 3653 0.0000 0.0162 -0.3839 0.1386 -3.4173 93.7072 -56.177*** 
BHP Billiton 3653 0.0001 0.0123 -0.0688 0.0712 0.0877 6.5239 -58.257*** 
Equally-Weighted Portfolio 3653 -0.0001 0.0088 -0.0815 0.0500 -0.2114 8.8620 -54.237*** 
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of the equally-weighted abnormal aluminium producer stock returns portfolio and its 
components between 1st January 2001 and 31st December 2014. With Obs as observations, Mean as average value, Std. Dev. As standard 
deviation, Min as minimum value, Max as maximum value, and ADF as augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic. To test the robustness of 
the ADF test, I use the Phillips-Perron test. For all variables, the test statistic for both tests suggest sufficient stationarity of the time-
series. The graph illustrates the portfolio values of the equally-weighted abnormal aluminium producer stock returns portfolio between 1st 
January 2001 and 31st December 2014. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. 
 Next, I shift to the results of the OLS regression as in equation (2.5) reported in Table 
2.9. Contrary to aluminium futures returns, the equally-weighted abnormal returns portfolio 
is significantly influenced by both anomaly indices. Only for temperature anomalies does the 
estimation identify a weakly significant positive effect (10 percent significance level) on the 
abnormal equity returns portfolio of aluminium miners. The significance of the coefficient 
strengthens if one focuses on the anomaly indices, for Australia only. This is expected as 
three out of four mine operators (Alcoa, Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton) within the portfolio have 
extensive exposure in Australia.30 Splitting the sample into periods before and after the 
supply glut in 2009 confirms these findings and indicates a non-significant effect of 
precipitation anomalies. For temperature anomalies, the effect appears to happen during the 
first sub-sample period, i.e. between 1st January 2001 and 30th June 2009. However, it must 
be noted that these results only hold at the 10 percent significance level. This coincides with 
                                                 
30 I’ve also evaluated the effects of the weather anomaly indices on the abnormal equity returns for each firm 
individually. The results are comparable to those obtained for the equally-weighted portfolio. The results are 
available upon request.  
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most of the news articles linked to weather and bauxite mining, where the majority are 
published from 2011 onwards.  
Table 2.9: Abnormal Stock Returns Portfolio 
 Equally-Weighted Abnormal Returns Portfolio 
 All Mines Australian Mines Only 
  Total 
01/01/2001 –  
30/06/2009 
01/07/2009 –  
31/12/2014 Total 
01/01/2001 –  
30/06/2009 
01/07/2009 –  
31/12/2014 
P_WAI -4.66e-06 -4.63e-06 -5.61e-06 -3.17e-06 -4.20e-06 -3.05e-06 
 (3.21e-06) (4.43e-06) (3.86e-06) (2.82e-06) (4.33e-06) (3.12e-06) 
T_WAI 3.36e-05* 3.52e-05 3.14e-05 2.42e-05** 2.62e-05* 2.07e-05 
 (1.82e-05) (2.40e-05) (2.40e-05) (1.18e-05) (1.55e-05) (1.56e-05) 
IL_r -0.0103 -0.0116 0.00180 -0.00905 -0.0105 0.00276 
 (0.0264) (0.0287) (0.0432) (0.0264) (0.0287) (0.0431) 
FP_r 0.0921*** 0.0957*** 0.0934*** 0.0921*** 0.0959*** 0.0933*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0183) (0.0171) (0.0132) (0.0183) (0.0171) 
EA_r 0.0248** 0.0610*** -0.0112 0.0245** 0.0609*** -0.0116 
 (0.0105) (0.0189) (0.00907) (0.0105) (0.0188) (0.00908) 
RIR_f -0.000594 0.00126 -0.00316 -0.000616 0.00122 -0.00316 
 (0.00283) (0.00427) (0.00197) (0.00283) (0.00427) (0.00197) 
TWI_r -0.0340 -0.110 0.121 -0.0342 -0.109 0.120 
 (0.0665) (0.0926) (0.0761) (0.0665) (0.0925) (0.0763) 
Constant -0.000326 -0.000281 -0.000431 -0.000388 -0.000307 -0.000530 
 (0.000356) (0.000507) (0.000425) (0.000280) (0.000404) (0.000339) 
Observations 3,653 2,217 1,436 3,653 2,217 1,436 
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.032 0.029 0.024 0.032 0.028 
Notes: This table illustrates the results of the OLS and structural break regression examining all mines and the five Australian mines only. 
The dataset consists of 3,653 trading days between 1st January 2001 and 31st December 2014. The temperature anomaly values WAI are 
in tenths of a degree Celsius and precipitation anomalies are in tenths of a mm. The structural break is set to end-June 2009 and is based 
on the growing supply glut in the global aluminium market since then. The parameters are defined as: WAI as the anomaly weather index 
value with P_ for precipitation and T_ for temperature, IL_r as LME aluminium inventory, FP_r as aluminium futures price returns, EA_r 
as Baltic Dry Index, RIR_r as real interest rate, and TWI_r as the trade-weighted USD index. With robust standard errors 
(Huber/White/sandwich estimator) in parentheses. If the ADF test suggests a unit root, log changes or first difference are used to 
transform the time-series (_r indicating log returns, _f indicating first difference). * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, 
** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1.  
The model is defined as: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
with 𝛼 as intercept, 𝛽𝑚 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 as coefficients, 𝑅𝑡 as the Equally-Weighted Abnormal Returns Portfolio, 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑡  as vector of weather anomaly 
index values for temperature or precipitation, 𝑋𝑡 as vector of controls with 𝑋𝑡 = [𝐹𝑃𝑡 + 𝐼𝐿𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡], 𝐹𝑃𝑡 as aluminium 
futures returns, 𝐼𝐿𝑡 as inventory, 𝐸𝐴𝑡 as economic activity represented by the Baltic Exchange Dry Index, 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 as real interest rate, 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 
as the relative value of the USD, and 𝜀𝑡 as error term. Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) are used to control for 
heteroscedasticity. 
 Lastly, the additional weather variables that build on the anomaly indices and their 
interaction with the equally-weighted abnormal returns portfolio are tested. Table 2.10 
reports the results. While weather events that happen on a weekend and the growing weather 
anomaly index estimates confirm a significant effect of weather anomalies on the equally-
weighted abnormal returns portfolio, that holds at the 10 percent level for precipitation and 
at the 5 and 1 percent significance level for temperature anomalies, missing precipitation 
weather information31 appears to have a significant effect on the portfolio, which holds at 
the 5 percent significance level. However, while the results are partially statistically 
significant, the magnitude of the effect on the abnormal stock returns portfolio, much like 
                                                 
31 As the availability of temperature data throughout the research period is sufficient, no missing temperature 
variable is tested.  
54 | C H A P T E R  2  W E A T H E R  E V E N T S  A N D  T H E  P R I M A R Y  A L U M I N I U M  M A R K E T  
 
the effect on futures returns, is small. That is, if precipitation weather information is missing, 
the abnormal stock returns portfolio is increased by only 0.127 percent.  
Table 2.10: Abnormal Stock Returns Portfolio with Additional Weather Variables 
  Equally-Weighted Abnormal Returns Portfolio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
P_Missing Weather 0.00127**    
 (0.000548)    
P_Weekend Data  -4.07e-06*   
  (2.30e-06)   
T_Weekend Data  3.34e-05***   
  (1.10e-05)   
P_Growing Index   -4.30e-06*  
   (2.52e-06)  
T_Growing Index   1.11e-05**  
   (5.53e-06)  
P_Average of 5 Days    -1.80e-06 
    (6.25e-06) 
T_Average of 5 Days    3.53e-05 
    (2.92e-05) 
Observations 3,653 3,653 3,653 3,653 
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.024 
Notes: This table provides information about the results of the regression examining all mines in this study. The dataset consists of 3,653 
trading days between 1st January 2001 and 31st December 2014. The temperature anomaly values are in tenths of a degree Celsius whereas 
precipitation is in tenths of a mm. The parameters are defined as: P_ for precipitation and T_ for temperature, Missing Weather as dummy 
variable that indicates whether more than 20 percent of weather anomalies are missing throughout the research period, Weekend Data as 
weather anomaly within the 90th percentile that is reported during a non-trading day and then shifted to the following trading day, Growing 
Index as index value that accumulates weather anomalies that exceed the 90th percentile of anomalies and is reset to 0 once a value is 
outside the 90th percentile of weather anomalies, and Average of 5 Days as a variable that measures the average weather anomaly index of 
the trading day itself and the four preceding trading and non-trading days, IL_r as LME aluminium inventory, FP_r as aluminium futures 
price returns, EA_r as Baltic Dry Index, RIR_r as real interest rate, and TWI_r as the trade-weighted USD index. With robust standard 
errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) in parentheses. If the ADF test suggests a unit root, log changes or first difference are used to 
transform the time-series (_r indicating log returns, _f indicating first difference). * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, 
** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. While the controls are included in the model, I refrain from reporting the controls coefficients. 
The model is defined as: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
with 𝛼 as intercept, 𝛽𝑚 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 as coefficients, 𝑅𝑡 as the Equally-Weighted Abnormal Returns Portfolio, 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡  as one of the four new 
variables Missing Weather, Weekend Data, Growing Index, and Average of 5 Days, 𝑋𝑡 as vector of controls with 𝑋𝑡 = [𝐹𝑃𝑡 + 𝐼𝐿𝑡 +
𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡], 𝐹𝑃𝑡 as aluminium futures returns, 𝐼𝐿𝑡 as inventory, 𝐸𝐴𝑡 as economic activity represented by the Baltic Exchange 
Dry Index, 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 as real interest rate, 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 as the relative value of the USD, and 𝜀𝑡 as error term. All variables are at time t. Robust 
standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) are used to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 Another observation which is present among all significant coefficients concerned with 
the equally-weighted abnormal returns portfolio evaluation and weather anomalies, is the 
sign of the temperature anomaly index coefficients. While missing precipitation data reduces 
the equally-weighted abnormal returns portfolio, temperature anomalies show a consistently 
positive effect on the portfolio. This is unexpected, as I initially projected both indices to 
have a negative effect on the abnormal stock returns portfolio. The positive relationship 
between temperature anomalies and the equally-weighted abnormal stock returns portfolio 
suggests that high temperature anomalies lead to positive abnormal returns. One potential 
explanation is that temperature anomalies during the research period are not as severe as 
they must be to significantly affect the production. Throughout the research period, the 
highest temperature anomaly index value is 53.79, which translates to a deviation from the 
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normal temperature by 5.379 degrees Celsius. As a result, one may conclude that the 
observed temperature anomalies have not been detrimental for the production process but 
are favourable instead. Moreover, the temperature anomaly index shows a pattern of 
recurring high values during the summer months of the southern hemisphere. Paired with 
the locations of the mines operated by the companies in the equally-weighted abnormal 
returns portfolio32, this may simply reflect the correlation of higher production during 
summer months with usually less precipitation (that might negatively affect production) and 
the higher observed temperature anomalies of up to 5.4 degrees Celsius. For precipitation 
anomalies, this pattern cannot be observed and the values are instead spread more equally 
throughout the year. Lastly, the effect of temperature anomalies might be less clear than 
hypothesised. Initially, I expected that the effect of weather anomalies is equally detrimental 
for the dependent variables, regardless whether the deviation from the normal temperature 
or precipitation is positive or negative. However, as most of the mines operated by the 
companies in the equally-weighted abnormal returns portfolio are in tropical and sub-
tropical areas, negative temperature anomalies, i.e. colder weather than usual, might be 
desired.  
Table 2.11: Abnormal Stock Returns with Opposing Weather Anomalies 
Equally-Weighted Abnormal Returns Portfolio 
P_WAI_Opposites 6.52e-07 
 (2.52e-06) 
T_WAI_ Opposites -8.38e-06 
 (1.20e-05) 
Observations 3,653 
Adjusted R2 0.023 
Notes: This table provides information about the result of the regression examining the effect of the opposing weather anomaly indices on 
the equally-weighted abnormal returns portfolio. The dataset consists of 3,653 trading days between 1st January 2001 and 31st December 
2014. The temperature anomaly values are in tenths of a degree Celsius whereas precipitation is in tenths of a mm. The parameters are 
defined as: P_ for precipitation and T_ for temperature, WAI as Weather Anomaly Index, Opposites indicating that the index can take 
negative and positive values, IL_r as LME aluminium inventory, FP_r as aluminium futures price returns, EA_r as Baltic Dry Index, 
RIR_r as real interest rate, and TWI_r as the trade-weighted USD index. With robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) 
in parentheses. If the ADF test suggests a unit root, log changes or first difference are used to transform the time-series (_r indicating log 
returns, _f indicating first difference). * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. While the 
controls are included in the model, I refrain from reporting the controls coefficients. 
The model is defined as: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚𝑊𝐴𝐼_𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
with 𝛼 as intercept, 𝛽𝑚  𝑡𝑜 𝑛 as coefficients, 𝑅𝑡 as the Equally-Weighted Abnormal Returns Portfolio, 𝑊𝐴𝐼_𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡  as vector of 
weather anomaly index values for temperature or precipitation with both negative and positive index values, 𝑋𝑡 as vector of controls with 
𝑋𝑡 = [𝐹𝑃𝑡 + 𝐼𝐿𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡], 𝐹𝑃𝑡  as aluminium futures returns, 𝐼𝐿𝑡 as inventory, 𝐸𝐴𝑡 as economic activity represented by 
the Baltic Exchange Dry Index, 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 as real interest rate, 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑡 as the relative value of the USD, and 𝜀𝑡 as error term. Robust standard 
errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) are used to control for heteroscedasticity. 
Thus, instead of using absolute weather anomaly indices, I rerun the OLS regression model 
but use an index that can take both positive and negative values. Positive index values 
                                                 
32 Alcoa: Huntly and Willowdale in Australia; Rio Tinto: Weipa and Gove in Australia; BHP Billiton: 
Boddington in Australia; Norsk Hydro: Paragominas in Brazil.  
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represent temperature and precipitation that is higher or stronger than the normal value, i.e. 
hotter temperature or more rainfall than usual. Negative index values represent temperature 
or precipitation that is colder or less than the normal.  For both indices with opposite 
values, the regression results in Table 2.11 indicate no significant relationship between 
weather anomalies and the equally-weighted abnormal returns portfolio.33 These findings 
suggest that the direction of anomalies does not influence the outcome of the estimations. 
 As a last exercise, I use a nonparametric test for abnormal returns, the rank test, to avoid 
the preconditions of parametric tests for event studies such as normality of the underlying 
time-series. Event days are defined as the strongest ten percent of anomalies within the 
temperature and precipitation anomaly indices. As highlighted earlier, the single-day event 
test might not be appropriate to examine weather events, as they usually occur as multi-day 
events rather than single-day events before they significantly harm the operations. Thus, the 
methodology presented by Corrado (1989) is extended by a multi-day test that considers the 
two preceding and succeeding days surrounding the event day. The rank test by Corrado 
(1989) and the multi-day extension model are defined as: 
Single-
Day 
𝑇0 = 
1
𝑁
∑
(𝐾𝑖,0 − 125.5)
𝑆(𝐾)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(2.10) 
Multi-
Day 𝑇1 = 
1
𝑁
∑
((
1
5
∑ 𝐾𝑖,𝑡
+2
𝑡=−2 ) − 125.5)
𝑆(𝐾)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(2.11) 
 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐴𝑖,𝑡) (2.12) 
 𝑆(𝐾) = √
1
250
∑ (
1
𝑁
∑(𝐾𝑖,𝑡 − 125.5)
𝑁
𝑖=1
)
2+5
𝑡=−244
 (2.13) 
with 𝑇0 and 𝑇1 as test statistic on the event day, 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 as the rank of the abnormal stock return 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 between time 𝑡 = -244 to +5, and 𝑆(𝐾) as standard deviation of the rank for stock 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡. Naturally, the average of rank 1 to 250 equals 125.5. Furthermore, higher abnormal 
                                                 
33 For aluminium futures returns and aluminium inventory changes, both anomaly indices with opposite values 
are non-significant when used for the estimation of the dependent variables.  
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returns represent a lower rank, i.e. the highest returns are at rank 1 and the lowest are at rank 
250. For both precipitation and temperature, the rank test statistic for the ten largest absolute 
anomalies suggests no statistical significance for any of the examined event dates. All values 
of test statistic T0 range between -1.59 and 1.61, which is below the 95 percent significance 
level z-score of 1.96. For T1, i.e. the multi-day test statistic, the obtained values range 
between -0.47 and 1.58, which suggests that the multi-day approach does not improve the 
test results. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This study extends prior research by providing insight on the effect of weather anomalies 
on changes in the inventory and price of exchange-traded aluminium. The analysis uses a 
self-defined algorithm to combine weather information from various bauxite mines spread 
throughout the globe. It also evaluates the impact of temperature and precipitation 
anomalies on changes in the global inventory and futures returns of exchange-traded 
aluminium. Lastly, it examines the effect on the abnormal returns of major aluminium 
mining and producing companies. Positive precipitation anomalies are found to reduce the 
global inventory of exchange-traded aluminium. This is particularly evident when weather 
data are unavailable and when precipitation anomalies occur on multiple days. However, this 
effect diminishes after the aluminium market became oversupplied in 2009. Temperature 
anomalies do not appear to influence inventory changes, or futures returns. Moreover, most 
of the independent variables are not related to the volatility of the two dependent variables. 
Multi-day temperature anomalies are the exception and positively affect the volatility of 
inventory changes. Moreover, a portfolio of abnormal stock returns of aluminium producing 
companies is found to be influenced by temperature anomalies. 
 Despite using the most accurate data for this study, the limited availability of weather 
information may bias the results. For remote locations where the mines are often located 
information is scarce. Thus, the individual weather anomaly indices for some mines use 
distant weather station information. In addition, the weather anomaly index calculation 
approach itself might introduce bias as I use a novel method to combine the information 
from mine locations spread throughout the globe. Lastly, the study covers a combined share 
of 50 percent of global mine production. Large mining countries such as China are excluded 
from this study due to the inaccessibility of reliable information. This could potentially 
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introduce a sample selection bias. While these factors might reduce the validity of the 
research, I believe that the evaluation of both futures returns and inventory changes, the 
examination of the abnormal stock returns of major aluminium producers, and the robust 
research model in this study sufficiently mitigate the above risks.  
 Future research may apply the algorithm presented here to combine the information 
from different mine locations to calculate precipitation and temperature anomaly indices for 
large cities with high demand for industrial metals to estimate the effect of weather anomalies 
on demand. Moreover, future research may focus on the relationship between earlier steps 
in the process chain and further retest the findings for other metals such as gold and copper. 
Especially for commodities with lower inventory stocks, or perishable commodities, the 
results may vary significantly. 
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CHAPTER 3 GLOBAL MONETARY POLICY AND METAL PRICES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
To overcome a liquidity crisis, the often-cited advice by Bagehot (Goodhart, 1999) suggests 
that central banks should lend freely, at a high rate of interest, and against good collateral. 
As in the case of the Mexican debt crisis bailout by the United States and others in 199534, 
history provides examples of the success of this theory. Since the GFC in 2008 and the 
subsequent monetary policy measures introduced by central banks globally, the requirements 
for liquidity have changed. Money has been freely available since then, despite low penalty 
rates and the inferior quality of acceptable collateral.  
 One of the main goals of all conventional and unconventional monetary policies is to 
ensure price stability. By increasing bank lending to non-financial corporations and 
households, quantitative easing (QE) aims to increase private expenditure and accelerate 
consumption and investment (Ryan-Collins et al., 2016). For this process to work, it is 
assumed that financial institutions provide effective credit intermediation and that debtors 
use those funds to consume. Prior research examines the impact of conventional monetary 
policy on different asset classes including commodities (e.g. Frankel, 2006, 2014; Calvo, 
2008; Akram, 2009; Vansteenkiste, 2009; Ma et al., 2015) and further scrutinises the response 
of commodity markets to announcements of unconventional monetary policy (Scrimgeour, 
2014). Leading financial writers also highlight the necessity for research in this area and 
illustrate the influence and potential risk of unconventional monetary policy on commodity 
prices (e.g. Kemp, 2010; Reddy, 2010; Campbell, 2014). Notwithstanding this, little research 
focuses on the precise impact on global industrial commodities and the longer-term 
interaction with global conventional and unconventional monetary policy. Although central 
banks are generally more concerned with domestic economic growth and less with global 
market conditions, one might expect that prices are driven by global supply and demand 
changes instead of individual economy-specific monetary policy. The implementation of 
announced measures, the resulting changes in global liquidity, and the ability of an economy 
to successfully incorporate the resulting liquidity changes into the market, are likely to be 
                                                 
34 In 1995, the United States coordinated a bailout of 50 billion USD to help Mexico overcome the debt crisis. 
The contract for Mexico included penalty rates and compelled the Mexican government to pledge oil exports 
as a collateral for the deal. The subsequent recovery of the Mexican economy suggests that the financial 
intervention by external bodies can solve a sovereign debt crisis (cf. Conesa and Kehoe, 2014). 
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more influential than the individual policy announcements. This study focuses on the 
medium to long-term impact of monetary policy measures by introducing a global multiplier 
ratio to proxy for global market liquidity and global unconventional monetary policy. 
 Investments in metals, both industrial and precious, may provide advantages for 
investors and other market participants. These advantages include (a) a hedge against 
inflation (Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2005; Bampinas and Panagiotidis, 2015), (b) a hedge 
against future USD demand, and (c) the ability of gold to serve as a safe haven asset (Roache 
and Rossi, 2010; Sari et al., 2010). Furthermore, metals and other storable commodities, as 
a primary contributor to production, immediately represent changes in future expected 
demand (e.g. Krugman, 2008; Kilian, 2009). As supply-increasing investments usually take 
several years to implement, changes in future growth expectations trigger future demand 
and drive today’s demand for inventory and ultimately prices. Thus, changes in industrial 
metal prices may serve as an early predictor of future changes in inflation. For example, 
Chen et al. (2014b) find evidence that commodities have predictive power on the consumer 
price index (CPI) and producer price index (PPI) of small commodity exporting countries. 
However, the gradual decline in commodity prices, particularly industrial metal prices, since 
the beginning of 2011 raises concerns about whether interventions by the central banks 
distort financial markets. In fact, the focus on USD prices may be misleading for exchange-
traded metals. Fluctuations of the USD triggered by relative changes in US (foreign) 
monetary stimulus influence the associated costs and revenue of commodity exporting and 
importing countries and may ultimately drive commodity prices (e.g. Portes, 2012).  
 Therefore, this study scrutinises the impact of changes in the balance sheets of major 
central banks, i.e. the monetary base, on exchange-traded non-ferrous metals and gold. To 
measure the effectiveness of central bank interventions, I create the multiplier ratio by 
dividing market liquidity (proxied by M2) by the chosen proxy for unconventional monetary 
policy (central bank assets) for each of the examined seven economies. In a second step, the 
economy-individual multiplier ratios are weighted by the size of their central bank assets and 
summarised to create the global multiplier ratio. Moreover, the study incorporates trade-
specific data of commodity exporting and importing countries and links this information 
with industrial commodities and monetary policy. This leads to the research question: how 
does global conventional and unconventional monetary policy influence the price of 
exchange-traded metals? The contributions of the study are: (1) I introduce a new measure, 
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the global multiplier ratio, which uses information on central banks assets to proxy for global 
central bank market interventions and unconventional monetary policy, to measure the 
effectiveness of the latter, i.e. the absorption of such into their economies. When central 
banks engage in unconventional monetary policy, they buy government and corporate debt 
securities in the secondary market, which increases their balance sheet assets. Thus, by using 
this information and by assuming that the other asset positions remain relatively constant 
over time, it is possible to circumvent the lack of availability of precise unconventional 
monetary policy data for all of the examined seven economies. This variable allows investors 
and policy makers to quickly and efficiently quantify the impact of global central bank market 
interventions and consider the associated effects on commodity prices in their models. More 
precisely, this measure provides a quick indication as to whether the intended 
unconventional monetary policy measures function as intended and are used to improve 
lending and eventually spending; (2) Unlike prior studies (e.g. Frankel, 2006; 2014), I do not 
limit the study to US interest rates but include other major economies; (3) I use global import 
information to complement the study with real demand measures instead of using proxies 
(e.g. Kuralbayeva and Malone, 2012); (4) I extend prior research and include commodities 
that have experienced little attention in prior studies; (5) I approach the potential 
endogeneity bias stemming from monetary policy and provide evidence that the model is 
robust. Overall, I find evidence that the global multiplier ratio, which measures the ratio 
between market liquidity and unconventional monetary policy35, is positively associated with 
the price of industrial metals. Moreover, prior research on the relationship between global 
real interest rates and commodity prices is confirmed for a few non-ferrous metals and gold. 
By adding unconventional monetary policy, market liquidity, and real interest rates to the 
equation, it is possible to distinguish between the effects of the different influential factors.  
 The remainder of Chapter 3 is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses prior research, 
the state of the literature, and how monetary policy can impact commodities. Subsequently, 
                                                 
35 Whereas unconventional monetary policy represents the root of the fresh liquidity that is induced by the 
actions of the central banks into the economy, the market liquidity (here: M2 money measure), which can be 
used to scrutinise the impact of money on the economy (Mankiw, 2016), provides a measure of all money and 
near money assets that circulate within an economy (Abel et al., 2011). When central banks engage in 
unconventional monetary policy, they buy government and corporate debt securities in the secondary market, 
which increases their balance sheet assets. By doing so, the central banks aim to encourage lenders to give out 
more money at lower rates, which should eventually translate into higher M2, if the measure works as intended. 
Thus, the global multiplier ratio provides a quick indication on whether the unconventional monetary policy 
measures function as intended and are used by the economy to improve lending and eventually spending. 
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I consolidate the data and conceive the methodology in Section 3.3 and present the empirical 
results of the study in Section 3.4. The study concludes with Section 3.5, which consolidates 
the findings and presents potential areas for future research.  
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 MONETARY POLICY AND COMMODITY MARKETS 
While most prior research scrutinises the relationships between conventional monetary 
policies and various forms of asset classes, the number of papers concerned with 
unconventional monetary policy is continuously increasing. For example, a common 
approach is to use the event study method of Kuttner (2001) to evaluate the immediate 
response of exchange-traded commodities to monetary policy announcements (Glick and 
Leduc, 2012; Joyce and Tong, 2012; Georgiadis and Gräb, 2015; Eser and Schwaab, 2016; 
Haitsma et al., 2016). The main advantage of this technique lies in its ability to evaluate the 
impact of the announcement, but it relies upon the implicit assumption that the 
announcement contains all the price sensitive information. However, although the 
announcements are important, details of the exact procedure of the market operation are 
not known at the announcement date (Fratzscher et al., 2013) and the market operation itself 
provides further information that should not be left out. In fact, the influence of monetary 
policy on prices resulting from the portfolio rebalancing channel may occur over a longer 
period than the typical event window used in these studies (Ueda, 2013). The evaluation of 
announcement reactions may not only withhold valuable information but further bias the 
real impact, as it only represents the first reaction to a shock. To account for these effects, 
other studies draw on lower frequency data and rely on techniques like the “identification 
through heteroscedasticity” approach by Rigobon and Sack (2004) or variations of vector 
autoregression (VAR) models that define non-announcement and announcement periods to 
test the impact of announcements on commodities and to confirm findings for higher 
frequency data (Kapetanios et al., 2012; Claus et al., 2014; Gambacorta et al., 2014; Unalmis 
and Unalmis, 2015; Haitsma et al., 2016; Tillmann, 2016).  
 Overall, the above studies present mixed results. For example, Glick and Leduc (2012) 
argue that the announcement of large-scale asset purchase programmes implies lower 
expected future economic growth, which leads to less future demand and therefore lower 
commodity prices. While this is a logical argument for an economy subjected to asset 
C H A P T E R  3  G L O B A L  M O N E T A R Y  P O L I C Y  A N D  M E T A L  P R I C E S  | 63 
 
purchases, it may not always generalise with respect to global commodity demand. In fact, 
global trade of raw materials such as copper ore and concentrates remained high throughout 
the years studied (Trade Map, 2016). Even if demand decreases due to lower expected future 
economic growth, the quantitative impact of such an influence on global commodity prices 
remains unclear. Second, if stock prices increase because of QE (Haitsma et al., 2016), 
investors and companies experience a growth in wealth, which enables them to consume 
more in the future. Again, higher future consumption would trigger higher future demand 
which causes higher demand for inventory today and thus higher commodity prices. 
Moreover, the support of central banks in meeting future economic growth expectations 
should drive commodity prices upwards as uncertainty about the future recedes. However, 
the effectiveness of QE is disputed. Although QE has evidently reduced interest rates 
(Girardin and Moussa, 2011), the impact on macroeconomic variables differs globally. While 
Ueda (2012) suggests a minor impact of QE on the Japanese CPI, Bowman et al. (2015) add 
that the improvement in lending by banks could not sufficiently stimulate demand in Japan, 
which ultimately led the researchers to the conclusion that QE did not sufficiently help to 
overcome deflation. The findings for the UK, however, are rather ambiguous. Whereas 
Lyonnet and Werner (2012) find little evidence for a positive effect of UK QE on UK GDP, 
Kapetanios et al. (2012) identify a peak impact of UK QE of 1.5 percent on real UK GDP 
and 1.25 percent on CPI. Moreover, Weale and Wieladek (2016) suggest an increase of 0.25 
percent for GDP and 0.32 percent for inflation for the UK and an increase of 0.58 percent 
for GDP and 0.62 percent for inflation for the US based on data from 2009 to mid-2014. 
Likewise, Le et al. (2016) present evidence for a positive impact of QE on real GDP and 
real economic growth for US data. The results suggest that announcement effects have a 
weaker influence on the UK economy than they do on the US economy. As US 
unconventional monetary policy is larger in dollar terms, the overall surplus in global 
liquidity may dictate the magnitude of the impact. Moreover, the difference in results 
between the QE measures of the US, UK, and Japan may also be influenced by the individual 
approach used. Whereas pure QE is less concerned with the composition of the assets 
purchased, targeted QE, also known as credit easing, evaluates each asset before it is 
purchased to ensure that the mix held by the central bank is not negatively affecting the 
market (Bernanke, 2009). While the effectiveness of the former is potentially limited, the 
latter can be more beneficial (Curdia and Woodford, 2011).  
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 Furthermore, Goodhart and Ashworth (2012) highlight that prior studies often 
underestimate the impact of UK QE1 on GDP as they do not fully account for beneficial 
effects on the credit spread and the relative value of a currency. Moreover, Martin and Milas 
(2012) show that the impact of QE diminished throughout time and for each batch. Whereas 
QE was apparently effective in 2008 and 2009, later measures show less impact. As literature 
examining the precise impact and interaction of QE, conventional monetary policy, global 
liquidity, and individual commodity prices is scarce, it remains unclear how QE influences 
commodity prices over time and whether such effects are different from the growth in global 
liquidity. Apart from the primarily positive impact of QE on real GDP and inflation, little is 
known about the recent impact on industrial metal prices.36 While central banks focus on 
economic growth and inflation (Clarida, 2012), commodity price changes immediately 
impact future growth and inflation. Hence, it is crucial to understand the consequences of 
all central bank actions and the potential implications for their primary target.  
 TRANSMISSION CHANNELS OF MONETARY POLICY 
Unlike unconventional monetary policy, economies around the globe use conventional 
measures to achieve price stability, stimulate economic growth, and currency control. 
Following Frankel (2006) and Anzuini et al. (2013), conventional monetary policy stimulates 
economic activity via three transmission channels: the inventory channel, the supply channel, 
and the financial channel. The inventory channel arises because lower real interest rates 
increase the demand for storable commodities. When real interest rates decrease, either via 
conventional monetary policy changes, i.e. changes in the main refinancing rate charged by 
a central bank, or because of unconventional monetary policy, i.e. QE (Glick and Leduc, 
2012), the cost of storage decreases. Thus, the demand for inventory increases, which 
increases the demand for commodities and ultimately puts upward pressure on the price 
(Akram, 2009; Frankel, 2014; Kilian and Murphy, 2014). For example, Scrimgeour (2014) 
finds that an increase in the interest rate by 0.1 percent leads to a decrease in commodity 
prices by 0.6 percent on average, with metals showing the largest impact. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the development of the GDP-weighted37 daily real 3-month interbank interest 
                                                 
36 Although prior research suggests an impact of QE on commodity prices (e.g. Claus et al., 2014; Barroso et 
al., 2015), none of the scrutinised studies includes recent quantitative measures by major central banks.  
37 The calculation of the GDP-weighted index is explained thoroughly in Section 3.3.2. 
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rates and the Standard & Poor’s GSCI Industrial Metals (SPIMSI) and Gold (SPGSI) spot 
indices from January 2006 to December 2015.  
Figure 3.1: Real Interest Rates and Commodity Prices 
Panel A          Panel B 
 
Notes: These figures illustrate the development of the GDP-weighted real 3-month interbank interest rates of the United States (US), the 
Eurozone (EU), Japan (JP), China (CN), the United Kingdom (UK), India (IN), and Brazil(BR), the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) GSCI Gold 
index (SPGSI), and the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) GSCI Industrial Metals index (SPIMSI) from January 2006 to December 2015. The 
interest rates are realised by subtracting the year-on-year change of the CPI from the nominal interest rates. The primary axis in both 
panels show the real interest rates in 100’s of percent, whereas the secondary axis in panel B illustrates the index value in USD per point. 
The SPGSI and SPIMSI are deflated by the US CPI (2015=100). With RIR for real interest rates.  
Following times of decreasing interest rates, commodity prices tend to show a delayed 
increasing trend. Especially after the GFC of 2007-2008, where nominal interest rates have 
decreased drastically, commodity prices increased rapidly. In line with prior research38, 
Figure 3.1 indicates a negative correlation between commodity prices and real interest rates. 
Particularly panel B in Figure 3.1 suggests that the US real interest rate has experienced 
stronger fluctuations than the measurement of global real interest rates.  For example, the 
correlation coefficients for the changes in the quarterly real interest rate and commodity 
prices in the EU (gold: -0.493) and China (industrial metals: -0.407) between the second 
quarter of 2006 and the fourth quarter of 201539 are stronger than those measures for the 
US (gold: -0.389, industrial metals: -0.306)40. Moreover, the correlation coefficients for the 
global multiplier ratio and global real interest rate are often stronger than the correlation 
coefficients for the individual economy measures. Although the US is still the largest single 
economy as of 2016, the arrival of Asian consumers led by China as the largest importer of 
coal and non-ferrous metals, with a share well above 40 percent (World Bank, 2015; IMF, 
                                                 
38 Harvey et al. (2016) present a comprehensive analysis of the relationship of commodity prices and UK 
interest rates since the 17th century. The researchers show that increasing interest rates cause a decrease in 
commodity prices.  
39 Due to the use of first differences, the sample runs from February or the second quarter of 2006 to December 
or the fourth quarter of 2015.  
40 In the data section of this chapter, I present and further discuss the quarterly and monthly correlation 
coefficients of global real interest rates, the global multiplier ratio, and commodity prices.  
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2016) may dilute the leading impact of the US on commodity market dynamics towards a 
more balanced global interaction. For example, Klotz et al. (2014) show a negative 
correlation between commodity prices and the real interest rate of China, which ranges from 
negative 0.52 for precious metals to negative 0.74 for energy commodities. Moreover, Le 
and Chang (2016) present a positive correlation (0.18) between interest rates and the oil price 
for Japan, which is a major importer of oil. Both studies, however, limit their focus to one 
country and fail to evaluate the combined impact of major economies. Thus, one should not 
generalise findings in prior research that focuses on US or other single economy real interest 
rates to global markets such as commodities. The growing interconnection of global trade 
and financial markets justifies a re-evaluation of the latest market changes and particularly 
the growing market interventions by central banks. 
 The supply channel, much like the inventory channel, transmits the impact of the 
interest rate. A reduction in the interest rate lowers the incentive for producers to extract 
the exhaustible commodity, which makes it more attractive to leave it underground instead. 
This ultimately reduces the supply of commodities and increases the market price. Thus, 
changes in interest rates do not only affect the market price via the increase in inventory 
demand (inventory channel) but also reduce the supply of the commodity to the market 
(supply channel).  
 The financial channel theory argues that investors and speculators shift into commodity 
contracts to compensate for the diminishing yields on bonds and other assets resulting from 
the decrease in interest rates. This shift increases the demand for commodities and drives 
the price. More precisely, the financial channel consists of three sub-channels: the signalling, 
the portfolio rebalancing41, and the liquidity premium channel. The signalling channel arises 
from latest information about future expected growth ‘signals’ implicit within central banks’ 
monetary policy announcements. Glick and Leduc (2012) argue that announcements of 
further asset purchases negatively impact investors’ future expectations, as they are 
introduced to improve market conditions. The portfolio rebalancing channel arises when 
investors seek to reallocate funds released when their portfolio holdings are purchased by 
central banks. Central bank purchases increase the demand and hence price of certain 
portfolio holdings, which reduces the yield of treasury bills and other relatively safe assets 
                                                 
41 Both the signalling and the portfolio rebalancing channel might also be triggered by other transmission 
channels and are not limited to the financial channel.  
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and motivates investors to sell their holdings. The newly available funds directly impact 
commodity prices via the portfolio rebalancing and the liquidity premium channel. The 
liquidity premium channel reflects the desire of investors to be compensated for liquidity 
risk that is associated with a market. Instead of investing in commodities, equities represent 
a suitable alternative. By shifting funds from fixed income to equities, the price of the latter 
increases, which increases both the market value of the company and the wealth of equity 
holders. The increase in the market value of companies provides several advantages. 
According to Mishkin (1996), the increase in firm value increases Tobin’s q (Tobin, 1969), 
which positively increases the investment spending affinity of companies. Moreover, the 
increase in firm value reduces the moral hazard and default risk of the company, which 
ultimately reduces the liquidity premium on debt and eases the access to fresh funds. Besides, 
equity holders experience an increase in wealth following the increase in equity prices. Thus, 
they can increase their consumption, which leads to higher demand for consumer goods and 
eventually higher commodity prices. Whereas conventional monetary policy does not 
influence the existence of asset price bubbles (Gali, 2014), loose monetary policy can fuel 
them (Hu and Rocheteau, 2015). 
 THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE EFFECT OF MONETARY POLICY 
Unlike other asset classes, commodities are primarily traded in USD. By increasing the 
money supply, central banks effectively dilute the value of their currency. Furthermore, one 
must differentiate between domestic measures and global prices. Whereas central banks are 
concerned with domestic growth and are unlikely to consider the financial conditions of 
other countries as key decision criteria, commodity prices are influenced by world demand 
and supply, which may be partially driven by individual central bank decisions and partially 
driven by other global market conditions. Thus, a monetary measure in one economy might 
have a different impact on commodity prices compared to another. To coherently explain 
this issue, let’s have a look at the following three examples:  
1. The United States of America, a major importer and consumer of commodities, 
introduces monetary policy that increases the supply of money. Following the increase in 
money supply and thus currency in circulation, the value of the USD decreases compared 
to other currencies. Thus, the demand for commodities from other currencies increases, 
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which lifts the price of a commodity to its new equilibrium. Result: The USD price of 
commodities increases. 
2. The Eurozone, another major importer of commodities, follows the United States and 
introduces money supply increasing measures. As a result, the value of the Euro decreases 
compared to the USD and other currencies. Hence, buying commodities at market price 
becomes more expensive for Eurozone economies, which in turn reduces the demand. 
Result: The price in USD of a commodity decreases. Yet, it must be highlighted that the 
decrease in the value of a currency also contributes to an increase in exports and relative 
attractiveness for foreign investors. Thus, the negative impact on commodity prices 
might be short-lasting and will be offset by an increase in exports and foreign investment 
in the long-term. This may contribute to an increase in demand and price. 
3. Chile, as the major exporter of copper, increases the money supply as the result of 
monetary policy. As in the other two examples, this decreases the value of the Chilean 
Peso (CLP) compared to the USD and other currencies. Consequently, the revenues of 
Chilean copper producers increase as the sale of copper in USD accumulates more CLP. 
Hence, this may lead to a slight decrease in (or at least stable) USD prices, as the exporting 
company requires less USD to maintain its operations at an equal level. In the mid-to 
long-term, producers’ incentive to increase supply rise due to the higher returns in CLP. 
Thus, the supply on the global market increases, which leads to a reduction in price.  
 Besides the impact on the USD market price, however, the relative decrease in currency 
value in the third example may lead to an influx of foreign investments as it encourages 
investors to shift funds to countries that provide higher expected yields. In return, these 
countries must cope with the impact of the liquidity influx and other related effects such as 
the appreciation of their currency, which eventually contributes to the so-called currency 
wars (Portes, 2012; Hanson and Stein, 2015). For commodity producing countries, the 
passive appreciation of their currency due to the escalating US monetary policy may 
disproportionally impact exports and returns. Especially for commodity-rich countries, this 
situation may lead to the highly unfavourable situation of a so-called Dutch disease (Oomes 
and Kalcheva, 2007). As a large influx of foreign investment leads to a currency appreciation, 
other exports of commodity-rich countries become less competitive on the global market, 
which eventually leads to an economic slowdown. As the exchange rates of major exporting 
countries such as Chile for copper or Australia for aluminium ores, and Japan and Europe 
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as major importers, are managed on a freely floating basis, these countries must cope with 
the adverse effect of a relative currency appreciation compared to the USD following a 
monetary measure by the US. In contrast, other large importers (China) or exporters (US) 
are less or not affected by the appreciation of their currency compared to the USD as they 
are either manage the exchange rate with the USD (China) or experience the benefit of being 
the currency of legal tender (US). This gives producers and consumers from those markets 
a competitive advantage as they do not have to bear an exchange rate risk associated with 
the sale or purchase of the commodities. This may influence producer and consumer 
decisions and ultimately impact the supply, demand, and price of the underlying good.42 
Barroso et al. (2015) evaluate the impact of the influx of foreign currency because of US 
monetary policy into Brazil. The researchers find that this influx contributed to the drastic 
increase in the Brazilian Real from 2000 to 2012 and they argue that this eventually 
contributed to increasing the inflation in Brazil. Albeit the nominal positive impact of a 
weaker USD on commodity prices is established (Akram, 2009; Chen et al., 2014a), little is 
known about the real impact on the flow of commodities and particularly industrial metals.  
 CENTRAL BANK LIQUIDITY 
Unconventional monetary policy has been extensively used by the US, the Eurozone, Japan, 
and the UK since the outbreak of the GFC in 2008. In contrast to a change in real interest 
rates, the asset purchase programmes by central banks infuse the market with fresh liquidity 
which is transmitted via different transmission channels. As a result, commodity prices are 
expected to react to the increase in money supply. For example, Wang et al. (2016), who 
evaluate monthly data until December 2011, illustrate the gradual impact of escalating 
foreign liquidity and increases in the domestic monetary base on Chinese asset prices. 
Moreover, Beckmann et al. (2014) and Ratti and Vespignani (2015) highlight the impact of 
BRIC and G3 liquidity shocks on monthly commodity prices and Ratti and Vespignani 
(2015) confirm Granger causality from broad market liquidity (M2) to commodity prices.  
 A primary target of quantitative easing is the active reduction of long-term interest rates, 
which shall lead to an increase in lending by commercial banks and eventually increase 
                                                 
42 Fratzschler et al. (2013) note that little evidence in favour of pegged exchange rates is available in prior 
literature. In fact, the researchers highlight that such measures might have exacerbated the impact of Fed’s 
monetary policy. 
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consumption. However, to ensure that this mechanism works, central banks rely on both 
commercial banks and their willingness to lend money and not to use it otherwise and 
borrowers to use the fresh capital to consume. The multiplier ratio, i.e. a measure of market 
liquidity and quantitative easing efforts by central banks, is an economic indicator that 
illustrates the ability of an economy to utilise fresh capital stemming from unconventional 
central bank measures and introduce it to the economy by lending and eventually spending. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the time series of the four variables which are either directly or indirectly 
related to unconventional monetary policy: (1) global M2, a monetary aggregate I use to 
proxy for market liquidity43, (2) central bank assets, which act as a proxy for global 
quantitative easing or unconventional monetary policy, (3) the global multiplier ratio, which 
is derived from (1) and (2), and (4) the real prices of industrial metals and gold.  
Figure 3.2: Multiplier Ratio, Liquidity, and Commodity Prices 
Panel A          Panel B 
  
Notes: Panel A illustrates the development of the global multiplier ratio (MR), defined as the central bank asset-weighted ratio of M2 over 
central bank assets of each of the seven central banks, and the index values of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) GSCI Industrial Metals 
(SPIMSI) and Gold Spot (SPGSI) indices, which are deflated by the individual CPI, from January 2006 to December 2015. Panel B 
illustrates the global multiplier ratio, the sum of the total assets of the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, 
the Bank of Japan, the People’s Bank of China, the Bank of England, the Reserve Bank of India, and the Central Bank of Brazil and the 
sum of M2 measures for each of the seven central banks. All deflators are re-indexed to 2015=100. The sum of the central bank assets 
and M2 are re-indexed to 2006 = 100. Monthly arithmetic averages for the exchange rates are used to convert to USD. In both panels, 
the primary axis shows the multiplier ratio. In panel A, the secondary axis illustrates the index value in USD per point. In panel B, the 
secondary axis shows the indexed values of M2 and the central bank assets. *1: QE1 by the FED; *2: QE2 by the FED; *3: BoJ increases 
the commercial account balance and expands QE; *4: QE3 by the FED; *5: Japan extends QE; *6: ECB launches the expanded asset 
purchase programme (QE). 
Figure 3.2 suggests that commercial banks do not sufficiently pass through the new liquidity 
to consumers by equivalently increasing their lending. This is shown by a stronger increase 
of central bank assets (indexed) compared to M2. Put simply, the money multiplier effect of 
one USD in central bank induced liquidity decreases over time suggesting that the global 
economy no longer uses fresh central bank liquidity as efficiently as it did prior to the GFC. 
                                                 
43 I follow prior research (e.g. Ratti and Vespignani, 2015) and use M2 as proxy for market liquidity.  
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3.3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 METHODOLOGY 
Index Measurements 
To evaluate the impact of monetary measures and global liquidity on commodity prices, 
some adjustments to raw data are necessary. The global multiplier ratio calculates the central 
bank asset weighted ratio of M2 over the central bank assets. Whereas prior studies estimate 
the immediate reaction to the central bank announcements or purely focus on absolute 
monetary aggregates, this approach tests the longer-term reaction of the commodity price 
index to the markets’ ability to utilise the fresh liquidity. In other words, the global multiplier 
ratio diverts from the prior ‘shock’ or ‘QE on/off’ evaluation of unconventional monetary 
policy and generalises the ability of an economy to utilise the fresh liquidity and translate it 
into economic growth. Thus, one can link commodity price changes and economic activity 
and extend this relationship by the ability of an economy to adapt to higher levels of central 
bank induced market liquidity. Put simply, every monetary unit a central bank introduces to 
a market increases the available liquidity in that market. Market participants can use this 
fresh capital to borrow, lend, or invest. Because of the fractional reserve banking common 
in most world economies, banks only hold a fraction of their customers’ deposits in reserve 
and earn interest by lending the remainder. Hence, the overall liquidity in the market is 
increased via the multiplier effect.44 The more often a monetary unit is traded among the 
market participants, the higher the broad market liquidity measure (i.e. M2) gets. Therefore, 
a change in lending leads to a change in the ratio of market liquidity (here proxied by M2) 
to central bank assets. The higher the ratio, the higher the lending among market 
participants, which ultimately translates to a higher market liquidity. There are three potential 
risks that can prevent central banks from achieving their aims: excess capital, future 
expectations, and alternative use of the eased access to fresh funds. First, financial 
institutions can hold excess capital that exceeds the daily required transaction levels due to 
limited demand by debtors, controlled supply by the banks itself because of insufficient 
collateral by existing and new debtors, or delayed intermediation due to other reasons45. 
Second, financial intermediates may interpret the market interventions of central banks as a 
                                                 
44 Please refer to Abel et al. (2011:526-527) for a more detailed explanation on fractional reserve banking.  
45 Benmelech and Bergman (2012) argue that during times of monetary expansions, banks tend to hoard 
liquidity instead of lending it.  
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signal for lower expected future economic growth, which may ultimately lower their 
incentive to issue loans and build reserves instead. Third, investments are usually not 
geographically restricted. Whereas central banks focus on the stimulation of their own 
economy, market participants can use the newly available funds to invest in other markets 
with potentially higher expected returns. Thus, the multiplier ratio measures the 
effectiveness of central banks’ efforts to increase their domestic money supply on a global 
scale, i.e. for the seven evaluated economies. This measure allows market participants to 
evaluate whether the unconventional monetary policy efforts by major central banks have 
been converted into market liquidity, i.e. whether the markets use the freshly available funds 
provided by the central banks to increase lending. More precisely, the measure provides a 
quick indication as to whether the increase in liquidity stemming from unconventional 
monetary policy is used to increase lending, thus eventually increasing M2. As a response to 
unconventional monetary policy, the global multiplier ratio should first decrease (as M2 
remains relatively stable and central bank assets increase) but should, over the mid- to long-
term horizon, increase, as M2 increases due to the multiplier effect. Thus, the global 
multiplier ratio allows market participants to quickly identify whether, to what extent, and 
how fast unconventional central bank measures are absorbed by the markets and translated 
into general market liquidity. The global multiplier ratio provides an easily reproduceable 
measure that quantifies the time an economy requires to convert new central bank liquidity 
into market liquidity and the extent to which an economy is able to multiply this new 
liquidity. The global multiplier ratio is calculated as: 
 
𝑀𝑅𝑡 =∑
𝑀2𝑘,𝑡
𝐶𝐵𝐴𝑘,𝑡
𝑛
𝑘=1
∗ 𝜌𝑘,𝑡 (3.1) 
 
𝜌𝑘,𝑡 = 
𝐶𝐵𝐴𝑘,𝑡
∑ 𝐶𝐵𝐴𝑘,𝑡
𝑛
𝑘=1
 (3.2) 
with 𝑀𝑅𝑡 as global multiplier ratio, 𝐶𝐵𝐴𝑘,𝑡 as central bank assets, 𝑀2𝑘,𝑡 as money supply 
that measures the amount of cash, checking and savings deposits, money market securities, 
and other time deposits within an economy, 𝜌𝑘,𝑡 as individual central bank asset weight for 
each economy 𝑘 at time 𝑡. 
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 Whereas simple summation of the data is sufficient for some variables, others require 
an economy-specific weighting to incorporate their relative economic strength. Despite the 
availability of pre-defined indices such as the trade-weighted USD index, no base metal 
specific index is available that fits the specifications of this study. Motivated by the approach 
underlying the trade-weighted USD index, I adopt a simplified version for the commodity 
trade-weighted USD index (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), 2016). 
This index has been proven to deliver reliable results in predicting commodity prices in prior 
research (Kuralbayeva and Malone, 2012; Chen et al., 2014a) and is calculated as: 
 
𝐹𝑋𝑡 = 𝐹𝑋𝑡−1 ∗  ∏(
𝑒𝑗,𝑡
𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
)
𝑐𝑤𝑗,𝑡𝑛
𝑗=1
 (3.3) 
 
𝑐𝑤𝑗,𝑡 = 
𝑋𝑗,𝑡−1
∑ 𝑋𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑗=1
 (3.4) 
where 𝐹𝑋𝑡 and 𝐹𝑋𝑡−1 are the nominal USD exchange rate index, 𝑒𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 are the price 
of the USD for foreign currency 𝑗, 𝑁(𝑡) is the number of countries in the index, 𝑐𝑤𝑗,𝑡 is the 
weight of currency 𝑗 with ∑𝑐𝑤𝑗,𝑡 = 1, and 𝑋𝑙,𝑡−1 represents the sum of the commodity 
exports and imports of economy 𝑙 = [Eurozone, United Kingdom, Japan, USA, China, 
Brazil, India], all at time 𝑡 or 𝑡 − 1. The weight is based on previous years’ trade and is 
adjusted once yearly at the turn of the year. Only yearly exports and imports declared as 
unwrought metal and converted to USD of the five commodities aluminium, copper, lead, 
nickel, and zinc are considered. I specifically do not include gold, as this commodity is highly 
traded, i.e. imported and exported, by countries that do neither produce nor consume the 
commodity but simply act as a merchant. This would disproportionally overvalue the 
importance of those currencies in the index. Furthermore, the weighting only considers 
countries with a share on global trade of more than five percent for the individual year, 
which allows me to concentrate on the major global trading countries.  
 Whereas the base metal trade-weighted USD index computes the product of periodical 
geometric-weighted changes, the real interest rate index follows a simpler approach and 
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multiplies the real interest rate with the country-specific GDP-weight46 for each year. 
Following Akram (2009), I use 3-month interbank rates deflated by the economy-specific 
year-on-year changes in consumer price indices to calculate the real interest rates. I chose 
real interest rates over nominal interest rates as a change in real interest rates represent a 
change in the cost of holding inventory. In contrast, this only holds true for nominal interest 
rates if inflation remains constant. The global real interest rate is calculated as: 
 
𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 = ∑𝑟𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ∗  𝑒𝑤𝑗,𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
 (3.5) 
 𝑟𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑖𝑗,𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗,𝑡 (3.6) 
 
𝑒𝑤𝑗,𝑡 = 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1
∑ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑗=1
 (3.7) 
with 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 as the real interest rate index, 𝑟𝑖𝑗,𝑡 as the real interest rate, 𝑖𝑗,𝑡 as the nominal 
interest rate, 𝜋𝑗,𝑡 as the year-on-year CPI change, and 𝑒𝑤𝑗,𝑡 as the economy-specific weight 
with ∑𝑒𝑤𝑗,𝑡 = 1, and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 as the GDP in USD of economy 𝑗 at time 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1. The 
GDP in local currency is converted using average daily exchange rates for each period. Note 
that the year-on-year CPI change is a monthly measure that remains constant throughout 
each month.  
Regression Model 
In the literature review, I discuss various techniques to evaluate the interaction between 
monetary policy and asset prices. The primary approach underlying most of these studies 
follows a simple logic – it distinguishes whether a monetary policy measure is in place or not 
and defines them as monetary shocks. In contrast, the model in this study uses OLS 
regression and new measures to estimate the mid-to long-term impact of central bank 
policies and commodity prices. The model is defined as: 
                                                 
46 Following Desroches and Francis (2010) and Rachel and Smith (2015), I use the GDP to weight global 
interest rates. I compare both nominal and real GDP and do not find a significant difference in the results. 
Thus, I concentrate on the nominal GDP weighting.  
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 𝐶𝐼𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝐵𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝑃500𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
(3.8) 
with 𝐶𝐼𝑡 as the commodity index, 𝛼 as the intercept, 𝛽 as coefficients, 𝑀𝑅𝑡 as the global 
multiplier ratio, 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 as the global real interest rate, 𝐹𝑋𝑡 as the global base metal trade-
weighted USD index, and the control variables 𝐶𝐹𝑆𝑡 as the cash-forward spread, to capture 
supply-demand imbalances (Kuralbayeva and Malone, 2012), 𝐼𝐵𝑀𝑡 as the imports of ores 
and unwrought base metals, to control for global physical supply and demand, 𝑆𝑃500𝑡 as 
the S&P 500 composite index, to control for equity market risk, 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 as the S&P 500 
volatility index, to control for the equity market volatility, and 𝜀𝑡 as the error term, all at time 
𝑡. Depending on the stationarity of each time-series, I either use data at levels or first 
differences. 
 It must be highlighted that the OLS model contains methodological caveats. It is likely 
that commodity price changes affect central bank decisions. While their primary focus is on 
consumer prices, increases in commodity prices certainly compromise future economic 
growth and impact consumer prices to a certain extent.47 Therefore, it is fair to assume that 
central bank interventions are not fully exogenous but endogenous to changes in commodity 
prices. However, in the OLS model they are defined as fully exogenous variables. As 
monetary measures are mostly announced ex ante and are usually not adjusted mid-term (Lo 
Duca et al., 2016), monetary policy is more concerned with consumer price stability than 
producer (base metal) prices, and inflation is stickier than commodity market prices, I believe 
that the potential endogeneity is small. Although it is not possible to eliminate it, I seek to 
mitigate the potential endogeneity by adding instrumental variables in the robustness tests.  
 DATA 
The analysis draws on three main data sources. Thomson Reuters Datastream, the trade map 
created by the International Trade Centre, a joint agency of the World Trade Organization 
and the United Nations, for country-specific export and import information, and 
                                                 
47 For example, changes in the oil prices often have an immediate effect on consumer petrol prices and energy 
costs, both part of consumer price indices. The impact, however, is not linear and often smaller than the actual 
change in commodity prices.  
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information provided by seven central banks. The central banks are: the European Central 
Bank (ECB), the Bank of England (BOE), the US Federal Reserve (FED), the Bank of Japan 
(BOJ), the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and Banco 
Central de Brazil (BCB). The economies and respective central banks are chosen based on 
their data availability throughout the research period and their importance for the global 
economy. More precisely, these seven economies are the seven largest economies according 
to the World Bank as of 2017 (World Bank, 2017). Moreover, while all seven central banks 
actively manage their interest rates and have adjusted them in response to market 
turbulences, four out of the seven central banks (ECB, BOE, FED, BOJ) have additionally 
engaged in quantitative easing measures. These four central banks (PBOC, FED, BOJ, ECB) 
hold assets of more than 17.8 trillion USD which translates to roughly 70 percent of the 
World’s central bank assets, or almost 24 percent of world GDP (Kuntz, 2016). Therefore, 
unlike prior research (e.g. Glick and Leduc, 2012; Haitsma et al., 2016), I do not limit the 
study to either the individual or total of the four major economies that had implemented 
quantitative easing measures as of 2016. The research period starts in January 2006 and ends 
in December 2015, totalling 120 (119) monthly and 40 (39) quarterly observations at level 
(first difference), which is limited by the availability of the trade data. As the primary source 
of the global commodity price data, I choose the daily S&P GSCI Industrial Metals Spot 
index (SPIMSI), comprising aluminium, copper, lead, nickel, and zinc, and the S&P GSCI 
Gold Spot index (SPGSI) in USD. Both the SPIMSI and the SPGSI are constructed using 
the nearest dated futures prices weighted by production data (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 
2017). The reason I choose the S&P GSCI indices is twofold. First, the S&P GSCI main 
and sub-indices have proven reliable in prior research (e.g. Chen et al., 2014b; Kang et al., 
2016). Second, the indices provide a measure of global market prices which is weighted by 
the production output of the individual index components. This approach considers the 
relative importance of each commodity for the global economy. Moreover, I obtain spot 
price data of the five commodities included in the SPIMSI provided by the LME for the 
robustness exercise.  
 In addition to commodity price data, I obtain monetary aggregate M2 data from 
Datastream, which is commonly referred to as market liquidity or broad money in prior 
research (e.g. Ratti and Vespignani, 2015). Moreover, I extract central bank asset information 
directly from the individual central banks to calculate the global multiplier ratio. It must be 
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noted that central bank assets do not only include assets that have been purchased for 
quantitative easing purposes but also include other assets that are in the possession of central 
banks. For example, the ECB (2018) holds other assets such as gold and gold reserves and 
tangible and intangible fixed assets48. However, as information on quantitative easing is often 
either not publicly available or is limited, I must assume that the other assets besides those 
held for monetary purposes do not greatly change over time and thus do not affect the 
outcome of the analysis.  
 Furthermore, I obtain data to calculate the base metal specific trade-weighted USD 
index based on equation (3.3) and (3.4), the real interest rate index based on equations (3.5) 
to (3.7), and other financial data to control for market interactions. This includes trade-
specific monthly import and export information in USD offered by the ITC and exchange-
rate information provided by Datastream, the nominal 3-month interbank rates deflated by 
the individual economy-specific year-on-year changes in the consumer price index from 
Datastream, spot and 3-month commodity futures prices from Datastream to calculate the 
spot-futures-spread (as spot minus futures prices), and information on the S&P 500 
composite index and the CBOE VIX to proxy for equity market risk and volatility.49 While 
the information on global trade (imports and exports), central bank assets, the consumer 
price index, and M2 are available at monthly frequencies, commodity price information, 
nominal interest rates, and equity market data are available at daily frequencies. I calculate 
the monthly (quarterly) averages for all variables which are available at a higher frequency. 
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of all of the variables used for this study and the 
pairwise correlation of industrial metal and gold prices, the global multiplier ratio, and global 
real interest rates. All prices and volumes in Table 3.1 are in USD or converted to USD for 
each period using average exchange rates. Where data at a lower frequency is available, the 
                                                 
48 The assets of the ECB include gold and gold receivables, claims on non-euro area residents denominated in 
foreign currency, claims on euro area residents denominated in foreign currency, other claims on euro area 
credit institutions denominated in euros, securities of euro area residents denominated in euros (which are 
securities that are held for monetary purposes), intra-Eurosystem claims, and other assets (ECB, 2018).  
49 In this study, I do not include inventory data. As discussed earlier in this paper, the inventory transmission 
channel suggests that a decrease in real interest rates lowers the costs to hold inventory and thus increases the 
demand for commodities (Anzuini et al., 2013). As the increased demand is not consummative, it increases the 
stocks held in warehouses. Therefore, real interest rates and inventory are expected to comparably affect 
commodity prices. As I am interested in the analysis of real interest rates, I focus on such to avoid ambiguity 
in the results. I find that once inventory data are added, the coefficients for real interest rates become non-
significant. This indicates that the hypothesised transmission of real interest rates to gold price changes might 
be sufficiently explained by either real interest rates itself or actual inventory data.  
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arithmetic average is calculated to obtain monthly values. The abbreviations are defined as: 
Vol for volume, ADF for augmented Dickey-Fuller, MON for monthly, QTR for quarterly, 
FD as first difference, S&P for Standard and Poor’s, TR as Thomson Reuters Datastream, 
CB for central bank, ITC for International Trade Centre, USD pp as USD per points, Mt as 
metric tonnes, and tsd. USD as thousands of USD, Unconv. as unconventional, Conv. as 
conventional, MP as monetary policy, ML as market liquidity, MR as global multiplier ratio, 
RIR as real interest rate, EU as Eurozone, US as United States, JP as Japan, UK as United 
Kingdom, CN as China, IN as India, and BR as Brazil. Time-series in italics are deflated by 
the US implicit price deflator of the Gross Domestic Product provided by the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA, 2009 = 100). Underlined variables indicate an index or 
combination of various rates, prices, or sources. Numbers in bold indicate whether data at 
levels or first differences for each variable are used. The Phillips-Perron (PP) test mostly 
confirms the findings of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) for both the monthly and 
quarterly time-series.  
 Panel D in Table 3.1 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients between changes in 
commodity prices and both the global multiplier ratio and global real interest rates and 
indicates that a more global approach, i.e. combining the seven evaluated economies, might 
provide additional advantage compared to examining only the multiplier ratios and real 
interest rates of the individual economies. While the favoured US interest rate and liquidity 
data in prior research (e.g. Frankel, 2014; Hammoudeh et al., 2015) significantly correlates 
with commodity prices in my sample, other economies are in no way inferior. For example, 
both multiplier ratios for the Eurozone and Japan, i.e. two economies that have implemented 
extensive quantitative easing measures during the recent decade, show comparable 
correlation to commodity prices. In fact, the correlation coefficients for the quarterly real 
interest rate and commodity prices in the EU (gold, -0.493) and China (industrial metals, -
0.407) are stronger than those measures for the US (gold: -0.389, industrial metals: -0.306). 
Moreover, the combined global multiplier ratio and real interest rate are often stronger than 
for the individual economy measures. Although the US is still the largest single economy as 
of 2016, the arrival of Asian consumers led by China as the largest importer of coal and non-
ferrous metals with a share well above 40 percent (World Bank, 2015; IMF, 2016) may alter 
the leading impact of the US on commodity market dynamics towards a more balanced 
global interaction. 
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Table 3.1: Overview of Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Overview 
Source 
Original 
Frequency 
Unit Type Proxy for 
ADF – MON ADF – QTR 
Variable Level FD Level FD 
 S&P Ind. Metals Spot TR Daily USD pp Index Industrial Metal Prices -1.13 -8.02*** -1.34 -4.96*** 
 S&P Gold Spot TR Daily USD pp Index Gold Price -1.62 -9.39*** -1.45 -4.32*** 
 Multiplier Ratio TR/CB Monthly - Index Unconv. MP and ML -1.36 -8.26*** -2.10 -6.05*** 
 Real Interest Rate TR Daily 100’s % Index Conv. MP -1.56 -7.36*** -1.72 -4.29*** 
 Trade-Weighted USD TR/ITC Daily - Index Exchange Rate Impact 0.92 -6.52*** 0.38 -3.86*** 
 Cash-Forward Spread TR Daily USD pp Index Implied Return on Inventory 
Holdings 
-2.81* -12.2*** -2.45 -5.73*** 
 CFS – Gold TR Daily USD Index -6.60*** -24.6*** -2.20 -9.65*** 
 Imports Base Metals ITC Monthly Tsd. USD Vol 
Global Trade and Demand 
-3.42** -15.9*** -1.96 -4.21*** 
 Imports Gold ITC Monthly Tsd. USD Vol -2.53 -13.0*** -1.67 -8.23*** 
 S&P 500 Index TR Daily -  Index Equity Risk -0.20 -8.75*** -0.23 -3.92*** 
 CBOE VIX TR Daily - Index Equity Volatility -2.79* -9.43*** -2.68* -6.46*** 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics – Monthly Mean Median StDev Obs Kurtosis Skew 
S&P Ind. Metals Spot -0.0090 0.0032 0.2331 119 4.7424 -0.3429 
S&P Gold Spot 0.0183 -0.0017 0.2697 119 3.8543 0.2140 
Global Multiplier Ratio -0.0144 -0.0097 0.0727 119 18.0476 -2.3748 
Global Real Interest Rate -0.0028 0.0002 0.2936 119 5.3376 -0.3170 
Trade-Weighted USD 0.1064 0.0133 1.1248 119 5.6184 0.9053 
Cash-Forward Spread – Industrial Metals -0.9056 -1.5239 2.2558 119 5.541 1.5777 
Cash-Forward Spread – Gold -2.4068 -2.2213 2.5272 119 2.3364 -0.398 
Imports Ores + Unwrought Metal 166486.7 171862.3 27853.69 119 3.8099 -0.9031 
Imports Gold 1,068.25 -20.8927 27,806.85 119 5.4470 -0.3198 
S&P 500 Index 0.0414 0.1557 0.4855 119 8.5288 -1.6537 
CBOE VIX 0.0498 -0.2961 4.6611 119 20.1990 3.0156 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics – Quarterly Mean Median StDev Obs Kurtosis Skew 
S&P Ind. Metals Spot -0.0283 -0.0014 0.4431 39 6.9970 -1.0555 
S&P Gold Spot 0.0603 0.0683 0.4478 39 3.4554 -0.0878 
Global Multiplier Ratio -0.0443 -0.0265 0.1399 39 15.8198 -2.7584 
Global Real Interest Rate -0.0126 0.0266 0.5576 39 4.4608 -0.7026 
Trade-Weighted USD 0.3062 -0.1481 2.3906 39 4.8555 1.1689 
Cash-Forward Spread – Industrial Metals -0.0462 0.0349 1.4305 39 4.2395 -0.2681 
Cash-Forward Spread – Gold 0.1474 0.2032 1.3759 39 6.6563 -1.0939 
Imports Ores + Unwrought Metal 761.4243 1,864.037 16,315.96 39 4.1532 -0.8217 
Imports Gold 2,565.160 6,280.595 26,724.25 39 6.2195 -0.5288 
S&P 500 Index 0.1257 0.2389 0.8776 39 8.3331 -1.9989 
CBOE VIX 0.1271 -0.4738 7.4433 39 11.6702 2.1299 
Panel D: Correlation MR – FD MR MR-EU MR-US MR-JP MR-UK MR-CN MR-IN MR-BR 
S&P Ind. Metals Spot – Monthly 0.399*** 0.277*** 0.342*** 0.197** -0.134 -0.088 0.141 0.209** 
S&P Ind. Metals Spot – Quarterly 0.631*** 0.500*** 0.614*** 0.504*** -0.186 -0.140 0.044 0.268* 
S&P Gold Spot – Monthly 0.048 0.020 0.079 -0.100 0.013 -0.069 -0.026 0.114 
S&P Gold Spot – Quarterly 0.172 0.001 0.257 0.274 -0.055 -0.249 -0.118 0.162 
Panel E: Correlation RIR – FD RIR RIR-EU RIR-US RIR-JP RIR-UK RIR-CN RIR-IN RIR-BR 
S&P Ind. Metals Spot – Monthly -0.305*** -0.247*** -0.262*** -0.159* -0.160* -0.181** 0.041 -0.076 
S&P Ind. Metals Spot – Quarterly -0.342** -0.175 -0.306* -0.189 0.020 -0.407** 0.046 -0.215 
S&P Gold Spot – Monthly -0.276*** -0.273*** -0.260*** -0.030 -0.112 -0.049 -0.117 -0.085 
S&P Gold Spot – Quarterly -0.456*** -0.493*** -0.389** -0.085 -0.328** -0.256 0.013 -0.253 
Notes: All prices and volumes are denoted in USD or converted to USD for each period using monthly average exchange rates. Where 
information at lower frequency is available, the arithmetic average is calculated. With Vol for volume, ADF for augmented Dickey-Fuller, 
MON for monthly, QTR for quarterly, FD as first difference, S&P for Standard and Poor’s, TR as Thomson Reuters Datastream, CB for 
central bank, ITC for International Trade Centre, USD pp as USD per points, Mt as metric tonnes, and tsd. USD as thousands of USD, 
Unconv. as unconventional, Conv. as conventional, MP as monetary policy, as ML as market liquidity, MR as global multiplier ratio, RIR 
as real interest rate, EU as Eurozone, US as United States, JP as Japan, UK as United Kingdom, CN as China, IN as India, and BR as 
Brazil. The research period stretches from January (February due to first differences) 2006 to December 2015 with 119 monthly and 39 
quarterly observations. Time-series in italic are deflated by the US implicit price deflator of the Gross Domestic Product provided by the 
Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2009 = 100). Underlined variables indicate an index or combination of various rates, prices, or 
sources. Numbers in bold indicate whether level data or first difference of each variable is used. The Phillips-Perron (PP) test mostly 
confirms the findings of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) for both the monthly and quarterly time-series. Panel D and E illustrate the 
monthly and quarterly pairwise correlation of first differences of the MR and RIR indices for each evaluated economy and the S&P 
Industrial Metals Spot index. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1.  
For example, Klotz et al. (2014) show a negative correlation between commodity prices and 
the real interest rate of China, which ranges from negative 0.52 for precious metals to 
negative 0.74 for energy commodities. Moreover, Le and Chang (2016) show a positive 
correlation (0.18) of interest rates and the oil price in Japan, which is a major importer of 
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oil. Both studies, however, limit their focus to one country and do not evaluate the potential 
combined impact of major economies. Compared to the evaluation of industrial metals, 
gold-specific indicators are obtained for the evaluation of the SPGSI. This includes global 
gold imports and the spot-futures spread.50 
3.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 INDUSTRIAL METALS SPOT INDEX 
Let us begin with the OLS results for the industrial metals. Table 3.2 reports the results for 
the monthly and quarterly time-series. The results for both the monthly and quarterly 
analysis indicate a positive impact of the global multiplier ratio changes on industrial metal 
index changes significant at the 5 percent level. Moreover, the estimates reveal that global 
central banks assets and global M2 separately and jointly provide weaker explanation power 
for industrial metal price changes compared to the multiplier ratio. Thus, the global 
multiplier ratio provides a better measurement of market and central bank induced liquidity 
than its individual components and shows that an increase in the ability of an economy to 
utilise fresh central bank liquidity has a positive effect on the development of industrial metal 
prices. The global real interest rate provides low negative explanatory power for changes in 
the industrial metals price index. Earlier research finds a significant negative impact of the 
real US interest rate on the aluminium price (e.g. Frankel, 2006, 2014), but the current study 
indicates that the effect of real interest rates is subsumed by the addition of the multiplier 
ratio indicating that this is a more important determinant of commodity prices than real 
interest rates. The unwrought base metal trade-weighted USD index significantly and 
negatively influences industrial commodity price index changes in the monthly dataset and 
confirms prior findings by Kuralbayeva and Malone (2012) for daily copper prices. These 
findings suggest that, despite the massive increase in liquidity by the FED since 2008, the 
exchange rate impact of the USD remains significant. In contrast, the analysis for the 
quarterly data shows that the estimation power of the base metal trade-weighted USD index 
diminishes. Thus, exchange rates seem to strongly influence monthly price changes for 
industrial metals but have limited impact on longer time horizons.  
                                                 
50 London Bullion gold price minus the third continuous COMEX futures contract price. 
C H A P T E R  3  G L O B A L  M O N E T A R Y  P O L I C Y  A N D  M E T A L  P R I C E S  | 81 
 
 Overall, the global multiplier ratio, a measure of global market liquidity and central bank 
assets, investigates the ability of an economy to utilise fresh capital provided by central 
banks; particularly during times of unconventional monetary policy. I show that this measure 
is superior to simply using its components. Furthermore, I extend prior research on the 
estimation power of the real interest rate by considering additional economies to the US. 
The individual rates are combined to form an easily testable GDP-weighted global real 
interest rate index. 
Table 3.2: OLS Regression Results – Industrial Metals Spot Index 
 Industrial Metals Spot Index 
 Monthly Quarterly 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Multiplier Ratio 0.581**    0.735**    
 (0.261)    (0.308)    
CBA  -2.11e-05*  -1.75e-05*  -1.51e-05  -2.08e-05 
  (1.11e-05)  (9.79e-06)  (1.21e-05)  (1.26e-05) 
M2   -9.75e-06 -6.32e-06   6.52e-06 1.19e-05 
   (6.51e-06) (5.51e-06)   (6.56e-06) (7.36e-06) 
Real Interest Rate -0.0731 -0.0560 -0.0522 -0.0439 0.0491 0.0651 0.0506 0.0487 
 (0.0616) (0.0614) (0.0596) (0.0613) (0.0595) (0.0688) (0.0687) (0.0668) 
Trade-Weighted USD -0.103*** -0.123*** -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.0171 -0.0288 0.00321 0.00715 
 (0.0168) (0.0188) (0.0266) (0.0258) (0.0158) (0.0191) (0.0263) (0.0252) 
Cash-Forward Spread 0.0119 0.00983 0.0108 0.00905 -0.0484 -0.0381 -0.0427 -0.0485 
 (0.00806) (0.00816) (0.00867) (0.00837) (0.0290) (0.0332) (0.0337) (0.0325) 
Imports -1.15e-06** -1.18e-06** -1.32e-06** -1.25e-06** 1.92e-05*** 1.92e-05*** 2.10e-05*** 2.09e-05*** 
 (5.73e-07) (5.62e-07) (5.50e-07) (5.44e-07) (2.86e-06) (3.39e-06) (4.03e-06) (3.58e-06) 
S&P 500 0.179*** 0.163*** 0.132** 0.144** 0.000980 -0.00436 0.0130 0.0207 
 (0.0636) (0.0589) (0.0556) (0.0556) (0.0450) (0.0523) (0.0521) (0.0487) 
CBOE VIX 0.0102 0.00975 0.00501 0.00894 -0.0110 -0.0152* -0.0199*** -0.0138* 
 (0.00793) (0.00821) (0.00651) (0.00778) (0.00648) (0.00754) (0.00631) (0.00769) 
Constant 0.204** 0.220** 0.248** 0.243** -0.00544 0.00600 -0.0828 -0.0634 
 (0.100) (0.0974) (0.0974) (0.0958) (0.0309) (0.0489) (0.0494) (0.0596) 
Observations 119 119 119 119 39 39 39 39 
Adj. R2 0.531 0.528 0.520 0.529 0.866 0.845 0.840 0.849 
Root MSE 0.160 0.160 0.162 0.160 0.162 0.174 0.177 0.172 
Notes: This table illustrates the monthly and quarterly OLS regression results for the SPIMSI. The research period runs from January 
(February due to first differences) 2006 to December 2015. This leads to 119 observations for the monthly and 39 for the quarterly data. 
Normality of the residuals cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level for all models using the skewness-kurtosis and Shapiro-Wilk tests. The 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test suggests stationarity for all residuals at the 1 percent level. For all models, I use robust standard errors 
(Huber/White/sandwich estimator) to control for heteroscedasticity. The correlogram with 95 percent confidence bands suggests some 
autocorrelation for higher lags (> 16) in the monthly time-series. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, 
and * for p<0.1. Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) in parentheses. 
The models are defined as:  
(1): ΔCIt = α + β1ΔMRt + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4CFSt + β5IBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(2): ΔCIt = α + β1ΔCBAt + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4CFSt + β5IBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(3): ΔCIt = α + β1ΔM2t + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4CFSt + β5IBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(4): ΔCIt = α + β1aΔCBAt + β1bΔM2t + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4CFSt + β5IBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(5): ΔCIt = α + β1ΔMRt + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4ΔCFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(6): ΔCIt = α + β1ΔCBAt + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4ΔCFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(7): ΔCIt = α + β1ΔM2t + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4ΔCFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(8): ΔCIt = α + β1aΔCBAt + β1bΔM2t + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4ΔCFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt 
With α as intercept, CI as commodity index changes, MR as multiplier ratio, CBA as the sum of central bank assets, M2 as the sum of M2 
market liquidity, RIR as real interest rate, FX as global base metal trade-weighted USD index, CFS as cash-forward spread, IBM as imports 
of ores of and unwrought base metals in USD, SP500 as S&P 500 composite index, VIX as S&P 500 volatility index, and ε as error term. 
The findings indicate that the interest rate index itself might not be the determining factor 
for industrial metal prices. Instead, the ability of an economy to multiply central bank 
induced liquidity is more important. Likewise, the global trade in base metals, proxied by the 
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imports of ores and unwrought base metals, significantly complements the model and 
increases its explanation power. Global imports, the trade-weighted USD index, and the 
multiplier ratio provide an adjusted R2 of 85 percent in the quarterly series and well above 
46 percent in the monthly series.51 
 GOLD SPOT INDEX  
Unlike industrial metals, gold is often used as a safe haven commodity which experiences 
high demand during times of uncertainty. Thus, one might expect that the effects of 
monetary policy transmitted via the transmission channels presented in Section 3.2.2 might 
differ for gold compared to industrial metals. While I expect that the inventory channel and 
the liquidity premium channel play a minor role for the transmission of monetary policy 
effects to the price of gold, the signalling channel and the portfolio rebalancing channel are 
important vehicles for the transmission of monetary policy effects. However, it is expected 
that these effects are different for gold compared to industrial metals, as investors and other 
market participants shift to gold from other assets if they feel uncertain about future 
economic growth. Whereas industrial metal prices are expected to act as an early indicator 
for economic growth, i.e. they experience a positive correlation with economic growth, the 
relationship between the price of gold and economic growth is expected to be inverse. While 
Glick and Leduc (2012) argue that the announcement of large-scale asset purchase 
programmes implies lower expected future economic growth, which leads to less future 
demand and therefore lower commodity prices, I argue that such announcements have the 
opposite effect for gold, as investors shift to safe haven assets during times of uncertainty, 
which increases the demand for gold and thus the price. Likewise, the effects stemming from 
the portfolio rebalancing channel might differ for gold compared to industrial metal prices 
due to the safe haven aspect that accompanies gold. That is, while the funds might be used 
by investors to invest in commodities such as copper and corn to profit from future price 
gains that are the result of market intervention by the central banks, gold prices might decline 
if investors expect that the market interventions are effective, which eventually leads to less 
uncertainty and thus lower demand for gold. Therefore, the effects from the portfolio 
                                                 
51 In addition to OLS regression, I test for the impact of the global multiplier ratio on the volatility of industrial 
metals index changes. While the GARCH (1,1) suggests significant impact of the global multiplier ratio, the 
ARCH-LM test results indicate no ARCH effects in the mean model for the quarterly time-series. For the 
monthly time-series, ARCH effects can be found. I report the GARCH (1,1) model results in Appendix A3.2. 
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rebalancing channel may have the opposite effect on the price of gold compared to the price 
of industrial metals.    
Table 3.3: OLS Regression Results – Gold Spot Index 
 Gold Spot Index 
 Monthly Quarterly 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Multiplier Ratio  0.102    0.564    
 (0.329)    (0.501)    
CBA  6.58e-06  3.09e-06  1.40e-07  -1.22e-05 
  (1.47e-05)  (1.57e-05)  (1.86e-05)  (2.13e-05) 
M2   6.66e-06 6.04e-06   1.81e-05 2.14e-05 
   (8.42e-06) (9.17e-06)   (1.62e-05) (1.83e-05) 
Real Interest Rate -0.0699 -0.0747 -0.0848 -0.0856 -0.146* -0.136 -0.170** -0.172** 
 (0.0669) (0.0641) (0.0657) (0.0649) (0.0816) (0.0817) (0.0745) (0.0788) 
Trade-Weighted USD -0.128*** -0.126*** -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.0991** -0.102** -0.0550 -0.0521 
 (0.0301) (0.0293) (0.0391) (0.0395) (0.0431) (0.0412) (0.0658) (0.0694) 
Cash-Forward Spread -0.00707 -0.00676 -0.00734 -0.00731 -0.0340 -0.0411 -0.0390 -0.0352 
 (0.00857) (0.00852) (0.00861) (0.00868) (0.0356) (0.0364) (0.0338) (0.0354) 
Imports 1.00e-06 1.04e-06 1.10e-06 1.11e-06 4.69e-06** 4.59e-06** 4.93e-06** 5.02e-06** 
 (1.00e-06) (9.92e-07) (9.68e-07) (9.72e-07) (1.77e-06) (1.81e-06) (1.85e-06) (1.95e-06) 
S&P 500 -0.130 -0.134* -0.111 -0.113 -0.221* -0.221* -0.152 -0.146 
 (0.0800) (0.0791) (0.0820) (0.0832) (0.112) (0.116) (0.135) (0.139) 
CBOE VIX 0.0121 0.00982 0.0116 0.0109 0.00536 -0.00157 0.00105 0.00477 
 (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.00986) (0.0109) (0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0129) (0.0153) 
Constant 0.0200 0.0137 0.00227 0.00106 0.134** 0.112 -0.0157 -0.00615 
 (0.0332) (0.0358) (0.0375) (0.0383) (0.0568) (0.0782) (0.121) (0.122) 
Observations 119 119 119 119 39 39 39 39 
Adj. R2 0.284 0.285 0.288 0.282 0.387 0.370 0.395 0.379 
Root MSE 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.351 0.356 0.348 0.353 
Notes: This table illustrates the monthly and quarterly OLS regression results for the SPGSI. The research period runs from January 
(February due to first differences) 2006 to December 2015. This leads to 119 observations for the monthly and 39 for the quarterly data. 
Normality of the residuals is rejected at the 5 percent level for model 1 using the skewness-kurtosis and Shapiro-Wilk tests. The augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test suggests stationarity for all residuals at the 1 percent level. For all models, I use robust standard errors 
(Huber/White/sandwich estimator) to control for heteroscedasticity. The correlogram with 95 percent confidence bands suggests some 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation for higher lags. Yet, the Box-Pierce’ Q statistic tests are non-significant at the 5 percent level. 
* indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator) in parentheses. 
The models are defined as:  
(1): ΔCIt = α + β1ΔMRt + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4CFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(2): ΔCIt = α + β1ΔCBAt + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4CFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(3): ΔCIt = α + β1ΔM2t + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4CFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(4): ΔCIt = α + β1aΔCBAt + β1bΔM2t + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4CFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(5): ΔCIt = α + β1ΔMRt + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4ΔCFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(6): ΔCIt = α + β1ΔCBAt + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4ΔCFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(7): ΔCIt = α + β1ΔM2t + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4ΔCFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt;  
(8): ΔCIt = α + β1aΔCBAt + β1bΔM2t + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4ΔCFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt 
With α as intercept, CI as commodity index changes, MR as multiplier ratio, CBA as the sum of central bank assets, M2 as the sum of M2 
market liquidity, RIR as real interest rate, FX as global base metal trade-weighted USD index, CFS as cash-forward spread, IBM as imports 
of ores of and unwrought base metals in USD, SP500 as S&P 500 composite index, VIX as S&P 500 volatility index, and ε as error term. 
 As a result, one may expect an opposite effect of changes in the global multiplier ratio 
on changes in the gold price index. However, the results reported in Table 3.3 do not show 
evidence of a statistically significant relationship between the multiplier ratio and the gold 
price. In contrast to industrial metals, the explanatory power of the global real interest rate 
index on changes in the gold price is negative and significant at the 5 percent level when 
quarterly data are used. These findings complement prior research (Frankel, 2006) and show 
that the gold price is influenced by the global real interest rate. Contrary to the evaluation of 
industrial metals, global imports are only associated with the gold price in the quarterly time-
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series but do not provide any significant impact at the monthly frequency. Overall, the results 
suggest that the real interest rate appears to be more important for the estimation of the 
gold price, whereas the global multiplier ratio provides better explanation power for 
industrial metals prices.  
 ENDOGENEITY 
This section takes a closer look at the potential endogeneity bias between monetary policy 
and industrial commodity prices. To control for endogeneity in the regression model, 
appropriate instrumental variables for the conventional (real interest rate index) and 
unconventional (global multiplier ratio) monetary policy must be identified. Such 
instrumental variables must affect the dependent variable only through the potentially 
endogenous variables of interest, i.e. without being correlated with the error term. Applied 
to this study’s framework, one must find instruments that impact the industrial metal price 
changes via the individual monetary policy measures without directly influencing the price 
development. This is challenging, as the almost immediate absorption of latest information 
on the financial markets complicates the unambiguous distinction between cause and effect. 
Therefore, I compare the effectiveness of several instrumental variables to mitigate a 
potential variable selection bias. The first instrumental variable for the global multiplier ratio 
is the consumer price index (CPI). Central banks, and thus monetary policy, are primarily 
concerned with consumer prices (e.g. ECB, 2017). Industrial metal prices, on the other side, 
are expected to contribute little to consumer price changes. However, as the CPI is a key 
decision criterion for central banks’ market interventions, i.e. it can influence central bankers 
to adjust their unconventional monetary policy measures to achieve their targeted inflation 
rate, it has a direct impact on both the global multiplier ratio and the real interest rate index52. 
The US, G7, and world CPI are obtained for this analysis. Second, the St. Louis Fed 
Financial Stress Index (STLFSI) provides a compact risk measure which includes, among 
other financial indicators, several interest rate series and yield spread data to identify financial 
distress in the markets. In addition, the Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Risk 
Index (NFCIRISK), a measure that helps to focus on financial conditions in money, debt, 
                                                 
52 CPI year-on-year changes are used to calculate the real interest rate and central banks use CPI information 
to adjust the nominal interest rate. Moreover, as the effects of unconventional monetary policy and inflation 
are expected to be sticky, I believe that inflation, measured by the CPI, acts as a good instrumental variable for 
monetary policy.  
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and equity markets, and its sub-indices for credit (NFCICREDIT), risk (NFCIRISK), and 
leverage (NFCILEVERAGE) are added. 
Table 3.4: IV Regression – Industrial Metals 
 Consumer Price Index (CPI) Financial Conditions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Monthly MR RIR MR+RIR MR RIR MR+RIR 
Multiplier Ratio 2.706* 0.573** 2.603 0.746* 0.618* 0.862 
(1.446) (0.242) (1.604) (0.448) (0.328) (0.557) 
Real Interest Rate -0.0617 -0.158 -0.0812 -0.0722 0.313 0.334 
(0.0756) (0.103) (0.117) (0.0602) (0.305) (0.307) 
Trade-Weighted USD -0.0820*** -0.0927*** -0.0806*** -0.102*** -0.152*** -0.152*** 
(0.0218) (0.0207) (0.0224) (0.0169) (0.0437) (0.0441) 
Cash-Forward Spread 0.00845 0.0133 0.00892 0.0116 0.00555 0.00485 
(0.00889) (0.00806) (0.00940) (0.00781) (0.00984) (0.00989) 
Imports -8.83e-07 
(7.47e-07) 
-1.21e-06** -9.09e-07 -1.13e-06** -8.79e-07 -8.35e-07 
(5.36e-07) (7.54e-07) (5.51e-07) (7.74e-07) (7.60e-07) 
S&P 500 0.247*** 
(0.0753) 
0.175*** 0.243*** 0.184*** 0.199** 0.208** 
(0.0582) (0.0816) (0.0641) (0.0781) (0.0833) 
CBOE VIX 0.0289** 
(0.0142) 
0.00878 0.0277* 0.0116 0.0165 0.0189 
(0.00702) (0.0164) (0.00851) (0.0105) (0.0119) 
Constant 
  
0.182 0.214** 0.185 0.202** 0.159 0.154 
(0.125) (0.0946) (0.125) (0.0965) (0.133) (0.131) 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 
R2 0.239 0.550 0.268 0.557 0.371 0.347 
Durbin Score 4.68** 1.21 4.73* 0.25 3.20* 3.72 
Wu-Hausman  4.50** 1.13 2.25 0.23 3.04* 1.76 
First-Stage statistics        
   Partial R2 0.05 0.33 0.04/0.28 0.32 0.06 0.31/0.06 
   Robust F-Value 1.57 23.13*** - 6.24*** 1.19 - 
Over-Identification tests       
   Sargan Score 0.32 3.45 0.00 7.46* 3.18 2.71 
   Basmann 0.30 3.26 0.00 7.23* 2.97 2.54 
Panel B: Quarterly (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Multiplier Ratio -0.684 0.717*** -1.947 0.644 0.744*** 0.617 
(2.467) (0.261) (3.645) (0.682) (0.283) (0.686) 
Real Interest Rate 0.0712 0.0979 0.204 0.0505 0.0261 0.0250 
(0.0661) (0.102) (0.265) (0.0578) (0.0960) (0.0974) 
Trade-Weighted USD -0.0199 -0.0224 -0.0348 -0.0173 -0.0146 -0.0145 
(0.0199) (0.0189) (0.0397) (0.0143) (0.0152) (0.0156) 
Cash-Forward Spread -0.0268 -0.0506** -0.0135 -0.0470 -0.0473* -0.0452 
(0.0533) (0.0258) (0.0709) (0.0290) (0.0265) (0.0305) 
Imports 2.06e-05*** 
(3.36e-06) 
1.96e-05*** 2.27e-05*** 1.93e-05*** 1.90e-05*** 1.91e-05*** 
(2.74e-06) (5.60e-06) (2.80e-06) (2.73e-06) (2.95e-06) 
S&P 500 -0.00352 
(0.0597) 
-0.00651 -0.0249 0.000692 0.00451 0.00458 
(0.0438) (0.109) (0.0409) (0.0416) (0.0426) 
CBOE VIX -0.0277 
(0.0297) 
-0.0115* -0.0433 -0.0121 -0.0108* -0.0122 
(0.00587) (0.0440) (0.00918) (0.00586) (0.00884) 
Constant 
  
-0.0646 -0.00342 -0.111 -0.00924 -0.00639 -0.0119 
(0.127) (0.0282) (0.178) (0.0346) (0.0279) (0.0349) 
Observations 39 39 39 39 39 39 
R2 0.803 0.888 0.563 0.890 0.890 0.889 
Durbin Score 0.70 0.36 2.13 0.02 0.08 0.11 
Wu-Hausman  0.55 0.28 0.84 0.02 0.06 0.04 
First-Stage statistics        
   Partial R2 0.02 0.28 0.02/0.17 0.13 0.27 0.13/0.27 
   Robust F-Value 0.23 8.17*** - 1.35 5.36*** - 
Over-Identification tests       
   Sargan Score 0.87 1.87 0.04 2.18 2.12 2.07 
   Basmann 0.66 1.46 0.03 1.66 1.61 1.62 
Notes: This table illustrates the monthly and quarterly IV regression results for the SPIMSI. The research period runs from January 
(February due to first differences) 2006 to December 2015. This leads to 119 observations for the monthly and 39 for the quarterly data. 
With MR as global multiplier ratio and RIR as real interest rate index. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for 
p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) in parentheses. With 5 percent or lower as most 
desirable. All variables are at time t. 
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All measures are expected to directly impact the lending and thus the global multiplier ratio 
via M2 as well as the real interest rate index but do not directly affect industrial commodity 
prices. The instrumental variable regression for both the CPI and the risk measures in Table 
3.4 suggest no significant endogeneity present in the models. The Durbin score and the Wu-
Hausman test (H0 = variables are exogenous) are non-significant at the 5 percent significance 
level in most tested scenarios. Only for the multiplier ratio and CPI, I obtain coefficients 
that are significant at the 5 percent level, which indicates that the variables are not 
exogenous. The first-stage regression statistics report partial R2 of up to 33 percent for the 
risk measures and thus provide a good instrumental variable analysis. In addition to CPI and 
risk, I test other instrumental variables. Yet, none of these variables provide a better fit than 
CPI or risk. 
 ROBUSTNESS EXERCISE 
Structural Changes 
During the research period, which spans from January 2006 to December 2015, the world 
economy experienced two major crises. The US mortgage crisis, which began emerging in 
2007, was heavily fuelled by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and 
eventually led to the GFC. The impact of this crisis spilled over to the European market and 
led to the second major crisis during the research period known as the European debt crisis, 
which started in 2009 and is still not fully resolved at the end of the research period in 2015. 
 To test for potential breaks, I begin with the addition of dummy variables to the main 
regression model and extend the base model by six dummy variables that capture the US 
mortgage and subsequent GFC (US1: January 2007 to December 2011, US2: January 2007 
to December 2009, and US3: January 2008 to December 2009) and the European debt crisis 
(EU1: January 2009 to December 2015, EU2: January 2009 to December 2013, and EU3: 
January 2010 to December 2012). The results in Table 3.5 suggest that the GFC in 2008-
2009 significantly affects the industrial metal index at the 1 percent level. Moreover, the 
significance of the monthly global multiplier ratio coefficient becomes non-significant after 
adding the dummy variables. In contrast, gold prices are stronger affected by the European 
debt crisis.53 It must be noted that the overlapping dummy variables may cause 
                                                 
53 In addition, I use the CBOE VIX index to define crises thresholds (cf. Fatum and Yamamoto, 2016). I test 
the significance of a dummy variable that indicates the 90th percentile and the 95th percentile of VIX values 
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multicollinearity. Much like Table 2.4, where I test for multicollinearity among lagged and 
lead variables, it is necessary to also test for multicollinearity here to ensure the accuracy of 
the estimated coefficients reported in Table 3.5.   
Table 3.5: OLS Regression – Extended by Dummy Variables 
 Industrial Metals Gold 
 Monthly Quarterly Monthly Quarterly 
Multiplier Ratio 0.371 1.088*** 0.160 1.050 
(0.271) (0.377) (0.395) (0.732) 
Real Interest Rate -0.0813 0.0428 -0.0338 -0.0602 
(0.0661) (0.0483) (0.0626) (0.109) 
Trade-Weighted USD -0.116*** -0.0302 -0.133*** -0.0951 
(0.0193) (0.0232) (0.0314) (0.0578) 
Cash-Forward Spread 0.0266** -0.0613*** -0.0219* 0.00435 
(0.0102) (0.0204) (0.0125) (0.0513) 
Imports -1.05e-06 1.63e-05*** 9.14e-07 3.46e-06 
(6.69e-07) (3.13e-06) (9.53e-07) (2.65e-06) 
S&P 500 0.156** 0.123* -0.0820 -0.116 
(0.0653) (0.0700) (0.0947) (0.169) 
CBOE VIX 0.00921 6.51e-05 0.0177 0.0128 
(0.00784) (0.00804) (0.0118) (0.0166) 
US1 0.0175 -0.0371 0.130 0.359 
 (0.0415) (0.113) (0.0916) (0.214) 
US2 -0.159* -0.200 -0.0962 -0.0384 
 (0.0927) (0.159) (0.120) (0.310) 
US3 0.166** 0.426*** 0.104 0.134 
 (0.0694) (0.102) (0.0703) (0.277) 
EU1 0.0619 -0.0538 0.207** 0.298 
 (0.0680) (0.100) (0.0818) (0.220) 
EU2 -0.0156 -0.158* -0.171** -0.385 
 (0.0480) (0.0909) (0.0845) (0.292) 
EU3 -0.00253 0.125 0.0521 0.278 
 (0.0467) (0.108) (0.103) (0.342) 
Constant 
  
0.171 0.0737 -0.150* -0.163 
(0.141) (0.0760) (0.0768) (0.158) 
Observations 119 39 119 39 
Adjusted R2 0.552 0.885 0.319 0.444 
Notes: This table illustrates the monthly and quarterly OLS regression results for the SPIMSI. The research period runs from January 
(February due to first differences) 2006 to December 2015. This leads to 119 observations for the monthly and 39 for the quarterly data. 
* indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator) in parentheses. 
The models are defined as:  
Industrial Metals – Monthly: ΔCIt = α + β1ΔMRt + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4CFSt + β5IBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + β8US1t + β9US2t 
+ β10US3t + β11EU1t + β12EU2t + β13EU4t + εt 
Industrial Metals – Quarterly: ΔCIt = α + β1ΔMRt + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4ΔCFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + β8US1t + 
β9US2t + β10US3t + β11EU1t + β12EU2t + β13EU4t + εt 
Gold – Monthly: ΔCIt = α + β1ΔMRt + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4CFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + β8US1t + β9US2t + β10US3t 
+ β11EU1t + β12EU2t + β13EU4t + εt 
Gold – Quarterly: ΔCIt = α + β1ΔMRt + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4ΔCFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + β8US1t + β9US2t + β10US3t 
+ β11EU1t + β12EU2t + β13EU4t + εt 
With α as intercept, CI as commodity index changes (industrial metals or gold), MR as multiplier ratio, RIR as real interest rate, FX as 
global base metal trade-weighted USD index, CFS as cash-forward spread, IBM as imports of ores of and unwrought base metals, SP500 
as S&P 500 composite index, VIX as S&P 500 volatility index, US1 as dummy variable indicating the period between the years 2007 and 
2011, US2 as dummy variable indicating the period between the years 2007 and 2009, US3 as dummy variable indicating the period between 
the years 2008 and 2009, EU1 as dummy variable for the period between 2009 and 2015, EU2 as dummy variable for the period between 
2009 and 2013, EU3 as dummy variable for the period between 2010 and 2012, and ε as error term. All variables are at time t. 
Thus, I first run the regression with non-overlapping dummy variables. Compared to the 
findings reported in Table 3.5, the results remain comparable, i.e. the significance of the 
                                                 
during the research period. As both percentile ranges simply cover the period between 2008 and 2009, this 
analysis does not provide additional value to the existing dummy variables and is thus not reported. 
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estimated coefficients for the variables of interest, the global multiplier ratio and global real 
interest rate, are comparable to those presented in Table 3.5. Second, I use the variance 
inflation factor (vif) to test for multicollinearity in the model. All vif values are well below 
1054. Moreover, as the dummy variables are primarily used as controls and are not variables 
of interest, potential collinearity among them does not affect the estimates of the variables 
of interest (Allison, 2012). According to Allison (2012), multicollinearity only increases the 
standard errors for the collinear variables and not the others. As long as these variables are 
not collinear with the variables of interest, their function as control variables is not weakened 
by potential multicollinearity among them (Allison, 2012). 
 While adding dummy variables to account for crisis periods can partially explain 
differences in the explanatory power of regressors throughout the research period, a 
statistical approach to identify breaks within the sample may be more appropriate. Thus, the 
second structural break evaluation relies on the Bai and Perron (2003a, 2003b) test and uses 
a least squares regression with breaks.  
Table 3.6: OLS with Bai-Perron Structural Breaks 
 Industrial Metals Gold 
Panel A: Monthly 
2006M02 - 
2008M01 
2008M02 - 
2009M08 
2009M09 - 
2011M02 
2011M03 - 
2015M12 
2006M02 - 
2008M12 
2009M01 - 
2011M09 
2011M10 - 
2013M06 
2013M07 - 
2015M12 
Multiplier Ratio  0.0648 1.0185*** 0.5741 -0.6835 -0.5534 1.4614** -0.4023 1.0032 
 (0.2524) (0.2883) (0.6967) (0.4209) (0.3955) (0.6195) (1.2321) (1.4083) 
Real Interest Rate 0.3190** -0.5310*** -0.0977 0.0544 0.0630 -0.1615*** 0.2709 0.4000*** 
 (0.1236) (0.0668) (0.0883) (0.0814) (0.0971) (0.0842) (0.2345) (0.1466) 
Trade-Weighted USD -0.4185*** -0.0466* -0.0642 -0.0984*** -0.1717*** -0.0761** -0.0761** -0.0381 
(0.0660) (0.0244) (0.0553) (0.0179) (0.0500) (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0280) 
Cash-Forward Spread 0.0249*** -0.0861*** -0.0124 0.0188 -0.0294** -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0618** 
 (0.0075) (0.0253) (0.0226) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0242) 
Imports -2.77e-06** -9.70e-07 3.32e-06* -2.17e-06** 4.41e-08 2.85e-06*** 2.85e-06*** -2.3e-06*** 
 (1.17e-06) (1.49e-06) (1.89e-06) (8.45e-07) (1.95e-06) (1.03e-06) (1.03e-06) (7.25e-07) 
S&P 500 -0.1784* 0.1070 0.2088 0.0853* -0.2498*** -0.0186 -0.0186 -0.2869** 
 (0.0993) (0.0897) (0.1354) (0.0512) (0.0537) (0.1404) (0.1404) (0.1405) 
CBOE VIX -0.0237* 0.0117 -0.0148** 0.0014 -0.0045 0.0358** 0.0358** -0.0406* 
 (0.0138) (0.0105) (0.0072) (0.0059) (0.0072) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0224) 
Constant 0.3142* 0.1860 -0.5716* 0.3947** -0.1536** 0.1288*** 0.1288*** -0.0222 
 (0.1865) (0.2569) (0.3422) (0.1587) (0.0688) (0.0419) (0.0419) (0.0343) 
Observations 24 19 18 58 35 33 21 30 
Adj. R2 0.776 0.550 
Notes: This table illustrates the monthly OLS regression Bai-Perron Structural Breaks and Newey-West Standard Errors results for the 
price of industrial metals and gold. The research period runs from January (February due to first differences) 2006 to December 2015. 
This leads to 119 observations for the monthly data. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for 
p<0.1. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. 
Due to the limited number of observations, I limit the potential breaks to three to ensure 
sufficient observations for each of the four sub-samples and further limit this exercise to 
monthly data. The results of the OLS model with Bai-Perron structural breaks reported in 
Table 3.6 show that the relationship between changes in commodity prices, the global 
                                                 
54 Chatterjee and Hadi (2012) argue that a vif value greater than 10 indicates collinearity issues.  
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multiplier ratio, and real interest rates is far from being constant. The results suggest that the 
positive effect of the multiplier ratio on monthly changes in the price of industrial metals is 
only significant between February 2008 and August 2009 in the monthly sample. This also 
applies to changes in the price of gold. Moreover, the results suggest a negative impact of 
real interest rates on monthly changes in the price of industrial metals that is significant 
between February 2006 and August 2009. This indicates that real interest rates had a 
significant positive effect on industrial metal price changes prior to the GFC, which indicates 
that the effect stemming from real interest rates, most notably the inventory channel55, has 
not been in line with theory during this time. Instead, other market forces appear to have 
had a stronger effect during this period. However, since September 2009, the significance of 
both variables diminishes.  
 These findings allow me to draw three conclusions. First, the impact of both the global 
multiplier ratio and real interest rates on industrial metal prices changes over time. Thus, 
linear models might not fully explain the true relationship between commodity prices and 
real interest rates. Second, while early QE measures may have lifted industrial metal prices, 
latest measures, i.e. after 2011, seem to have a non-significant impact on industrial metal 
prices. Third, while the impact of global real interest rates is non-significant for the overall 
research period, sub-sample results suggest that the impact can be significant during shorter 
periods. The findings indicate that the price of gold is significantly and positively affected 
by the multiplier ratio between January 2009 and the September 2011. Moreover, like 
industrial metals, the price of gold is both positively and negatively affected by the global 
real interest rate during different sub-periods. Industrial metals and gold prices are similarly, 
i.e. positively, affected by the multiplier ratio. The assumption that gold, as a safe haven asset 
that experiences higher demand during times of uncertainty, has an inverse relationship with 
the multiplier ratio and real interest rates compared to industrial metals cannot be confirmed.  
Individual Industrial Metals 
The findings for the SPIMSI indicate that the global multiplier ratio has significant positive 
estimation power at the 5 percent significance level on the industrial metals index. Yet, it 
remains unclear whether this effect applies to all industrial metals equally. In this section, I 
split the analysis by each of the five individual industrial metals. Compared to the evaluation 
                                                 
55 Low real interest rates lead to an increase in inventory demand and thus raise in prices. 
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of the industrial metals index, commodity-specific indicators are used for imports and the 
spot-futures spread. The results in Table 3.7 show a significant positive impact of the global 
multiplier ratio on the price of copper at the 5 percent significance level in both the monthly 
and quarterly time-series.  
Table 3.7: OLS Regression – Individual Industrial Metals 
Panel A: Monthly Aluminium Spot Copper Spot Lead Spot Nickel Spot Zinc Spot 
Multiplier Ratio 1.807 13.55** 4.066 41.36* 1.643 
 (1.438) (5.374) (4.074) (24.79) (2.606) 
Real Interest Rate -0.811* -0.871 0.119 -9.147 0.201 
 (0.416) (1.382) (0.587) (7.886) (0.599) 
Trade-Weighted USD -0.489*** -2.228*** -0.622*** -4.549** -0.804*** 
 (0.103) (0.395) (0.167) (1.837) (0.149) 
Cash-Forward Spread 0.0121*** 0.0205** 0.0156** 0.0176*** 0.0283** 
 (0.00409) (0.00812) (0.00713) (0.00262) (0.0140) 
Imports -1.14e-05 -1.23e-05 -0.000105* -0.00212*** -0.000223*** 
 (1.35e-05) (2.30e-05) (5.58e-05) (0.000682) (6.81e-05) 
S&P 500 0.746* 2.960** 1.478** 13.87** 1.973*** 
 (0.438) (1.329) (0.609) (5.459) (0.443) 
CBOE VIX 0.0586 0.103 0.130 0.579 0.152*** 
 (0.0532) (0.152) (0.0919) (0.549) (0.0578) 
Constant 0.812 0.949 1.070** 32.88*** 3.605*** 
  (0.625) (2.037) (0.480) (10.39) (1.087) 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 
Adjusted R2 0.421 0.490 0.261 0.448 0.349 
Panel B: Quarterly Aluminium Spot Copper Spot Lead Spot Nickel Spot Zinc Spot 
Multiplier Ratio 0.364 19.86** 2.852 -5.967 4.577 
 (1.344) (7.750) (3.216) (43.51) (4.793) 
Real Interest Rate -0.366 0.852 1.158 -12.05 0.725 
 (0.310) (1.358) (0.689) (8.723) (1.007) 
Trade-Weighted USD -0.183* -1.246*** -0.296 5.415 -0.153 
 (0.0904) (0.338) (0.182) (4.149) (0.234) 
Cash-Forward Spread 0.0120 0.0558*** 0.0469 0.0195*** 0.0117 
 (0.0150) (0.0143) (0.0285) (0.00633) (0.0388) 
Imports 0.000268*** 0.000482*** 0.00107*** 0.0109*** 0.000938*** 
 (4.75e-05) (9.88e-05) (0.000294) (0.00362) (0.000309) 
S&P 500 0.115 1.672* 1.094** -4.576 0.0376 
 (0.397) (0.877) (0.471) (6.458) (0.573) 
CBOE VIX -0.0693** -0.0115 0.0407 -2.263 -0.0332 
 (0.0307) (0.161) (0.0868) (1.379) (0.0871) 
Constant 0.134 -0.193 0.339 -6.824 0.126 
  (0.521) (0.774) (0.497) (5.077) (0.857) 
Observations 39 39 39 39 39 
Adjusted R2 0.814 0.810 0.609 0.729 0.435 
Notes: This table illustrates the monthly and quarterly OLS regression results for the individual industrial metal spot prices. The research 
period runs from January (February due to first differences) 2006 to December 2015. This leads to 119 observations for the monthly and 
39 for the quarterly data. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Robust standard errors 
(Huber/White/sandwich estimator) in parentheses.  
The model is defined as: 
ΔCIt = α + β1ΔMRt + β2ΔRIRt + β3ΔFXt + β4CFSt + β5ΔIBMt + β6ΔSP500t + β7ΔVIXt + εt 
With α as intercept, CI as commodity index changes, MR as multiplier ratio, RIR as real interest rate, FX as global base metal trade-
weighted USD index, CFS as cash-forward spread, IBM as imports of ores of and unwrought base metals, SP500 as S&P 500 composite 
index, VIX as S&P 500 volatility index, and ε as error term. All variables are at time t. 
However, the real interest rate index provides mostly non-significant estimation power on 
the price of the individual commodities. Once I drop the primarily non-significant stock 
market related controls from the model, the global multiplier ratio is significant for 
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aluminium, copper, lead, and nickel in the quarterly time-series.56 Overall, the individual 
commodity results only confirm the findings obtained for the SPIMSI for copper, the most-
traded industrial metal on the market.57 Contrary to the industrial metals index, the cash-
forward (spot-futures) spread provides significant positive estimation power at the 1 percent 
level in the quarterly time-series and extends findings in prior research. Both Frankel and 
Rose (2010) and Frankel (2014) report a non-significant impact of the spot-futures spread 
on annual real copper prices. Moreover, Sun et al. (2013) report non-significant estimation 
power of log returns of the LME aluminium futures-spot spread on the returns of the LME 
futures and Chinese Shanghai Metals Market spot price of aluminium. I, however, show that 
the LME spot-futures spread significantly and positively affects aluminium price changes. 
Variable Selection Bias 
The last section of the robustness exercise deals with the potential variable selection bias 
underlying the dataset. First, the SPIMSI is swapped by the LMEX, a comparable index 
provided by the London Metal Exchange that consists of futures data of six non-ferrous 
metals (SPIMSI plus tin) that is, like the SPIMSI, weighted by the preceding five-year 
production data. As expected, all results for the OLS regression are comparable and the 
global multiplier ratio remains significant for both the monthly and quarterly data. Second, 
individual commodity currencies are added to the dataset to test their estimation power 
compared to the self-created trade-weighted base metal USD index. The Australian Dollar, 
Chilean Peso, Norwegian Krone, and Peruvian Sol are floating currencies of countries with 
major non-ferrous metal operations.58 The addition of several individual currencies provides 
little extra value. Compared to the OLS results, the individual currencies indicate a minor 
advantage based on slightly higher R2. However, the adjusted R2 and root-mean-square error 
(RMSE) suggest superiority of the trade-weighted base metal USD index in the quarterly 
analysis. The trade-weighted base metal USD index does not only provide better results than 
the individual currencies, it further offers a pooling of various base metal-related currencies 
                                                 
56 These results are not included in this study but are available upon request.  
57 In addition to industrial metals and gold, I extend the analysis to crude oil (WTI, NYMEX), natural gas 
(NYMEX), and wheat (No. 2). The findings suggest a significant positive effect of the global multiplier ratio 
and a significant negative effect of the real interest rate on crude oil in the reduced-form model, both at the 1 
percent significance level. Once I add further controls such as global imports, the significance of the global 
multiplier ratio diminishes. Moreover, the models suggest little significant estimation power for both focus 
variables on the price of natural gas and wheat. Results are stored in Table A3.3 in the appendix.  
58 Currencies, in the context of this study, are defined as the currency pair local currency to USD.  
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and their joint movement throughout time. This equips researchers with a convenient and 
accurate measure to track movements in base metal currencies.59 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Changes in nominal refinancing interest rates and the implementation of comprehensive 
asset purchase programmes are two approaches used by major inflation-targeting central 
banks to maintain price stability. Since the outbreak of the GFC in 2008, asset purchase 
programmes have been used by leading central banks. The combination of nominal near-
zero interest rates and the purchase of significant quantities of government and corporate 
debt has equipped market participants with access to plentiful cheap capital. Because of these 
market interventions, the four largest central banks (PBOC, FED, BoJ, ECB) hold assets of 
more than 17.8 trillion USD which translates to roughly 70 percent of the World’s central 
bank assets, or almost 24 percent of world GDP (Kuntz, 2016). Consequently, the reduction 
in the availability of government debt on the secondary market has forced investors to find 
alternatives for the newly accessible funds. 
 Despite the considerable share of global financial markets accounted for by central bank 
assets, little research evaluates the impact of the monetary policy induced distortion of global 
liquidity on the price of non-ferrous metals and gold. This study closes the gap in the 
literature and scrutinises the effects of monetary policy and changes in liquidity on exchange-
traded base metal and gold prices. It goes beyond prior research and introduces a new 
measure, the global multiplier ratio, to proxy for global central bank market interventions 
and unconventional monetary policy measures. This variable indicates whether the freshly 
induced money by central banks is translated into broad market liquidity (by measuring the 
relationship with M2) and whether this transmission influences industrial metal and gold 
prices. The significance of the positive effect of the global multiplier ratio on the price of 
industrial metals is limited in time and specific to one commodity, i.e. the effect appears to 
be only significant during the period surrounding the GFC for an index of industrial metals 
and gold and is found to only significantly influence the price of copper if the industrial 
                                                 
59 In addition to the presented robustness tests, I further evaluate linear interdependencies of the monthly 
time-series. Due to few quarterly observations, this analysis is limited to monthly data. The linear 
interdependency analysis suggests long-run causality from the independent variables to the real interest rate 
index and from the independent variables to global imports in the monthly data at the 5 percent significance 
level. The results for short-run causality indicate a significant impact of the lagged global multiplier ratio on all 
but global imports in the monthly time-series. 
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metals are evaluated individually. Despite the limited statistical significance of the results, 
the global multiplier ratio allows investors and policy makers to quickly and efficiently 
quantify the impact of global central bank market interventions and to consider the 
associated effects on commodity prices in their models. The findings reported here suggest 
that the increase in central bank induced liquidity had a limited influence on both industrial 
metals and gold prices. This is contrary to the initial expectation that industrial metal prices 
respond to monetary policy measures. That is, if the effects of monetary policy work as 
intended, one should be able to observe an increase in investment and consumption, which 
should increase industrial metal prices. However, as the results suggest a non-significant 
relationship between monetary policy and metal prices, it remains arguable whether the 
examined monetary measures during the research period sufficiently fulfil their purpose.  
 The global multiplier ratio is complemented by a newly created global real interest rates 
index, which is not limited to US interest rates but also includes the interest rates of other 
major economies. The results provide little evidence that real interest rates influence non-
ferrous metal prices. In line with prior research for the US, I do find evidence that real 
interest rates are associated with the gold price. In addition, I evaluate commodities that 
have experienced little attention in prior studies and show that the explanatory variables 
have different estimation power for individual commodities. In fact, the price of copper is 
the only industrial metal that is influenced by the global multiplier ratio in both the monthly 
and quarterly sample. However, as copper is also the most traded industrial metal among 
those evaluated, the findings suggest that most market participants may use this metal to 
trade and participate in the speculative industrial metal markets (i.e. without the intention to 
hedge risk linked to physical metals or use the goods). That is, by engaging in copper trading, 
market participants may try to benefit from future economic growth changes, as prior 
literature has found significant links between global copper prices and economic activity (e.g. 
Guo, 2018) and copper consumption and economic growth (Jaunky, 2013).  
 Overall, this study provides new insights into the interaction of money supply, monetary 
policy, and global base metal and gold prices. The increasing normalisation and persistence 
of asset purchases within the central bank toolkit motivates greater attention by researchers. 
The results presented in this chapter serve as a fresh reminder of the consequences of market 
interventions by central banks and their impact on areas that experience less attention in an 
inflation-target environment.  
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CHAPTER 4 FINANCIALIZATION AND COMMODITY FUTURES RETURNS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 2000s, commodities have increasingly been regarded as an asset class in their 
own right. The expanded supply of futures contracts facilitating trading in commodities is a 
process known as the financialization of commodity markets (Basak and Pavlova, 2016). 
Since the onset of financialization, sharp surges and subsequent corrections in commodity 
prices have fuelled a debate about the effects of commodity market financialization, and 
particularly financial non-commercial speculation, among policy makers, academics, and the 
media. While some prominent figures advocate that “[…] both trend-following speculation and 
institutional commodity index buying reinforce the upward pressure on prices.” (Soros, 2008:2) and “Index 
speculators have driven futures and spot prices higher.” (Masters, 2008:5), agreement about the impact 
of speculation remains elusive in the academic literature. Rather than financial speculation 
increasing volatility, some find evidence for a lowering effect (Bohl and Stephan, 2013; Kim, 
2015), no impact on price levels (Buyuksahin and Harris, 2011; Fattouh et al., 2012), or no 
evidence of speculative bubbles for a range of commodities (Brooks et al., 2015). Others 
argue that spot prices go up with financialization (Basak and Pavlova, 2016), have been 
particularly driven by speculative shocks between 2004 and 2008 and the subsequent 
correction of prices (Juvenal and Petrella, 2015), and are not solely driven by their physical 
supply and demand anymore but also by financial supply and demand due to index 
investment (Tang and Xiong, 2012). 
 Motivated by recent regulatory changes in the US and the EU60 and inconsistent 
findings in the academic literature on the impact of commodity market financialization, this 
study examines the effectiveness of variables linked to financialization for explaining the 
returns of ten commodities comprising softs, copper, three precious metals, crude oil, and 
natural gas. I separate the evaluation of the effects of commodity financialization on 
commodity futures returns, particularly at the extremes, into excess net long non-
                                                 
60 Recent regulatory changes such as the Dodd-Frank act in the US and the MiFID II directive in the EU aim 
to stabilise the asset markets and limit speculative trading activity by non-commercial commodity investors. 
According to article 58 paragraph 2 of MiFID II (Directive 2014/65/EU), traders must report precise holding 
positions at least daily to avoid trading beyond the set limits (cf. European Parliament, 2014). Article 69 
paragraph 1 and 2 grant supervisory powers to EU member states’ financial authorities, “(o) request any person to 
take steps to reduce the size of the position or exposure;” and “(p) limit the ability of any person from entering into a commodity 
derivative, including by introducing limits on the size of a position any person can hold at all times in accordance with Article 57 
of this Directive;” (European Parliament, 2014: 107). 
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commercial speculation and trader concentration61. I further show that these effects are 
transmitted via two channels denoted as the financial channel and the signalling channel. 
This approach assesses the growing participation of commercial and non-commercial traders 
on US commodity markets since the early-2000s and whether this has influenced prices 
during boom-and-bust cycles over the last two decades. I find that speculation, on average, 
has a reinforcing effect on returns. However, when examining the whole distribution of 
returns using a quantile regression, I find that speculation seems to stabilise returns for a 
panel of ten commodities, by dampening them at the upper and lower quantiles of the 
distribution. However, the commodity-specific findings suggest that ESV only has a stronger 
stabilising, i.e. positive effect on the left tail of the return distribution, i.e. the 5th to 50th 
quantiles for soybeans and gold. For most other individual commodities, the results rather 
indicate a reinforcing relationship between ESV and returns, for both the mean and quantile 
regressions. Moreover, for all commodities, the effect of non-commercial speculation on 
returns, indicated by the magnitude of the coefficients, is small. Further analysis using 
Granger causality tests reveals reverse causality62, i.e. returns Granger-cause non-commercial 
speculation. This contradicts the common belief that non-commercial speculation drives 
commodity prices. The stabilising effect observed for the panel of ten commodities, i.e. 
support at the lower tail and reduction at the upper tail, of speculation on returns is rather 
the reaction of non-commercial traders to changes in the futures price. When prices fall, 
non-commercial traders increase their positions, which leads to an increase in non-
commercial open interest. Conversely, traders reduce their open interest by taking profits 
when prices increase. This might be due to traders who calculate expected prices of the 
commodities and use short-term market fluctuations, i.e. variations from their expected 
price, to profit. However, another possible explanation for the observed interaction might 
be grounded in the frequency of the data, i.e. the weekly observations. The observed 
unidirectional Granger causality from returns to non-commercial speculation might be part 
of an interaction between returns and speculation, where the Granger causal effects from 
                                                 
61 In this study, I synonymously use the terms market concentration and trader concentration, as both describe 
the concentration of market participants, i.e. traders, on commodity futures markets. 
62 In this study, I define causality as causal effects from non-commercial speculation to returns and reverse 
causality as causality from returns to non-commercial speculation, to easily distinguish between the two forms 
of potential causality. If causality exists both ways, it is denoted as bidirectional causality. I chose this definition 
due to the common perception in the media that speculation has influenced the price of commodities. 
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speculation to returns is not observable with weekly data63. In addition to the financial effect, 
I identify a second transmission channel of speculation, denoted as the signalling effect, 
which suggests that the information content of the US Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) Commitment of Traders report significantly affects returns once the 
information becomes public. These results are robust to a range of commodity-specific and 
macroeconomic controls. The findings help investors, regulators, and policymakers to better 
understand the role of commodity financialization in shaping the relationship between non-
commercial speculation, trader concentration, and the futures returns of exchange-traded 
commodities. 
 The remainder of Chapter 4 is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the 
transmission from speculation to returns and provides a review of prior research. 
Subsequently, Section 4.3 introduces the data and methodology, which is followed by the 
empirical results of the study in Section 4.4 and the conclusion in Section 4.5. 
4.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE  
Financialization describes the phenomenon of the increasing importance of the financial 
sector relative to the real sector of the economy (Palley, 2013) and the increasing significance 
of financial markets, actors, and institutions for the world economy (Epstein, 2005). The 
financialization of commodity markets offers market participants an alternative to physical 
hedging and speculation, as it does not require them to buy, store, and hold goods until 
consumption or (re)sale. Likewise, market participants who are interested in selling 
commodities can do so by taking short positions. With the financialization of exchange-
traded commodities and the increase in the number of products available, the trading of 
commodities has become easier. Smaller producers or consumers and traders who are less 
interested in the production or consumption of the goods can profit from the advantages of 
a financialized market such as accessibility, competition, open pricing, liquidity, and leverage. 
Thus, the financialization of commodity markets provides more opportunities for traders to 
participate in financial hedging and speculation. While producers offer their products on a 
market and use the short position of futures contracts to mitigate their downside price risk, 
consumers of those goods usually take the long position to insure themselves against rising 
                                                 
63 As data at higher frequency is not available, the validation of this assumption is not possible. 
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prices. Similarly, financial speculators take either short or long positions to gain from future 
price movements and, in return, provide an obligation to either sell or buy the underlying 
goods in future.64 Therefore, both commercial (producers and consumers) and non-
commercial (speculators) traders enter into an obligation to either sell or buy a commodity 
once the futures contract expires. Despite their different intentions, the impact of their 
involvement in futures markets on the underlying commodity is similar: both affect the 
(expected) demand and supply (for either consumption or speculation) and thus the price.65 
In addition to lower costs, easier tradability, and leverage, financial hedging and speculation 
provides another advantage over physical hedging and speculation: measurability. Unlike its 
physical counterpart, where one may buy goods and store them in private warehouses that 
are not monitored or even known by any authority, the traceability of financial hedging and 
speculation is relatively clear.  
 Particularly since the beginning of the early 2000s, commodity markets received 
increasing attention from investors and researchers. Growing demand from developing 
countries, an increasing global population, and the absence of alternative investment 
opportunities following the dot-com bubble burst attracted index fund investors to 
commodity markets. In March 2003, the first exchange traded fund (ETF) backed by 
physical gold launched (Saefong, 2013). Since then, the daily open interest (and trade 
volume) in major commodity markets such as gold, corn, and crude oil futures on average 
tripled from 324 thousand (68 thousand) contracts in 1996 to 1.2 million (555 thousand) 
contracts in 2016. As this development may have fuelled the two most prominent 
commodity peaks since the turn of the millennium in 2008 and 2011, it has encouraged 
researchers to scrutinise the link between the volume and structure of the commodity futures 
market and the time-series characteristics of commodity prices.  
                                                 
64 Unlike stocks and bonds, commodities do not pay dividends or accrue value via interest and retained earnings 
but can be either consumed or used to produce other goods. Thus, commodity investors solely profit from 
price changes arising due to changes in (expected) supply and demand. 
65 One might imagine a situation where a producer that has sold future produce on the futures market and is 
not able to fulfil the contract obligation at maturity. Likewise, a consumer that secures expected future demand 
with a futures contract might not need the full quantity at maturity. As both can sell all or parts of their 
obligation, it remains unclear whether this initial hedge is, in fact, a speculative trade at a later point in time. 
Moreover, one might be unclear as to whether a wholesaler is defined as a hedger or speculator. Consequently, 
the question arises as to whether speculation has a different impact on commodities to hedging and if its impact 
is measurable. 
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 To identify a link between speculation and returns, prior research often uses direct 
measures of speculation paired with commodity futures open interest. It concentrates on 
the conditional mean and neglects the heterogeneity in the impact of non-commercial 
speculative open interest between quantiles of the commodity return distribution (e.g. Irwin 
and Sanders, 2010; Etienne et al., 2016). 
Figure 4.1: Trading Volume, Open Interest, Commodity Prices, and Equity Indices 
Corn  Copper 
  
Gold  Crude Oil 
  
Notes: This figure illustrates the monthly development of the price, open interest (in contracts), and trade volume (in contracts) of gold, 
copper, crude oil (light sweet), and corn continuous futures traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), Commodities 
Exchange (COMEX), and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), the S&P 500 Agricultural Products index, the Euromoney North America 
Base Metals and Gold indices, and the FTSE North America Oil & Gas index from January 1995 to March 2017. All price time-series are 
nominal and indexed to 2002-2004 = 100. 
However, the mean analysis might hide valuable information that is crucial to understand 
the relationship between the main variables. First, commodity futures returns experience fat 
tails (Han et al., 2015; Nagayev et al., 2016). Thus, outliers disproportionally affect the mean. 
Second, the mean models assume that the relationship between commodity prices or returns 
and speculative open interest is constant. If speculative open interest provides reinforcing 
(e.g., Haase et al., 2016) or increasing (Basak and Pavlova, 2016) effects, one should be able 
to observe constant coefficients at the lower and upper quantiles of the return structure. 
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However, if speculative open interest has a destabilising effect, as shown by Bosch and 
Pradkhan (2015) for precious metals prior to June 2006, one may observe negative 
coefficients on the left tail and positive coefficients on the right tail of commodity returns. 
These effects may even accelerate at the extremes when momentum or predatory trading is 
present in the market.66 However, if speculative open interest has a stabilising effect (e.g., 
Kim, 2015; Brunetti et al., 2016) the coefficient should be positive on the left tail and 
negative on the right tail of commodity returns. Either way, the mean analysis conceals the 
real impact of the regressors on different quantiles of the dependent variable. Extreme 
events in financial markets have led to drastic price fluctuations during the last two decades. 
Yet, little is known about the effects of non-commercial speculation and its impact on the 
returns formation, particularly in the extremes.  
 Moreover, despite the usefulness of linear regression where all observations are 
captured at the same time, past values of the regressors may hold valuable information to 
improve the estimation of the dependent variable. While this sort of causality, commonly 
referred to as Granger causality, may not identify the true causal relationship between 
variables, it provides predictive causality and improves the estimation of a dependent 
variable.67 Evidence on the existence or direction of causality between speculation and 
commodity prices is mixed. For example, Huchet and Fam (2016) present evidence in 
support of Granger causality from changes in non-commercial positions to agricultural 
commodity prices including wheat, sugar, coffee, and corn. Others, however, find evidence 
to the contrary and argue that non-commercial trader positions do not Granger-cause prices 
(Brunetti and Buyuksahin, 2009; Stoll and Whaley, 2010; Buyuksahin and Harris, 2011) and 
index trader positions generally cannot predict agricultural futures returns (Hamilton and 
Wu, 2015). Instead, price changes drive speculative positions (Alquist and Gervais, 2013; 
Andreasson et al., 2016). However, most prior studies either rely on raw non-commercial 
                                                 
66 While Bessembinder et al. (2014) find little significant evidence for predatory strategies present in the crude 
oil futures market but rather liquidity-supporting effects, research on momentum trading, i.e. trading on 
existing trends, indicates a tendency of overreaction in asset markets at long horizons (e.g. Hong and Stein, 
1999). Building on Moskowitz et al. (2012), I create a dummy that illustrates a 12-week time-series momentum 
strategy with a 1-week holding period, i.e. if the average return of the last 12 weeks is positive or zero, the 
dummy is 1 and if the average return of the last 12 weeks is negative, the dummy is set to 0. While the 
momentum dummy is negative and highly significant, i.e. at the 1 percent level, which suggests strong impact 
of momentum on the estimation of commodity futures returns, all variables of interest remain significant and 
with their respective signs as highlighted in the main analysis.  
67 Hereinafter, I use the terms Granger causality and causality synonymously. 
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positions that neglect the trading of other market participants or use measures that 
insufficiently account for non-reportable positions (e.g. Working’s T-index) which have 
been found to gain considerable influence in agricultural commodity markets (Meyer, 2017).  
 To measure the impact of commodity market financialization on prices, returns, and 
the volatility thereof, most prior research focuses on the evaluation of non-commercial 
speculation (cf. Haase et al, 2016), i.e. the financial speculation stemming from traders that 
are purely interested in financial gains and neither the production nor consumption of the 
underlying.68 In addition to the increase in trading volume and open interest, the 
financialization of commodity markets allows more traders to access and participate in 
financial commodity markets. As a result, the average number of reportable traders, i.e. 
traders that meet the minimum reporting threshold in open interest set by the CFTC, 
increased simultaneously. For example, the number of traders engaged in trading crude oil 
futures almost quadrupled from an average of 184 in 1995 to almost 700 in 2017.69 To answer 
the question of who affects the price of commodities and whether the financialization of 
commodity markets plays a key role, it is not sufficient to focus on whether the effects come 
from commercial or non-commercial open interest increases throughout the last two 
decades. Instead, I argue that trader concentration plays a significant role in explaining recent 
developments in commodity markets. Trades by both commercial and non-commercial 
traders affect the (expected) demand and supply for commodities. Their actions, on average, 
like any other market participant such as producers and consumers, affect the equilibrium 
                                                 
68 Surprisingly, most research focuses on the negative impact, or the existence of such, on commodity prices, 
but pays significantly less attention to the general effects of financial trading. As highlighted, the effect of 
trading by hedgers (commercial speculation) and speculators (non-commercial speculation) on the price is 
similar. Thus, it should be less of a question of whether non-commercial speculation affects prices, but rather 
if non-commercial speculation disproportionally affects commodity prices, i.e. if there is a stronger effect 
stemming from non-commercials compared to commercials. By implying that commercial speculation 
(hedging) is good and non-commercial hedging is bad, one assumes that the intentions underlying the trading 
of commercial speculators differ to those of non-commercials. Yet, it should be obvious that every trader’s 
goal is the same: To achieve the highest possible price for their sales and the lowest possible price for their 
purchases. I address this issue by extending the focus from excess non-commercial speculation to net long 
speculation by commercials and non-commercials by using disaggregated data in Section 4.3.1 and further 
consider the effect of the overall open interest in commodity futures markets.  
69 For other commodities, the increase is comparable. For example, the number of traders in corn almost 
doubled from 572 in 1995 to 1,077 in 2017, and copper experienced a trader increase of 409 percent from 102 
in 1995 to 417 in 2017. In average for the 10 commodities evaluated in this study, the trader count increased 
from 209 in 1995 to 532 in 2017, which illustrates a percental increase of 254 percent. During the same time, 
the ratio of commercial to non-commercial traders (i.e. count of commercial traders / count of non-
commercial traders) decreased from 2.1 to 0.5 for crude oil. Thus, while there has been one non-commercial 
trader for every to two commercial traders in 1995, the sides have switched until 2017, where the market is 
occupied by two non-commercial traders for each commercial trader. 
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and thus price of the underlying commodity. Ultimately, the absolute and relative size of the 
trades matter, too. Yet, the relative size, and thus trader concentration of futures traders, has 
experienced comparably little attention in prior research70. This is surprising, as prior work 
highlights the significant link between market concentration and prices (Weiss, 1989), which 
is expected to also exist in futures markets. Whereas the main goal of suppliers is to receive 
the highest possible price, the demand side wants to pay the lowest possible price (Mankiw 
and Taylor, 2011). When the number of suppliers on a market is small, the market power of 
each supplier increases and thus positively influences the market price. Conversely, a higher 
market concentration on the demand side equips each market participant with (on average) 
higher market power and thus puts downward pressure on the price. Particularly when 
relatively large traders change their position, one should be able to see a stronger influence 
on the extreme returns of commodity futures, i.e. the outer quantiles.  
 According to a report by the CFTC (2008a), there is no significant relationship between 
large short-term futures trader concentration and silver prices. However, their study focuses 
on the market share of the four largest traders but disregards the overall market structure. 
Combined with the relatively short research period from 2005 to 2007 that purely focuses 
on the period leading up to the global financial crisis (GFC) where commodity prices have 
generally experienced an upward trend and the focus on silver, the study might not fully 
account for the real impact of trader concentration.71 Recent regulatory changes such as the 
MiFID II directive in the EU, however, indicate that policymakers are aware of the 
potentially negative impact of trader concentration and thus limit the latitude of market 
participants.72 While ap Gwilym and Ebrahim (2013) argue that position limits cannot 
confine market manipulation and are counterproductive, traders on the London Metal 
Exchange blame JPMorgan’s excessive market share in physical aluminium for higher prices 
despite the long-lasting supply glut on the market (Sanderson et al., 2016). What might have 
been attributed to non-commercial trading in prior research might really be the result of 
                                                 
70 Whereas prior studies often focus on the manipulative motives of market concentration, I am interested in 
the general, mid to longer-term relationship between market/trader structure and commodity returns. For 
more information on the economics of commodity manipulation, please refer to Pirrong (2017).  
71 Other studies, such as Oellerman and Farris (1986) find comparable results for live cattle futures. However, 
as their study also concentrates on a few large firms (four-firm concentration) and the research period is dated 
(1977-1981) I pay less attention to these studies.  
72 According to article 58 paragraph 2 of MiFID II (Directive 2014/65/EU), traders must report precise 
holding positions at least daily to avoid trading beyond the set limits (cf. European Parliament, 2014). 
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trader concentration. The question of “who?” affects commodity prices might be less a 
matter of trader type but rather relative size. 
 With the inflow of long index investor capital, and thus impact on future demand, into 
commodity markets, the price equilibrium has been increased beyond the expected changes 
based on the fundamentals (e.g., Masters, 2008). Yet, the question remains whether this 
impact has influenced the price or simply increased the open interest on the markets. This 
present study closes this gap and provides a thorough analysis of the relationship between 
the effects of the financialization of commodity markets, measured by speculation and trader 
concentration, and commodity futures price changes, particularly at the extremes. The 
hypothesis tested in this study is as follows: 
H1: The financialization of commodity markets affects commodity futures returns.  
 This study extends prior research by thoroughly analysing the commodity futures return 
distribution, shedding light on the precise impact of non-commercial speculation at the 
extremes, and identifying the effects of trader concentration on returns. This helps to 
identify the measures that are affected by financialization, i.e. speculation and trader 
concentration, and their transmission to commodity futures returns via the financial and the 
signalling channel. Overall, this study addresses the research question: What is the effect of 
financialization on commodity futures returns? 
4.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 DATA 
The primary sources of the daily and weekly data are the Thomson Reuters database for 
financial and economic data (Datastream), the Commitment of Traders (COT) futures only 
report by the CFTC, the disaggregated Commitment of Traders (DCOT) futures only report 
by the CFTC, and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The research period spans from 
3rd January 1995 to 7th March 2017 for a total of 1,156 weeks. The sample includes the rise 
of commodity financialization from the early 2000s onwards, the surge in commodity prices 
between 2006 and 2008, the slump of prices following the GFC in 2008, the temporary 
recovery until the third quarter of 2011, and the continuous decline in prices afterwards. 
Data obtained from the COT report includes open interest, grouped as commercial, non-
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commercial, and non-reportable73. For the robustness tests I also use disaggregated data 
(DCOT) comprising open interest separated into producer/merchant/processor/user74, 
swap dealer, and managed money for the period from 13th June 2006 to 7th March 2017. The 
CFTC publishes the weekly snapshots of Tuesday’s end-of-day open interest at 3.30pm 
Eastern Time each Friday, except for public holidays. Futures prices are in continuous time 
format and represent the price of the nearest contract month. On the expiration date, the 
position is rolled over to the next available contract. The ten commodities used have been 
selected based on the relative size and availability of the commodities compared to their 
peers in the individual commodity classes agricultural, metals, and energy. They are: corn, 
soybeans, sugar, cotton, gold, silver, copper, platinum, natural gas, and crude oil. All futures 
price time-series are quoted in USD. I use Tuesday-to-Tuesday75 and Friday-to-Friday 
settlement prices to construct the times-series’ weekly returns for each commodity and 
match it with the open interest data. The weekly returns are calculated as 𝑅𝑡 =
𝑙𝑛 (𝑃𝑡 / 𝑃𝑡−1) with 𝑅𝑡 as returns and 𝑃𝑡 as futures settlement price.  
 In addition, I obtain other information to control for general market conditions. 
Following prior research, I consider variables with good estimation power for exchange-
traded commodity returns (e.g., Frankel, 2014; Andreasson et al., 2016). Variables include 
the trade-weighted USD index, which provides a trade-weighted foreign exchange value 
average of the USD relative to a basket of major trading currencies, the S&P 500 composite 
index as proxy for equity market risk, the TED spread as a proxy for credit risk, and the real 
3-month USD interbank interest rate, which is calculated by deducting the year-on-year 
change of the US consumer price index from the USD 3-month interbank rate. Moreover, 
I follow Henderson et al. (2014) and include the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) which measures the 
                                                 
73 Beginning in 1998, the COT reporting for corn and soybeans was changed from bushels to contracts (CFTC, 
2017). To ensure data consistency throughout the research period, I transform the open interest before 1998 
by dividing the reported numbers by 5. 
74 The term used by the CFTC is producer/merchant/processor/user and represents all traders that primarily 
produce or process the traded commodities. 
75 If the data are captured for another weekday, I calculate the appropriate weekly return, i.e. always from 
reporting date to reporting date. Thus, the interval between the reports can be shorter or longer than 1 week, 
depending on the reporting schedule. As most, i.e. >98.5%, of reports capture Tuesday data, I keep the term 
Tuesday returns. While some studies use the Tuesday to Tuesday returns calculation (e.g. Kim, 2015), others 
prefer Wednesday to Tuesday (e.g. Bohl and Stephan, 2013) or Wednesday to Wednesday returns 
(Silvennoinen and Thorp, 2013), I believe that my approach is most accurate as it covers the same period as 
the open interest. 
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shipping rates for most dry commodities transported by sea, as a proxy for global demand 
for commodities. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Commodity Futures Returns and Controls   
 Mean StDev Skew Kurt LLC(HT) 
 Rep. Pub. Rep. Pub. Rep. Pub. Rep. Pub. Rep. Pub. 
Commodity Futures Returns        
  Total 0.06% 0.06% 4.50% 4.46% 0.36 0.22 20.3 19.3 -81.3*** -81.0*** 
    Agricultural 0.03% 0.02% 4.39% 4.35% 0.96 1.16 38.9 39.0 -52.1*** -51.1*** 
    Metals 0.09% 0.09% 3.32% 3.39% -0.28 -0.73 7.58 9.89 -49.6*** -50.4*** 
    Energy 0.07% 0.07% 6.36% 6.22% 0.06 -0.15 6.33 5.22 -38.0*** -37.6*** 
Commodity-Specific Market Liquidity – either log returns (LR), first difference (FD), or level ()    
  Total 0.24 0.23 0.15 0.15 1.94 5.91 15.3 175.2 -46.8*** -50.3*** 
    Agricultural 0.20 0.19 0.11 0.14 1.30 14.7 5.98 553.6 -34.4*** -41.9*** 
    Metals 0.25 0.24 0.17 0.16 2.34 1.87 19.1 11.3 -26.7*** -26.7*** 
    Energy 0.30 0.27 0.14 0.13 1.09 0.95 4.93 4.48 -19.7*** -20.5*** 
Market Controls – either log returns (LR) or first difference (FD)    
S&P 500 – LR 0.14% 0.14% 2.40% 2.40% -0.71 -0.77 7.70 9.48 -90.1*** -78.3*** 
RIR – FD -0.43% -0.42% 21.1% 21.3% 0.43 0.44 25.5 27.9 -81.7*** -81.3*** 
TED – LR -0.09% -0.05% 14.4% 13.6% 1.24 0.32 18.3 6.17 -86.3*** -82.0*** 
TW USD – LR 0.01% 0.01% 0.97% 0.97% -0.13 0.13 4.37 4.19 -79.5*** -80.3*** 
BDI – LR -0.06% -0.05% 7.21% 7.04% -0.08 -0.13 9.78 7.19 -53.5*** -52.5*** 
Panel B: Excess Net-Long Non-Commercial Speculation (ESV), Long Trader Concentration (LTC), Short Trader 
Concentration (STC), and Open Interest 
 Mean StDev Skew Kurt LLC(HT) LLC(HT) – T 
ESV (in 100,000’s contracts)      
Total 0.76 1.76 1.32 6.87 -4.63*** -72.1*** 
    Agricultural 1.00 1.72 1.43 5.79 -2.63*** -44.6*** 
    Metals 0.69 1.19 1.95 7.35 -4.89*** -45.6*** 
    Energy 0.43 2.55 1.06 4.83 -0.50 -33.9*** 
LTC       
Total 6.81 4.30 1.01 3.65 -3.77*** -100*** 
    Agricultural 6.48 3.42 0.34 2.10 -2.41*** -61.1*** 
    Metals 5.17 2.94 0.99 3.48 -2.37*** -61.1*** 
    Energy 10.7 5.53 0.12 1.93 -1.73**(***) -54.1*** 
STC       
Total 10.4 7.46 1.98 20.0 -5.15*** -100*** 
    Agricultural 7.29 5.67 0.34 2.10 -1.64**(***) -58.6*** 
    Metals 11.0 6.82 3.67 59.4 -8.42*** -67.9*** 
    Energy 15.5 8.66 0.56 3.22 -2.52*** -51.7*** 
Open Interest (in 100,000’s contracts)     
Total 4.03 4.19 1.48 4.48 -0.47 -83.5*** 
    Agricultural 4.57 3.83 1.12 3.32 -1.05 -47.9*** 
    Metals 1.41 1.30 1.58 5.01 -0.56 -52.1*** 
    Energy 8.21 4.83 0.54 2.22 0.99 -49.3*** 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for the ten commodity futures returns between 3rd January 1995 and 7th March 2017 totalling 
1,156 observations for each commodity. With Rep. as reporting date (i.e. day when open interest is captured), Pub. as publishing day (i.e. 
day when open interest is published), StDev as standard deviation, S&P 500 as S&P 500 composite index, RIR as real interest rate, TED 
as TED spread, TW USD as trade-weighted USD index, BDI as Baltic Dry Index, LR as log returns, FD as first difference, T for 
transformed time-series by either log returns or first difference, LLC as Levin-Lin-Chu unit root test, and HT as Harris-Tzavalis unit-root 
test. Both LLC and HT test the null hypothesis that all the panels contain a unit root. The commodities are grouped as agricultural (corn, 
soybeans, sugar No. 11, cotton No. 2), metals (gold, silver, copper, platinum), and energy (crude oil, natural gas). For commodity futures 
returns, the mean and standard deviation are quoted in percent. Although the controls are based on the same data for each commodity, 
the different number of observations lead to slightly different summary statistics. I report the summary statistics for the commodity with 
most observations. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. 
Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for the ten commodity futures returns between 3rd 
January 1995 and 7th March 2017, totalling 1,156 observations for each commodity. The 
abbreviations are defined as: Rep. as reporting date (i.e. day when open interest is captured), 
Pub. as publishing day (i.e. day when open interest is published), StDev as standard 
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deviation, S&P 500 as S&P 500 composite index, RIR as real interest rate, TED as TED 
spread, TW USD as trade-weighted USD index, BDI as Baltic Dry Index, LR as log returns, 
FD as first difference, T for transformed time-series by either log returns or first difference, 
LLC as Levin-Lin-Chu unit root test, and HT as Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test. Both LLC 
and HT test the null hypothesis that all the members of the panel contain a unit root. The 
commodities are grouped into three categories: agricultural (corn, soybeans, sugar No. 11, 
cotton No. 2), metals (gold, silver, copper, platinum), and energy (crude oil, natural gas). For 
commodity futures returns, the mean and standard deviation are quoted in percent. Table 
4.1 shows that all returns and trader concentration and most ESV time-series are stationary 
at levels. Only metals ESV, all total open interest, and the controls time-series needed to be 
transformed to achieve stationarity. Moreover, the descriptive statistics suggest that the 
distribution of commodity futures returns, like most controls time-series, is positively 
skewed and leptokurtic, which indicates that the time-series have fat tails. The commodity-
specific pairwise correlations between the variables ESV, LTC, and STC suggest high 
correlation between the variables.76 
 METHODOLOGY 
The real impact of the financialization of commodity markets on commodity futures returns 
has long been a matter of dispute among researchers (cf. Haase et al., 2016). I argue that the 
financialization effects are transmitted to commodity futures returns via several mechanisms. 
First, the impact is not limited to the immediate response of the market to trading, i.e. the 
financial channel. Instead, I argue that information about trading activates the signalling 
channel, which represents the response of market participants to information linked to 
trading futures. The reporting schedule of the CFTC reports allows me to differentiate 
between the two transmission channels, as the information on the financial data captured 
each Tuesday is only published on the following Friday. Second, it is not sufficient to focus 
                                                 
76 I use commodity-specific pairwise correlations to account for the heterogeneity of the ten commodities. 
While the pairwise correlations of ESV and LTC (average: 0.21) range between -0.35 (natural gas) and 0.74 
(platinum) and of ESV and STC (average: 0.57) between -0.24 (natural gas) and 0.83 (sugar), LTC and STC 
(average: 0.42) indicate a range from -0.17 (copper) to 0.79 (natural gas). To account for the correlation between 
independent variables in the panel regression models, I first rely on the variance inflation factor after running 
the models to test for multicollinearity. These tests do not indicate multicollinearity in most estimations. 
Second, I drop two out of three variables to test if the coefficient and its significance for the remaining variable 
remains constant. For most of the panel regressions, the coefficients and their significance remain comparable 
to the models including all three variables. Only in a few cases does the significance of the three main variables 
slightly reduce, but it remains for all of them well below the 5 percent level.  
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on the total amount of or any calculations on the open interest held in the futures markets 
as it has been done in prior research (e.g. Bosch and Pradkhan, 2015; Andreasson et al., 
2016; Brunetti et al., 2016). Instead, the financialization of commodity markets also led to 
the entrance of new traders that may have changed the trader concentration and thus the 
importance of and dependence on a few large traders in the market. As a result, global 
commodity futures markets might have become more robust to individual trader position 
changes. To estimate this effect, it is not sufficient to concentrate on the open interest. 
Instead, the concentration of traders on the futures market might significantly contribute to 
the explanation of variations in the price and returns of commodity futures. Thus, this 
section details the measures for both non-commercial speculation and trader concentration.  
Excess Net Long Non-Commercial Open Interest 
To evaluate the impact of non-commercial speculation on commodities, one must find a 
measure that accurately represents the level of excess speculation in the market. While some 
excess speculation is necessary for a market to function well, too much excess speculation 
might lead to bubbles. Commercial traders (hedgers) primarily use financial products to 
actively mitigate their price risk but non-commercial traders (speculators) mostly use those 
financial products to speculate. The negative connotation of speculation in society and its 
deteriorating effects on economic health overshadow the positive impact on the financial 
markets which include the provision of liquidity, price discovery mechanisms, a reduction 
in hedging costs, and better integration of commodity markets with financial markets 
(Fattouh et al., 2012; Irwin and Sanders, 2012).  
 Prior studies often rely on the Working T-index (e.g., Irwin and Sanders, 2010; 
Buyuksahin and Robe, 2014; Andreasson et al., 2016; Robe and Wallen, 2016), which is a 
measure of excess speculation. It is derived from the ratio of speculation to hedging of short 
and long positions of commercial and non-commercial open interest without considering 
the direction of speculation and without considering the non-reportable interest. A healthy 
value ranges between 1.00 and 1.15 which ensures sufficient liquidity in the market (Irwin 
and Sanders, 2010). The Working T-index (WTI) is calculated as: 
 
𝑊𝑇𝐼 = 1 +
𝑆𝑆
(𝐻𝐿 + 𝐻𝑆)
 𝑖𝑓 (𝐻𝑆 ≥ 𝐻𝐿) (4.1) 
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𝑊𝑇𝐼 = 1 +
𝑆𝐿
(𝐻𝐿 + 𝐻𝑆)
 𝑖𝑓 (𝐻𝑆 < 𝐻𝐿) (4.2) 
with open interest held by commercial (hedgers) and non-commercial (speculators) traders 
classified as 𝑆𝑆 for speculation short, 𝑆𝐿 for speculation long, 𝐻𝑆 for hedging short, and 
𝐻𝐿 for hedging long. Despite its wide use in prior research, the WTI has some limitations.  
 First, the WTI strictly separates hedgers and speculators and assumes that both take 
positions only based on their classification. While this might have been true in the past, 
Buyuksahin and Harris (2011) argue that the traditional definition of hedgers and speculators 
loses its relevance as both parties can speculate. Moreover, every purchase of commodities 
that is not used for current consumption is speculation (Kilian and Murphy, 2014). Although 
I appreciate that the classification suits the availability of data, one must accept that this 
restriction limits the validity of the results. Second, the WTI does not distinguish between 
long and short speculation, thus preventing one from taking the direction of speculation 
into account when evaluating its impact on commodity prices. Third, the WTI uses hedger’s 
open interest to determine the appropriate numerator. In theory, this approach is reasonable, 
as all market participants can clearly be identified as either hedgers or speculators. In 
practice, this distinction is impossible because the data contains a third group, the non-
reportable positions. Thus, net hedger (commercial) and net speculator (non-commercial) 
open interest positions do not usually offset each other. This leads to the fourth limitation, 
the disregard of non-reportable open interest. This position consolidates all trades that fall 
below the threshold set by the CFTC. While some commodities are dominated by large 
traders, small or non-reportable traders have a considerable market share for others. 
Between 1995 and early-2017, the average share of non-reportable open interest ranged 
between 6 percent for crude oil and 25 percent for corn.77 Thus, the non-reportable positions 
might noticeably impact the study outcome and should therefore be considered, too.  
 Although some studies attempt to overcome these flaws, few have succeeded. For 
example, Shanker (2017) extends the WTI calculation and proposes two measures of 
adequate and excess speculation. Instead of neglecting the non-reportable data, the 
researcher follows prior studies (Irwin et al., 2009; Sanders et al., 2010; Etienne et al., 2016) 
and allocates the non-reportable open interest by assuming that the ratio of commercial to 
                                                 
77 A4.1 in the appendix illustrates the share of non-reportable open interest per commodity.  
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non-commercial positions remains stable between reportable and non-reportable 
positions.78 While this approach considers all open interest, it assumes that the ratio between 
hedgers and speculators is similar for reportable and non-reportable open interest, which 
might not be appropriate. Prior analysis by IHS Markit (O’Donnell, 2016) suggests that small 
producers hedge significantly more than large producers of oil and gas. Moreover, based on 
a sample of 2,797 non-financial US firms between 1994 and 2009, Chen and King (2014) 
find that only 25.6 percent of agriculture, forest, and fishing firms and 33.1 percent of miners 
and oil & gas producers use commodity price hedging. A report by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2016) complements these findings and suggests that mining companies hardly use financial 
derivatives to hedge their price risk. Although hedging is common among precious metal 
miners (GFMS, 2016) and has proven to be beneficial for gold miners and other companies 
(Baur, 2014; Chen and King, 2014; O’Connor et al., 2016), mining companies are reluctant 
to establish appropriate hedging programmes. Logically, most non-reportable open interest 
is held by either consumers or speculators, which can only passively influence the production 
of the goods. Therefore, non-reportable positions do not represent the overall market and 
one should not use the ratio of reportable open interest to allocate non-reportable positions.  
 Tadesse et al. (2014) indirectly address this issue and focus on the excess speculative 
positions held by non-commercial traders and argue that excess net long positions by those 
traders put upward pressure on prices that might eventually lead to bubbles. The measure 
of excess speculation, denoted as ESV, can be written as: 
 
𝐸𝑆𝑉𝑡 = ∑
[(𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑑 − 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝑑) − (𝐶𝐿𝑑 − 𝐶𝑆𝑑)]
𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝑑=1
 (4.3) 
Or simplified   
 𝐸𝑆𝑉𝑡 = (𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑡 − 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝑡) − (𝐶𝐿𝑡 − 𝐶𝑆𝑡) (4.4) 
with 𝑁𝑡 as number of days 𝑑 per month 𝑡 where CFTC position data are available, non-
commercial long (𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑡), non-commercial short (𝑁𝐶𝑆𝑡), commercial long (𝐶𝐿𝑡), and 
commercial short (𝐶𝑆𝑡) open interest positions. While the ESV’s initial purpose is to 
                                                 
78 Others, such as Behmiri et al. (2016) simply use a 50/50 ratio and equally allocate the non-reportable 
information to reportable commercial and non-commercial data.  
110 | C H A P T E R  4  F I N A N C I A L I Z A T I O N  A N D  C O M M O D I T Y  F U T U R E S  R E T U R N S  
 
measure excess speculation and it does not actively incorporate non-reportable positions, it 
considers all open interest information. The initial formula can be rewritten as: 
 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑡 + 𝐶𝐿𝑡 + 𝑁𝑅𝐿𝑡 = 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝑡 + 𝐶𝑆𝑡 + 𝑁𝑅𝑆𝑡 (4.5) 
 (𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑡 − 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝑡) + (𝑁𝑅𝐿𝑡 − 𝑁𝑅𝑆𝑡) = −(𝐶𝐿𝑡 − 𝐶𝑆𝑡) (4.6) 
 𝐸𝑆𝑉𝑡 = 2 ∗ (𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑡 − 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝑡) + (𝑁𝑅𝐿𝑡 − 𝑁𝑅𝑆𝑡) (4.7) 
 𝐸𝑆𝑉𝑡 = −2 ∗ (𝐶𝐿𝑡 − 𝐶𝑆𝑡) − (𝑁𝑅𝐿𝑡 − 𝑁𝑅𝑆𝑡) (4.8) 
with non-commercial long (𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑡), non-commercial short (𝑁𝐶𝑆𝑡), commercial long (𝐶𝐿𝑡), 
and commercial short (𝐶𝑆𝑡), non-reportable long (𝑁𝑅𝐿𝑡), and non-reportable short (𝑁𝑅𝑆𝑡) 
open interest positions. With this approach, Tadesse et al. (2014) provide a measure that 
focuses on the difference between the net long positions of non-commercial and commercial 
traders and thus incorporates all the information content arising from net open interest. 
Trader Concentration 
In addition to speculation, I further evaluate the impact of trader concentration. I separate 
long and short open interest to investigate the impact of long and short trader concentration. 
The ratios of reportable to non-reportable long and short open interest extends the analysis 
from whether non-commercial trading affects commodity futures returns to whether trader 
concentration matters. I introduce two new measures that capture the ratio between 
reportable and non-reportable open interest, i.e. large market participants that satisfy the 
minimum threshold set by the CFTC in relation to traders with less exposure.79 The variables 
are calculated as: 
For long positions:  
𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑡 =
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡
 (4.9) 
For short positions:  
𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑡 =
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡
 (4.10) 
                                                 
79 The reporting limits are commodity-specific and may change over time. For example, current reporting limits 
are set to 250 contracts for corn, 150 for soybeans, and 350 for crude oil (CME Group, 2017b).  
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with 𝐿𝑇𝐶 as long reportable to non-reportable open interest and 𝑆𝑇𝐶 as short reportable to 
non-reportable open interest at time 𝑡.  
Econometric Models 
In this study, I first apply a panel regression model with commodity fixed effects80 to 
estimate the impact of speculative and trader concentration on returns. The model can be 
written as: 
𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.11) 
with 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿 as coefficients, 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 as commodity-specific futures log returns, 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 as a 
speculative measures vector consisting of 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 = [𝐸𝑆𝑉𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡, 𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡]. Control 
variables are represented by the vector, 𝐹𝑖𝑡, which includes: OI as total open interest per 
commodity, TWI as the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as the S&P 500 composite index, 
TED as the TED spread, RIR as the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as 
commodity-specific market liquidity (as in Manera et al., 2016) and calculated as ML = Trade 
Volume / Open Interest), BDI as the Baltic Dry Index, DotCom as a dummy variable for 
the dot-com bubble between the years 2000 and 2002, GFC as a dummy variable for the 
GFC between the years 2008 and 2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European debt 
crisis between the years 2010 and 2012 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 as error term for each commodity 𝑖 at time 
𝑡. I estimate standard errors using the Driscoll–Kraay procedure to account for cross-
sectional dependence, as the Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence and the Pesaran CD 
test both indicate cross-sectional dependence.81 Depending on the panel unit root and 
stationary tests, I either calculate periodical log changes or first differences. To evaluate the 
individual commodity effects, I mirror the panel analysis and rely on a mix of regression 
models to analyse the commodity-specific interaction between returns and speculation. I 
begin with an OLS regression that estimates the mean interaction between the variables of 
interest. The OLS regression model can be written as: 
                                                 
80 I also run a regression with random effects and compare both models using both, the Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier test and the Hausman specification test which confirm the superiority of the fixed effects 
approach. The results are available upon request.  
81 As a robustness test, I also use Newey-West standard errors to further account for autocorrelations and 
obtain comparable results. 
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𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (4.12) 
with 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿 as coefficients, 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑡 as commodity-specific futures log returns, 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑡 and 𝐹𝑡 
as commodity-specific variables as defined in (4.11), and ε as the error term at time 𝑡.  
 Second, I adopt a quantile regression estimator with nonadditive commodity fixed 
effects introduced by Powell (2016) to estimate a quantile regression model for panel data.82 
The model builds on a quantile regression (QR) model originally developed by Koenker and 
Bassett (1978). Prior attempts that merge quantile regression and longitudinal data rely on 
additive fixed effects (Koenker, 2004). However, this approach leads to biased estimates 
(Hausman et al., 2016; Smith, 2016; Boumparis et al., 2017). The nonadditive approach by 
Powell (2016) maintains the non-separable error term that is traditionally associated with 
quantile regression (Aldieri and Vinci, 2017) and further ensures the comparability with 
cross-sectional regression (Boumparis et al., 2017). Moreover, it is particularly useful in a 
setup where one expects the variable effects to be heterogenous throughout the outcome 
distribution (Powell, 2016). As an alternative to quantile regression, prior studies truncate 
the data based on the value of the dependent variable. For example, Kim (2015) pools all 
commodities with returns of 10 or 20 percent over a period of 5, 10, or 20 weeks. While this 
method concentrates on the strongest deviations of returns during a specific time, it might 
be inappropriate for the estimation of the relationship between speculation and commodity 
returns. First, concentrating on the top 10 or 20 percent of returns assumes that the impact 
of speculation on commodity returns is constant for all commodities, i.e. all commodities 
respond similarly to speculation. As commodities are a diverse asset class driven by different 
intrinsic and extrinsic factors, the magnitude of speculation may differ among them. 
Moreover, the revaluation of the dataset, i.e. checking if the commodity returns are equal or 
higher than 10 percent, may lead to changes in the dataset each period. Consequently, I 
would effectively compare different base data, i.e. a different mix of commodities, each 
period. Second, pooling the commodities with high returns favours commodities that 
experience relatively higher volatility, even if this volatility may stem from factors that are 
unrelated to speculation. While speculation may influence all commodities, limiting the 
sample to the most volatile commodities neglects potentially valuable information. Third, 
                                                 
82 I use the Stata package by Baker et al. (2016) to estimate the quantile regression for panel data (QRPD) 
model.  
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this method assumes that speculation has a large effect on commodity returns. As I do not 
know the size of the impact of speculation, limiting the analysis to extreme returns may 
falsely truncate the data. In support, Koenker and Hallock (2001) argue that such a 
truncation of data, i.e. dividing the sample into subsets based on the unconditional 
distribution of the response variable, followed by OLS regression on the subsets is fruitless 
and leads to highly undesirable results. Quantile regression addresses these issues as it 
evaluates the conditional distribution for a τ-th quantile of each commodity instead of 
dictating a percentage threshold on the dependent variable that is equally applicable for all 
commodities. Moreover, the focus on the median (50th percentile) or other quantiles instead 
of the conditional mean, deals more robustly with outliers, which is particularly fruitful for 
turbulent financial markets. Quantile regression enables me to scrutinise extreme price 
changes and their precise relationship with the independent variables. While the mean 
regression assumes that the explanatory power of the regressors for the dependent variable 
is constant, quantile regression evaluates different quantiles of the response variable. With 
this, it is possible to identify potentially nonlinear relationships between the return structure 
of returns and its regressors. If one finds a significant skewed impact of the speculation and 
trader concentration measures on returns, it is possible to conclude whether the regressors 
are reinforcing, stabilising, or destabilising. Following Powell (2016) and Boumparis et al. 
(2017), the underlying model can be written as: 
𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =∑𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑗(𝑈𝑖,𝑡
∗ )
𝑘
𝑗=1
 (4.13) 
where 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the commodity futures return for each commodity, 𝛽𝑗 is the parameter of 
interest for each of the k ∈ ℕ* regressors, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝐹𝑖,𝑡] is the vector of regressors, 
and 𝑈𝑖,𝑡
∗  is the non-separable error term traditionally associated with quantile estimation. 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽(𝜏) is strictly increasing in 𝜏 and the model is linear-in-parameters. For a 𝜏-th quantile 
(0 < 𝜏 < 1) of 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡, the quantile regression relies on the conditional restriction:  
𝑃(𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽(𝜏)|𝐷𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜏 (4.14) 
The parameters of interest are estimated as: 
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?̂?(𝜏) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔min
𝑏∈𝛽
𝑔′̂(𝑏) ?̂??̂?(𝑏) (4.15) 
for some weighting matrix ?̂?. Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) optimisation is used to 
estimate the model as it produces satisfactory estimates (Powell, 2016). The individual 
commodity equivalent is a quantile regression as in Koenker and Bassett (1978) and 
Buchinsky (1998) that is defined as: 
𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖 = 𝜋 + 𝛾𝜏𝑆𝐹′𝑖 + 𝑢𝜏𝑖     𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜏(𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖|𝑆𝐹𝑖) =  𝛾𝜏𝑆𝐹′𝑖 (4.16) 
For a 𝜏-th quantile (0 < 𝜏 < 1) of 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖, the parameters can be estimated using the quantile 
regression minimisation of the objective function: 
min
𝛾
{ ∑ 𝜏|𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖 − 𝑆𝐹𝑖
′𝛾|
𝑖:𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖≥𝑆𝐹𝑖
′𝛾
+ ∑ (1 − 𝜏)|𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖 − 𝑆𝐹𝑖
′𝛾|
𝑖:𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖<𝑆𝐹𝑖
′𝛾
} (4.17) 
with 𝜋 as coefficient, 𝛾𝜏 as a vector of coefficients with 𝛾𝜏 = [𝛾𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 , 𝛾𝐹], 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖 as 
commodity-specific futures returns, 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜏(𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖|𝑆𝐹𝑖) as the conditional quantile of 
𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖, conditional on the vector of regressors 𝑆𝐹𝑖 = [𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖, 𝐹𝑖], 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖 as a speculative 
measures vector consisting of 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖 = [𝐸𝑆𝑉𝑖, 𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑖, 𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑖], 𝐹𝑖 as a vector of fundamental 
explanatory variables and dummies, and the error term 𝑢𝜏𝑖. 
 Third, to test for Granger non-causality for the panel dataset of this study, I adopt a 
model presented by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) and implemented by Lopez and Weber 
(2017) for heterogeneous panel data with fixed coefficients that uses cross-sectional 
averaged Wald statistics of Granger non-causality for a strictly balanced dataset. The 
underlying linear model is defined as: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +∑𝛾𝑖
(𝑘)
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
+∑𝛽𝑖
(𝑘)
𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4.18) 
with time-fixed 𝛼𝑖, the lag-order K ∈ ℕ* which is constant across all individuals 𝑖, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 as observations of two stationary variables for 𝑖 at time 𝑡, which in this case are returns 
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and ESV. Both coefficients 𝛾𝑖
(𝑘)
 and 𝛽𝑖
(𝑘)
 are constant over time but can vary across 𝑖. If 
past values of 𝑥𝑖 significantly estimate the current value of 𝑦𝑖 even when past values of 𝑦𝑖 
are included in the model, then 𝑥𝑖 Granger-causes 𝑦𝑖. Using (4.18), one can test homogenous 
non-causality as: 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝑖 = 0   ∀𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁 (4.19) 
As there can be causality for some units 𝑖 in the panel but not necessarily for all, the 
alternative hypothesis is defined as:  
𝐻1: 𝛽𝑖 = 0   ∀𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁1 (4.20) 
𝐻1: 𝛽𝑖 ≠ 0   ∀𝑖 = 𝑁1 + 1, 𝑁1 + 2,… ,𝑁  (4.21) 
where 𝑁1 ∈ [0, 𝑁 − 1] is unknown and 0 ≤ 𝑁1/𝑁 < 1. Therefore, if 𝑁1 = 0 there is 
causality for all individuals 𝑖 and if 𝑁1 = 𝑁 there is no causality and 𝐻1 reduces to 𝐻0. 
Following Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012), I use the average individual Wald statistics for the 
cross-section of each individual 𝑖 corresponding to (4.19). It can be written as: 
?̅? =
∑ 𝑊𝑖,𝑇
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 (4.22) 
with ?̅? as the average value of the 𝑖-individual Wald statistics 𝑊𝑖,𝑇 for time 𝑇.
83 As this test 
statistic is designed to detect causality for panel data, some individuals within this panel may 
not have a causal relationship even though 𝐻0 for the panel is rejected. The corresponding 
Z-statistic, under the assumption that 𝑊𝑖,𝑇 is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) 
across all 𝑖 and 𝑇,𝑁 → ∞, i.e. 𝑇 → ∞ first and then 𝑁 → ∞, follows a standard normal 
distribution and can be written as: 
?̅? =√
𝑁
2𝐾
∗ (?̅? − 𝐾)     
𝑇,𝑁→∞
→     
      𝑑 𝑁(0,1) (4.23) 
                                                 
83 Please refer to Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) for the definition of 𝑊𝑖,𝑇. 
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If ?̅? is larger than the corresponding normal critical values (p-value ≤ 0.05), 𝐻0 can be 
rejected and one can conclude that 𝑥𝑖 Granger-causes 𝑦𝑖. For each variable pair, i.e. returns 
and one of the three regressors ESV, LTC, and STC, lags are chosen based on the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC). The individual commodity Granger causality tests use a 
comparable setup that relies on a simple vector autocorrelation (VAR) model that adopts a 
variable setup as in equation (4.11). Afterwards, pairwise Granger causality tests are 
executed. Lags for the VAR model are chosen based on the AIC.  
 Instead of using panel regression, which basically uses a 1/n weighting, one may suggest 
building an index based on a commodity-specific weighting to account for the relative 
importance of each commodity. However, I believe that in the absence of a sound theoretical 
basis such an approach has the potential to introduce biases. First, as both returns and the 
open interest data used to calculate ESV, LTC, and STC have the same basis for weighting 
(e.g. production output) the weighting would effectively cancel out. Second, if I apply 
different weightings to the individual variables without a sound theoretical basis, I am 
effectively manipulating the data. Third, by using any weighting other than 1/n, I may 
disproportionally under- or overvalue commodities that are traded more than others. For 
example, gold is heavily traded on the market, but its production in metric tonnes is relatively 
low compared to industrial metals, which are traded significantly less. If I would use 
production data to weight the returns, I would undervalue the importance of gold in favour 
of industrial metals.  
 Still, the question remains as to whether panel regression provides an advantage over 
individual commodity evaluation. I argue that panel regression provides a first overview on 
the potential homogeneity among commodities regarding non-commercial speculation. 
While commodities undoubtedly have heterogenous characteristics, i.e. they are driven by 
individual commodity factors, there are also influences that affect all commodities, or certain 
commodity groups. These effects may be equally influential for all commodities but may 
also impact commodity prices differently, i.e. the coefficients may differ in magnitude and 
direction. In fact, the Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence and the Pesaran CD test both 
indicate cross-sectional dependence between the ten commodity future returns. Another 
important issue to consider is that the panel regression approach may result in a 
misinterpretation error. If the regressors of interest only affect a few commodities, the 
results may indicate that all are affected (or not) in the same way. As highlighted above, panel 
C H A P T E R  4  F I N A N C I A L I Z A T I O N  A N D  C O M M O D I T Y  F U T U R E S  R E T U R N S  | 117 
 
regression basically uses a 1/n weighting. Thus, I estimate the effect of the regressors on the 
dependent variable and assume that this effect is comparable for all commodities in the 
sample. However, the indicated heterogeneity of commodities is not limited to the question 
of whether their prices are affected by a variable or not. Often, it is the direction and the 
magnitude of the effect on each commodity that matters. Thus, due to the heterogenous 
characteristics of commodities and possibility of misleading results, the study is not limited 
to the panel regression but further evaluates each of the ten commodities individually to 
more completely identify the interactions between non-commercial speculation, trader 
concentration, and commodity futures returns.  
4.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 THE FINANCIAL EFFECT OF SPECULATION AND TRADER CONCENTRATION 
To capture the direct estimation power of excessive speculation (ESV) and market 
concentration (LTC and STC), I estimate both a panel regression with commodity fixed 
effects and a quantile regression with nonadditive commodity fixed effects for the 5th, 10th, 
25th, 50th (median), 75th, 90th, and 95th quantiles for Tuesday’s returns.  
 The consolidated findings in Table 4.2 for the fixed effects panel regression confirm 
the highly statistically significant positive impact of excessive net long speculation on returns 
found in prior research, which suggests reinforcing rather than weakening effects of 
speculation. However, the quantile regression reveals that this effect is not constant for the 
entire return distribution. Instead, I find highly statistically significant evidence for a positive 
effect of excessive net long speculation on the left tail and a negative effect on the right tail 
of returns, which confirms a stabilising impact of speculation on the returns. The stabilising 
effect observed, i.e. support at the lower tail and reduction at the upper tail, of speculation 
on returns is rather the reaction of non-commercial traders to changes in the futures price. 
When prices fall, non-commercial traders increase their positions, which leads to an increase 
in non-commercial open interest. Conversely, traders reduce their open interest by taking 
profits when prices increase. This might be due to traders who calculate expected prices of 
the commodities and use short-term market fluctuations, i.e. variations from their expected 
price, to profit. Shifting to trader concentration, the long and short concentration 
significantly influence returns. The coefficients suggest a gradually decreasing negative effect 
of LTC. LTC is significantly negative for the lower quantiles of returns and the magnitude 
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of the coefficient incrementally decreases with increasing quantiles. Although the 
coefficients for STC are positive and significant at the 1 percent level in the mean model, 
the quantile regression suggests that the effect on returns is positive and larger at both tails 
instead of positive and gradually increasing.84 
Table 4.2: Quantile and Panel Fixed Effects Regression – Financial Effect 
 Commodity Futures Returns 
   Quantile 
Financial Effect  PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
ESV 
All 0.0016*** 0.0051*** 0.0038*** 0.0027*** 0.0011*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** -0.0008*** 
Agri 0.0019*** 0.0023*** 0.0029*** 0.0016*** 0.0014*** 0.0010*** 0.0020*** 0.0011*** 
Metals 0.0011*** 0.0052*** 0.0045*** 0.0015*** 0.0003* 0.0003 -0.0023*** -0.0027*** 
Energy (_f) 0.0760*** 0.0738*** 0.0787*** 0.0749*** 0.0810*** 0.0638*** 0.0680*** 0.0709*** 
LTC 
All -0.0007*** -0.0023*** -0.0019*** -0.0012*** -0.0004*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
Agri -0.0012*** -0.0007*** -0.0010*** -0.0013*** -0.0008*** -0.0003*** -0.0016*** -0.0019*** 
Metals -0.0004* 0.0011*** 0.0005*** 0.0001 -0.0003*** 0.0000 -0.0012*** -0.0019*** 
Energy 0.0000 0.0040*** 0.0005 0.0015*** 0.0004*** -0.0009*** -0.0028*** -0.0046*** 
STC 
All 0.0003*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0008*** 
Agri 0.0010*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0010*** 0.0016*** 0.0024*** 
Metals 0.0002** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.0000*** 
Energy -0.0002 -0.0029*** -0.0008*** -0.0010*** 0.0000 0.0007*** 0.0016*** 0.0025*** 
Notes: This table illustrates the results of the panel regression with commodity fixed effects (PD-FE) and quantile regression with 
nonadditive commodity fixed effects (QRPD) for the financial effect of commodity futures returns between 3rd January 1995 and 7th 
March 2017 totalling 1,156 observations for each of the 10 commodities. With _f and _r indicating first differences and log returns 
respectively. With ESV, LTC, and STC as focus variables. For the PD-FE model, I use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors to account for 
cross-sectional dependence. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Detailed results are 
in Appendix A4.2. 
The models are defined as: 
PD-FE: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
QRPD: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑗(𝑈𝑖,𝑡
∗ )𝑘𝑗=1       𝑃(𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽(𝜏)|𝐷𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜏      ?̂?(𝜏) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔min
𝑏∈𝛽
𝑔′̂(𝑏) ?̂?𝑔(𝑏) 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[ESV, LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes in total open interest per commodity, 
TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite index, TED as changes in the TED spread, 
RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in 
the Baltic Dry Index, DotCom as a dummy variable for the dot-com bubble between the years 2000 and 2002, GFC as a dummy variable 
for the Global Financial Crisis between the years 2008 and 2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European Debt Crisis between the 
years 2010 and 2012 and ε as error term for each commodity i at time t. With βj as the parameter of interest for each of the k ∈ N* 
regressors, D' = [SPEC, F] is the vector of regressors, and U* is the non-separable error term traditionally associated with quantile 
estimation. For a τ-th quantile (0 < τ < 1) of CFR. 
 Commodities, much like other asset classes, are driven by various extrinsic and intrinsic 
factors. A basket of different commodities is somewhat like the S&P500.85 While some 
factors such as economic growth may impact all stocks, others only affect sub-sectors of the 
S&P500. Likewise, this applies to commodities. Some factors may purely affect the price of 
crude oil and may not – or to a much lesser extent – affect the price of corn. To account for 
the heterogeneity of commodity classes, I group commodities based on their nature, i.e. 
                                                 
84 Higher short trader concentration leads to relatively higher market power of few short traders. As short 
traders, i.e. suppliers, desire higher prices, I would expect stronger coefficients at the upper quantiles of returns. 
Instead, the 5th and 95th quantile of returns both show stronger, positive coefficients compared to the centre 
of the distribution. 
85 Whereas the S&P 500 is weighted by the market capitalisation of the individual components, my approach 
assumes an equally-weighted portfolio.  
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agriculture (corn, soybeans, sugar, cotton), metals (gold, silver, copper, platinum), and energy 
(crude oil and natural gas) commodities. First, the mean estimation coefficients suggest that 
returns of all commodity sub-classes react positively and highly significantly (1 percent) to 
ESV. However, the quantile regression coefficients differ among the three sub-classes and 
confirm the heterogeneity claim. While the impact of the ESV for agricultural commodities 
tends to decrease at higher quantiles, the coefficients remain almost constant for energy 
commodities. Only for metals, one can observe the stabilising effect found for the overall 
commodity basket. Thus, the often-drawn conclusion in prior research that speculation is 
reinforcing or stabilising cannot be confirmed per se as it depends on the commodity group. 
Overall, the results suggest that speculation has a stabilising effect on returns overall, and on 
metal returns in particular, and a reinforcing effect on agricultural and energy returns. 
Moreover, the effect of non-commercial speculation on returns, indicated by the magnitude 
of the coefficients, is small. The findings for trader concentration are also different for each 
commodity class. Whereas returns of agricultural commodities respond to changes in both 
trader concentration measures, STC is the only concentration variable associated with metal 
returns, while energy returns are not influenced by either concentration variable.  
Table 4.3: Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression 
Commodity Futures Returns 
Quantile 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
ESV 0.0032*** 0.0028*** 0.0024*** 0.0010*** 0.0003*** -0.0009*** 0.0007*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
LTC -0.0024*** -0.0019*** -0.0015*** 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0010*** 0.0003** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
STC 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** -0.0001*** -0.0003*** -0.0000 0.0008*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Notes: This table illustrates the quantile regression for panel data with commodity fixed effects and instrumental variables, i.e. the lags of 
the three regressors at t-1 and t-2, for the research period from 3rd January 1995 to 7th March 2017, totalling 1,156 for each of the 10 
commodities. With ESV, LTC, and STC as focus variables. Note that the instrumental variable model concentrates on the dependent 
variable, the three regressors ESV, LTC, and STC and their respective lags at t-1 and t-2 as instruments. All controls are omitted from the 
model. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. 
The model is defined as: 
QRPD: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑗(𝑈𝑖,𝑡
∗ )𝑘𝑗=1       𝑃(𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽(𝜏)|𝐷𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜏      ?̂?(𝜏) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔min
𝑏∈𝛽
𝑔′̂(𝑏) ?̂?𝑔(𝑏) 
with CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, βj as the parameter of interest for each of the k ∈ N* regressors, D' is the vector of 
regressors with regressors ESV, LTC, and STC and instrumental variables ESVt-1, ESVt-2, LTCt-1, LTCt-2, STCt-1, STCt-2, and U* is the non-
separable error term traditionally associated with quantile estimation. For a τ-th quantile (0 < τ < 1) of CFR. 
 To test for endogeneity, I reduce the main quantile regression as in equation (4.13) to 
purely focus on returns and three main regressors ESV, LTC, and STC. Following Aldieri 
and Vinci (2017) and Boumparis et al. (2017), I add lagged versions of all three estimators 
for t-1 and t-2. In line with the main analysis, non-commercial net open interest (ESV) 
continues to stabilise returns rather than reinforcing them and the coefficients for both LTC 
and STC remain comparable to the main analysis.  
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The Financial Effect on Individual Commodities 
While fixed effects panel regression provides an equally-weighted analysis that controls for 
all unobserved time-invariant variables in the model, it may not fully factor in the 
heterogeneity of each commodity (cf. Brooks and Prokopczuk, 2013). I now individually 
evaluate the effects of speculation and trader concentration for each of the ten commodities. 
The results are reported in Table 4.4. While the individual commodity mean regression 
results support the findings of the panel regression, the STC coefficient for silver is 
significant and negative compared to the positive coefficient for metals overall. As in the 
panel regression, the effect of ESV in the quantile regression can be allocated into three 
groups. However, quantile regression illustrates the heterogeneity in the relationships 
between speculation and returns across individual commodities. For example, ESV has a 
stronger stabilising, i.e. positive effect on the left tail of the return distribution, i.e. the 5th to 
50th quantiles for soybeans and gold, a constant positive effect on the whole distribution of 
returns for corn, cotton, platinum, natural gas, and crude oil, and significantly stronger 
reinforcing effects on the left and right tail of returns for silver and copper. For highly traded 
non-agricultural commodities such as gold, I find a positive effect of the ESV on returns 
across the whole distribution. Shifting to the trader concentration measures LTC and STC, 
I find evidence that most agricultural commodities show a tendency for a stronger significant 
negative impact of LTC and positive impact of STC on the lower quantiles of returns.  
 While LTC significantly reduces returns for metals, particularly gold and copper, in the 
mean model, the quantile regression suggests a constant negative impact for gold but a 
gradually decreasing (i.e. strengthening) effect for copper. Thus, positive returns are 
influenced more strongly by LTC than negative returns. For these two commodities, STC is 
significant at the left tail of returns. A negative coefficient for STC across the whole 
distribution is exhibited for silver, which suggests that increases in short trader concentration 
negatively affect returns. For energy commodities, the non-significance of LTC and STC 
observed in the panel regression remains for natural gas. However, the quantile regression 
coefficients for crude oil indicate a significantly positive (LTC) and negative (STC) 
relationship with returns. When returns are in the 50th quantile or higher, returns significantly 
correlate with LTC and STC. These findings suggest that the impact of trader concentration 
is stronger if returns are positive and that trader concentration for crude oil is reinforcing 
for long trader concentration and dampening for short trader concentration. 
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Table 4.4: Commodity-Individual OLS and QR – Financial Effect 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Corn Soybeans 
  Quantile  Quantile 
 OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th 
ESV 0.0016*** -0.0006 0.0006 0.0023*** 0.0029*** 0.0023** 0.0029*** 0.0036** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0028** 0.0018 
 (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
LTC_r -0.123*** -0.192*** -0.164*** -0.146*** -0.089*** -0.0498 -0.119*** -0.162*** -0.143*** -0.106*** -0.065*** -0.0472** 
 (0.0243) (0.0402) (0.0367) (0.0210) (0.0311) (0.0473) (0.0180) (0.0264) (0.0172) (0.0152) (0.0186) (0.0223) 
STC_r 0.1433*** 0.1710*** 0.1881*** 0.1803*** 0.0804** 0.0394 0.0965*** 0.1405*** 0.1445*** 0.0865*** 0.0247 0.0051 
 (0.0334) (0.0548) (0.0493) (0.0281) (0.0405) (0.0621) (0.0195) (0.0276) (0.0223) (0.0181) (0.0214) (0.0218) 
ML 0.0966** 0.1426** 0.1122* 0.0758* -0.0574 0.0084 0.1859*** 0.2029*** 0.1608*** 0.1858*** 0.1552*** 0.1683*** 
 (0.0420) (0.0722) (0.0647) (0.0387) (0.0531) (0.0892) (0.0263) (0.0373) (0.0341) (0.0268) (0.0332) (0.0361) 
OI_r 0.0397** -0.106*** -0.087*** 0.0351** 0.1361*** 0.1639*** 0.0246** -0.0356* -0.0191 0.0355*** 0.0839*** 0.0818*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0311) (0.0267) (0.0173) (0.0222) (0.0344) (0.0112) (0.0191) (0.0131) (0.0100) (0.0138) (0.0123) 
SP500_r 0.0969* 0.0581 -0.0230 0.0383 0.1163* 0.1402 0.1250*** 0.0270 0.0662 0.0931** 0.1338*** 0.1734** 
 (0.0571) (0.0842) (0.0821) (0.0498) (0.0672) (0.0939) (0.0419) (0.0847) (0.0510) (0.0431) (0.0507) (0.0694) 
RIR_f -0.0150* -0.026*** -0.0154 -0.0090 -0.0175** -0.0167 -0.0091 -0.0287** -0.016*** -0.0037 0.0010 0.0029 
 (0.0083) (0.0093) (0.0102) (0.0062) (0.0081) (0.0102) (0.0067) (0.0128) (0.0053) (0.0041) (0.0065) (0.0072) 
TED_r -0.0073 0.0162 -0.0024 -0.0038 -0.0089 -0.0122 -0.0067 -0.0076 -0.0118 -0.0068 -0.0080 -0.0134 
 (0.0074) (0.0122) (0.0105) (0.0072) (0.0090) (0.0150) (0.0063) (0.0122) (0.0083) (0.0074) (0.0089) (0.0104) 
TWI_r -0.776*** -0.627*** -0.651*** -0.446*** -0.827*** -0.957*** -0.663*** -0.695*** -0.596*** -0.636*** -0.631*** -0.621*** 
 (0.1313) (0.1703) (0.2039) (0.1242) (0.1892) (0.2525) (0.1043) (0.1957) (0.1306) (0.1109) (0.1465) (0.1560) 
BDI_r 0.0075 -0.0338 -0.0126 -0.0043 0.0078 0.0309 0.0135 -0.0091 0.0010 -0.0077 0.0255 0.0232 
 (0.0168) (0.0253) (0.0315) (0.0175) (0.0279) (0.0301) (0.0145) (0.0337) (0.0133) (0.0155) (0.0209) (0.0178) 
DotCom 0.0031 0.0108** 0.0029 -0.0043* 0.0117*** 0.0061 0.0024 0.0035 0.0009 0.0031 -0.0019 -0.0002 
 (0.0030) (0.0053) (0.0039) (0.0026) (0.0044) (0.0064) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0035) 
GFC -0.0042 -0.037*** -0.0235 -0.0023 0.0240** 0.0245*** -0.0048 -0.0244** -0.028*** -0.0025 0.0140* 0.0168* 
 (0.0059) (0.0077) (0.0170) (0.0073) (0.0111) (0.0089) (0.0047) (0.0102) (0.0046) (0.0057) (0.0074) (0.0096) 
EDC -0.0039 0.0041 -0.0051 -0.0071 -0.0031 -0.0022 -0.0043 -0.0016 -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0092** -0.0077 
 (0.0041) (0.0080) (0.0063) (0.0044) (0.0059) (0.0079) (0.0026) (0.0083) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0042) (0.0062) 
Constant -0.010*** -0.035*** -0.023*** -0.008*** 0.0104** 0.0211*** -0.010*** -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.013*** 0.0081* 0.0185*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0065) (0.0053) (0.0030) (0.0051) (0.0069) (0.0035) (0.0064) (0.0039) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0052) 
R2 0.115 0.168 0.112 0.058 0.103 0.126 0.195 0.183 0.158 0.111 0.142 0.141 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Sugar Cotton 
  Quantile  Quantile 
 OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th 
ESV 0.0013 0.0053 0.0071*** 0.0007 -0.0027 -0.0030       
 (0.0016) (0.0040) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0027)       
ESV_f       0.1412*** 0.1469*** 0.1289*** 0.1352*** 0.1229*** 0.1365*** 
       (0.0094) (0.0211) (0.0118) (0.0071) (0.0145) (0.0240) 
LTC_r -0.160*** -0.107*** -0.123*** -0.187*** -0.130*** -0.147*** -0.0299* -0.0088 -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.0101 0.0097 
 (0.0176) (0.0353) (0.0235) (0.0152) (0.0186) (0.0316) (0.0171) (0.0281) (0.0158) (0.0104) (0.0209) (0.0348) 
STC 0.0007* -0.0007 -0.0012** 0.0008* 0.0019*** 0.0021** 0.0004** 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003** 0.0005 0.0003 
 (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
ML 0.0473* -0.190*** -0.131*** 0.0366 0.1553*** 0.1585*** 0.0106 -0.0892** -0.072*** -0.0192 0.1027*** 0.1219*** 
 (0.0243) (0.0481) (0.0363) (0.0242) (0.0293) (0.0519) (0.0165) (0.0348) (0.0221) (0.0126) (0.0306) (0.0425) 
OI_r 0.1813*** 0.4110*** 0.3337*** 0.1644*** 0.0459 0.0270 0.0628** 0.2362*** 0.1331*** 0.0321 -0.0078 0.0004 
 (0.0434) (0.0748) (0.0533) (0.0302) (0.0374) (0.0790) (0.0288) (0.0538) (0.0313) (0.0200) (0.0433) (0.0724) 
SP500_r 0.0294 -0.0561 0.1212* 0.0926* -0.0261 -0.0905 0.1816*** 0.2109** 0.2261*** 0.1328*** 0.1485* 0.1532 
 (0.0588) (0.1234) (0.0706) (0.0493) (0.0682) (0.1219) (0.0539) (0.0905) (0.0456) (0.0384) (0.0863) (0.1296) 
RIR_f -0.0010 0.0056 -0.0001 -0.0021 0.0035 0.0000 0.0032 0.0121 0.0062* -0.0087** 0.0067 0.0135 
 (0.0068) (0.0136) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0086) (0.0140) (0.0055) (0.0101) (0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0088) (0.0115) 
TED_r -0.0035 -0.0070 -0.0011 -0.0105 -0.0033 -0.0328 0.0008 -0.0152 -0.025*** 0.0060 0.0114 0.0032 
 (0.0099) (0.0221) (0.0133) (0.0089) (0.0098) (0.0221) (0.0089) (0.0212) (0.0065) (0.0058) (0.0136) (0.0192) 
TWI_r -0.3928** -0.2612 -0.1749 -0.2790** -0.4580** -0.5486* -0.3183** -0.3388 -0.2069 -0.1215 -0.3671* -0.3144 
 (0.1970) (0.3464) (0.1816) (0.1338) (0.1882) (0.3067) (0.1250) (0.2541) (0.1379) (0.1005) (0.2120) (0.2591) 
BDI_r -0.049*** -0.1146** -0.062*** -0.0213 -0.0755** -0.0819** 0.0070 -0.0303 -0.0101 0.0007 0.0113 -0.0089 
 (0.0187) (0.0473) (0.0179) (0.0195) (0.0303) (0.0364) (0.0154) (0.0370) (0.0217) (0.0137) (0.0260) (0.0353) 
DotCom 0.0035 -0.0111 -0.0129* 0.0046 0.0046 0.0067 0.0026 -0.0016 -0.0035 0.0022 0.0111** 0.0194** 
 (0.0042) (0.0072) (0.0078) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0120) (0.0032) (0.0093) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0056) (0.0098) 
GFC 0.0013 -0.0293 -0.0190** 0.0042 0.0179* 0.0239*** 0.0006 -0.026*** -0.0203** 0.0042 0.0159 0.0247*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0205) (0.0078) (0.0064) (0.0108) (0.0088) (0.0044) (0.0070) (0.0084) (0.0047) (0.0098) (0.0083) 
EDC -0.0061 -0.0193 -0.023*** -0.0052 0.0130 0.0154*** -0.0000 -0.0261* -0.026*** 0.0022 0.0244** 0.0533*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0120) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0105) (0.0058) (0.0048) (0.0133) (0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0118) (0.0103) 
Constant -0.015*** -0.036*** -0.025*** -0.014*** 0.0082 0.0217** -0.0076** -0.042*** -0.028*** -0.0018 0.0123** 0.0258*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0121) (0.0066) (0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0089) (0.0036) (0.0089) (0.0042) (0.0026) (0.0054) (0.0090) 
R2 0.118 0.111 0.101 0.093 0.131 0.129 0.245 0.192 0.201 0.181 0.140 0.139 
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Table 4.4 cont. 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Gold Silver 
  Quantile  Quantile 
 OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th 
ESV 0.0006 0.0045*** 0.0026*** 0.0004 0.0012 0.0004 0.0127*** 0.0245*** 0.0128** 0.0083** 0.0176*** 0.0254*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0030) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0032) (0.0052) (0.0043) 
LTC_r -0.057*** -0.041*** -0.048*** -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.058*** -0.0251 -0.0083 -0.0115 -0.0150 -0.0195 -0.0096 
 (0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0079) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0113) (0.0210) (0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0135) (0.0205) (0.0223) 
STC 0.0001 -0.0006** -0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0010*** -0.0016** -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
ML 0.0005 -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.0002 0.0328*** 0.0360*** 0.0005 -0.071*** -0.0359** -0.0028 0.0522*** 0.0627*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0093) (0.0071) (0.0047) (0.0073) (0.0087) (0.0075) (0.0191) (0.0166) (0.0064) (0.0105) (0.0151) 
OI_r 0.1277*** 0.1497*** 0.1466*** 0.1059*** 0.0859*** 0.0999*** 0.1856*** 0.3506*** 0.2137*** 0.1133*** 0.1292*** 0.0766*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0163) (0.0140) (0.0097) (0.0154) (0.0216) (0.0324) (0.0415) (0.0426) (0.0228) (0.0352) (0.0259) 
SP500_r -0.0233 0.0422** 0.0471 0.0112 -0.0258 -0.0935** 0.1542*** 0.1988** 0.1820** 0.1053*** 0.1722*** 0.1428*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0201) (0.0316) (0.0221) (0.0368) (0.0452) (0.0450) (0.0772) (0.0713) (0.0407) (0.0588) (0.0551) 
RIR_f -0.0043 -0.0031 -0.0076* -0.007*** -0.0041 -0.0078 -0.0071 -0.0126 -0.0190* -0.016*** 0.0034 0.0037 
 (0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0114) (0.0109) (0.0047) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
TED_r 0.0136*** 0.0167*** 0.0130*** 0.0089*** 0.0126** 0.0096 0.0075 -0.0255** -0.0065 0.0111* 0.0087 0.0139** 
 (0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0025) (0.0056) (0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0124) (0.0141) (0.0063) (0.0086) (0.0068) 
TWI_r -1.008*** -1.030*** -0.935*** -0.944*** -0.898*** -0.931*** -1.7502*** -1.582*** -1.495*** -1.727*** -1.404*** -1.473*** 
 (0.0769) (0.0500) (0.0906) (0.0559) (0.0860) (0.1108) (0.1420) (0.1763) (0.1725) (0.1063) (0.1624) (0.1665) 
BDI_r -0.0069 -0.0016 -0.0083 -0.0142* 0.0053 -0.0116 0.0096 0.0285 0.0241 -0.0008 0.0273 0.0368 
 (0.0090) (0.0113) (0.0118) (0.0085) (0.0133) (0.0161) (0.0156) (0.0314) (0.0174) (0.0142) (0.0214) (0.0296) 
DotCom 0.0011 0.0036* 0.0037** -0.0003 0.0007 0.0003 0.0036 0.0074 0.0047 0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0037 
 (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0054) (0.0048) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0034) 
GFC -0.0002 -0.014*** -0.0051 -0.0041 0.0074 0.0083 0.0034 -0.0053 -0.0052 -0.0013 0.0088 0.0162 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0056) (0.0102) (0.0046) (0.0068) (0.0072) (0.0049) (0.0071) (0.0161) 
EDC -0.0007 -0.0031 0.0007 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0047 0.0035 0.0075 -0.0009 0.0070** -0.013*** -0.0057 
 (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0071) (0.0049) (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0081) 
Constant -0.0019 -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.0025 0.0090*** 0.0119*** -0.0001 -0.040*** -0.030*** -0.0016 0.0273*** 0.0313*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0075) (0.0064) (0.0035) (0.0041) (0.0045) 
R2 0.351 0.259 0.230 0.211 0.224 0.252 0.272 0.247 0.195 0.134 0.197 0.218 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Copper Platinum 
  Quantile  Quantile 
 OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th 
ESV 0.0078*** 0.0135** 0.0053 0.0050 0.0116*** 0.0118**       
 (0.0029) (0.0058) (0.0045) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0048)       
ESV_f       0.3024*** 0.2550*** 0.2717*** 0.2849*** 0.3063*** 0.3144*** 
       (0.0197) (0.0355) (0.0302) (0.0156) (0.0358) (0.0234) 
LTC_r -0.039*** -0.0286* -0.0167 -0.036*** -0.055*** -0.074*** -0.0053 -0.0115 -0.0035 -0.0027 -0.0048 0.0022 
 (0.0110) (0.0152) (0.0115) (0.0085) (0.0090) (0.0186) (0.0080) (0.0141) (0.0092) (0.0055) (0.0111) (0.0162) 
STC 0.0005** 0.0012*** 0.0009*** 0.0006** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
ML 0.0026 -0.031*** -0.036*** 0.0040 0.0192*** 0.0110 -0.0095 -0.063*** -0.052*** -0.0055 0.0379** 0.0667*** 
 (0.0080) (0.0118) (0.0138) (0.0089) (0.0067) (0.0116) (0.0081) (0.0183) (0.0139) (0.0067) (0.0157) (0.0245) 
OI_r 0.0656*** 0.1272*** 0.0787*** 0.0899*** 0.0455** -0.0023 0.0858*** 0.1317*** 0.0999*** 0.0711*** 0.0379* 0.0369* 
 (0.0226) (0.0323) (0.0184) (0.0177) (0.0213) (0.0319) (0.0146) (0.0233) (0.0162) (0.0107) (0.0210) (0.0204) 
SP500_r 0.3157*** 0.3007*** 0.2916*** 0.2352*** 0.2858*** 0.3399*** 0.1135*** 0.1979*** 0.1128*** 0.1000*** 0.1782*** 0.1374** 
 (0.0515) (0.0800) (0.0432) (0.0345) (0.0482) (0.0985) (0.0349) (0.0765) (0.0413) (0.0310) (0.0521) (0.0633) 
RIR_f 0.0047 -0.0108 -0.0097** 0.0014 0.0194*** 0.0121 -0.0033 0.0051 -0.0033 -0.0048 0.0040 0.0009 
 (0.0054) (0.0123) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0070) (0.0123) (0.0053) (0.0074) (0.0057) (0.0033) (0.0056) (0.0079) 
TED_r 0.0025 0.0256* 0.0080 -0.0015 0.0012 0.0068 0.0002 -0.0128 -0.0099 0.0022 -0.0090 -0.0066 
 (0.0068) (0.0133) (0.0070) (0.0061) (0.0081) (0.0133) (0.0084) (0.0115) (0.0061) (0.0049) (0.0081) (0.0129) 
TWI_r -0.898*** -0.586*** -0.734*** -0.926*** -0.797*** -0.904*** -0.930*** -1.130*** -0.929*** -0.698*** -0.932*** -0.912*** 
 (0.1129) (0.2187) (0.1011) (0.1024) (0.1307) (0.1899) (0.1002) (0.1599) (0.1048) (0.0691) (0.1214) (0.1787) 
BDI_r 0.0364** 0.0531* 0.0479*** 0.0236* 0.0192 -0.0143 0.0268 0.0278 0.0243 -0.0010 0.0242 0.0075 
 (0.0144) (0.0296) (0.0176) (0.0135) (0.0190) (0.0264) (0.0164) (0.0224) (0.0155) (0.0073) (0.0151) (0.0206) 
DotCom -0.0015 0.0058 0.0033 -0.0056** -0.009*** -0.0162* 0.0026 -0.0107 -0.0074 0.0031 0.0141*** 0.0194** 
 (0.0025) (0.0044) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0031) (0.0084) (0.0027) (0.0114) (0.0049) (0.0028) (0.0050) (0.0087) 
GFC 0.0037 -0.0118 -0.0057 -0.0013 0.0153 0.0239 -0.0015 -0.046*** -0.0273** 0.0008 0.0246*** 0.0361*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0268) (0.0101) (0.0043) (0.0094) (0.0147) (0.0049) (0.0095) (0.0138) (0.0035) (0.0062) (0.0075) 
EDC -0.0013 0.0064 0.0077*** -0.0002 -0.008*** -0.0079 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0032 -0.0015 0.0027 0.0042 
 (0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0072) (0.0020) (0.0041) (0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0037) (0.0054) 
Constant -0.0047** -0.054*** -0.036*** -0.0040 0.0307*** 0.0461*** 0.0010 -0.023*** -0.017*** 0.0010 0.0195*** 0.0227*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0055) (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0051) (0.0016) (0.0037) (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0032) (0.0038) 
R2 0.196 0.173 0.146 0.104 0.119 0.116 0.347 0.329 0.287 0.215 0.207 0.220 
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Table 4.4 cont. 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Natural Gas Crude Oil 
  Quantile  Quantile 
 OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th 
ESV_f 0.1222*** 0.0905*** 0.0996*** 0.1348*** 0.1222*** 0.1387*** 0.0607*** 0.0644*** 0.0721*** 0.0590*** 0.0586*** 0.0563*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0170) (0.0128) (0.0090) (0.0151) (0.0280) (0.0045) (0.0081) (0.0075) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0074) 
LTC_r 0.0089 0.0477 0.0299 0.0032 0.0406 0.1070 0.0171 -0.0440 -0.0022 0.0366*** 0.0748*** 0.0474* 
 (0.0246) (0.0523) (0.0437) (0.0263) (0.0284) (0.0718) (0.0197) (0.0317) (0.0291) (0.0139) (0.0203) (0.0283) 
STC -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006* 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0001       
 (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0006)       
STC_r       -0.0349* -0.0178 -0.0415 -0.046*** -0.062*** -0.068*** 
       (0.0181) (0.0291) (0.0272) (0.0138) (0.0174) (0.0252) 
ML 0.0570** -0.0573 -0.0230 0.0163 0.1814*** 0.1783*** -0.0108 -0.110*** -0.079*** -0.0116 0.0475*** 0.0664*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0501) (0.0313) (0.0212) (0.0349) (0.0592) (0.0125) (0.0225) (0.0213) (0.0078) (0.0098) (0.0208) 
OI_r 0.1247** 0.0660 0.1085 0.1404*** -0.1278* -0.0771 0.1417*** 0.2797*** 0.2032*** 0.1510*** 0.0525 -0.0280 
 (0.0610) (0.1311) (0.0862) (0.0494) (0.0750) (0.1601) (0.0455) (0.0585) (0.0718) (0.0343) (0.0490) (0.0745) 
SP500_r 0.2178*** -0.2294 -0.0456 0.1846** 0.5254*** 0.2554* 0.2691*** 0.3672*** 0.2911*** 0.2079*** 0.1524** 0.2197** 
 (0.0824) (0.1846) (0.0962) (0.0840) (0.1518) (0.1495) (0.0732) (0.1218) (0.1016) (0.0552) (0.0622) (0.1062) 
RIR_f -0.0027 0.0003 -0.0103 -0.0062 -0.0102 -0.0102 0.0029 0.0049 -0.0066 -0.0085 0.0243*** 0.0296** 
 (0.0111) (0.0214) (0.0161) (0.0088) (0.0154) (0.0249) (0.0063) (0.0100) (0.0129) (0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0142) 
TED_r 0.0165 0.0256 0.0080 0.0134 0.0065 0.0237 0.0145 -0.0084 0.0189 0.0105 0.0051 0.0123 
 (0.0162) (0.0303) (0.0199) (0.0132) (0.0207) (0.0393) (0.0109) (0.0206) (0.0178) (0.0076) (0.0115) (0.0138) 
TWI_r -0.571*** -0.7178* -0.942*** -0.3491* -0.7685** -0.9596** -0.859*** -0.8009** -0.807*** -0.755*** -0.786*** -0.843*** 
 (0.2098) (0.3901) (0.2572) (0.1844) (0.3279) (0.4217) (0.1551) (0.3183) (0.2494) (0.1266) (0.1198) (0.2565) 
BDI_r 0.0538** 0.0158 -0.0061 0.0260 0.0304 0.0766 0.0432** 0.0891*** 0.0518** 0.0183 0.0131 0.0646* 
 (0.0262) (0.0516) (0.0273) (0.0261) (0.0398) (0.0597) (0.0207) (0.0306) (0.0258) (0.0177) (0.0173) (0.0345) 
DotCom 0.0077 -0.0383** -0.0315** 0.0051 0.0304** 0.0263 0.0027 -0.0290 -0.0005 0.0011 0.0156*** 0.0202*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0189) (0.0139) (0.0092) (0.0133) (0.0173) (0.0045) (0.0204) (0.0142) (0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0062) 
GFC 0.0017 -0.0148 -0.027*** -0.0011 0.0150* 0.0042 0.0015 -0.0048 -0.0147* 0.0001 0.0078 0.0062 
 (0.0081) (0.0094) (0.0097) (0.0092) (0.0085) (0.0105) (0.0062) (0.0132) (0.0082) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0139) 
EDC -0.0070 0.0323*** 0.0159*** -0.0048 -0.030*** -0.0291 0.0017 0.0369*** 0.0271*** 0.0045* -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0083) (0.0052) (0.0045) (0.0079) (0.0178) (0.0034) (0.0054) (0.0057) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0050) 
Constant -0.0113* -0.089*** -0.059*** -0.0040 0.0215* 0.0680*** 0.0031 -0.036*** -0.026*** 0.0032 0.0358*** 0.0412*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0162) (0.0105) (0.0056) (0.0115) (0.0183) (0.0039) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0025) (0.0039) (0.0068) 
R2 0.135 0.076 0.074 0.089 0.113 0.101 0.262 0.178 0.166 0.176 0.162 0.165 
Notes: This table illustrates the detailed results of the OLS and quantile regression with robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator) for commodity futures returns between 3rd January 1995 and 7th March 2017 with 1,157 to 1,159 observations, depending on 
the commodity. With OLS regression models and quantile regression for lower quantiles (5th and 10th), median (50th), and upper quantiles 
(90th and 95th). For the OLS regression, the R2 represents the adjusted R2. For quantile regression, I calculate the pseudo R2 as R2 = 1 – 
(sum of weighted deviations about estimated quantile / sum of weighted deviations about raw quantile) as suggested by Koenker and 
Machado (1999). With _f and _r indicating first difference and log returns respectively. With ESV, LTC, and STC as focus variables, OI 
as total open interest, ML as market liquidity, SP500 as Standard & Poor’s 500 composite index, RIR as real interest rate, TED as TED 
spread, TWI as trade-weighted USD index, BDI as Baltic Dry Index, and DotCom, GFC, and EDC as dummies for crisis periods 
throughout the research period. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Following Clogg 
et al. (1995), I use a Z-test to check if the regression coefficients of the OLS model (1) and the quantile regressions for each ESV, LTC, 
and STC are significantly different. With a Z-value of ≥1.64 corresponding with the significance level of 5 percent or lower. The formula 
can be written as: Z = (β1- β2) / [(SEβ1)2+(SEβ2)2]1/2, with β as coefficients and SEβ as standard error of β. Underlined QR coefficients 
represent significantly (5%) different coefficients compared to the OLS model. Bold QR coefficients indicate significant coefficients based 
on a simple lagged QR model, which indicate Granger causality.  
The models are defined as: 
OLS: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
QR: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖 = 𝜋 + 𝛾𝜏𝑆𝐹′𝑖 + 𝑢𝜏𝑖     𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜏(𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖|𝑆𝐹𝑖) =  𝛾𝜏𝑆𝐹′𝑖 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[ESV, LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes in total open interest per commodity, 
TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite index, TED as changes in the TED spread, 
RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in 
the Baltic Dry Index, DotCom as a dummy variable for the dot-com bubble between the years 2000 and 2002, GFC as a dummy variable 
for the Global Financial Crisis between the years 2008 and 2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European Debt Crisis between the 
years 2010 and 2012, SF' = [SPEC, F] is the vector of regressors, and u is the error term traditionally associated with quantile estimation. 
and ε as error term of the OLS at time t. For a τ-th quantile (0 < τ < 1) of CFR. 
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 THE CAUSALITY BETWEEN RETURNS, SPECULATION, AND TRADER 
CONCENTRATION 
Mean Granger Causality 
So far, I show that speculation, proxied by ESV, and returns have a stabilising relationship 
for the panel of ten commodities and mostly reinforcing relationships when examined for 
each commodity individually. Independent variables in a linear regression model estimate 
the relationship with the dependent variable and show how a dependent variable reacts to 
changes in the predictors. Much like correlation, linear regression (usually) only reveals the 
interaction between variables but provides little explanation on their causation, i.e. whether 
a variable is useful to forecast another variable. In some cases, the causal relationship is clear. 
For example, prior studies (e.g. Roll, 1984) show the significant impact of weather events 
on the price of frozen orange juice concentrate. Here, the causality is obvious, i.e. weather 
events drive the price of frozen orange juice concentrate. It is, of course, highly unlikely that 
changes in frozen orange juice concentrate prices have any influence on the weather. Other 
relationships, however, are less obvious. This includes the variables of interest in this study. 
While Huchet and Fam (2016) argue that speculation is driving agricultural commodity 
prices, Tang and Xiong (2012) warn that non-commercial traders simply hold information 
about future changes in demand and supply and thus predict the price changes, leading to 
reverse causality. Likewise, most prior literature argues that non-commercial trader positions 
do not Granger-cause prices (Brunetti and Buyuksahin, 2009; Stoll and Whaley, 2010; 
Buyuksahin and Harris, 2011), index trader positions generally cannot predict agricultural 
futures returns (Hamilton and Wu, 2015), and long-short speculators do not Granger-cause 
commodity futures returns volatility (Miffre and Brooks, 2013). Instead, price changes drive 
speculation (Alquist and Gervais, 2013; Andreasson et al., 2016). However, less attention 
has been devoted to metals and their causal relationship with speculation and other measures 
than to the Working T-index and the causal relationship between speculation and returns at 
the extremes. 
 The obtained coefficients reported in Table 4.5 suggest that speculation does not 
Granger-cause returns. While the first column indicates the value for y, i.e. the dependent 
variable, the first row indicates the value for x, i.e. the independent variable that potentially 
Granger-causes y for each pairwise test. For example, with a Z-value of -0.2018 (all 
commodities, 1995 to 2017), the null hypothesis that ESV does not Granger-cause 
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commodity futures returns cannot be rejected. Thus, one must accept H0, i.e. ESV does not 
Granger-cause commodity futures returns. 
Table 4.5: Panel Granger Causality 
All Commodities – 1995 to 2017 All Commodities – 2003 to 2017 
y / x CFR ESV LTC STC y / x CFR ESV LTC STC 
CFR - -0.2018 -0.8590 0.7431 CFR - -0.4110 0.3393 1.4920 
ESV 18.4989*** - 11.0547*** 6.2852*** ESV 13.7810*** - 4.5446*** 2.6429*** 
LTC 11.9983*** 17.2145*** - 12.9397*** LTC 10.4968*** 11.4402*** - 9.2934*** 
STC 16.4028*** 29.4499*** 15.8522*** - STC 11.7103*** 21.5351*** 10.1976*** - 
All Commodities – 2003 to June 2008 All Commodities – July 2008 to 2011 
y / x CFR ESV LTC STC y / x CFR ESV_f LTC STC 
CFR - -1.1777 -0.5052 0.6401 CFR - 1.4416 1.0020 3.3990*** 
ESV 2.6192*** - 4.1990*** 3.3588*** ESV_f 0.3146 - -1.4209 0.5003 
LTC 1.2066 5.0979*** - 5.8536*** LTC 4.6954*** 5.1751*** - 7.1350*** 
STC 2.0684** 11.7076*** 7.1991*** - STC 4.8475*** 10.0148*** 3.5717*** - 
Agriculture – 1995 to 2017 Metals – 1995 to 2017 
y / x CFR ESV LTC STC y / x CFR ESV LTC STC 
CFR - -1.1327 1.6849* -1.0368 CFR - 0.5864 1.1721 1.6991* 
ESV 13.8964*** - 10.1175*** 6.5143*** ESV 8.2912*** - 5.8146*** -0.5741 
LTC 8.1725*** 12.3731*** - 12.6037*** LTC 5.0338*** 10.2448*** - 5.2752*** 
STC 10.0411*** 11.2170*** 20.1777*** - STC 10.2495*** 28.7414*** 1.4866 - 
Energy – 1995 to 2017 
y / x CFR ESV_f LTC STC 
CFR - -0.2758 -0.2890 0.7249 
ESV_f 13.0018*** - -0.2526 4.5421*** 
LTC 6.6294*** 4.7294*** - 5.2774*** 
STC 9.8134*** 10.1323*** 11.5208*** - 
Notes: This table illustrates the Z-statistics of the pairwise Granger non-causality test for panel data. With the first column indicating y, i.e. 
the dependent variable, and the first row indicating x, i.e. the independent variable that potentially Granger-causes y for each pairwise test. 
AIC and BIC are used to determine the appropriate lag length for each pair. Reported figures represent the coefficients based on AIC. 
The research period runs between 3rd January 1995 and early March 2017 totalling 1,156 observations for each commodity (10 
commodities, 11,560 observations in total). With _f and _r indicating first difference and log returns respectively. With ESV, LTC, and 
STC as variables of interest. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. 
For example, with a Z-value of -0.2018 (all commodities, entire research period), the null hypothesis that ESV does not Granger-cause 
commodity futures returns cannot be rejected. Thus, one must accept H0, i.e. ESV does not Granger-cause Commodity futures returns. 
In fact, I cannot find any evidence of Granger causality from speculation to returns for either 
the full research period from 1995 to 7th March 2017, or for the sub-periods that include the 
financialization period from 2002 onwards including the GFC and EDC. Moreover, all 
commodity-class sub-samples indicate comparable non-significant coefficients, i.e. cannot 
confirm any Granger causality from speculation to returns. Instead, the coefficients indicate 
highly significant, i.e. at the 1 percent level, Granger casualty from returns to speculation. 
These findings confirm prior research for Granger causality from speculation to prices and 
returns for agricultural and energy commodities (Brunetti and Buyuksahin, 2009; 
Buyuksahin and Harris, 2011; Alquist and Gervais, 2013; Andreasson et al., 2016). 
 Furthermore, I extend prior research and provide evidence in favour of Granger 
causality from metal returns to speculation and show that both trader concentration 
measures LTC and STC are significantly Granger-caused by returns. Thus, returns not only 
cause changes in speculative open interest but also lead to changes in trader concentration. 
Moreover, the findings suggest little significant evidence for bidirectional Granger causality. 
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In fact, almost none of the variables of interest seem to Granger-cause returns. Only during 
the aftermath of the GFC to the end of 2011, one can observe bidirectional Granger causality 
between returns and STC.  
Table 4.6: Commodity-Individual Granger Causality 
 Lags ESV LTC STC 
Corn 1 No / Yes*** No / Yes** No / No 
Soybeans 1 No / Yes*** Yes* / No No / No 
Sugar 1 No / Yes*** Yes* / Yes*** No / No 
Cotton 1 No / Yes*** Yes* / Yes** No / No 
Gold 2 No / Yes*** No / Yes* No / No 
Silver 2 No / Yes*** No / No Yes* / No 
Copper 2 No / Yes*** Yes*** / Yes** Yes* / No 
Platinum 2 No / Yes*** Yes* / No Yes** / No 
Natural Gas 4 No / Yes*** No / No No / Yes*** 
Crude Oil 4 No / Yes*** No / No No / Yes** 
Notes: This table illustrates the results of the Granger causality test for the individual commodities between 3rd January 1995 and 7th March 
2017. With the first “Yes” and “No” as the answer to “Do ESV, LTC, or STC, Granger-cause commodity futures returns?” and the 
second “Yes” and “No” as the answer to “Do commodity futures returns Granger-cause ESV, LTC, or STC?” * indicates the statistical 
significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. 
Following the approach in the panel analysis, I use Granger causality tests to identify the 
lead/lag relationship between individual commodity futures returns and the main 
explanatory variables. Table 4.6 presents the findings of the Granger causality test for the 
individual commodities between 3rd January 1995 and 7th March 2017. While the first “Yes” 
or “No” in column 3 of the table answers the question “Do ESV, LTC, or STC, Granger-
cause commodity futures returns?”, the second “Yes” or “No” that follows the slash in the 
same column answers the question “Do commodity futures returns Granger-cause ESV, 
LTC, or STC?” For example, one can see that the Granger causality tests at lag 1 for corn 
suggest that ESV is not Granger-causing corn futures returns. Instead, corn futures returns 
Granger-cause ESV with a statistical significance that holds at the 1 percent level. In line 
with the panel Granger causality reported in Table 4.5, the results summarised in Table 4.6 
indicate that ESV does not Granger-cause the returns of any of the ten commodities 
analysed. Instead, the Granger causality tests uniformly suggest that returns Granger-cause 
ESV at a significance level of 1 percent. The relationship between trader concentration and 
returns is less clear. While the results for bidirectional Granger causality of returns and LTC 
for soybeans, gold, silver, platinum, natural gas, and crude oil are non-significant, the test 
results for other commodities suggest reverse Granger causality, i.e. from LTC to returns 
(corn, sugar, cotton). Only for copper, I find significant, i.e. at the 5 percent significance 
level, bi-directional Granger causality between returns and LTC. STC results, on the other 
side, mostly suggest no Granger causality, with platinum being the only commodity that 
indicates Granger causality from STC to returns. For natural gas and crude oil, I find the 
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opposite, i.e. significant Granger causality from returns to STC, which suggests that returns 
significantly Granger-cause short trader concentration.  
 Overall, I find little evidence that changes in open interest, whether it is commercial or 
non-commercial, significantly Granger-cause returns. In fact, the results suggest the 
opposite: returns lead to changes in open interest. Put simply, traders use information about 
price changes to adjust their positions86. In other words, changes in future economic outlook 
trigger changes in the supply-demand equilibrium. This leads to an adjustment of the fair 
value of the underlying price. Following the change in the underlying price, market 
participants adjust their exposure accordingly, which leads to a change in open interest. In 
the end, the answer to the question of whether non-commercial open interest improves the 
estimation of commodity futures returns is yes. However, the findings also reveal that non-
commercial open interest does not Granger-cause returns.87  
Quantile Regression Granger Causality 
To reveal the lead/lag relationship between two variables, Granger causality uses lagged 
values of the dependent and independent variables to determine the forecasting power of 
the latter on the former, which is usually accomplished with some sort of mean regression. 
However, as indicated by the quantile regression outcomes, the relationship between returns 
and ESV may not be as linear as the mean model assumes. In the spirit of Granger causality, 
I adopt a model that switches the 𝐸𝑆𝑉𝑖 with a lagged version of such, i.e. at time 𝑡 − 1, and 
further add a lagged version of the dependent variable 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖 at time 𝑡 − 1.
88 The model for 
the 𝜏-th quantile (0 < 𝜏 < 1) can be written as: 
                                                 
86 This reinforces Soros’ (2008) claim that trend chasers and uninformed traders enter markets following 
positive returns. I further test this claim in the following sections that are concerned with the signalling effect.  
87 It must be highlighted that, while the presented results provide evidence in favour of Granger causality from 
returns to speculation, bidirectional Granger causality cannot be fully ruled out. Bidirectional Granger causality 
may not happen at the same frequency, i.e. while the effects from speculation to returns might happen quite 
fast, the reverse effects take longer time and are thus the only causality measurable at weekly frequency. To 
truly analyse their bidirectional relationship, data at higher frequency is necessary.  
88 Reboredo and Ugolini (2017) use a comparable approach to determine the causal link between gold stock 
prices and gold prices. While the researchers find that gold prices significantly Granger-cause Australian gold 
mining stocks, the causal relationship of gold prices with European, Middle Eastern, and African mining stocks 
is non-significant. However, the researchers attribute little attention to the potential bias stemming from gold 
price hedging, which is common among gold miners. Thus, the inability to establish a Granger-causal link 
between gold and gold miner prices might thus be simply based on an efficient price hedging approach of the 
companies evaluated. Splitting the observed mining stocks into hedgers and non-hedgers might help to mitigate 
this bias.  
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𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖 = 𝜋 + 𝛼𝜏𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝜏𝐸𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝜏𝑆𝐹𝐸′𝑖 + 𝑢𝜏𝑖 (4.24) 
𝐸𝑆𝑉𝑖 = 𝜋 + 𝛼𝜏𝐸𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝜏𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝜏𝑆𝐹𝐸′𝑖 + 𝑢𝜏𝑖 (4.25) 
with 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖 as commodity futures returns, 𝑆𝐹𝐸′𝑖 as the vector of regressors consisting of 
𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑖, 𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑖, and all fundamental explanatory variables and dummies as in equation (4.11). 
The equation is then complemented by Wald tests for all lagged 𝐸𝑆𝑉𝑖, which is in this case 
𝐸𝑆𝑉𝑖 at time 𝑡 − 1. Bold figures in Table 4.4 indicate the quantiles with a significant lagged 
impact from ESV to returns. Like the individual commodity mean Granger causality tests, I 
find little evidence of Granger causality from ESV to returns. However, for a few 
commodities I find significant Granger causality from ESV to returns for some quantiles. 
Specifically, for corn and copper, the results suggest a significant (5 percent) lagged impact 
on the left tail of the return distribution. While for sugar, cotton, and gold, I find similarly 
significant effects on the right tail of the return distribution and for crude oil, a positive 
lagged impact can be found for both extremes, i.e. the 5th and 95th quantile of the returns. 
For all other commodities, the coefficients remain non-significant. Evaluating the opposite 
direction, i.e. the lagged impact from returns to ESV, I find consistent significance for most 
commodities, which suggest that the lagged impact from returns to ESV is stronger than the 
lagged impact from ESV to returns. Nevertheless, these findings also reveal that Granger 
causality, i.e. the lead/lag relationship between variables, may not be as constant as other 
approaches assume. Instead, it seems that the relationship between the returns and 
speculation is quantile-dependent and may change based on the conditional distribution of 
returns. This observation may have significant implications for the estimation of the returns. 
While speculation does not impact the returns on average, the returns of some commodities 
significantly respond to changes in speculation, depending upon the direction of the returns. 
For example, while crude oil returns are on average not driven by speculation, extreme 
returns, i.e. at the 5th and 95th quantile, are driven by speculation.  
 ROBUSTNESS EXERCISE FOR THE FINANCIAL EFFECT 
The Financial Effect of Disaggregated Open Interest 
With the beginning of June 2006, the CFTC started to publish a disaggregated COT report 
that distinguishes between several types of traders, i.e. merchants, swap dealers, and 
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managed money89. While the separation used for the analysis so far only differentiates 
between commercial and non-commercial open interest, i.e. hedgers or speculators, the 
disaggregated COT report allows further differentiation between commercial open interest 
comprised mostly of merchant and swap dealer open interest. Whereas merchants are 
hedgers that use the futures market to mitigate their price risk for a product they are 
producing, selling, or using, swap dealers use the futures market to hedge their price risk 
stemming from swap contracts. Often, swap dealers are commercial or investment banks or 
insurance companies, as these institutions typically have sufficient funds to ensure their 
creditworthiness and mitigate the potential credit risk for the counterparty (CFTC, 2008b). 
For example, the counterpart of the swap dealer might be a pension fund or other long-term 
oriented investor but can also include speculative traders (CFTC, 2018) that prefer to 
mitigate their price risk exposure by using swap contracts instead of getting directly involved 
in futures investing, which might be due to costs, experience, risk exposure, or the effort to 
roll over the standardised futures contracts. Moreover, the counterparty can be an issuer of 
ETF’s, which does not use physical commodities or futures contracts to back its exposure 
but synthetically tracks the performance of an underlying commodity index by engaging in 
swaps90. These ETF’s are then used to invest in commodities without any interest in 
consuming or producing the goods, i.e. speculation. While the swap dealers themselves 
hedge their price risk, their counterparties might, in fact, be speculative traders. As swap 
dealers usually mitigate their price risk by entering futures contracts, their involvement in 
the futures market is a direct proxy for both hedging and speculative demand. For example, 
while airlines may use swaps to mitigate price risk related to their jet fuel demand, which 
marks this trade as hedging, financial speculators may enter swaps to speculate. As both 
swap contracts may be handled by the same swap dealer, the disaggregated COT report 
enables separation of the commercial open interest into two categories: (a) traditional 
hedgers’ open interest, stemming from producers, consumers, users, or merchants of the 
underlying commodity and (b) swap dealers, that might engage in commodity futures due to 
their commercial and non-commercial swap contract counterparts.  
                                                 
89 I neglect the fourth and fifth group reported in the disaggregated COT report, the other reportables and the 
non-reportables, for this exercise.  
90 For example, the iShares Diversified Commodity Swap UCITS ETF, which holds net assets of more than 
1.3 bn USD, uses unfunded total return swaps (iShares, 2018). 
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 The focus of prior research has been on managed money, which typically includes 
institutional investors. Irwin and Sanders (2012) claim that passive index investment does 
not lead to commodity price bubbles but may even be beneficial for the market, while Bosch 
and Pradkhan (2015) find little evidence for a short-term impact of managed money on 
precious metal returns. Likewise, Miffre and Brooks (2013) find no support for a 
destabilising effect of speculation, measured by managed money open interest, on 
commodity prices. The results reported here partially contradict these studies. The findings 
in the first results column of Table 4.7 indicate a significant relationship between the two 
variables long managed money open interest (MM_long), short managed money open 
interest (MM_short) and returns. Long managed money open interest reinforces returns. 
The coefficient of 0.004 suggests that for each 100,000 long contracts of open interest by 
traders allocated to the managed money group, returns increase by 0.004 percent. In 
contrast, short managed money open interest reduces returns. The coefficient of -0.0034 
suggests that for each 100,000 short contracts by traders allocated to the managed money 
group, returns decrease by 0.0034 percent. This indicates that managed money open interest 
has a slightly stronger increasing effect for the same number of contracts in open interest 
compared to the decreasing effect that is associated with decreasing open interest. The 
impact of the consolidated managed money net positions (MM_net), i.e. long minus short 
open interest, on returns is non-significant. Moreover, while I do not find a significant 
impact of long swap dealer open interest (Swap_long) on returns, changes in short positions 
(Swap_short) significantly increase returns. More precisely, if short swap dealer open interest 
increases by 1 percent, one can see an increase of 0.0134 percent in returns. The significance 
remains when I evaluate the impact of net swap dealer open interest (Swap_net), where one 
can observe a negative impact of net swap open interest on returns. Likewise, the impact on 
returns of long merchants’ open interest (Merch_long), which usually represents the 
consumer-side, is non-significant. However, much like swap dealer open interest, changes 
in short positions (Merch_short), i.e. producers, significantly increase returns. For each 1 
percent increase in merchants’ short open interest, returns increase by 0.2 percent. Shifting 
to net positions (Merch_net), the impact remains significant but switches to a negative 
impact in the mean model. These results suggest that changes in merchants’ open interest, 
i.e. open interest by traders that are primarily interested in either selling their produced 
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commodities or consuming those commodities, have a stronger effect on returns that the 
open interest stemming from managed money. 
Table 4.7: Disaggregated Data 
Commodity Futures Returns 
  Quantile 
LONG PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
Merch_long -0.0013 -0.0077*** -0.0065*** -0.0027*** -0.0027*** -0.0019*** -0.0002*** 0.0014*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Swap_long 0.0033 -0.0105*** -0.0092*** -0.0072*** 0.0026*** 0.0080*** 0.0146*** 0.0198*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
MM_long 0.0040*** 0.0130*** 0.0119*** 0.0085*** 0.0021*** -0.0015*** -0.0076*** -0.0115*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTC -0.0006** -0.0012*** -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
STC 0.0003** -0.0007*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0008*** 0.0013*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ML 0.0087 -0.0238*** -0.0218*** -0.0134*** 0.0075*** 0.0236*** 0.0422*** 0.0502*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
OI _r 0.1255*** 0.2208*** 0.2293*** 0.1672*** 0.1434*** 0.1026*** 0.0797*** 0.0525*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0003) (0.0034) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0000) 
SP500_r 0.2278*** 0.3348*** 0.3086*** 0.2631*** 0.2106*** 0.1782*** 0.1633*** 0.0946*** 
 (0.0502) (0.0011) (0.0105) (0.0002) (0.0032) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0000) 
RIR_f -0.0032 -0.0053*** -0.0091*** -0.0101*** -0.0065*** -0.0022*** 0.0061*** 0.0058*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
TED_r -0.0039 -0.0152*** 0.0016 0.0005*** -0.0009*** 0.0030*** -0.0037*** -0.0019*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0003) (0.0022) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
TWI_r -1.1273*** -1.0758*** -0.9613*** -1.0501*** -1.0672*** -1.1133*** -1.0722*** -1.1630*** 
 (0.1152) (0.0031) (0.0242) (0.0010) (0.0062) (0.0002) (0.0015) (0.0001) 
BDI_r 0.0144 0.0387*** 0.0125*** -0.0008*** 0.0062*** 0.0218*** 0.0111*** 0.0184*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
GFC 0.0017 -0.0280*** -0.0163*** -0.0077*** 0.0001 0.0113*** 0.0182*** 0.0231*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
EDC -0.0008 -0.0040*** 0.0002 -0.0001*** -0.0006*** -0.0004*** 0.0023*** 0.0061*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  Quantile 
SHORT PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
Merch_short_r 0.1968*** 0.2329*** 0.2220*** 0.2000*** 0.1921*** 0.2048*** 0.2296*** 0.2190*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0002) (0.0024) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Swap_short_r 0.0134*** 0.0091*** 0.0105*** 0.0142*** 0.0143*** 0.0136*** 0.0096*** 0.0108*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
MM_short -0.0034** -0.0126*** -0.0112*** -0.0057*** -0.0012*** 0.0027*** 0.0057*** 0.0083*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTC -0.0001 -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
STC 0.0003** -0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ML 0.0078 -0.0225*** -0.0168*** -0.0074*** 0.0082*** 0.0190*** 0.0182*** 0.0259*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
OI _r -0.0533** 0.0751*** 0.0238*** -0.0269*** -0.0725*** -0.0929*** -0.1244*** -0.1035*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0003) (0.0025) (0.0006) (0.0025) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
SP500_r 0.2186*** 0.3289*** 0.3367*** 0.2667*** 0.2111*** 0.1721*** 0.1398*** 0.1378*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0009) (0.0043) (0.0003) (0.0029) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
RIR_f -0.0028 -0.0019*** -0.0099*** -0.0089*** -0.0057*** -0.0023*** 0.0041*** 0.0062*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
TED_r -0.0017 -0.0208*** -0.0026*** -0.0011*** -0.0008 0.0019*** 0.0005*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
TWI_r -1.0104*** -1.0223*** -0.8377*** -0.8906*** -0.9353*** -0.9465*** -1.0684*** -1.0730*** 
 (0.1195) (0.0013) (0.0041) (0.0009) (0.0079) (0.0012) (0.0003) (0.0000) 
BDI_r 0.0148 0.0084*** 0.0128*** 0.0013*** 0.0070*** 0.0082*** 0.0179*** 0.0297*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0002) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
GFC 0.0012 -0.0380*** -0.0246*** -0.0105*** 0.0028*** 0.0172*** 0.0254*** 0.0344*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
EDC 0.0000 -0.0100*** -0.0033*** -0.0006*** 0.0004* 0.0029*** 0.0067*** 0.0115*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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Table 4.7 cont. 
Commodity Futures Returns 
  Quantile 
NET PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
Merch_net -0.0025** 0.0073*** 0.0049*** 0.0026*** -0.0012*** -0.0051*** -0.0086*** -0.0115*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Swap_net_f -0.0605*** -0.0653*** -0.0519*** -0.0700*** -0.0693*** -0.0578*** -0.0613*** -0.0601*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0005) (0.0070) (0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0005) 
MM_net 0.0016 0.0118*** 0.0099*** 0.0071*** 0.0007*** -0.0040*** -0.0088*** -0.0115*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTC -0.0004 -0.0017*** -0.0019*** -0.0012*** -0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** -0.0000 
 (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
STC 0.0002* -0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ML 0.0105 -0.0284*** -0.0215*** -0.0080*** 0.0171*** 0.0255*** 0.0438*** 0.0584*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0005) 
OI _r 0.1183*** 0.2404*** 0.1939*** 0.1730*** 0.1149*** 0.0765*** 0.0562*** 0.0501*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0007) (0.0142) (0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0016) 
SP500_r 0.2316*** 0.3667*** 0.2528*** 0.2750*** 0.2331*** 0.1730*** 0.1947*** 0.1031*** 
 (0.0506) (0.0015) (0.0284) (0.0004) (0.0097) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0015) 
RIR_f -0.0031 -0.0046*** -0.0133*** -0.0117*** -0.0105*** -0.0035*** 0.0049*** 0.0038*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0000) (0.0014) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
TED_r -0.0033 -0.0080*** -0.0106*** 0.0038*** -0.0018*** 0.0038*** -0.0078*** 0.0203*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0008) 
TWI_r -1.0953*** -1.0735*** -1.0888*** -0.9369*** -1.0140*** -1.1322*** -1.0846*** -1.3741*** 
 (0.1176) (0.0030) (0.0896) (0.0003) (0.0051) (0.0041) (0.0006) (0.0041) 
BDI_r 0.0154* 0.0197*** 0.0139*** 0.0021*** 0.0122*** 0.0199*** 0.0092*** 0.0222*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0006) 
GFC 0.0010 -0.0288*** -0.0195*** -0.0105*** 0.0005** 0.0118*** 0.0221*** 0.0290*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
EDC -0.0011 -0.0074*** -0.0017*** -0.0019*** -0.0009 0.0005*** 0.0028*** 0.0053*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Notes: This table illustrates the period results of the panel regression with commodity fixed effects (PD-FE) and quantile regression with 
nonadditive commodity fixed effects (QRPD) for the financial effect of commodity futures returns for the restricted research period 
where disaggregated data are available from June 2006 to 7th March 2017 with 561 observations for each commodity. With 10 commodities, 
4 commodities each for agriculture (corn, soybeans, sugar, cotton), metals (gold, silver, copper, platinum), and 2 energy commodities 
(crude oil and natural gas). With _f and _r indicating first difference and log returns. With merch (producer/user), swap (swap dealers), 
and MM (managed money) as focus variables for commercial and non-commercial open interest, OI as total open interest, ML as market 
liquidity, SP500 as Standard & Poor’s 500 composite index, RIR as real interest rate, TED as TED spread, TWI as trade-weighted USD 
index, BDI as Baltic Dry Index, and GFC and EDC as dummies for crisis periods throughout the research period. * indicates the statistical 
significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1.  
The models are defined as: 
PD-FE: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
QRPD: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑗(𝑈𝑖,𝑡
∗ )𝑘𝑗=1       𝑃(𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽(𝜏)|𝐷𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜏      ?̂?(𝜏) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔min
𝑏∈𝛽
𝑔′̂(𝑏) ?̂?𝑔(𝑏) 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[MERCH, SWAP, MM, LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes in total open 
interest per commodity, TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite index, TED as 
changes in the TED spread, RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-specific market 
liquidity, BDI as changes in the Baltic Dry Index, GFC as a dummy variable for the Global Financial Crisis between the years 2008 and 
2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European Debt Crisis between the years 2010 and 2012 and ε as error term for each commodity 
i at time t. With βj as the parameter of interest for each of the k ∈ N* regressors, D' = [SPEC, F] is the vector of regressors, and U* is the 
non-separable error term traditionally associated with quantile estimation. For a τ-th quantile (0 < τ < 1) of CFR. 
More precisely, when I switch short managed money open interest with log returns of short 
managed money open interest (to make it comparable to log changes in merchants’ open 
interest in the initial model), one can see that, while both coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level (p = 0.000) the coefficient for log changes in merchants’ 
open interest is four times larger than that for log returns of short managed money open 
interest. The quantile regression further reveals that net merchants’ open interest increases 
returns at the left tail but reduces them at the right tail, which supports the stabilising 
C H A P T E R  4  F I N A N C I A L I Z A T I O N  A N D  C O M M O D I T Y  F U T U R E S  R E T U R N S  | 133 
 
hypothesis. Likewise, net managed money open interest presents a similar picture when 
looking at the whole distribution of returns. In contrast, swap dealer open interest indicates 
the opposite, i.e. it appears to destabilise returns. As the main findings for ESV and returns 
suggest that the Granger-causal relationship between the two variables runs from returns to 
ESV, the conclusion as to whether open interest is stabilising or destabilising only holds if 
one identifies the Granger-causal relationship between the disaggregated open interest and 
returns, which is discussed in the next section. 
Disaggregated Granger Causality 
Table 4.8 presents the findings of the Granger causality test for the individual commodities 
disaggregated dataset from June 2006 to 7th March 2017. While the first column indicates 
the value for y, i.e. the dependent variable, the first row indicates the value for x, i.e. the 
independent variable that potentially Granger-causes y for each pairwise test. For example, 
with a Z-value of 0.6366, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that net merchants’ open interest 
(Merch_net, i.e. long merchants’ open interest minus short merchants’ open interest) does 
not Granger-cause returns of all ten commodities, i.e. net merch open interest does not 
Granger-cause returns for all ten commodities. 
Table 4.8: Granger Causality – Disaggregated Data 
All Commodities All Commodities – June 2006 to June 2008 
y / x CFR Merch_net Swap_net_f MM_net y / x CFR Merch_net_f Swap_net_f MM_net_f 
CFR - 0.6366 -0.5481 -1.2956 CFR - -0.3854 0.3948 0.2435 
Merch_net 13.2308*** - 8.1968*** 26.8708*** Merch_net_f 2.1800** - 5.4424*** 7.7050*** 
Swap_net_f 17.8967*** 10.9720*** - 25.8607*** Swap_net_f 3.5558*** 3.4607*** - 3.0616*** 
MM_net 10.4625*** 4.7586*** 0.8320 - MM_net_f 0.7695 0.3380 0.7445 - 
All Commodities – July 2008 to end-2011 Agriculture 
y / x CFR Merch_net_f Swap_net_f MM_net y / x CFR Merch_net Swap_net_f MM_net 
CFR - 1.7581* -0.3915 -0.7722 CFR - -0.7635 -0.1541 -1.2541 
Merch_net_f 1.7157* - 1.2756 6.0142*** Merch_net 3.2781*** - 0.7129 2.2640** 
Swap_net_f 1.4062 3.5053*** - 6.6441*** Swap_net_f 4.7856*** 9.3535*** - 2.2664** 
MM_net 1.1203 26.7815*** -0.5771 - MM_net 11.5493*** 4.9011*** -0.3201 - 
Metals Energy 
y / x CFR Merch_net Swap_net MM_net y / x CFR Merch_net_f Swap_net_f MM_net 
CFR - -0.7167 0.2220 -0.1228 CFR - -0.7542 -0.4213 -0.9498 
Merch_net 12.7318*** - 13.1275*** 31.0162*** Merch_net_f 8.2378*** - 0.5033 13.1214*** 
Swap_net 3.4137*** 6.4685*** - 10.1423*** Swap_net_f 16.2731*** 4.7113*** - 28.0164*** 
MM_net 4.6433*** 2.6474*** 3.5650*** - MM_net 0.4949 0.6170 0.9192 - 
Notes: This table illustrates the Z-statistics of the Granger causality test for panel data. With the first column indicating y, i.e. the dependent 
variable, and the first row indicating x, i.e. the independent variable that potentially Granger causes y. I use AIC and BIC to determine the 
appropriate lag length for each pair. Reported figures represent the coefficients based on AIC. The research period runs between June 
2006 and 7th March 2017 totalling 561 observations for each commodity. With _f and _r indicating first difference and log returns 
respectively. With producer/user/merchant (merch), swap dealers (swap), and managed money (MM), both for long and short positions. 
* indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. For example, with a Z-value of 0.6366, I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that net merch open interest does not Granger-cause returns of all ten commodities, i.e. net merch open interest 
does not Granger-cause returns for all ten commodities.  
In support of the findings for ESV, I find supportive evidence for Granger causality from 
returns to speculation rather than the opposite. In fact, none of the three measures of net 
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open interest, i.e. merchants, swap dealers, and managed money, significantly Granger-cause 
returns. Both periods June 2006 to June 2008 and July 2008 to December 2011, indicate 
little statistically significant evidence for Granger causality from open interest to returns. 
Switching directions, i.e. testing whether open interest positions are Granger-caused by 
returns, the statistical significance strengthens. Overall returns significantly Granger-cause 
net open interest for all commodities, and the subgroups agriculture and metals. Only the 
net open interest of energies has a no causal relationship with returns during the tested 
period. 
Pre- and Post-2003 Era and the Global Financial Crisis 
With the rise of commodity financialization beginning in the early 2000s, commodity 
markets have attracted an increasing number of non-commercial traders. To test for 
potential structural changes throughout the research period, the sample is split into two sub-
samples from 1995 to 2002 and 2003 to 2017. This approach allows me to investigate the 
relationship between the regressors and the dependent variable before commodities received 
more attention by institutional investors. Table 4.9 reports the results. During both periods, 
the pre-financialization period from 1995 to 2002 and the financialization period starting in 
2003, speculation and trader concentration significantly impact the returns. However, the 
magnitude of the coefficients reduces in the second sub-period, i.e. the positive coefficient 
of speculation halves. This indicates that the financialization of commodity markets, and 
thus number of market participants, may have led to a market that is less dependent on just 
a few traders and therefore more robust to changes in trader concentration. The reducing 
significance and magnitude of the coefficients from 2003 to 2017 includes periods that led 
to two peaks in commodity prices. To crystallise the interaction between returns, 
speculation, and trader concentration throughout the period leading to the GFC in late-2008 
and the period shortly after until the end of 2011, where commodities experienced their 
second peak, I further segment the data. While speculation has been beneficial for the 
explanation of returns during both surges in commodity prices, STC was particularly 
significant during the second rush between July 2008 and end-2011. However, the 
coefficients for LTC suggest that long trader concentration did not play a significant role 
during both surges in commodity prices during the last two decades. 
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Table 4.9: Pre- and Post-2003 and the Global Financial Crisis 
Panel A: Pre-/Post-2003 Commodity Futures Returns 
   Quantile 
  PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
1995-2002 
ESV 0.0079*** 0.0069*** 0.0061*** 0.0043*** 0.0062*** 0.0095*** 0.0118*** 0.0089*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTC -0.0011* -0.0091*** -0.0053*** -0.0027*** -0.0002 0.0026*** 0.0053*** 0.0053*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
STC 0.0004** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0009*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
2003-2017 
ESV 0.0013*** 0.0041*** 0.0032*** 0.0024*** 0.0007*** -0.0000 -0.0008*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTC -0.0006*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0012*** -0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
STC 0.0003** 0.0001*** 0.0005*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0007*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Panel B: GFC  Quantile 
  PD-FE 5
th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
2003-200806 
ESV 0.0031*** 0.0062*** 0.0039*** 0.0035*** 0.0019*** 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0012*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000) 
LTC -0.0007 -0.0021*** -0.0026*** -0.0012*** -0.0001*** 0.0011 0.0010*** 0.0018*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) 
STC 0.0002 -0.0008*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0000 0.0001** 0.0009*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
200807-2011 
ESV_f 0.0624*** 0.0559*** 0.0581*** 0.0596*** 0.0580*** 0.0596*** 0.0595*** 0.0562*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0010) (0.0030) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0005) 
LTC -0.0011 -0.0018*** -0.0006 -0.0010*** -0.0001*** -0.0004*** 0.0000 0.0004*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
STC 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0003*** -0.0000*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Notes: This table illustrates the sub-period results of the panel regression with commodity fixed effects (PD-FE) and quantile regression 
with nonadditive commodity fixed effects (QRPD) for the financial (PD-FE and QR) effect of commodity futures returns for the research 
sub-periods from 3rd January 1995 to end-December 2002, January 2003 to 7th March 2017, January 2003 to June 2008 (first surge of 
commodity prices), and July 2008 to December 2011 (GFC). With 10 commodities, 4 commodities each for agriculture (corn, soybeans, 
sugar, cotton), metals (gold, silver, copper, platinum), and 2 energy commodities (crude oil and natural gas). With _f and _r indicating first 
difference and log returns respectively. With ESV, LTC, and STC as focus variables. Note that quantile regression for panel data with 
nonadditive fixed effects relies on a non-separable error term U* and does not report a separate constant term. While the PD-FE model 
includes a constant, I refrain from reporting it for reasons of clarity and comprehensibility. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** 
for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1.  
The models are defined as: 
PD-FE: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
QRPD: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑗(𝑈𝑖,𝑡
∗ )𝑘𝑗=1       𝑃(𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽(𝜏)|𝐷𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜏      ?̂?(𝜏) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔min
𝑏∈𝛽
𝑔′̂(𝑏) ?̂?𝑔(𝑏) 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[ESV, LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes in total open interest per commodity, 
TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite index, TED as changes in the TED spread, 
RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in 
the Baltic Dry Index, DotCom as a dummy variable for the dot-com bubble between the years 2000 and 2002, GFC as a dummy variable 
for the Global Financial Crisis between the years 2008 and 2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European Debt Crisis between the 
years 2010 and 2012 and ε as error term for each commodity i at time t. With βj as the parameter of interest for each of the k ∈ N* 
regressors, D' = [SPEC, F] is the vector of regressors, and U* is the non-separable error term traditionally associated with quantile 
estimation. For a τ-th quantile (0 < τ < 1) of CFR. 
Unknown Structural Breaks 
In addition to the separation of the research period based on major events in the commodity 
markets, the question arises as to whether the cross-sectional time-series’ experience 
unknown structural breaks. To search for potential breaks, an array of tests is applied. While 
it is expected that structural breaks occur around the same time for each of the commodities 
(i.e. shortly before the GFC and around the end of 2011), I use an individual commodity 
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OLS analysis as in equation (4.12) to ensure that all potential structural breaks are identified. 
First, I begin with the cumulative sum (CUSUM) test to determine whether the model is 
adequately defined. Only for sugar, can I reject the null hypothesis of no structural break at 
the 5 percent level, i.e. the models for the other commodities are adequately defined.  
 Second, I adopt Wald and likelihood ratio (LR) tests for parameter instability and 
structural change presented by Andrews (1993). Contrary to the CUSUM test, the supremum 
Wald and LR tests suggest structural breaks for all ten commodities. The identified breaks 
are spread throughout the research period. They vary for each commodity, with breaks for 
precious metals (gold and silver) during the early days of the financialization period in 
2002/2003 and breaks for all other commodities during the surge of commodity prices 
leading to the GFC. However, one drawback of the Wald and LR tests is the limitation to 
single breaks. As it is likely that most commodity prices have experienced more than one 
break during the last two decades, it is suspected that the data includes multiple structural 
breaks.  
 Therefore, the third evaluation uses Bai and Perron’s (2003a, 2003b) test for multiple 
structural breaks, which tests for structural breaks in the regression model. The results in 
Table 4.10 show that the Bai-Perron test identifies several structural breaks for all 
commodities. Much like the supremum Wald and LR tests, the breaks for each commodity 
are at different points in time. Yet, the periods can be segmented into three main groups, 
namely the pre-financialization period before 2002/2003, the surges in commodity prices 
during the research period starting in 2002/2003 until 2012/2013, and the stagnation of 
prices since then. Complementary to the panel regression pre- and post-2003 and GFC sub-
samples, the individual commodity least squares evaluation with sub-samples based upon 
Bai-Perron’s test for structural breaks not only confirms the time-varying effects of all three 
measures of non-commercial speculation and trader concentration but further shows that 
the effect over time is different for the individual commodities. The effect of ESV is 
generally stronger before the GFC for most commodities. However, the impact of trader 
concentration, both long and short, strongly varies for the individual commodities. The 
effect of LTC and STC on returns weakens over time for some commodities (cotton, gold, 
silver, platinum), strengthens (sugar, soybeans), or changes its direction for others (corn, 
copper, crude oil). 
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Table 4.10: Least Squares with Bai-Perron Structural Breaks – Financial Effect 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Pre-Financialization Commodity Price Peaks Post-Peak 
Corn 3/1/1995 – 
28/4/1998 
5/5/1998 – 
16/10/2001 
23/10/2001 – 
22/2/2005 
1/3/2005 – 
17/6/2008 
24/6/2008 – 
9/7/2013 
16/7/2013 – 
7/3/2017 
ESV 0.0094*** 0.0030 0.0017 0.0019* 0.0007 0.0003 
LTC_r -0.2325*** -0.2061*** -0.1376*** -0.1033* -0.0987 0.1261** 
STC_r 0.1803*** 0.2479*** 0.1135 0.0014 0.2848*** 0.0297 
Soybeans 3/1/1995 – 
8/9/1998 
15/9/1998 – 
8/1/2002 
15/1/2002 – 
10/5/2005 
17/5/2005 – 
2/9/2008 
9/9/2008 – 
31/7/2012 
7/8/2012 – 
7/3/2017 
ESV 0.0077*** 0.0080* 0.0072* 0.0045** 0.0020* 0.0019** 
LTC_r -0.1278*** -0.0564** -0.0762 -0.1875*** -0.1488*** -0.1866*** 
STC_r 0.0302 0.0388 0.0025 0.2000*** 0.3096*** 0.1696*** 
Sugar 3/1/1995 – 
6/10/1998 
13/10/1998 – 
23/4/2002 
30/4/2002 – 
23/8/2005 
30/8/2005 – 
16/12/2008 
22/12/2008 – 
24/4/2012 
1/5/2012 – 
7/3/2017 
ESV 0.0004 0.0065 -0.0077 0.0033 0.0099 -0.0009 
LTC_r -0.1583*** -0.1560*** -0.1539*** -0.1311** -0.2201*** -0.1888*** 
STC 0.0041 0.0049*** 0.00353** 0.0007 -0.0010 0.0017 
Cotton 3/1/1995 – 
28/4/1998 
5/5/1998 – 
2/12/2003 
9/12/2003 – 
27/3/2007 
3/4/2007 – 
20/7/2010 
27/7/2010 – 
12/11/2013 
19/11/2013 – 
7/3/2017 
ESV_f 0.1612*** 0.2135*** 0.1498*** 0.1736*** 0.0507 0.0910*** 
LTC_r -0.0821 0.0035 -0.0583 0.0086 -0.1025** -0.036 
STC -0.0057 0.0018*** -0.0002 0.0004 0.0021*** 0.0001 
Gold 3/1/1995 – 
27/7/1999 
3/8/1999 – 
10/12/2002 
17/12/2002 – 
13/6/2006 
20/6/2006 – 
22/12/2009 
29/12/2009 – 
16/4/2013 
23/4/2013 – 
7/3/2017 
ESV 0.0022* -0.0019 0.0050*** -0.0012 0.0049*** 0.0008 
LTC_r -0.0615*** -0.0784*** 0.0135 -0.0463* -0.1022*** -0.034* 
STC 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0023** 0.0007*** -0.0002 -0.0001 
Silver 3/1/1995 – 
2/3/1999 
9/3/1999 – 
1/4/2003 
8/4/2003 – 
25/7/2006 
1/8/2006 – 
20/4/2010 
27/4/2010 – 
13/8/2013 
20/8/2013 – 
7/3/2017 
ESV 0.0166** -0.0003 0.0184** 0.0015 0.0331*** 0.0134** 
LTC_r -0.0636* 0.0081 0.0439 0.1012 -0.2084*** 0.0099 
STC 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0043*** -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0022 
Copper 3/1/1995 – 
23/2/1999 
2/3/1999 – 
22/10/2002 
29/10/2002 – 
28/2/2006 
7/3/2006 – 
23/6/2009 
30/6/2009 – 
23/4/2013 
30/4/2013 – 
7/3/2017 
ESV 0.0256** 0.0103** 0.0041 0.0356 0.0066 0.0116** 
LTC_r -0.1085*** -0.0962*** -0.0531 -0.0718* 0.0470** 0.0782*** 
STC 0.0033 0.0004 0.0003 0.0041 -0.0006 -0.0010 
Platinum 3/1/1995 – 
5/10/1999 
12/10/1999 – 
15/7/2003 
22/7/2003 – 
23/1/2007 
30/1/2007 – 
1/6/2010 
8/6/2010 – 
22/10/2013 
29/10/2013 – 
7/3/2017 
ESV_f 0.3528*** 0.8156*** 0.7860*** 0.2948 0.2631*** 0.2433*** 
LTC_r 0.0131 -0.0090 0.0081 -0.0117 -0.0453* 0.0016 
STC 0.0005** 0.0002** 0.0007 0.0006 0.0000 0.0002 
Natural Gas 3/1/1995 – 
28/4/1998 
5/5/1998 – 
2/10/2001 
9/10/2001 – 
20/12/2005 
27/12/2005 – 
15/9/2009 
26/5/2009 – 
16/10/2012 
23/10/2012 – 
7/3/2017 
ESV_f 0.2398*** 0.2088*** 0.2242*** 0.1437*** 0.0972*** 0.0222** 
LTC_r -0.1058 -0.0043 -0.0175 -0.0395 0.1586** -0.0870 
STC 0.0100 -0.0012 0.0025** 0.0035*** 0.0000 0.0002 
Crude Oil 3/1/1995 – 
18/4/2000 
25/4/2000 – 
26/8/2003 
2/9/2003 – 
19/12/2006 
26/12/2006 – 
1/6/2010 
8/6/2010 – 
29/10/2013 
5/11/2013 – 
7/3/2017 
ESV_f 0.1035*** 0.0418** 0.0861*** 0.0164 0.0526*** 0.0372*** 
LTC_r 0.0676 -0.1428*** 0.0125 0.1060*** 0.1123*** 0.3129*** 
STC_r -0.0432 0.1035*** -0.0625 -0.1530*** -0.0486 -0.1646*** 
Notes: This table illustrates the results of the least squares regression with Bai-Perron structural breaks and Newey-West standard errors 
for the ten commodities between 3rd January 1995 and 7th March 2017 totalling 1,156 observations for each commodity. With ESV, LTC, 
and STC as focus variables, _r as log returns, and _f as first difference. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for 
p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. 
The model is defined as: 
𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[ESV, LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes in total open interest per commodity, 
TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite index, TED as changes in the TED spread, 
RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in 
the Baltic Dry Index, and ε as error term at time t.  
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Commercial and Non-Commercial Trader Concentration 
While the time-varying effects are probably the result of changes in individual commodity 
supply and demand, I take a closer look at the commodities with direction changing 
coefficients. For example, the LTC coefficient for copper turns significantly positive 
beginning in mid-2009. A positive coefficient for LTC indicates a positive relationship 
between LTC, i.e. long trader concentration (e.g. consumers), and returns, which contradicts 
the expectation that consumers want to pay the lowest price possible. However, long trader 
concentration includes both open interest of consumers and other traders who also hold 
long positions, in particular institutional commodity index investors. Moreover, one must 
remember that LTC measures the ratio of large to small traders. Thus, an increase in LTC 
can either be the result of an increase in long traders’ open interest or a decrease in small 
traders’ open interest. To evaluate the diverging effects of commercial and non-commercial 
trader concentration, I separate LTC and STC into their commercial and non-commercial 
parts. Extending (4.9) and (4.10), the separated long and short trader concentration measures 
can be written as: 
𝐿𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡 =
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝐼 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑂𝐼 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡
 (4.26) 
𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑁𝐶𝑡 =
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝐼 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑂𝐼 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡
 (4.27) 
𝑆𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡 =
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝐼 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑂𝐼 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡
 (4.28) 
𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑁𝐶𝑡 =
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝐼 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑂𝐼 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡
 (4.29) 
 For all three commodities with switching coefficients (corn, copper, crude oil), I create 
the commercial (𝐿𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡) and non-commercial (𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑁𝐶𝑡) long trader concentration variables. 
As crude oil experiences a similar switching behaviour of STC, I also create commercial 
(𝑆𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡) and non-commercial (𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑁𝐶𝑡) short trader concentration variables in the same 
manner. The findings confirm and oppose the underlying hypothesis for long and short 
trader concentration, i.e. that long traders want to achieve the lowest price and short traders 
the highest price possible. If the trader concentration increases, each market participant is 
equipped with a relatively higher market power, which puts upward (short) or downward 
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(long) pressure on the price. While the obtained coefficients for all for LTCC and STCC 
mostly confirm this hypothesis, the variables for non-commercial trader concentration 
indicate the opposite, i.e. negative coefficients for short and positive coefficients for long 
trader concentration.91 These findings suggest that, while the relationship for returns and 
commercial trader concentration works as expected and represents rational trader behaviour, 
non-commercial trader concentration may not. Moreover, commercial trader concentration 
has a stronger influence on returns before the rise in financialization for copper and crude 
oil whereas non-commercial trader concentration has a stronger impact for both 
commodities afterwards. For corn and soybeans, the significance of commercial and non-
commercial trader concentration is constant throughout the research period. All results are 
reported in Appendix A4.3 and A4.4.  
 The question arises why the relationship between returns and non-commercial trader 
concentration is contrasting the rational trader hypothesis. First, correlation is not causation. 
Although both variables correlate, either no causal relationship may exist or both are driven 
by a third unobserved variable. However, as I identify a significant and Granger causal 
relationship for trader concentration overall, it is likely that the variables are connected. 
Second, large non-commercial traders are less interested in the best price but use 
commodities for other reasons, e.g. portfolio diversification. Thus, short-term changes of 
the commodity price might be of less interest, which leads to the observed coefficient 
behaviour. Third, trader concentration is calculated by dividing large trader open interest by 
small trader open interest, defined by the reporting threshold set by the CFTC. For non-
commercial trader concentration, large traders are institutional investors such as ETF’s 
(numerator). It is assumed that positions are not being adjusted based on small price 
changes. The denominator of the equation is made up of small non-commercial traders such 
as day and momentum traders who react to small price changes. For example, if returns 
increase, the numerator of long trader concentration remains relatively stable, but the 
denominator decreases as small traders exit their positions. As a result, LTC increases 
together with returns, which indicates a positive correlation and thus positive coefficient in 
                                                 
91 In addition to the individual commodity analysis, I evaluate the effects of the separated trader concentration 
variables on returns in the commodity fixed effects panel regression framework. The results for all 10 
commodities confirm the negative and highly significant (1 percent level) impact of LTCC and positive and 
highly significant (1 percent level) of STCC on returns. However, the coefficients for non-commercial trader 
concentration, both long and short, remain non-significant, which suggests that overall, commercial trader 
concentration has a higher explanation power for returns than non-commercial trader concentration. 
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the least squares regression.92 To thoroughly understand the interaction between trader 
concentration and returns, further research is necessary. For example, one might be 
interested in a potential time-varying Granger causal relationship between trader 
concentration, speculation, and returns. As this is beyond the scope of this study, I leave this 
endeavour for future research.  
 Overall, one should be aware that these findings, while interesting and worth pursuing 
further, illustrate the effect of returns on trader concentration and not the other way around. 
The Granger causality evaluation suggests that LTC and STC of most commodities, either 
individually or jointly, are not Granger-caused by returns. Instead, returns unidirectionally 
Granger-cause LTC and STC for most commodities.  
 THE SIGNALLING EFFECT OF SPECULATION AND TRADER CONCENTRATION 
This section aims to address the holistic impact of trading on the price of the underlying. I 
argue that the impact of futures trading on returns is not solely financial. Prior research 
concerned with speculation and commodity futures assumes that, if speculation drives 
commodities, changes in weekly non-commercial open interest should impact price, 
volatility, and other related measures during the same period. Moreover, it implies that these 
effects happen immediately. To illustrate this effect, it is best to use an example. Imagine a 
trader who buys corn futures. All other things being equal, the demand for corn futures 
increases, which increases the price. This effect is defined as the financial effect, which is 
evaluated in Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3. Additionally, one may expect other market participants 
to react to those changes once the information is available. I argue that, when herd 
behaviour93 is present, it is not only the trader who buys or sells futures that influences the 
price, but also other traders who follow the first trader. This herd behaviour is denoted as 
the signalling effect as it follows the signals set by other traders. Studies on monetary policy 
(e.g., Glick and Leduc, 2012; Scrimgeour 2014), economic events (Roache and Rissi, 2010), 
or weather conditions (Fleming et al., 2006) show that public information influences 
                                                 
92 The valuation of lower frequency data (monthly and yearly) produces comparable coefficients, i.e. opposing 
coefficients, which contradicts with the short-term trader theory. Moreover, I observe the same coefficient 
behaviour for short trader concentration, i.e. without (or with fewer) ETF involvement. As detailed 
information on individual trades is scarce, it may not be possible to link the effects to the individual buyer or 
seller of futures contracts.  
93 Another term that is often used to describe herd behaviour is the ‘bandwagon effect’. I use both terms to 
describe the same psychological behaviour.  
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commodity prices. Moreover, Roache and Rissi (2010) argue that the sensitivity of 
commodities to news has increased since the financialization of the commodity market. 
Demirer et al. (2015) add that herd behaviour is prominent in grain futures markets during 
high volatility states, but less so in energy and metal markets. Once the signalling effect of 
open interest changes, measured by trader concentration, on CFR is identified, market 
participants such as commodity producers, consumers, and financial investors can better 
understand commodity market dynamics and incorporate this information into their 
decision-making processes.  
 The examination of the signalling effect contains a crucial side benefit. Unlike the 
financial effect, which measures commodity prices and open interest changes on the same 
day, the signalling effect uses data gathered each Tuesday and evaluates its impact on returns 
once the report is published on the subsequent Friday. As a result, the causal relationship 
between speculation and returns is clear, and is a result of the time difference. The evaluation 
of the signalling effect not only provides novel insight on herd behaviour and reaction to 
news related to trading in commodity markets but sheds further light on the causal 
relationship between speculation and commodity returns and addresses the endogeneity bias 
highlighted by Buyuksahin and Harris (2011). The ongoing disagreement about the real 
impact of speculation on returns, paired with the increasing interest in exchange-traded 
commodities as an alternative investment to stocks and bonds, motivates the investigation 
to fully understand their relationship. Estimating the signalling effect helps to shed further 
light on this topic. By evaluating the estimation power of the three regressors of interest to 
explain returns on the day of the report publication, it is possible to uncover the markets’ 
reaction to the latest information about speculation and trader concentration. In other 
words, if traders react to these announcements and adjust their positions, returns should 
change accordingly. Combined with the unambiguous causal relationship between 
speculation and returns underlying the signalling effect94, one may conclude that speculation 
drives returns. More precisely, while I show that non-commercial speculation transmitted 
by the financial channel does not directly Granger-cause weekly returns, the publication of 
non-commercial trading information through the signalling channel may be a driver of 
returns. 
                                                 
94 The analysis of the signalling effect uses information that is captured each Tuesday to estimate its impact on 
following Friday’s financial data. 
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Table 4.11: Quantile and Panel Fixed Effects Regression – Signalling Effect 
 Commodity Futures Returns 
   Quantile 
Signalling Effect  PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
ESV 
All 0.0005 0.0029*** 0.0028*** 0.0017*** 0.0005*** -0.0010*** -0.0015*** -0.0021*** 
Agri 0.0004 0.0002** 0.0004*** -0.0000 0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.0012*** 0.0008*** 
Metals 0.0003 0.0037*** 0.0033*** -0.0006* 0.0002** 0.0007*** -0.0028*** -0.0044*** 
Energy (_f) 0.0204*** 0.0120*** 0.0414*** 0.0206*** 0.0213*** 0.0200*** 0.0170*** 0.0241*** 
LTC 
All 0.0000 -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0005*** -0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
Agri -0.0003 0.0011*** 0.0004*** -0.0005*** 0.0002*** 0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0015*** 
Metals 0.0001 0.0015*** 0.0010*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0003*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** 
Energy 0.0005 0.0056*** -0.0011 0.0016*** 0.0007*** -0.0017*** -0.0030*** -0.0055*** 
STC 
All 0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000** 0.0000*** -0.0000** 0.0003*** 
Agri 0.0004** -0.0011*** -0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0001** 0.0005*** 0.0013*** 0.0015*** 
Metals -0.0001 0.0001*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0000*** -0.0002*** 
Energy -0.0005* -0.0029*** 0.0005 -0.0010*** 0.0001 0.0009*** 0.0016*** 0.0029*** 
Notes: This table illustrates the detailed results of the panel regression with commodity fixed effects (PD-FE) and quantile regression with 
nonadditive commodity fixed effects (QRPD) for the signalling effect of commodity futures returns between 3rd January 1995 and 7th 
March 2017 totalling 1,156 observations for each of the 10 commodities. With _f and _r indicating first difference and log returns 
respectively. With ESV, LTC, and STC as focus variables. Note that quantile regression for panel data with nonadditive fixed effects relies 
on a non-separable error term U* and does not report a separate constant term. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, 
** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Detailed results are in Appendix A4.5.  
The models are defined as: 
PD-FE: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
QRPD: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑗(𝑈𝑖,𝑡
∗ )𝑘𝑗=1       𝑃(𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽(𝜏)|𝐷𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜏      ?̂?(𝜏) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔min
𝑏∈𝛽
𝑔′̂(𝑏) ?̂?𝑔(𝑏) 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[ESV, LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes in total open interest per commodity, 
TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite index, TED as changes in the TED spread, 
RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in 
the Baltic Dry Index, DotCom as a dummy variable for the dot-com bubble between the years 2000 and 2002, GFC as a dummy variable 
for the Global Financial Crisis between the years 2008 and 2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European Debt Crisis between the 
years 2010 and 2012 and ε as error term for each commodity i at time t. With βj as the parameter of interest for each of the k ∈ N* 
regressors, D' = [SPEC, F] is the vector of regressors, and U* is the non-separable error term traditionally associated with quantile 
estimation. For a τ-th quantile (0 < τ < 1) of CFR. 
Contrary to the financial channel, Table 4.11 shows that the ESV coefficient non-significant 
for the mean model. Significant evidence of a reinforcing signalling effect that remains 
reinforcing in the quantile evaluation can only be found for energy commodities, i.e. a market 
that experiences considerably more attention from institutional investors and traders. Thus, 
market participants in highly traded markets such as energy commodities appear to follow 
the direction of non-commercial commodity futures traders once the information becomes 
public and adjust their positions accordingly. However, the magnitude of this herd behaviour 
is weaker compared to the financial effect. Shifting to trader concentration, I observe little 
significance of the variables for both the full basket of commodities and the subsets. Only 
for agricultural commodities, the mean model estimates a significant (5 percent level), 
positive impact of short trader concentration. 
Expectation vs. Reality 
So far, the results for the signalling effect of excess speculation on returns are only significant 
and reinforcing for energy commodities. However, metals, agricultural, and commodities 
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overall are less affected by the signalling effect of any of the three variables of interest. 
However, what seems to be non-significance might simply be the result of limited deviation 
between expectation and reality. In fact, if the base data of the three regressors of interest in 
the COT report is not too different compared to the expectations of market participants, a 
non-significant relationship is likely. In the spirit of Bessembinder and Seguin (1993), I use 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test95 to determine whether the time-series are stationary and 
adopt AR (10) models for stationary and ARIMA (10,1,0) models for non-stationary data to 
obtain one-step-ahead forecast errors as expected values, defined as: 
𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡|𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−𝜔, 𝜔 = 1,… ,10]  (4.30) 
with 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 as forecast error, 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 as actual value, and 𝐸[… ] as expected value of 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
estimated using an AR (10) for stationary and ARIMA (10,1,0) for non-stationary data for 
each commodity 𝑖 and entity 𝑗 with 𝑗 =  [𝐸𝑆𝑉, 𝑛𝑒𝑡(𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐ℎ, 𝑠𝑤𝑎𝑝,𝑀𝑀)], which represent 
merchants, i.e. commercials (merch), swap dealers (swap), and managed money (MM). This 
variable is added to equation (4.11). To truly compare ESV and the measures of net open 
interest by trader type, I limit this analysis to the shortened research period starting mid-
June 2006. The results are reported in Tables 4.12 and 4.13. 
 In line with the prior analysis of the signalling effect, I only observe a positive signalling 
effect of ESV on returns for energy commodities. However, once the ESV is switched with 
the forecast error as explanatory variable, the significance of the coefficients increases. For 
commodities overall and the three subgroups agricultural, metals, and energy, the forecast 
error of ESV significantly (1 percent level) increases returns. Thus, traders react to 
unexpected changes in non-commercial open interest once the reported figures deviate from 
the expected, i.e. previous values. While the absolute size of ESV plays a subordinate role 
for the signalling effect, deviations from the expected value of ESV significantly explain 
variations in returns.  
 The individual commodity results, which are reported in Appendix A4.7, further suggest 
that agricultural commodities and metals are influenced by expectation deviations, i.e. 
forecast errors, of ESV. Only for energy commodities, i.e. natural gas and crude oil, the 
                                                 
95 In addition, I run Phillips-Perron tests to confirm the findings. If the recommendations following both tests 
are ambiguous, the Dickey-Fuller test with generalised least squares (DFGLS) is used.  
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forecast error variable is non-significant. Moreover, I test if the signalling effect experiences 
breaks between June 2006 and the end of the research period in 2017. This break analysis 
helps me to reveal if the signalling effect has become more relevant during the recent years 
and whether the reliance of traders on CFTC reports has changed. To identify unknown 
breaks, I use least squares regressions with Bai-Perron structural breaks. The obtained 
coefficients, which can be found in Appendix A4.10, suggest that the effect stemming from 
expectation deviations of non-commercial speculation increases since the last commodity 
price peak end-2011 for some commodities such as silver, platinum, and crude oil. This 
indicates that investors’ awareness of and interest in the CFTC COT report has increased. 
As a result, markets react stronger to deviations in the expected excess non-commercial 
speculative open interest. Traders and other market participants benefit from these findings 
as they allow them to adequately consider the effect in their trading decision process. 
Table 4.12: Expectation vs. Reality 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 ESV-All ESV-All ESV-AG ESV-AG ESV-PM ESV-PM ESV-IM ESV-IM ESV-EN ESV-EN 
ESV 0.0001  0.0002  -0.0004  -0.0005    
 (0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0008)  (0.0036)    
ESV_r         0.0127**  
         (0.0055)  
FE[ESV]  0.0176***  0.0186***  0.0144***  0.0388***  0.0120** 
  (0.0028)  (0.0035)  (0.0039)  (0.0137)  (0.0060) 
Obs. 5,610 5,610 2,244 2,244 1,683 1,683 561 561 1,122 1,122 
Notes: This table illustrates the results of the panel regression with commodity fixed effects for the signalling effect of returns between 
June 2006 and 7th March 2017 totalling 561 observations for each commodity (10 commodities, agriculture (AG: corn, soybeans, sugar, 
cotton), precious metals (PM: gold, silver, platinum), industrial metals (IM: copper), and energy commodities (EN: crude oil and natural 
gas)). With _f and _r indicating first difference and log returns respectively. With ESV as focus variable and obs. as observations. I use 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors to account for cross-sectional dependence. With FE[…] indicating the forecast error for each of the series, 
estimating by either AR (10) for stationary or ARIMA (10,1,0) for non-stationary time-series. * indicates the statistical significance, with 
*** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Detailed results are stored in Appendix A4.6. Commodity-individual results are stored in 
Appendix A4.7. 
The model is defined as: 
𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[ESV, LTC, STC] or SPEC = [FE[ESV], LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes 
in total open interest per commodity, TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite 
index, TED as changes in the TED spread, RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-
specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in the Baltic Dry Index, GFC as a dummy variable for the Global Financial Crisis between the 
years 2008 and 2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European Debt Crisis between the years 2010 and 2012 and ε as error term for 
each commodity i at time t.  
The Signalling Effect of Disaggregated Open Interest 
The disaggregated net open interest data extends these findings and indicates a significant 
signalling effect of the forecast errors for both agricultural and energy returns. While 
agricultural commodities are primarily driven by forecast errors on the open interest of 
merchants and swap dealers, i.e. traders that have either a direct commercial or longer-term 
investment interest in the underlying and are thus often in the centre of public debate, energy 
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commodities, which are amongst the most frequently traded commodities, are influenced by 
forecast errors in the open interest of swap dealers and managed money, i.e. non-commercial 
traders that are mostly interested in short-term financial gains and not the commodity itself.  
Table 4.13: Expectation vs. Reality Disaggregated Data 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 DISS-All DISS-All DISS-AG DISS-AG DISS-PM DISS-PM DISS-IM DISS-IM DISS-EN DISS-EN 
Merch_net -0.0024**  -0.0043**  0.0056  0.0002    
 (0.0011)  (0.0019)  (0.0054)  (0.0173)    
Merch_net_f         -0.0462**  
         (0.0198)  
FE[Merch]  -0.0121  -0.0498***  0.0057  0.0008  0.0157 
  (0.0089)  (0.0106)  (0.0180)  (0.0487)  (0.0225) 
Swap     0.0026  0.0068    
     (0.0079)  (0.0217)    
Swap_net_f -0.0187**  -0.0048      -0.0083  
 (0.0091)  (0.0175)      (0.0141)  
FE[Swap]  0.0011  -0.0424**  -0.0174  -0.0200  0.0478** 
  (0.0128)  (0.0184)  (0.0199)  (0.0619)  (0.0202) 
MM -0.0012  -0.0044**  0.0042  0.0008  0.0033  
 (0.0012)  (0.0019)  (0.0074)  (0.0144)  (0.0025)  
FE[MM]  0.0325***  -0.0137  0.0283  0.0629*  0.0719*** 
  (0.0077)  (0.0096)  (0.0188)  (0.0360)  (0.0123) 
Obs. 5,610 5,610 2,244 2,244 1,683 1,683 561 561 1,122 1,122 
Notes: This table illustrates the results of the panel regression with commodity fixed effects for the signalling effect of returns between 
June 2006 and 7th March 2017 totalling 561 observations for each commodity (10 commodities, agriculture (AG: corn, soybeans, sugar, 
cotton), precious metals (PM: gold, silver, platinum), industrial metals (IM: copper), and energy commodities (EN: crude oil and natural 
gas)). With _f and _r indicating first difference and log returns respectively. With producer/user (merch), swap dealers (swap), and managed 
money (MM), and obs. as observations. I use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors to account for cross-sectional dependence. With FE[…] 
indicating the forecast error for each of the series, estimating by either AR (10) for stationary or ARIMA (10,1,0) for non-stationary time-
series. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Detailed results are stored in Appendix 
A4.6.  
The model is defined as: 
𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶′𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC’ as disaggregated speculative measures vector consisting 
of SPEC’ = [MERCH, SWAP, MM, LTC, STC] or SPEC’ = [FE[MERCH], FE[SWAP], FE[MM], LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental 
explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes in total open interest per commodity, TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD 
index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite index, TED as changes in the TED spread, RIR as first difference of the real 3-month 
USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in the Baltic Dry Index, GFC as a dummy 
variable for the Global Financial Crisis between the years 2008 and 2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European Debt Crisis between 
the years 2010 and 2012 and ε as error term for each commodity i at time t.  
The findings manifest the previously obtained findings that traders are less concerned with 
the absolute size of open interest but react stronger to unexpected changes in such. 
Moreover, the disaggregated open interest results show that the effect on agricultural and 
energy commodities is stronger compared to metals.96 The individual commodity results, 
which are reported in Appendix A4.8, further suggest that agricultural commodities are 
primarily affected by expectation deviations, i.e. forecast errors, of merchants’ open interest. 
Both natural gas and crude oil returns experience a positive, highly significant signalling 
                                                 
96 As metal producers tend to hedge little or none of their production (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016), but 
agricultural producers often sell their future harvest on the market, changes in merchant open interest may 
signal changes in the expected future harvest. Thus, increases in both the merchant open interest and the 
forecast error in merchant open interest signal higher expected future yield, which should reduce the market 
price and thus reduce the price and returns today. 
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effect that stems from expectation deviations for the measure of non-commercial 
speculation, i.e. managed money.  
The Signalling Effect of Speculation on the Realised Volatility 
Finally, I evaluate the volatility of returns and their interaction with ESV, forecast error of 
ESV, LTC, and STC by using a constant only mean model of returns and the former four 
main regressors as explanatory variables in the variance equation. Detailed results are 
reported in Appendix A4.11. As I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the errors are not 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic based on the ARCH-LM test for silver and sugar, 
I limit this evaluation to the eight remaining commodities. The asymmetry terms suggest 
that the volatility of corn and soybeans returns is significantly more affected by positive 
shocks, whereas negative shocks have a greater impact on the volatility of copper and crude 
oil returns. Except for copper, the magnitude of symmetric shocks is relatively stronger and 
often statistically more significant than the asymmetric shocks. The results also suggest that 
the volatility of corn, soybeans, and natural gas returns are significantly affected by ESV and 
the forecast error of ESV. In contrast, the volatility of gold and copper returns is only 
affected by expectation errors and not by ESV. This confirms that traders are less concerned 
with the absolute size of open interest but react more strongly to unexpected changes. 
Although the financial effect of speculation on returns might be ambiguous, the signalling 
effect of speculation clearly shows that markets react to news on speculative and non-
speculative open interest, which is particularly present when the actual values deviate from 
the expected open interest. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This study evaluates non-commercial speculation, trader concentration, and their 
explanatory power of these variables to explain the return distribution of a basket of ten 
commodity futures. Not only does it evaluate the mean impact of speculation and trader 
concentration, but it further extends prior research by analysing the varying impact of the 
regressors on different quantiles of returns. With this approach, I scrutinise the quantiles of 
returns, focussing on the extremes, to identify the nonlinear explanatory power of 
speculation and trader concentration. Granger causality tests for heterogenous panel data 
complement the evaluation by identifying the direction of the impact. Moreover, the 
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evaluation of the signalling effect provides a novel extension of prior research which 
primarily focuses on the financial effect.  
 The results imply that speculation stabilises the futures returns of a panel of ten 
commodities and the subgroup of four metals: gold, silver, copper, and platinum. Moreover, 
the results suggest that speculation reinforces the returns of the energy and agricultural 
subgroups. The commodity-specific findings indicate that ESV has a stronger stabilising, i.e. 
positive effect on the left tail of the return distribution, i.e. the 5th to 50th quantiles for 
soybeans and gold, a constant positive effect on the whole distribution of returns for corn, 
cotton, platinum, natural gas, and crude oil, and significantly stronger reinforcing effects on 
the left and right tail of returns for silver and copper. Thus, for most individual commodities, 
the results indicate a reinforcing relationship between ESV and returns, for both the mean 
and quantile regressions. This confirms the misinterpretation error that can arise from the 
use of panel regression, described earlier, as the results for some commodities do not 
coincide with the findings for their respective commodity group. Moreover, for all 
commodities, the effect of non-commercial speculation on returns, indicated by the 
magnitude of the coefficients, is small. The obtained coefficients suggest that the impact of 
changes in open interest on futures returns is miniscule. Yet, the impact of merchants’ open 
interest, i.e. traders primarily concerned with producing or consuming the commodities, is 
approximately four times97 stronger than the effects stemming from non-commercial 
hedging (i.e. managed money open interest). Thus, the effect of non-commercial, i.e. 
speculative, trading on futures returns is smaller than the effects stemming from commercial 
trading. Granger causality tests, on a weekly basis, reveal that the leading driver is, in fact, 
returns and not speculation. This is consistent with the idea that relatively low prices induce 
non-commercial speculators to buy futures and when prices rise beyond a certain point, non-
commercial speculators sell their positions. These findings apply for all ten tested 
commodities and are important for regulators, investors, and other parties that are interested 
in the factors that influence commodity prices. Investors and traders gain from these 
findings by realising that their actions, on a weekly basis, do not drive returns. In addition, 
the results for the signalling effect show that market participants use information on changes 
in non-commercial open interest and adjust their exposure accordingly. This effect is 
                                                 
97 Please refer to Chapter 4.4.3 for more details.  
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particularly present when non-commercial speculation deviates from its expected value. 
Investors can benefit from these findings by developing a better understanding of the 
interactions between trader concentration and speculation in commodity futures markets 
and thus improve their financial models accordingly. Moreover, instead of imposing new 
regulations on trading and position limits, regulators may be well-advised to review their 
position in favour of a more transparent, market-oriented approach. This may include 
publishing daily reports of trading volumes and open interest and may further include the 
reporting of the names of the trading parties. That is, if more information is available, the 
impact of each publication is likely to be less. Future research may further analyse the impact 
of trader participation and concentration, extend the investigation to other commodities or 
asset classes, estimate a model that combines quantile regression and Granger causality for 
panel data, or use trading data at higher frequencies to evaluate the potential intraweek or 
intraday Granger causality between speculation and returns. 
 Overall, the findings suggest that financialization does not destabilise commodity 
markets. The growing interest and investment during the last two decades have attracted 
more traders which has led to more robust markets that are less prone to changes in trader 
concentration. Moreover, the information content of CFTC’s Commitment of Traders 
report significantly affects returns once the information is available to the public. In the end, 
the answer to the question of whether non-commercial speculation improves the estimation 
of commodity futures returns, would appear to be yes. However, the findings also reveal 
that non-commercial speculation does not Granger-cause commodity futures returns at 
weekly frequencies. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
To understand and forecast changes in commodity prices, one must identify the influential 
factors that impact and potentially drive them. Only then, is it possible to reveal their 
relationships with commodity prices and understand how they interact. This thesis provides 
an extension of prior research by identifying and quantifying the relationships between 
environmental, macroeconomic, and intra-market forces and commodity prices, returns, and 
the volatility thereof. The findings are beneficial for several stakeholders. First, and 
foremost, the results allow commodity producers and consumers to better understand 
commodity market behaviour and the effects of commodity-specific, market-specific, 
macroeconomic, and environmental factors on the financial feasibility and stability of their 
operations and thus enable them to actively adjust their risk management. Second, the results 
equip investors with key information to optimise their models and thus portfolios. Likewise, 
insurers can adjust their policies or provide new products to customers that require specific 
weather insurance. Third, policy makers may be particularly interested in the findings on 
monetary policy and non-commercial speculation and their relationship with commodity 
markets and may use them to develop regulations and guidelines that are better aligned with 
actual market interactions. Instead of introducing strict position limits as required by MiFID 
II (ESMA, 2018), which may reduce the positive effects that speculators bring to commodity 
markets, such as providing liquidity to hedgers (Brunetti and Buyuksahin, 2009), it can be 
more rewarding for policy makers to publish all trading information in real time, so that all 
market participants can understand who is currently trading, what commodities and 
derivatives they are trading, and the directions of their trades. This can reduce potential 
asymmetric information and thus strengthen commodity markets. 
 Chapter 2 provides new insights into the effects of weather anomalies on exchange-
traded aluminium. It begins with temperature and precipitation anomalies, measured by self-
created global weather anomaly indices that consider mine-specific weather station data, and 
their effect on aluminium futures returns and changes in aluminium inventory. Precipitation 
anomalies are found to significantly reduce global inventory changes. Particularly when 
weather data are unavailable and precipitation anomalies occur on multiple days, the 
reducing effect on inventory changes is significant. Despite this, the effect on aluminium 
futures returns is limited. The limited significance that is observed might be the result of an 
increase in the oversupply of aluminium since 2009, which has also dampened the statistical 
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significance of the impact of precipitation anomalies on changes in aluminium inventory. In 
addition to inventory and futures returns, abnormal stock returns on an index of equally-
weighted index of bauxite mining and aluminium producing firms are found to be driven by 
temperature anomalies. Anomalies observed on the same day as the abnormal returns, 
anomalies that have been captured during non-trading days, and multi-day anomalies are 
significant at least at the 10 percent significance level. These findings imply that despite the 
high costs that weather events can impose on mining operations (cf. BHP Billiton, 2015), 
there is a limited effect on exchange-traded aluminium futures returns. Moreover, if the 
coefficients are significant, the obtained results suggest that the magnitude of weather 
anomalies on aluminium returns and inventory changes is miniscule. Thus, practitioners 
should not be too concerned about the short-term effects of weather events on the global 
aluminium price, as inventories seem to sufficiently buffer for those effects. The second 
contribution to the literature is rooted in the novel method of combining global weather 
station-specific data, which equips other academics and practitioners with a fast and 
computationally simple approach to evaluate weather effects for different economic 
applications. For example, one could calculate precipitation and temperature anomaly 
indices for large cities with a high demand for industrial metals to estimate the effect of 
weather anomalies on demand. As bauxite and other metal mines are often located in remote 
areas with limited weather information, future research may re-evaluate the findings once 
the availability of weather information improves. This includes weather information nearest 
to the evaluated mines and weather information from mines in countries such as China, 
where reliable weather information is scarce. Lastly, future research may focus on the 
relationships between earlier steps in the process chain and retest the findings for other 
metals such as gold and copper. Especially for commodities with lower inventory stocks or 
perishable commodities, the results may differ. 
 Chapter 3 evaluates the impact of changes in global liquidity due to monetary policy 
changes and their impact on the price of non-ferrous metals and gold. The chapter provides 
a novel measure of global unconventional monetary policy in relation to global liquidity, 
defined as a global multiplier ratio, and a global measure of real interest rates. Compared to 
its individual measures, the global multiplier ratio provides a better measurement of market 
and central bank induced liquidity. It is found that the global multiplier ratio significantly 
increases the price of an index of non-ferrous metals overall and copper in particular. These 
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results suggest that an increase in the ability of an economy to utilise fresh central bank 
liquidity has a positive effect on the development of industrial metal prices. However, the 
significance of the positive effect of the global multiplier ratio on the price of industrial 
metals appears to be only significant during the period surrounding the GFC and only 
significantly influences the price of copper. The global real interest rate, which has been 
found to significantly reduce the aluminium price in prior research for lower frequency data, 
has little significant impact on industrial metal prices. The study indicates that the effect of 
real interest rates is subsumed by the addition of the multiplier ratio, which suggests that this 
is a more important determinant of industrial metal prices than real interest rates. 
Conversely, changes in the global real interest rate significantly reduce the price of gold, but 
the global multiplier ratio seems to have a negligible effect. Overall, the findings suggest that 
a market’s ability to absorb central bank liquidity and translate it into economic growth might 
be more important than the level of global real interest rates for the estimation of industrial 
metal prices. Despite the limited statistical significance of the results, the global multiplier 
ratio allows investors and academics to quickly and efficiently quantify the impact of global 
central bank market interventions and consider the associated effects on commodity prices 
in their models. With this measure, it is possible to illustrate whether the intended effects of 
quantitative easing, i.e. an increase in lending and thus market liquidity, are sufficiently 
transmitted to the markets, which is particularly interesting for policy makers. The results 
imply that, on a monthly and quarterly basis, policy makers should not worry too much 
about the effects of their actions on industrial metal and gold prices. Moreover, the findings 
indicate that the global approach provides better estimates than the focus on US measures 
in prior research. For example, I show that the correlation of China’s real interest rate with 
industrial metal prices is stronger than the correlation with the US real interest rate. These 
findings are fruitful for other academics who are interested in the analysis of monetary policy 
and indicate that future research should shift from a focus on US markets towards a more 
global approach. Although the US is still the largest single economy as of 2016, the arrival 
of Asian consumers led by China as the largest importer of coal and non-ferrous metals, 
with a share well above 40 percent (World Bank, 2015; IMF, 2016) may alter the leading 
impact of the US on commodity market dynamics. Furthermore, researchers may gain from 
using the trade data employed in this study, which explains a considerable share of variations 
of the price of industrial metals and gold. These data are freely available and offered by the 
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International Trade Centre, a joint agency of the World Trade Organization and the United 
Nations. Given that monetary policy, and particularly unconventional monetary policy since 
the GFC, deserves considerable attention, these results serve as a fresh reminder of the 
consequences of market interventions by central banks and their impact on areas that 
experience less attention in an inflation-targeting environment. Moreover, it remains unclear 
if the found interactions between the global multiplier ratio, the global real interest rate, and 
metal prices will change once the central banks reduce their holdings in fixed income assets.  
 Chapter 4 investigates the interaction of non-commercial speculation, trader 
concentration, and their explanatory power on the return distribution of a basket of ten 
different commodity futures. It extends prior research by evaluating the quantiles of the 
commodity futures return distributions. The findings indicate a stabilising effect of non-
commercial speculation for commodity futures returns for a panel of ten commodities, the 
subgroup metals, and some individual commodities. For most individual commodities, i.e. 
8 out of 10, the results indicate a reinforcing relationship between ESV and returns, for both 
the mean and quantile regression. Granger causality tests reveal that non-commercial 
speculation, which is associated with increasing effects on commodity prices, is not Granger-
causing commodity futures returns. Instead, commodity futures returns Granger-cause non-
commercial speculation. This is consistent with the idea that relatively low prices induce 
non-commercial speculators to buy futures and that when prices rise beyond a certain point, 
non-commercial speculators sell their positions. In addition, the results for the signalling 
effect show that traders use information on changes in non-commercial open interest to 
adjust their positions. This effect is particularly evident when non-commercial speculation 
deviates from its expected value. Non-commercial traders, particularly large ones, are 
perceived to have deeper market knowledge. Thus, their actions are used as guidance for 
other, potentially less informed traders. Once data at higher frequency become available, 
future research might be able to answer the question of whether the Granger causal effect 
from non-commercial speculation to commodity futures is, indeed, unidirectional. Due to 
the unavailability of data at higher frequency, this question must be left unanswered for now. 
The implications and contributions to the literature that can be drawn from the fourth 
chapter are threefold. First, the obtained coefficients suggest that the impact of changes in 
open interest on futures returns is miniscule. Nevertheless, the impact of merchants’ open 
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interest is approximately four times98 stronger than the effects stemming from non-
commercial hedging. Thus, the effect of non-commercial, i.e. speculative, trading on futures 
returns is smaller than the effects stemming from commercial trading. Second, on a weekly 
basis, there is no significant lagged impact of speculative trading on any of the ten tested 
commodity futures returns. These findings are important for regulators, investors, and other 
parties that are interested in the factors that drive commodity prices. Investors and traders 
benefit from these findings by realising that their actions, on a weekly basis, do not drive 
returns. The results contrast with the poor image of speculation in society and the media 
and its perceived negative economic impact, which overshadows its potentially positive 
impact on financial markets. These include the provision of liquidity, aiding the price 
discovery mechanisms, reducing hedging costs, and better integration of commodity markets 
with financial markets (Fattouh et al., 2012; Irwin and Sanders, 2012). Third, the findings 
suggest that markets react to information on commodity futures open interest once it 
becomes public. In particular, when excess non-commercial speculation deviates from its 
expected value, one can observe a highly significant impact on futures returns. Instead of 
imposing new regulations on trading and position limits, regulators may be well-advised to 
review their approach in favour of a more transparent and market-oriented approach. This 
could include publishing daily reports of trading volumes and open interest and the names 
of the trading parties. If more information is made available, its publication is likely to have 
a minimal impact. 
 Higher frequency data are crucial for future research. Whether one wants to test for a 
bidirectional causal relationship between non-commercial speculation and commodity 
futures returns or link intraday financial data with intraday weather data to see how the 
markets interact, analysis that draws on higher frequency data will be most important to cope 
with the ever-increasing speed of trading. Moreover, the question of potential endogeneity 
biases present in a model is another fruitful field for future research. It is necessary to identify 
instrumental variables that can cope with high frequency data and the fast-changing 
environment present in financial markets. Lastly, more reliable proxies for global commodity 
inventory and production output or more accurate and better reporting standards for global 
imports and exports would enable researchers to significantly improve the accuracy of 
                                                 
98 Please refer to Chapter 4.4.3 for more details.  
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commodity pricing models. Financial market behaviour is time-variant and depends upon 
multiple observed and yet to be observed factors that do not necessarily have to be obvious 
or easily detectable. The results of prior research are time specific and we do not yet have a 
model that is able to generalise well to multiple time periods. Only if one keeps up with 
innovations and new regulations, is it possible to adequately price exchange-traded 
commodities. This task is therefore left for future research endeavours. 
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APPENDICES 
A2.1: Correlation of Daily Weather and Non-Weather Variables with Threshold  
  P_D_MAUabs T_D_MaUabs 
Observations 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 3653 
Threshold, Percentile - 90th 95th - 90th 95th 
Deflated Price_r 0.003 -0.008 -0.006 0.003 -0.015 -0.025 
Global Inventory_r -0.031* -0.017 -0.009 0.012 0.031* 0.035** 
Global Demand_r 0.026 0.015 0.022 -0.071*** -0.053*** -0.047*** 
Monetary Policy_r -0.001 -0.013 -0.003 0.019 0.013 0.008 
TWI_r 0.009 0.009 0.014 0.001 -0.03 -0.003 
CBOE VIX -0.073*** -0.057*** -0.046*** 0.006 0.011 0.031* 
SP500_r 0.008 0.008 0.008 -0.020 -0.005 -0.008 
Global Supply 0.048*** 0.023 0.012 -0.077*** -0.093*** -0.081*** 
Notes: This table shows the results of a pairwise correlation matrix of two weather indices and all other non-weather variables with varying 
observations and increasing percentile thresholds, whereby 3653 observations illustrate the overall research period of 3653 trading days 
between 1st January 2001 and 31st December 2014. The data source is a NOAA daily dataset. The parameters are defined as: P for 
precipitation, T for temperature, D for daily data, and MaU for mine-specific and USGS information. Variables ending with abs indicate 
the absolute weather indices. Furthermore, all variables ending with _r are the logarithmic periodical changes. The parameters are defined 
as Deflated Price as the deflated 3-month futures aluminium price, Global Inventory as LME inventory stocks, Global Demand as Baltic 
Dry Index, Monetary Policy as real interest rate, TWI as the trade-weighted USD index, CBOE VIX as the VIX index, SP500 as the S&P 
500 index, and Global Supply as the USGS output. All variables that are not available on a daily or monthly scale are distributed by cubic 
spline interpolation. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. 
 
A2.2: Sample Calculation of Weather Index Values 
  Mine A Mine B  
Time W M N UAV WAV W M N UAV WAV TIV 
t0 0.2 24.90 24.40 0.50 0.10 0.8 21.10 21.10 0.00 0.00 0.10 
t1 0.2 24.70 22.10 2.60 0.52 0.8 24.20 21.30 2.90 2.32 2.84 
t2 0.25 24.10 21.10 3.00 0.75 0.75 24.60 21.20 3.40 2.55 3.30 
t3 0.3 23.70 24.00 0.30 0.09 0.7 22.20 21.40 0.80 0.56 0.65 
t4 0.32 24.70 22.70 2.00 0.64 0.68 24.70 21.60 3.10 2.11 2.75 
Notes: This table provides a simplified example application of equation 1. This example consists of only two mines A and B and for the 
research period t0 to t4. The parameters are defined as: W as Weight, M as Measurement, N as Normal, UAV as Unweighted Anomaly 
Value, WAV as Weighted Anomaly Value, and TIV as Total Index Value for period t. 
With UAV = M – N, WAV = (M – N) * W, and TIV = WAVmine 1 + WAVmine 2. 
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A3.1: Pairwise Correlation  
Panel A: Level Overall 
Pre-Crisis 
(01/06 – 
11/08) 
FED 
(12/08 – 
12/15) 
FED QE1 
(12/08 – 
03/10) 
FED QE2 
(11/10 – 
06/11) 
FED QE3 
(09/12 – 
12/13) 
BoJ (08/11 
– 12/15) 
ECB 
(03/15 – 
12/15) 
Industrial Metals / Global MR 67.24% 64.45% 19.50% -35.08% -36.02% 40.88% 72.74% -74.86% 
Gold / Global MR -75.77% -58.15% -22.29% -31.46% -66.29% 45.36% 78.85% -81.54% 
Industrial Metals / Global RIR 2.40% 35.07% -79.39% -70.87% 20.71% -85.56% -83.28% 70.52% 
Gold / Global RIR -78.56% -73.93% -76.72% -84.54% -96.55% -80.65% -84.52% 73.98% 
SP 500 / Global MR -12.67% 75.72% -88.09% -48.21% -73.39% -56.26% -85.64% -40.37% 
JPM Gbl Bonds TR / Global MR -89.02% -68.23% -30.20% -49.90% 9.81% 7.14% 70.43% -42.59% 
SP 500 / Global RIR 19.61% 57.42% 14.87% -71.58% -23.96% 75.58% 87.57% -1.68% 
JPM Gbl Bonds TR / Global RIR -72.14% -67.94% -66.05% -52.95% -40.14% -74.05% -81.06% 43.34% 
Panel B: First Difference         
Industrial Metals / Global MR 71.53% 89.04% 76.58% -7.62% 34.22% -16.45% 94.84% 98.92% 
Gold / Global MR 81.42% 37.34% 85.29% -13.54% 14.97% -19.80% 93.35% 99.76% 
Industrial Metals / Global RIR -22.39% -29.25% -16.66% -27.01% -61.64% -66.88% 36.18% 66.53% 
Gold / Global RIR -11.34% -48.64% -8.16% -59.47% -18.06% -56.10% 35.35% 63.69% 
SP 500 / Global MR 95.89% 73.10% 97.57% -29.74% 11.24% -26.27% 98.88% 99.84% 
JPM Gbl Bonds TR / Global MR 92.93% 3.34% 98.14% 10.36% 13.11% -62.91% 99.29% 99.97% 
SP 500 / Global RIR 7.53% -11.25% 14.31% -40.93% -32.34% 44.30% 49.48% 58.54% 
JPM Gbl Bonds TR / Global RIR 8.09% -17.19% 12.03% 6.97% 28.19% -50.67% 43.47% 62.61% 
Notes: This table reports the pairwise correlation between industrial metals and gold prices, the S&P 500 composite index, the JPM Global 
Bonds total return index, and the global multiplier ratio (MR) and global real interest rate (RIR). It differentiates between different period 
during the last decade to emphasize periods that have experienced increasing quantitative easing measures by the Federal Reserve (FED), 
the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and the research period from January 2006 to December 2015 overall. 
With data at level in panel A and data at first difference in panel B. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, 
and * for p<0.1. Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) in parentheses. 
 
A3.2: GARCH (1,1) 
 Monthly Quarterly 
 Mean Model Variance Model Mean Model Variance Model 
Global Multiplier Ratio - -13.02*** - -6.805*** 
  (4.217)  (1.813) 
ARCH Term - 0.0617 - -0.0200 
  (0.0439)  (0.0921) 
GARCH Term - 0.896*** - 0.828*** 
  (0.0528)  (0.151) 
Constant -0.0273* -8.099*** -0.0668 -5.347*** 
 (0.0149) (1.796) (0.0483) (1.417) 
Observations 119 119 39 39 
Notes: This table illustrates the monthly and quarterly GARCH (1,1) results for the SPGSI. The research period runs from January 
(February due to first differences) 2006 to December 2015. This leads to 119 observations for the monthly and 39 for the quarterly time-
series. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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A3.3: OLS Regression Results – Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Wheat 
Panel A – Monthly Crude Oil Crude Oil Natural Gas Natural Gas Wheat No. 2 Wheat No. 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Global Multiplier Ratio 0.1579*** 0.0988 -0.0029 -0.0029 0.0050 -0.0002 
 (0.0569) (0.0769) (0.0079) (0.0087) (0.0070) (0.0077) 
Real Interest Rate Index -0.0523*** -0.0485*** -0.0046* -0.0045 -0.0005 -0.0011 
 (0.0191) (0.0173) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0021) 
Trade-Weighted USD Index – Unwrought -0.0299*** -0.0199*** -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0008* -0.0005 
 (0.0048) (0.0057) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Cash-Forward Spread 0.6600** 0.5551* 0.1722 0.1592 0.1191 0.1384 
 (0.2904) (0.2880) (0.1786) (0.1885) (0.0932) (0.1085) 
Imports in USD  0.0000***  0.0000  -0.0000 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
S&P 500  0.0154  0.0011  -0.0008 
  (0.0190)  (0.0023)  (0.0018) 
CBOE VIX  -0.0013  0.0001  -0.0002 
  (0.0023)  (0.0003)  (0.0002) 
Inventory Stocks qty  0.0000  -0.0000   
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   
Constant 0.0094* 0.0058 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0008 
  (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 
R2 0.4984 0.5629 0.0826 0.0897 0.0734 0.0911 
Panel B – Quarterly (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Global Multiplier Ratio 0.2165** 0.0188 0.0037 0.0051 -0.0002 -0.0008 
 (0.0817) (0.0843) (0.0124) (0.0196) (0.0109) (0.0115) 
Real Interest Rate Index -0.0361 -0.0170 -0.0060** -0.0056** -0.0018 -0.0010 
 (0.0234) (0.0131) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0033) 
Trade-Weighted USD Index – Unwrought -0.0375*** -0.0096 -0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0007 
 (0.0049) (0.0067) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0010) 
Cash-Forward Spread 1.9113** 1.1167* 0.4338 0.2003 0.4908 0.6061 
 (0.7801) (0.5477) (0.3379) (0.2822) (0.3466) (0.3590) 
Imports in USD  0.0000***  0.0000**  0.0000 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
S&P 500  0.0090  0.0042  -0.0033 
  (0.0124)  (0.0025)  (0.0029) 
CBOE VIX  -0.0050**  0.0002  -0.0004 
  (0.0021)  (0.0005)  (0.0004) 
Inventory Stocks qty  0.0000  -0.0000   
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   
Constant 0.0332** 0.0066 0.0004 -0.0012 0.0027 0.0033* 
  (0.0163) (0.0127) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0019) 
Observations 39 39 39 39 39 39 
R2 0.7613 0.8946 0.3233 0.4601 0.1918 0.2701 
Notes: This table illustrates the monthly and quarterly OLS regression results for crude oil natural gas, and wheat spot prices. The research 
period runs from January (February due to first differences) 2006 to December 2015. This leads to 119 observations for the monthly and 
39 for the quarterly data. Normality of the residuals can be rejected at the 5% level for models 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 using the skewness-
kurtosis and Shapiro-Wilk tests. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test suggests stationarity for all residuals at the 1% level. For all models, I 
use robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) to control for heteroscedasticity. The correlogram with 95% confidence 
bands suggests autocorrelation for higher lags and for models 1, 5, and 6 from lag 1 onwards in the monthly time-series. * indicates the 
statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) in 
parentheses. 
The models are defined as: 
For crude oil and natural gas: CIt = α + β1MRt + β2RIRt + β3FXt + β4CFSt + β5IBMt + β6SP500t + β7VIXt + β8INVt + εt 
For wheat: CIt = α + β1MRt + β2RIRt + β3FXt + β4CFSt + β5IBMt + β6SP500t + β7VIXt + εt 
With α as intercept, CI as commodity index changes, MR as multiplier ratio, RIR as real interest rate, FX as global base metal trade-
weighted USD index, CFS as cash-forward spread, IBM as imports of ores of and unwrought base metals, SP500 as S&P 500 composite 
index, VIX as S&P 500 volatility index, INV as inventory stocks, and ε as error term. All variables are at time t or time t-1 respectively. 
All variables at first difference. All data are gathered from Thomson Reuters Datastream, the International Trade Centre, and the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). Due to limited data availability, I use US inventory data for crude oil and natural gas. For 
wheat, I omit the inventory variable due to insufficient availability of data.  
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A4.1: Average Share of Non-Reportable Open Interest 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the share of the average non-reportable open interest for a range of commodities between 3rd January 1995 
and 7th March 2017. The value is calculated as: average of non-reportable open interest per commodity / (average of non-reportable open 
interest per commodity + average of reportable open interest per commodity) * 100. 
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A4.2: Quantile and Panel Fixed Effects Regression – Financial Effect – Details 
Panel A: All 
Commodities 
Commodity Futures Returns 
  Quantile 
 PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
ESV 0.0016*** 0.0051*** 0.0038*** 0.0027*** 0.0011*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTC -0.0007*** -0.0023*** -0.0019*** -0.0012*** -0.0004*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
STC 0.0003*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ML 0.0118** -0.0415*** -0.0270*** -0.0129*** 0.0103*** 0.0331*** 0.0526*** 0.0686*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
OI_r 0.1482*** 0.2217*** 0.2096*** 0.1623*** 0.1283*** 0.1295*** 0.1137*** 0.0667*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) 
SP500_r 0.1763*** 0.2020*** 0.1795*** 0.1672*** 0.1131*** 0.1434*** 0.1660*** 0.1709*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0074) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0012) 
RIR_f -0.0037 -0.0084*** -0.0081*** -0.0064*** -0.0089*** -0.0058*** 0.0038*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
TED_r 0.0044 0.0015*** 0.0062*** 0.0011*** 0.0023*** 0.0055*** 0.0040*** 0.0044*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
TWI_r -0.8830*** -0.7051*** -0.6326*** -0.7967*** -0.8458*** -0.7700*** -0.7920*** -0.8640*** 
 (0.0893) (0.0003) (0.0023) (0.0002) (0.0029) (0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0017) 
BDI_r 0.0129 0.0138*** 0.0134*** 0.0016*** 0.0012* 0.0204*** 0.0098*** 0.0099*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
DotCom 0.0024 -0.0031*** -0.0015*** -0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0033*** 0.0095*** 0.0090*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
GFC 0.0010 -0.0275*** -0.0162*** -0.0075*** -0.0005 0.0096*** 0.0174*** 0.0225*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
EDC -0.0010 -0.0029*** 0.0008*** 0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0015*** -0.0020*** -0.0014*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Notes: This table illustrates the detailed results of the panel regression with commodity fixed effects (PD-FE) and quantile regression with 
nonadditive commodity fixed effects (QRPD) for the financial effect of commodity futures returns between 3rd January 1995 and 7th 
March 2017 totalling 1,156 observations for each commodity (10 commodities, 11,560 observations in total, 4 commodities each for 
agriculture in panel B (corn, soybeans, sugar, cotton), metals in panel C (gold, silver, copper, platinum), and 2 energy commodities in panel 
D (crude oil and natural gas)). With _f and _r indicating first difference and log returns respectively. With ESV, LTC, and STC as focus 
variables, OI as total open interest, ML as market liquidity, SP500 as Standard & Poor’s 500 composite index, RIR as real interest rate, 
TED as TED spread, TWI as trade-weighted USD index, BDI as Baltic Dry Index, and DotCom, GFC, and EDC as dummies for crisis 
periods throughout the research period. Note that quantile regression for panel data with nonadditive fixed effects relies on a non-separable 
error term U* and does not report a separate constant term. While the PD-FE model includes a constant, I refrain from reporting it for 
reasons of clarity and comprehensibility. The constant terms for the PD-FE models are (with standards errors in parentheses): panel B: -
0.0023* (0.0013); panel C: -0.0069*** (0.0024); panel D: -0.0008 (0.0015); panel E: -0.0022 (0.0034). For the PD-FE model, I use Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors to account for cross-sectional dependence. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, 
and * for p<0.1.  
The models are defined as: 
PD-FE: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
QRPD: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑗(𝑈𝑖,𝑡
∗ )𝑘𝑗=1       𝑃(𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽(𝜏)|𝐷𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜏      ?̂?(𝜏) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔min
𝑏∈𝛽
𝑔′̂(𝑏) ?̂?𝑔(𝑏) 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[ESV, LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes in total open interest per commodity, 
TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite index, TED as changes in the TED spread, 
RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in 
the Baltic Dry Index, DotCom as a dummy variable for the dot-com bubble between the years 2000 and 2002, GFC as a dummy variable 
for the Global Financial Crisis between the years 2008 and 2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European Debt Crisis between the 
years 2010 and 2012 and ε as error term for each commodity i at time t. With βj as the parameter of interest for each of the k ∈ N* 
regressors, D' = [SPEC, F] is the vector of regressors, and U* is the non-separable error term traditionally associated with quantile 
estimation. For a τ-th quantile (0 < τ < 1) of CFR. 
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A4.2 cont. 
Panel B: Agriculture Commodity Futures Returns 
  Quantile 
 PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
ESV 0.0019*** 0.0023*** 0.0029*** 0.0016*** 0.0014*** 0.0010*** 0.0020*** 0.0011*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTC -0.0012*** -0.0007*** -0.0010*** -0.0013*** -0.0008*** -0.0003*** -0.0016*** -0.0019*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
STC 0.0010*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0010*** 0.0016*** 0.0024*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ML 0.0299*** -0.0206*** -0.0185*** 0.0010 0.0308*** 0.0497*** 0.0623*** 0.0759*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
OI_r 0.1763*** 0.3129*** 0.2665*** 0.2332*** 0.1771*** 0.1166*** 0.0580*** 0.0643*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0048) (0.0006) (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0012) 
SP500_r 0.1361*** 0.2017*** 0.1446*** 0.1632*** 0.1523*** 0.0800*** 0.1250*** 0.0894*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0032) (0.0010) (0.0242) (0.0103) (0.0065) (0.0006) (0.0021) 
RIR_f -0.0045 -0.0094*** -0.0009*** -0.0080*** -0.0043*** -0.0063*** 0.0003*** -0.0054*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
TED_r -0.0022 -0.0086*** 0.0027*** 0.0025 0.0029 -0.0015*** -0.0002** -0.0132*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
TWI_r -0.5761*** -0.2874*** -0.4976*** -0.2971** -0.5682*** -0.5466*** -0.5909*** -0.7484*** 
 (0.0952) (0.0092) (0.0023) (0.1243) (0.0043) (0.0071) (0.0022) (0.0053) 
BDI_r -0.0047 -0.0038*** -0.0160*** -0.0039 -0.0174*** 0.0076*** -0.0015** -0.0151*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0129) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
DotCom 0.0012 0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0006 0.0031* 0.0039*** 0.0056*** 0.0066*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
GFC -0.0002 -0.0353*** -0.0208*** -0.0058** 0.0043** 0.0017** 0.0209*** 0.0217*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
EDC -0.0010 -0.0137*** -0.0166*** 0.0035 0.0018*** 0.0025*** 0.0092*** 0.0124*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0032) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Panel C: Metals Commodity Futures Returns 
  Quantile 
 PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
ESV 0.0011*** 0.0052*** 0.0045*** 0.0015*** 0.0003* 0.0003 -0.0023*** -0.0027*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTC -0.0004* 0.0011*** 0.0005*** 0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0000 -0.0012*** -0.0019*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
STC 0.0002** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ML 0.0029 -0.0680*** -0.0411*** -0.0201*** 0.0014* 0.0257*** 0.0444*** 0.0572*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
OI_r 0.1169*** 0.1633*** 0.1265*** 0.1101*** 0.1064*** 0.1062*** 0.1104*** 0.0883*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0045) (0.0023) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
SP500_r 0.1536*** 0.2267*** 0.1887*** 0.1583*** 0.1047*** 0.0524*** 0.1150*** 0.1488*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0110) (0.0026) (0.0126) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
RIR_f -0.0023 -0.0051*** -0.0067*** -0.0132*** -0.0035*** -0.0033*** 0.0006*** 0.0040*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
TED_r 0.0060 0.0073*** 0.0029*** 0.0116*** 0.0033** 0.0124*** 0.0120*** 0.0168*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
TWI_r -1.2125*** -1.1441*** -1.1208*** -1.1531*** -1.0993*** -0.8600*** -1.0428*** -1.2118*** 
 (0.1046) (0.0025) (0.0010) (0.0147) (0.0120) (0.0186) (0.0010) (0.0007) 
BDI_r 0.0146 0.0269*** 0.0107*** -0.0013 -0.0023** 0.0101*** 0.0212*** 0.0155*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0046) (0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
DotCom 0.0012 0.0041*** 0.0020*** 0.0014 -0.0005** 0.0038*** -0.0029*** -0.0030*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
GFC 0.0004 -0.0186*** -0.0125*** -0.0060*** -0.0007* 0.0072*** 0.0156*** 0.0227*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
EDC -0.0001 0.0051*** -0.0002*** 0.0052*** 0.0003 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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A4.2 cont. 
Panel D: Energy Commodity Futures Returns 
  Quantile 
 PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
ESV_f 0.0760*** 0.0738*** 0.0787*** 0.0749*** 0.0810*** 0.0638*** 0.0680*** 0.0709*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0001) (0.0029) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
LTC -0.0000 0.0040*** 0.0005 0.0015*** 0.0004*** -0.0009*** -0.0028*** -0.0046*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
STC -0.0002 -0.0029*** -0.0008*** -0.0010*** 0.0000 0.0007*** 0.0016*** 0.0025*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ML 0.0151 -0.0295*** -0.0282*** -0.0164*** 0.0029*** 0.0186*** 0.0680*** 0.0988*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0014) 
OI_r 0.1360*** 0.2068*** 0.0381* 0.1720*** 0.1549*** 0.1347*** -0.0003 0.0770*** 
 (0.0473) (0.0031) (0.0220) (0.0003) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0098) 
SP500_r 0.2432*** 0.2367*** 0.2442*** 0.2295*** 0.2271*** 0.2341*** 0.3289*** 0.4415*** 
 (0.0660) (0.0037) (0.0265) (0.0009) (0.0114) (0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0182) 
RIR_f 0.0008 -0.0211*** 0.0144*** -0.0070*** -0.0065*** 0.0022*** 0.0135*** 0.0023** 
 (0.0076) (0.0006) (0.0044) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0010) 
TED_r 0.0146 0.0456*** 0.0134*** 0.0138*** 0.0155*** 0.0150*** 0.0080*** 0.0381*** 
 (0.0097) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
TWI_r -0.6866*** -0.5897*** -0.5675*** -0.6186*** -0.2910*** -0.6007*** -0.6524*** -1.0327*** 
 (0.1652) (0.0119) (0.0413) (0.0019) (0.0763) (0.0023) (0.0071) (0.0078) 
BDI_r 0.0472** 0.0818*** -0.0026 0.0340*** 0.0238*** 0.0357*** 0.0172*** 0.0531*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0002) (0.0058) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0019) 
DotCom 0.0041 -0.0330*** 0.0019 -0.0032*** 0.0090*** 0.0182*** 0.0211*** 0.0179*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0003) (0.0043) (0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
GFC 0.0000 -0.0287*** -0.0260*** -0.0061*** -0.0052*** 0.0100*** 0.0129*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
EDC -0.0018 0.0317*** 0.0225*** 0.0052*** -0.0047*** -0.0105*** -0.0222*** -0.0145*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0008) 
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A4.3: Commercial and Non-Commercial Trader Concentration 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Corn Corn Soybeans Soybeans Sugar Sugar Cotton Cotton Gold Gold 
ESV 0.0012** 0.0007 0.0023*** 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0005   0.0004 0.0008 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0018)   (0.0006) (0.0008) 
ESV_f       0.1413*** 0.1448***   
       (0.0094) (0.0096)   
LTC_r -0.1241***  -0.1196***  -0.1614***  -0.0296*  -0.0566***  
 (0.0244)  (0.0181)  (0.0176)  (0.0171)  (0.0085)  
LTCC      -0.0057***  -0.0005  -0.0016** 
      (0.0014)  (0.0010)  (0.0006) 
LTCC_r  -0.2124***  -0.1822***       
  (0.0172)  (0.0144)       
LTCNC_r  0.0813***  0.0849***  0.0290**  0.0027  0.0221*** 
  (0.0161)  (0.0116)  (0.0115)  (0.0092)  (0.0055) 
STC     0.0009*  0.0004**  0.0001  
     (0.0004)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  
STC_r 0.1468***  0.0983***        
 (0.0336)  (0.0208)        
STCC    0.0027*  0.0013*  0.0006**  -0.0002 
    (0.0015)  (0.0008)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
STCC_r  0.2319***         
  (0.0203)         
STCNC  -0.0013  -0.0042**  0.0055**  -0.0003  0.0002 
  (0.0011)  (0.0019)  (0.0022)  (0.0011)  (0.0004) 
STCNC_r           
           
R2 0.113 0.336 0.192 0.312 0.117 0.066 0.244 0.242 0.351 0.318 
 Silver Silver Copper Copper Platinum Platinum NatGas NatGas Crude Crude 
ESV 0.0114*** 0.0114*** 0.0072*** 0.0074**       
 (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0036)       
ESV_f     0.3030*** 0.2938*** 0.1206*** 0.1003*** 0.0607*** 0.0496*** 
     (0.0197) (0.0213) (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0045) (0.0048) 
LTC_r -0.0264  -0.0389***  -0.0053  0.0005  0.0174  
 (0.0209)  (0.0110)  (0.0079)  (0.0263)  (0.0196)  
LTCC    0.0006  -0.0021**  -0.0025*  -0.0001 
    (0.0007)  (0.0010)  (0.0015)  (0.0006) 
LTCC_r  -0.0859***         
  (0.0084)         
LTCNC_r  0.0629***  0.0438***  0.0049  0.0896***  0.0403*** 
  (0.0132)  (0.0094)  (0.0068)  (0.0172)  (0.0142) 
STC -0.0008***  0.0005**  0.0000  -0.0001    
 (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)    
STC_r         -0.0342*  
         (0.0181)  
STCC  -0.0012***  0.0004  0.0000  0.0016*  -0.0002 
  (0.0004)  (0.0003)  (0.0001)  (0.0009)  (0.0004) 
STCC_r           
           
STCNC  0.0002    -0.0001     
  (0.0008)    (0.0004)     
STCNC_r    -0.0319***    -0.0221  -0.0565*** 
    (0.0057)    (0.0136)  (0.0133) 
Adj. R2 0.270 0.374 0.194 0.218 0.346 0.351 0.132 0.154 0.262 0.273 
Notes: This table illustrates the results of the OLS regression with robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) for 
commodity futures returns between 3rd January 1995 and 7th March 2017. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for 
p<0.05, and * for p<0.1.  
The model is defined as: 
𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[ESV, LTC, STC] or SPEC = [ESV, LTCC, LTCNC, STCC, STCNC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables and dummies 
with OI as changes in total open interest per commodity, TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 
500 composite index, TED as changes in the TED spread, RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as 
commodity-specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in the Baltic Dry Index, and ε as error term at time t. Depending on ADF and PP 
tests for unit roots, log returns or first differences are used to transform the individual time-series.  
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A4.4: Granger Causality – Commercial and Non-Commercial 
 Lags LTCC LTCNC STCC STCNC 
Corn 2 Yes** / No No / Yes** No / Yes*** No / Yes*** 
Soybeans 2 Yes* / No No / No No / No No / Yes* 
Sugar 2 No / Yes*** Yes*** / Yes* No / Yes*** No / No 
Cotton 2 No / Yes** No / No No / No No / No 
Gold 2 No / Yes*** No / No No / No No / No 
Silver 2 No / Yes*** No / No No / No No / Yes** 
Copper 2 No / Yes*** No / No No / No No / Yes*** 
Platinum 2 No / No No / Yes* Yes** / No No / Yes*** 
Natural Gas 4 No / No No / No No / Yes*** No / No 
Crude Oil 4 No / Yes* No / No No / Yes*** No / No 
Notes: This table illustrates the results of the Granger causality test for the individual commodities between 3rd January 1995 and 7th March 
2017. With the first “Yes” and “No” as the answer to “Does the regressor, i.e. LTCC, LTCNC, STCC, or STCNC Granger-cause 
commodity futures returns?” and the second “Yes” and “No” as the answer to “Do commodity futures returns Granger-cause the 
regressors i.e. LTCC, LTCNC, STCC, or STCNC?” * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for 
p<0.1. 
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A4.5: Quantile and Panel Fixed Effects Regression – Signalling Effect – Details 
Panel A: All 
Commodities 
Commodity Futures Returns 
  Quantile 
 PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
ESV 0.0005 0.0029*** 0.0028*** 0.0017*** 0.0005*** -0.0010*** -0.0015*** -0.0021*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTC -0.0000 -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0005*** -0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
STC -0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000** 0.0000*** -0.0000** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ML 0.0002 -0.0602*** -0.0411*** -0.0196*** 0.0041*** 0.0270*** 0.0390*** 0.0471*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
OI_r 0.0348*** 0.1089*** 0.0721*** 0.0326*** 0.0157*** 0.0121*** 0.0146*** -0.0111*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
SP500_r 0.1876*** 0.2423*** 0.2727*** 0.2156*** 0.1482*** 0.1260*** 0.0913*** 0.1212*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0005) 
RIR_f -0.0073** -0.0069*** -0.0057*** -0.0072*** -0.0043*** -0.0052*** -0.0087*** -0.0098*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
TED_r 0.0069* 0.0033*** -0.0011*** 0.0001* 0.0027*** 0.0047*** 0.0088*** 0.0161*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
TWI_r -0.9281*** -0.7656*** -0.8469*** -0.8881*** -0.9147*** -0.8427*** -0.9033*** -0.8058*** 
 (0.0773) (0.0037) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0005) 
BDI_r 0.0140 0.0306*** 0.0199*** 0.0044*** 0.0048*** 0.0075*** 0.0145*** 0.0100*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
DotCom 0.0022 -0.0010*** -0.0005*** 0.0010*** 0.0003*** 0.0020*** 0.0047*** 0.0077*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
GFC 0.0012 -0.0266*** -0.0167*** -0.0076*** 0.0018*** 0.0091*** 0.0179*** 0.0216*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
EDC 0.0005 0.0035*** -0.0010*** -0.0007*** -0.0001*** 0.0009*** 0.0029*** 0.0016*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Notes: This table illustrates the detailed results of the panel regression with commodity fixed effects (PD-FE) and quantile regression with 
nonadditive commodity fixed effects (QRPD) for the signalling effect of commodity futures returns between 3rd January 1995 and 7th 
March 2017 totalling 1,156 observations for each commodity (10 commodities, 11,560 observations in total, 4 commodities each for 
agriculture in panel B (corn, soybeans, sugar, cotton), metals in panel C (gold, silver, copper, platinum), and 2 energy commodities in panel 
D (crude oil and natural gas)). With _f and _r indicating first difference and log returns respectively. With ESV, LTC, and STC as focus 
variables, OI as total open interest, ML as market liquidity, SP500 as Standard & Poor’s 500 composite index, RIR as real interest rate, 
TED as TED spread, TWI as trade-weighted USD index, BDI as Baltic Dry Index, and DotCom, GFC, and EDC as dummies for crisis 
periods throughout the research period. Note that quantile regression for panel data with nonadditive fixed effects relies on a non-separable 
error term U* and does not report a separate constant term. While the PD-FE model includes a constant, I refrain from reporting it for 
reasons of clarity and comprehensibility. The constant terms for the PD-FE models are (with standards errors in parentheses): panel B: -
0.0001 (0.0013); panel C: -0.0031* (0.0017); panel D: 0.0016 (0.0016); panel E: -0.0014 (0.0035). For the PD-FE model, I use Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors to account for cross-sectional dependence. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, 
and * for p<0.1. 
The models are defined as: 
PD-FE: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
QRPD: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑗(𝑈𝑖,𝑡
∗ )𝑘𝑗=1       𝑃(𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽(𝜏)|𝐷𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜏      ?̂?(𝜏) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔min
𝑏∈𝛽
𝑔′̂(𝑏) ?̂?𝑔(𝑏) 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[ESV, LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes in total open interest per commodity, 
TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite index, TED as changes in the TED spread, 
RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in 
the Baltic Dry Index, DotCom as a dummy variable for the dot-com bubble between the years 2000 and 2002, GFC as a dummy variable 
for the Global Financial Crisis between the years 2008 and 2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European Debt Crisis between the 
years 2010 and 2012 and ε as error term for each commodity i at time t. With βj as the parameter of interest for each of the k ∈ N* 
regressors, D' = [SPEC, F] is the vector of regressors, and U* is the non-separable error term traditionally associated with quantile 
estimation. For a τ-th quantile (0 < τ < 1) of CFR. 
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A4.5 cont. 
Panel B: Agriculture Commodity Futures Returns 
  Quantile 
 PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
ESV 0.0004 0.0002** 0.0004*** -0.0000 0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.0012*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTC -0.0003 0.0011*** 0.0004*** -0.0005*** 0.0002*** 0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0015*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
STC 0.0004** -0.0011*** -0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0001** 0.0005*** 0.0013*** 0.0015*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ML 0.0054 -0.0990*** -0.0457*** -0.0061*** 0.0035*** 0.0427*** 0.0484*** 0.0754*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
OI_r 0.0607*** 0.1251*** 0.1032*** -0.0636*** 0.0368*** 0.0163*** -0.0617*** -0.0877*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0182) (0.0035) (0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0006) 
SP500_r 0.1776*** 0.3073*** 0.2478*** 0.0941*** 0.1388*** 0.0568*** 0.0804*** 0.1085*** 
 (0.0407) (0.0082) (0.0008) (0.0297) (0.0029) (0.0071) (0.0022) (0.0010) 
RIR_f -0.0044 -0.0091*** -0.0056*** 0.0159*** -0.0048*** -0.0016*** -0.0014*** -0.0092*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0042) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
TED_r 0.0004 0.0073*** -0.0068*** -0.0584*** 0.0096*** 0.0024*** -0.0040*** -0.0013*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0169) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
TWI_r -0.7107*** -0.6636*** -0.7281*** -0.5931*** -0.5955*** -0.6081*** -0.7991*** -0.6634*** 
 (0.0938) (0.0082) (0.0028) (0.0317) (0.0107) (0.0168) (0.0028) (0.0017) 
BDI_r -0.0017 -0.0032*** -0.0245*** -0.0026 -0.0097*** -0.0058*** 0.0223*** -0.0077*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0026) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0003) 
DotCom 0.0021 0.0076*** -0.0019*** -0.0042*** -0.0011** 0.0045*** 0.0072*** 0.0056*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
GFC 0.0014 -0.0182*** -0.0117*** -0.0063*** -0.0049*** -0.0011 0.0175*** 0.0298*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
EDC 0.0001 -0.0034*** -0.0051*** -0.0053*** -0.0043*** 0.0007* 0.0092*** 0.0164*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Panel C: Metals Commodity Futures Returns 
  Quantile 
 PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
ESV 0.0003 0.0037*** 0.0033*** -0.0006* 0.0002** 0.0007*** -0.0028*** -0.0044*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LTC 0.0001 0.0015*** 0.0010*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0003*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
STC -0.0001 0.0001*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0000*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ML -0.0070 -0.0595*** -0.0470*** -0.0231*** -0.0126*** 0.0050*** 0.0401*** 0.0534*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
OI_r 0.0189** 0.0416*** 0.0120*** 0.0072*** 0.0060*** -0.0188*** 0.0353*** 0.0475*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0026) (0.0010) (0.0039) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
SP500_r 0.1607*** 0.2832*** 0.2423*** 0.1777*** 0.1253*** 0.1148*** 0.1227*** 0.1260*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0049) (0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0005) (0.0014) 
RIR_f -0.0064* -0.0034*** -0.0103*** -0.0024*** 0.0003 0.0123*** -0.0051*** -0.0053*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
TED_r 0.0048 -0.0068*** -0.0076*** 0.0040*** 0.0035*** 0.0079*** 0.0127*** 0.0372*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
TWI_r -1.2125*** -1.2216*** -1.1781*** -1.1971*** -1.1385*** -1.0661*** -1.0102*** -0.9464*** 
 (0.0906) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0082) (0.0068) (0.0111) (0.0010) (0.0023) 
BDI_r 0.0207 0.0317*** 0.0196*** 0.0110*** 0.0002 0.0103*** 0.0179*** 0.0338*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
DotCom 0.0006 0.0057*** 0.0048*** 0.0066*** -0.0057*** -0.0006* -0.0037*** -0.0048*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
GFC 0.0012 -0.0282*** -0.0164*** 0.0014 -0.0052** 0.0191*** 0.0227*** 0.0283*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
EDC 0.0022 0.0022*** -0.0003*** 0.0031*** 0.0002 0.0009* 0.0060*** 0.0044*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
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A4.5 cont. 
Panel D: Energy Commodity Futures Returns 
  Quantile 
 PD-FE 5th  10th  25th 50th  75th 90th  95th  
ESV_f 0.0204*** 0.0120*** 0.0414*** 0.0206*** 0.0213*** 0.0200*** 0.0170*** 0.0241*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0045) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
LTC 0.0005 0.0056*** -0.0011 0.0016*** 0.0007*** -0.0017*** -0.0030*** -0.0055*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
STC -0.0005* -0.0029*** 0.0005 -0.0010*** 0.0001 0.0009*** 0.0016*** 0.0029*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ML 0.0126 -0.0886*** 0.0622*** -0.0149*** -0.0057 0.0399*** 0.0787*** 0.0525*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0004) (0.0179) (0.0002) (0.0042) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0009) 
OI_r 0.0059 0.1512*** -0.5222*** 0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0925*** -0.1397*** -0.1300*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0025) (0.0832) (0.0014) (0.0165) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0037) 
SP500_r 0.2545*** 0.4805*** 0.6512*** 0.2570*** 0.1672*** 0.1440*** 0.1123*** 0.2851*** 
 (0.0749) (0.0035) (0.0500) (0.0018) (0.0146) (0.0035) (0.0048) (0.0024) 
RIR_f -0.0136 -0.0274*** 0.0794*** -0.0132*** -0.0114*** -0.0267*** -0.0181*** -0.0122*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0006) (0.0128) (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
TED_r 0.0226* 0.0544*** -0.0703*** 0.0222*** 0.0009 0.0313*** 0.0106*** 0.0195*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0006) (0.0130) (0.0004) (0.0070) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
TWI_r -0.7474*** -0.1556*** 0.5431*** -0.7805*** -0.7193*** -0.7507*** -0.8600*** -0.8707*** 
 (0.1668) (0.0175) (0.1857) (0.0033) (0.0207) (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0028) 
BDI_r 0.0318* 0.0394*** -0.1004*** 0.0250*** 0.0476*** 0.0273*** 0.0264*** -0.0286*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0002) (0.0206) (0.0003) (0.0112) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0006) 
DotCom 0.0041 -0.0088*** 0.0028* -0.0053*** 0.0048*** 0.0084*** 0.0075*** 0.0159*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
GFC -0.0017 -0.0395*** -0.0325*** -0.0053*** -0.0048** 0.0101*** -0.0052*** 0.0008* 
 (0.0056) (0.0004) (0.0026) (0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
EDC -0.0016 0.0202*** 0.0122*** 0.0075*** -0.0051*** -0.0075*** -0.0175*** -0.0222*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
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A4.6: Expectation vs. Reality – Signalling Effect 
Commodity Futures Returns 
Panel A ESV-All ESV-All ESV-AG ESV-AG ESV-PM ESV-PM ESV-IM ESV-IM ESV-EN ESV-EN 
ESV 0.0001  0.0002  -0.0004  -0.0005    
 (0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0008)  (0.0036)    
ESV_r         0.0127**  
         (0.0055)  
FE[ESV]  0.0176***  0.0186***  0.0144***  0.0388***  0.0120** 
  (0.0028)  (0.0035)  (0.0039)  (0.0137)  (0.0060) 
LTC 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002   
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0008)   
LTC_r         0.0447* 0.0440* 
         (0.0233) (0.0233) 
STC 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002*   -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)   (0.0003) (0.0003) 
STC_r       -0.0054 -0.0103   
       (0.0155) (0.0159)   
ML -0.0018 -0.0023 0.0193 0.0174 -0.0201* -0.0201* 0.0154 0.0141 0.0257* 0.0256* 
 (0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0131) (0.0122) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0167) (0.0145) (0.0150) (0.0150) 
OI_r 0.0108 -0.0080 0.0493 0.0219 0.0420** 0.0214 0.0059 0.0070 -0.2506*** -0.2509*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0168) (0.0305) (0.0286) (0.0210) (0.0221) (0.0375) (0.0362) (0.0597) (0.0597) 
SP500_r 0.2155*** 0.2136*** 0.2083*** 0.2016*** -0.0010 0.0041 0.6223*** 0.6234*** 0.3492*** 0.3484*** 
 (0.0469) (0.0463) (0.0560) (0.0560) (0.0764) (0.0764) (0.0966) (0.0979) (0.0993) (0.0994) 
RIR_f -0.0084* -0.0081* -0.0069 -0.0067 -0.0086** -0.0087** -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0120 -0.0122 
 (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
TED_r 0.0009 0.0016 -0.0101 -0.0085 0.0099 0.0102 -0.0114 -0.0105 0.0173 0.0178 
 (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0093) (0.0095) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0207) (0.0207) 
TWI_r -1.1274*** -1.1081*** -0.8299*** -0.8125*** -1.6664*** -1.6525*** -1.1148*** -1.0585*** -0.8460*** -0.8503*** 
 (0.1097) (0.1076) (0.1390) (0.1375) (0.1364) (0.1343) (0.1797) (0.1832) (0.2065) (0.2062) 
BDI_r 0.0173* 0.0166* -0.0020 -0.0039 0.0243 0.0242 0.0183 0.0173 0.0480** 0.0474** 
 (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0113) (0.0110) (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0189) 
GFC 0.0017 0.0017 0.0004 0.0006 0.0012 0.0008 0.0066 0.0062 -0.0028 -0.0028 
 (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
EDC 0.0011 0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0044* 0.0041 0.0016 0.0009 -0.0022 -0.0022 
 (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Constant -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0067 0.0074* -0.0097 -0.0087 0.0010 0.0010 
 (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0072) (0.0068) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0074) (0.0072) (0.0092) (0.0093) 
Obs. 5,610 5,610 2,244 2,244 1,683 1,683 561 561 1,122 1,122 
Notes: This table illustrates the results of the panel regression with commodity fixed effects for the signalling effect of commodity futures 
returns between June 2006 and 7th March 2017 totalling 561 observations for each commodity (10 commodities, agriculture (AG: corn, 
soybeans, sugar, cotton), precious metals (PM: gold, silver, platinum), industrial metals (IM: copper), and energy commodities (EN: crude 
oil and natural gas)). With _f and _r indicating first difference and log returns respectively. With ESV, producer/user (merch), swap dealers 
(swap), and managed money (MM), LTC, and STC as focus variables, OI as total open interest, ML as market liquidity, SP500 as Standard 
& Poor’s 500 composite index, RIR as real interest rate, TED as TED spread, TWI as trade-weighted USD index, BDI as Baltic Dry 
Index, GFC and EDC as dummies for crisis periods throughout the research period, and obs. as observations. I use Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors to account for cross-sectional dependence. With FE[…] indicating the forecast error for each of the series, estimating by 
either AR (10) for stationary or ARIMA (10,1,0) for non-stationary time-series. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, 
** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1.  
The models are defined as: 
Panel A: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Panel B: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶′𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[ESV, LTC, STC] or SPEC = [FE[ESV], LTC, STC], SPEC’ as disaggregated speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC’ = [MERCH, 
SWAP, MM, LTC, STC] or SPEC’ = [FE[MERCH], FE[SWAP], FE[MM], LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables 
and dummies with OI as changes in total open interest per commodity, TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as 
changes in the S&P 500 composite index, TED as changes in the TED spread, RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank 
interest rate, ML as commodity-specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in the Baltic Dry Index, GFC as a dummy variable for the Global 
Financial Crisis between the years 2008 and 2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European Debt Crisis between the years 2010 and 
2012 and ε as error term for each commodity i at time t.  
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A4.6 cont.  
Commodity Futures Returns 
Panel B DISS-All DISS-All DISS-AG DISS-AG DISS-PM DISS-PM DISS-IM DISS-IM DISS-EN DISS-EN 
Merch_net -0.0024**  -0.0043**  0.0056  0.0002    
 (0.0011)  (0.0019)  (0.0054)  (0.0173)    
Merch_net_f         -0.0462**  
         (0.0198)  
FE[Merch]  -0.0121  -0.0498***  0.0057  0.0008  0.0157 
  (0.0089)  (0.0106)  (0.0180)  (0.0487)  (0.0225) 
Swap     0.0026  0.0068    
     (0.0079)  (0.0217)    
Swap_net_f -0.0187**  -0.0048      -0.0083  
 (0.0091)  (0.0175)      (0.0141)  
FE[Swap]  0.0011  -0.0424**  -0.0174  -0.0200  0.0478** 
  (0.0128)  (0.0184)  (0.0199)  (0.0619)  (0.0202) 
MM -0.0012  -0.0044**  0.0042  0.0008  0.0033  
 (0.0012)  (0.0019)  (0.0074)  (0.0144)  (0.0025)  
FE[MM]  0.0325***  -0.0137  0.0283  0.0629*  0.0719*** 
  (0.0077)  (0.0096)  (0.0188)  (0.0360)  (0.0123) 
LTC 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001   
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0008)   
LTC_r         0.0489** 0.0346 
         (0.0231) (0.0218) 
STC -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003*   -0.0007* -0.0004 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)   (0.0004) (0.0003) 
STC_r       -0.0052 -0.0059   
       (0.0154) (0.0168)   
ML -0.0029 -0.0030 0.0213 0.0181 -0.0204* -0.0205* 0.0147 0.0155 0.0269* 0.0200 
 (0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0132) (0.0122) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0178) (0.0145) (0.0149) (0.0149) 
OI_r 0.0073 -0.0085 0.0499 0.0180 0.0420** 0.0218 0.0048 0.0096 -0.2525*** -0.2523*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0167) (0.0306) (0.0289) (0.0210) (0.0222) (0.0380) (0.0366) (0.0595) (0.0591) 
SP500_r 0.2173*** 0.2102*** 0.2137*** 0.1993*** -0.0009 0.0048 0.6211*** 0.6227*** 0.3454*** 0.3233*** 
 (0.0468) (0.0462) (0.0563) (0.0562) (0.0765) (0.0766) (0.0968) (0.0974) (0.0981) (0.0989) 
RIR_f -0.0081* -0.0080* -0.0067 -0.0069 -0.0086* -0.0087** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0113 -0.0138 
 (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0112) (0.0113) 
TED_r 0.0009 0.0015 -0.0110 -0.0084 0.0098 0.0104 -0.0112 -0.0107 0.0175 0.0160 
 (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0092) (0.0095) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0206) (0.0204) 
TWI_r -1.1217*** -1.0975*** -0.8236*** -0.8094*** -1.6656*** -1.6481*** -1.1148*** -1.0466*** -0.8527*** -0.8132*** 
 (0.1100) (0.1080) (0.1408) (0.1388) (0.1367) (0.1337) (0.1795) (0.1853) (0.2021) (0.2066) 
BDI_r 0.0178* 0.0162* -0.0015 -0.0049 0.0243 0.0244 0.0177 0.0188 0.0452** 0.0445** 
 (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0159) (0.0156) (0.0190) (0.0191) (0.0189) (0.0188) 
GFC 0.0013 0.0015 0.0009 0.0009 0.0014 0.0008 0.0065 0.0065 -0.0012 -0.0029 
 (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0061) 
EDC 0.0009 0.0009 0.0011 0.0000 0.0048* 0.0041 0.0012 0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0014 
 (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Constant -0.0041 -0.0012 -0.0078 -0.0016 0.0077* 0.0080* -0.0101 -0.0078 0.0054 0.0021 
 (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0075) (0.0068) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0081) (0.0072) (0.0104) (0.0090) 
Obs. 5,610 5,610 2,244 2,244 1,683 1,683 561 561 1,122 1,122 
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A4.7: Commodity-Individual Signalling Effect with Expectations 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Corn Corn Soybeans Soybeans Sugar Sugar Cotton Cotton Gold Gold 
ESV -0.0000    0.0003    -0.0006  
 (0.0008)    (0.0021)    (0.0010)  
ESV_f   0.0214***    0.0140    
   (0.0042)    (0.0108)    
FE[ESV]  0.0201***  0.0201***  0.0136**  0.0192*  0.0074** 
  (0.0046)  (0.0043)  (0.0060)  (0.0115)  (0.0030) 
LTC -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0010* -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0007 
 (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
LTC_r           
           
STC     -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002 
     (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
STC_r 0.0801 0.0865 0.0301 0.0304       
 (0.0574) (0.0546) (0.0359) (0.0363)       
ML -0.0269 -0.0578 -0.0187 -0.0062 -0.0987 -0.1153 0.0861* 0.0834 0.0649*** 0.0376 
 (0.0867) (0.0830) (0.0500) (0.0497) (0.0754) (0.0756) (0.0509) (0.0507) (0.0222) (0.0243) 
OI_r -0.0072 -0.0123 0.0123 0.0137 0.0734** 0.0709** 0.0362 0.0358 -0.0107 -0.0117 
 (0.0283) (0.0266) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0328) (0.0327) (0.0321) (0.0322) (0.0077) (0.0073) 
SP500_r 0.1853** 0.1669** 0.2437*** 0.2433*** 0.1581* 0.1551* 0.2456*** 0.2477*** -0.1955*** -0.1907*** 
 (0.0788) (0.0793) (0.0625) (0.0627) (0.0915) (0.0910) (0.0909) (0.0912) (0.0513) (0.0517) 
RIR_f -0.0141 -0.0132 -0.0029 -0.0030 -0.0082 -0.0079 -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0060 -0.0060 
 (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0041) (0.0040) 
TED_r 0.0120 0.0138 -0.0027 -0.0036 -0.0487*** -0.0469*** -0.0004 0.0000 0.0238** 0.0237** 
 (0.0167) (0.0163) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
TWI_r -1.0581*** -1.0209*** -0.8829*** -0.8870*** -0.5929*** -0.5823*** -0.7323*** -0.7261*** -1.3707*** -1.3548*** 
 (0.2197) (0.2115) (0.1620) (0.1623) (0.2198) (0.2200) (0.1826) (0.1832) (0.1067) (0.1051) 
BDI_r 0.0115 0.0080 0.0116 0.0139 -0.0563** -0.0572** 0.0169 0.0167 0.0131 0.0130 
 (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0126) (0.0124) 
GFC -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0056 -0.0060 0.0074 0.0078 0.0015 0.0016 0.0037 0.0027 
 (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0037) (0.0035) 
EDC 0.0026 0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0061 -0.0057 0.0005 0.0005 0.0053* 0.0044 
 (0.0050) (0.0044) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Constant 0.0140 0.0140 0.0077 0.0082 0.0056 0.0055 -0.0093 -0.0093 0.0010 0.0029 
 (0.0159) (0.0150) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0170) (0.0168) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0082) (0.0081) 
Observations 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 
R2 0.105 0.154 0.170 0.165 0.079 0.087 0.095 0.097 0.296 0.301 
Notes: This table illustrates the results of the OLS regression with robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) for the 
signalling effect of commodity futures returns between June 2006 and 7th March 2017 totalling 561 observations for each commodity (10 
commodities, agriculture (AG: corn, soybeans, sugar, cotton), precious metals (PM: gold, silver, platinum), industrial metals (IM: copper), 
and energy commodities (EN: crude oil and natural gas)). With _f and _r indicating first difference and log returns respectively. With ESV, 
LTC, and STC as focus variables, OI as total open interest, ML as market liquidity, SP500 as Standard & Poor’s 500 composite index, RIR 
as real interest rate, TED as TED spread, TWI as trade-weighted USD index, BDI as Baltic Dry Index, GFC and EDC as dummies for 
crisis periods throughout the research period, and obs. as observations. With FE[…] indicating the forecast error for each of the series, 
estimating by either AR (10) for stationary or ARIMA (10,1,0) for non-stationary time-series. * indicates the statistical significance, with 
*** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1.  
The model is defined as: 
𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[ESV, LTC, STC] or SPEC = [FE[ESV], LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes 
in total open interest per commodity, TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite 
index, TED as changes in the TED spread, RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-
specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in the Baltic Dry Index, GFC as a dummy variable for the Global Financial Crisis between the 
years 2008 and 2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European Debt Crisis between the years 2010 and 2012 and ε as error term at 
time t.  
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A4.7 cont. 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Silver Silver Copper Copper Platinum Platinum NatGas NatGas Crude Crude 
ESV   -0.0005        
   (0.0041)        
ESV_f 0.0841***    0.1320***  0.0045  0.0103  
 (0.0183)    (0.0277)  (0.0119)  (0.0064)  
FE[ESV]  0.0840***  0.0388***  0.1576***  0.0039  0.0100 
  (0.0211)  (0.0134)  (0.0300)  (0.0120)  (0.0065) 
LTC   0.0003 0.0002     0.0007 0.0007 
   (0.0007) (0.0007)     (0.0007) (0.0007) 
LTC_r -0.0123 -0.0127   -0.0021 -0.0018 0.0379 0.0375   
 (0.0236) (0.0237)   (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0582) (0.0581)   
STC -0.0011 -0.0011   -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0013** -0.0013** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007)   (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
STC_r   -0.0054 -0.0103       
   (0.0169) (0.0169)       
ML -0.0315 -0.0274 0.0059 0.0070 -0.0040 -0.0043 -0.3645*** -0.3648*** -0.1986*** -0.1991*** 
 (0.0530) (0.0544) (0.0351) (0.0341) (0.0313) (0.0311) (0.1184) (0.1183) (0.0631) (0.0633) 
OI_r -0.0316 -0.0318 0.0154 0.0141 -0.0302* -0.0299* 0.1088*** 0.1091*** -0.0103 -0.0106 
 (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0144) (0.0128) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0330) (0.0329) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
SP500_r 0.0878 0.0835 0.6223*** 0.6234*** 0.1179 0.1154 0.1394 0.1395 0.5387*** 0.5374*** 
 (0.0866) (0.0867) (0.0857) (0.0857) (0.0855) (0.0856) (0.1187) (0.1186) (0.0905) (0.0909) 
RIR_f -0.0092 -0.0102 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0121* -0.0127** -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.0192** -0.0195** 
 (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0097) (0.0098) 
TED_r 0.0129 0.0123 -0.0114 -0.0105 -0.0006 -0.0012 0.0213 0.0214 0.0135 0.0142 
 (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0190) (0.0188) 
TWI_r -2.2075*** -2.2046*** -1.1148*** -1.0585*** -1.3560*** -1.3418*** -0.5908* -0.5902* -1.0772*** -1.0840*** 
 (0.1994) (0.2011) (0.1938) (0.1965) (0.1241) (0.1235) (0.3064) (0.3063) (0.2549) (0.2567) 
BDI_r 0.0411* 0.0390* 0.0183 0.0173 0.0306 0.0296 0.0588* 0.0588* 0.0387* 0.0379* 
 (0.0214) (0.0215) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0202) (0.0200) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0230) (0.0230) 
GFC 0.0008 0.0006 0.0066 0.0062 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0024 
 (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0075) (0.0075) 
EDC 0.0070* 0.0069* 0.0016 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 -0.0110 -0.0110 0.0066* 0.0067* 
 (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Constant 0.0221** 0.0224** -0.0097 -0.0087 0.0072* 0.0073* -0.0120 -0.0121 0.0150 0.0153 
 (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0177) (0.0177) 
Observations 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 
R2 0.309 0.305 0.303 0.310 0.270 0.276 0.062 0.062 0.214 0.213 
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A4.8: Commodity-Individual Signalling Effect with Expectations – Disaggregated 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Corn Corn Soybeans Soybeans Sugar Sugar Cotton Cotton Gold Gold 
Merch_net -0.0043*    -0.0028      
 (0.0024)    (0.0039)      
Merch_net_f   -0.0455***    -0.0353*  -0.0168*  
   (0.0082)    (0.0195)  (0.0093)  
FE[Merch]  -0.0477***  -0.0560***  -0.0400**  -0.1124***  -0.0036 
  (0.0169)  (0.0155)  (0.0201)  (0.0413)  (0.0179) 
Swap_net         -0.0008  
         (0.0061)  
Swap_net_f -0.0075  -0.0184  -0.0123  -0.1056    
 (0.0242)  (0.0295)  (0.0250)  (0.0775)    
FE[Swap]  -0.0483*  -0.0192  -0.0408  -0.1553*  -0.0148 
  (0.0261)  (0.0306)  (0.0339)  (0.0811)  (0.0210) 
MM_net -0.0049*  -0.0003  -0.0035  -0.0140  -0.0017  
 (0.0025)  (0.0019)  (0.0053)  (0.0086)  (0.0047)  
MM_net_f           
           
FE[MM]  -0.0074  -0.0142  -0.0177  -0.0955*  0.0081 
  (0.0146)  (0.0152)  (0.0260)  (0.0501)  (0.0190) 
LTC -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0009 0.0007 
 (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
LTC_r           
           
STC     -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0008** 0.0005* -0.0001 -0.0003 
     (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
STC_r 0.0692 0.0557 0.0206 0.0179       
 (0.0574) (0.0565) (0.0351) (0.0363)       
ML -0.0171 -0.0450 -0.0160 -0.0013 -0.1062 -0.1284 0.0808 0.0867* 0.0439* 0.0359 
 (0.0864) (0.0833) (0.0489) (0.0485) (0.0758) (0.0790) (0.0504) (0.0505) (0.0244) (0.0243) 
OI_r -0.0042 -0.0108 0.0120 0.0141 0.0723** 0.0704** 0.0397 0.0353 -0.0109 -0.0121* 
 (0.0286) (0.0264) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0330) (0.0328) (0.0322) (0.0319) (0.0076) (0.0073) 
SP500_r 0.1945** 0.1637** 0.2392*** 0.2384*** 0.1647* 0.1563* 0.2429*** 0.2395*** -0.1927*** -0.1899*** 
 (0.0788) (0.0793) (0.0624) (0.0623) (0.0917) (0.0907) (0.0926) (0.0921) (0.0509) (0.0519) 
RIR_f -0.0135 -0.0135 -0.0031 -0.0039 -0.0081 -0.0077 -0.0037 -0.0034 -0.0063 -0.0060 
 (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0041) (0.0040) 
TED_r 0.0103 0.0140 -0.0029 -0.0038 -0.0491*** -0.0476*** -0.0003 0.0022 0.0237** 0.0237** 
 (0.0168) (0.0164) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0153) (0.0149) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
TWI_r -1.0362*** -1.0086*** -0.8691*** -0.8684*** -0.6043*** -0.5928*** -0.7294*** -0.7381*** -1.3624*** -1.3507*** 
 (0.2217) (0.2130) (0.1617) (0.1629) (0.2222) (0.2233) (0.1844) (0.1837) (0.1069) (0.1046) 
BDI_r 0.0116 0.0076 0.0106 0.0119 -0.0555** -0.0586*** 0.0166 0.0172 0.0134 0.0131 
 (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0127) (0.0125) 
GFC 0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0050 -0.0055 0.0082 0.0079 -0.0005 0.0016 0.0040 0.0028 
 (0.0063) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0066) (0.0062) (0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0035) 
EDC 0.0044 0.0015 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0045 0.0007 0.0008 0.0058 0.0046 
 (0.0052) (0.0044) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0067) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0039) (0.0030) 
Constant 0.0006 0.0113 0.0069 0.0070 0.0015 0.0052 -0.0136 -0.0121 0.0006 0.0037 
 (0.0187) (0.0153) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0124) (0.0117) (0.0085) (0.0082) 
Observations 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 
R2 0.1108 0.1588 0.1768 0.1749 0.0802 0.0916 0.1015 0.1050 0.2992 0.3039 
Notes: This table illustrates the results of the OLS regression with robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) for the 
signalling effect of commodity futures returns between June 2006 and 7th March 2017 totalling 561 observations for each commodity (10 
commodities, agriculture (AG: corn, soybeans, sugar, cotton), precious metals (PM: gold, silver, platinum), industrial metals (IM: copper), 
and energy commodities (EN: crude oil and natural gas)). With _f and _r indicating first difference and log returns respectively. With ESV, 
producer/user (merch), swap dealers (swap), and managed money (MM), LTC, and STC as focus variables, OI as total open interest, ML 
as market liquidity, SP500 as Standard & Poor’s 500 composite index, RIR as real interest rate, TED as TED spread, TWI as trade-
weighted USD index, BDI as Baltic Dry Index, GFC and EDC as dummies for crisis periods throughout the research period, and obs. as 
observations. With FE[…] indicating the forecast error for each of the series, estimating by either AR (10) for stationary or ARIMA 
(10,1,0) for non-stationary time-series. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1.  
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A4.8 cont. 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Silver Silver Copper Copper Platinum Platinum NatGas NatGas Crude Crude 
Merch_net   0.0002        
   (0.0174)        
Merch_net_f -0.1014    -0.2928***  0.0584  0.0123  
 (0.0758)    (0.0870)  (0.0519)  (0.0289)  
FE[Merch]  -0.0326  0.0008  -0.1369  0.0424  0.0029 
  (0.0942)  (0.0527)  (0.1388)  (0.0524)  (0.0295) 
Swap_net   0.0068  -0.0576      
   (0.0227)  (0.0460)      
Swap_net_f -0.2050***      0.1260***  0.0386*  
 (0.0647)      (0.0460)  (0.0224)  
FE[Swap]  -0.1076  -0.0200  -0.2648*  0.1141***  0.0328 
  (0.0896)  (0.0654)  (0.1413)  (0.0435)  (0.0236) 
MM_net 0.0101  0.0008  -0.0595**      
 (0.0093)  (0.0148)  (0.0277)      
MM_net_f       0.0954***  0.0617***  
       (0.0196)  (0.0173)  
FE[MM]  0.1040*  0.0629*  0.1117  0.0904***  0.0551*** 
  (0.0618)  (0.0359)  (0.1131)  (0.0192)  (0.0176) 
LTC   0.0001 0.0001     0.0002 0.0004 
   (0.0008) (0.0008)     (0.0007) (0.0007) 
LTC_r 0.0020 -0.0146   0.0009 -0.0008 0.0230 0.0222   
 (0.0241) (0.0262)   (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0588) (0.0588)   
STC -0.0016* -0.0012*   0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0010* -0.0011** 
 (0.0009) (0.0007)   (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
STC_r   -0.0052 -0.0059       
   (0.0168) (0.0185)       
ML -0.0344 -0.0248 0.0048 0.0096 0.0126 -0.0013 -0.3541*** -0.3459*** -0.2106*** -0.2119*** 
 (0.0546) (0.0564) (0.0357) (0.0341) (0.0306) (0.0322) (0.1158) (0.1167) (0.0642) (0.0640) 
OI_r -0.0332 -0.0320 0.0147 0.0155 -0.0289* -0.0320** 0.0991*** 0.0986*** -0.0127 -0.0125 
 (0.0221) (0.0216) (0.0151) (0.0129) (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0322) (0.0320) (0.0164) (0.0163) 
SP500_r 0.0800 0.0787 0.6211*** 0.6227*** 0.1223 0.1155 0.1292 0.1228 0.5080*** 0.5132*** 
 (0.0849) (0.0861) (0.0858) (0.0855) (0.0887) (0.0848) (0.1186) (0.1191) (0.0912) (0.0914) 
RIR_f -0.0093 -0.0106 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0112* -0.0127** -0.0087 -0.0089 -0.0205** -0.0202** 
 (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0096) (0.0098) 
TED_r 0.0124 0.0133 -0.0112 -0.0107 -0.0026 -0.0007 0.0211 0.0200 0.0134 0.0129 
 (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0144) (0.0142) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0280) (0.0281) (0.0180) (0.0179) 
TWI_r -2.2078*** -2.1969*** -1.1148*** -1.0466*** -1.3620*** -1.3362*** -0.5608* -0.5494* -1.0340*** -1.0373*** 
 (0.1989) (0.2012) (0.1936) (0.1971) (0.1242) (0.1239) (0.3031) (0.3038) (0.2534) (0.2566) 
BDI_r 0.0416* 0.0394* 0.0177 0.0188 0.0247 0.0302 0.0575* 0.0584* 0.0366 0.0341 
 (0.0214) (0.0215) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0202) (0.0200) (0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0230) (0.0228) 
GFC 0.0012 0.0007 0.0065 0.0065 -0.0033 -0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0021 -0.0029 -0.0026 
 (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0074) (0.0074) 
EDC 0.0061 0.0066 0.0012 0.0010 0.0003 0.0010 -0.0098 -0.0107 0.0062 0.0067* 
 (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0036) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
Constant 0.0260** 0.0235** -0.0101 -0.0078 0.0064 0.0095** -0.0119 -0.0089 0.0194 0.0174 
 (0.0123) (0.0112) (0.0079) (0.0074) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0176) (0.0177) 
Observations 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 
R2 0.3098 0.3089 0.3029 0.3123 0.2625 0.2762 0.0950 0.0930 0.2363 0.2329 
Notes cont.:  
The model is defined as: 
𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶′𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC’ as disaggregated speculative measures vector consisting 
of SPEC’ = [MERCH, SWAP, MM, LTC, STC] or SPEC’ = [FE[MERCH], FE[SWAP], FE[MM], LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental 
explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes in total open interest per commodity, TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD 
index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite index, TED as changes in the TED spread, RIR as first difference of the real 3-month 
USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in the Baltic Dry Index, GFC as a dummy 
variable for the Global Financial Crisis between the years 2008 and 2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European Debt Crisis between 
the years 2010 and 2012 and ε as error term for each commodity i at time t.  
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A4.9: Commodity-Individual OLS and QR – Signalling Effect 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Corn Soybeans 
  Quantile  Quantile 
 OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th 
ESV 0.0002 -0.004*** -0.0020* 0.0014*** 0.0020** 0.0019 0.0013* -0.0016 -0.0008 0.0019** 0.0016* 0.0014 
 (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012) 
LTC_r -0.072*** -0.0861** -0.108*** -0.0410** -0.0304 0.0533 -0.079*** -0.143*** -0.124*** -0.068*** -0.0278 -0.0530* 
 (0.0247) (0.0373) (0.0296) (0.0182) (0.0356) (0.0355) (0.0163) (0.0309) (0.0213) (0.0145) (0.0185) (0.0300) 
STC_r 0.0874*** 0.0756 0.1409*** 0.0664*** 0.0785 -0.0187 0.0512*** 0.0837** 0.0625*** 0.0587*** 0.0438* 0.0348 
 (0.0334) (0.0544) (0.0355) (0.0248) (0.0483) (0.0517) (0.0191) (0.0360) (0.0240) (0.0162) (0.0225) (0.0290) 
ML -0.0073 0.0586 0.0870 0.0260 -0.213*** -0.1979*** 0.0690** 0.1531*** 0.1167*** 0.0655** -0.0004 0.0192 
 (0.0495) (0.0702) (0.0586) (0.0337) (0.0565) (0.0750) (0.0293) (0.0547) (0.0379) (0.0262) (0.0321) (0.0488) 
OI_r 0.0028 -0.174*** -0.115*** -0.0025 0.1339*** 0.1867*** 0.0048 -0.0228 -0.0447** 0.0030 0.0423** 0.0379 
 (0.0127) (0.0292) (0.0331) (0.0183) (0.0374) (0.0399) (0.0037) (0.0312) (0.0210) (0.0124) (0.0175) (0.0261) 
SP500_r 0.1897*** 0.3172*** 0.2756*** 0.1519*** 0.0739 0.0321 0.2044*** 0.2280*** 0.1859*** 0.2250*** 0.2056*** 0.1929** 
 (0.0518) (0.0686) (0.0671) (0.0411) (0.0619) (0.0960) (0.0403) (0.0835) (0.0643) (0.0455) (0.0550) (0.0868) 
RIR_f -0.0077 -0.0182 -0.0171** -0.0047 0.0086 0.0096 0.0001 -0.0173 -0.023*** 0.0049 0.0148*** 0.0028 
 (0.0077) (0.0119) (0.0071) (0.0031) (0.0087) (0.0116) (0.0059) (0.0106) (0.0068) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0083) 
TED_r 0.0063 0.0166 -0.0044 0.0123** 0.0028 -0.0029 -0.0022 0.0169 0.0059 -0.0028 -0.0078 -0.0017 
 (0.0087) (0.0149) (0.0113) (0.0062) (0.0135) (0.0125) (0.0075) (0.0155) (0.0101) (0.0071) (0.0083) (0.0119) 
TWI_r -0.848*** -0.4295** -0.634*** -0.720*** -0.922*** -1.1999*** -0.766*** -0.2946 -0.770*** -0.702*** -0.674*** -0.894*** 
 (0.1412) (0.1907) (0.1981) (0.1001) (0.1790) (0.2376) (0.1102) (0.2106) (0.1621) (0.1068) (0.1379) (0.2188) 
BDI_r 0.0050 0.0302 -0.0120 -0.0112 0.0038 -0.0180 0.0165 0.0560** 0.0013 0.0012 0.0314*** 0.0284 
 (0.0166) (0.0240) (0.0260) (0.0143) (0.0254) (0.0280) (0.0145) (0.0260) (0.0213) (0.0155) (0.0120) (0.0313) 
DotCom 0.0020 0.0058 0.0014 -0.0016 0.0107 0.0122** 0.0023 0.0156*** 0.0079** -0.0002 0.0010 -0.0057 
 (0.0031) (0.0072) (0.0037) (0.0024) (0.0067) (0.0050) (0.0025) (0.0048) (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0044) (0.0051) 
GFC -0.0002 -0.0056 -0.0085 -0.0018 0.0228*** 0.0203** -0.0019 -0.025*** -0.0212** -0.0040 0.0202** 0.0245* 
 (0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0068) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0096) (0.0051) (0.0057) (0.0102) (0.0061) (0.0091) (0.0148) 
EDC 0.0024 0.0025 -0.0043 -0.0017 0.0037 -0.0013 -0.0010 0.0136* 0.0070* -0.0005 -0.0032 -0.0062 
 (0.0045) (0.0109) (0.0084) (0.0037) (0.0077) (0.0148) (0.0028) (0.0080) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0058) 
Constant -0.0013 -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.0012 0.0152** 0.0243*** -0.0024 -0.049*** -0.026*** -0.0004 0.0211*** 0.0352*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0031) (0.0064) (0.0070) (0.0015) (0.0101) (0.0077) (0.0036) (0.0058) (0.0073) 
Obs. 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 
R2 0.077 0.148 0.101 0.038 0.097 0.117 0.114 0.136 0.092 0.069 0.083 0.090 
Notes: This table illustrates the detailed results of the OLS and quantile regression with robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator) for commodity futures returns between 3rd January 1995 and 7th March 2017. With OLS regression models and quantile 
regression for lower quantiles (5th and 10th), median (50th), and upper quantiles (90th and 95th). For OLS regression, the R2 represents the 
adjusted R2. For quantile regression, I calculate the pseudo R2 as R2 = 1 – (sum of weighted deviations about estimated quantile / sum of 
weighted deviations about raw quantile) as suggested by Koenker and Machado (1999). With _f and _r indicating first difference and log 
returns respectively. With ESV, LTC, and STC as focus variables, OI as total open interest, ML as market liquidity, SP500 as Standard & 
Poor’s 500 composite index, RIR as real interest rate, TED as TED spread, TWI as trade-weighted USD index, BDI as Baltic Dry Index, 
DotCom, GFC, and EDC as dummies for crisis periods throughout the research period, and obs. as observations. * indicates the statistical 
significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. Following Clogg et al. (1995), I use a Z-test to check if the regression 
coefficients of the OLS model (1) and the quantile regressions for each ESV, LTC, and STC are significantly different. With a Z-value of 
≥1.64 corresponding with the significance level of 5 percent or lower. The formula can be written as: Z = (β1- β2) / [(SEβ1)2+(SEβ2)2]1/2, 
with β as coefficients and SEβ as standard error of β. Underlined QR coefficients represent significantly (5%) different coefficients 
compared to the OLS model. Bold QR coefficients indicate significant coefficients based on a simple lagged QR model, which indicate 
Granger causality. Results highlighted in red indicate multicollinearity the variables, which is tested using the variance inflation factor (vif 
> 10). 
The models are defined as: 
OLS: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
QR: 𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖 = 𝜋 + 𝛾𝜏𝑆𝐹′𝑖 + 𝑢𝜏𝑖     𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜏(𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖|𝑆𝐹𝑖) =  𝛾𝜏𝑆𝐹′𝑖 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[ESV, LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes in total open interest per commodity, 
TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite index, TED as changes in the TED spread, 
RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-specific market liquidity, BDI as changes in 
the Baltic Dry Index, DotCom as a dummy variable for the dot-com bubble between the years 2000 and 2002, GFC as a dummy variable 
for the Global Financial Crisis between the years 2008 and 2009, EDC as a dummy variable for the European Debt Crisis between the 
years 2010 and 2012, SF' = [SPEC, F] is the vector of regressors, and u is the error term traditionally associated with quantile estimation. 
and ε as error term of the OLS at time t. For a τ-th quantile (0 < τ < 1) of CFR. 
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A4.9 cont. 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Sugar Cotton 
  Quantile  Quantile 
 OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th 
ESV -0.0001 0.0020 0.0009 0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0016       
 (0.0016) (0.0036) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0030)       
ESV_f       0.0253*** 0.0222 0.0162 0.0280*** 0.0318*** 0.0318* 
       (0.0087) (0.0151) (0.0118) (0.0089) (0.0100) (0.0191) 
LTC_r -0.060*** -0.0240 -0.0316 -0.062*** -0.0403** -0.0134 -0.0062 -0.0588** -0.0234 -0.0055 0.0248* -0.0044 
 (0.0173) (0.0362) (0.0248) (0.0145) (0.0184) (0.0224) (0.0149) (0.0279) (0.0175) (0.0129) (0.0134) (0.0245) 
STC 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0017** 0.0015* 0.0003* 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003* 0.0006*** 0.0003 
 (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
ML 0.0035 -0.244*** -0.194*** 0.0370 0.1570*** 0.1603*** 0.0008 -0.161*** -0.132*** 0.0103 0.1407*** 0.1303*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0597) (0.0274) (0.0256) (0.0268) (0.0281) (0.0215) (0.0379) (0.0275) (0.0193) (0.0264) (0.0361) 
OI_r 0.0450 0.1889** 0.0721 -0.0337 -0.0315 -0.0429 0.0525* 0.1035*** 0.0911*** 0.0525** -0.0042 -0.0258 
 (0.0486) (0.0751) (0.0463) (0.0307) (0.0345) (0.0323) (0.0293) (0.0303) (0.0317) (0.0250) (0.0263) (0.0526) 
SP500_r 0.1499** 0.2118 0.2172** 0.1126** 0.0030 -0.1439* 0.1579*** 0.2485*** 0.2497*** 0.0815* 0.2995*** 0.3008*** 
 (0.0644) (0.1389) (0.0876) (0.0475) (0.0769) (0.0805) (0.0607) (0.0876) (0.0636) (0.0472) (0.0559) (0.0989) 
RIR_f -0.0059 -0.0241 -0.0087 -0.0024 -0.0134** -0.027*** -0.0033 0.0069 0.0016 -0.0065* -0.0017 -0.0043 
 (0.0071) (0.0147) (0.0067) (0.0019) (0.0056) (0.0099) (0.0066) (0.0097) (0.0058) (0.0038) (0.0066) (0.0140) 
TED_r -0.0058 -0.0163 -0.0145 -0.0183** -0.0135 0.0013 0.0026 -0.0191* -0.0046 -0.0033 0.0014 -0.0047 
 (0.0125) (0.0198) (0.0138) (0.0087) (0.0094) (0.0164) (0.0105) (0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0079) (0.0108) (0.0165) 
TWI_r -0.565*** -0.4500 -0.563*** -0.500*** -0.622*** -0.621*** -0.610*** -0.860*** -0.761*** -0.471*** -0.571*** -0.831*** 
 (0.1907) (0.3303) (0.1972) (0.1205) (0.1939) (0.2261) (0.1358) (0.2255) (0.1574) (0.1156) (0.1580) (0.2407) 
BDI_r -0.0507** -0.0979** -0.0705** -0.049*** -0.0324 -0.0174 0.0231 0.0077 0.0295 0.0154 0.0067 -0.0017 
 (0.0220) (0.0422) (0.0332) (0.0176) (0.0327) (0.0389) (0.0170) (0.0404) (0.0183) (0.0163) (0.0228) (0.0316) 
DotCom 0.0027 -0.0050 -0.0037 0.0031 0.0061 0.0105** 0.0022 -0.0034 0.0026 -0.0015 0.0095* 0.0040 
 (0.0045) (0.0089) (0.0045) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0051) (0.0034) (0.0041) (0.0058) (0.0029) (0.0052) (0.0064) 
GFC 0.0067 -0.038*** -0.0123 0.0013 0.0243* 0.0448*** 0.0005 -0.0157 -0.019*** 0.0018 0.0108** 0.0130* 
 (0.0062) (0.0143) (0.0128) (0.0040) (0.0141) (0.0161) (0.0048) (0.0129) (0.0070) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0070) 
EDC -0.0027 -0.023*** -0.0046 -0.0074 0.0057 0.0154** -0.0001 -0.0205** -0.0068* -0.0012 0.0217** 0.0376*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0067) (0.0094) (0.0052) (0.0091) (0.0065) (0.0046) (0.0100) (0.0035) (0.0050) (0.0099) (0.0079) 
Constant -0.0042 -0.035*** -0.024*** -0.0039 0.0163*** 0.0267*** -0.0044 -0.033*** -0.026*** -0.0038 0.0138*** 0.0354*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0096) (0.0060) (0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0034) (0.0070) (0.0044) (0.0032) (0.0049) (0.0079) 
Obs. 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 
R2 0.037 0.099 0.079 0.028 0.076 0.095 0.054 0.105 0.084 0.026 0.077 0.098 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Gold Silver 
  Quantile  Quantile 
 OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th 
ESV -0.0000 0.0013 0.0023* -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0023 -0.0182* -0.0019 0.0027 0.0060 0.0033 
 (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0035) (0.0105) (0.0044) (0.0034) (0.0040) (0.0036) 
LTC_r -0.0139* -0.0091 -0.0128 -0.0147** -0.0149* -0.0164* 0.0132 -0.0234 -0.0069 0.0171 0.0328* 0.0226 
 (0.0081) (0.0075) (0.0098) (0.0058) (0.0087) (0.0084) (0.0155) (0.0395) (0.0197) (0.0122) (0.0193) (0.0195) 
STC -0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0005* 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
ML 0.0006 -0.046*** -0.042*** 0.0040 0.0325*** 0.0447*** -0.0183 -0.0818** -0.046*** -0.0059 0.0330*** 0.0278* 
 (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0086) (0.0052) (0.0070) (0.0104) (0.0147) (0.0375) (0.0114) (0.0089) (0.0066) (0.0151) 
OI_r 0.0261** -0.0025 0.0041 0.0212* -0.0043 0.0346** 0.0356 0.0467 -0.0165 -0.0070 0.0416 0.0469 
 (0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0185) (0.0115) (0.0127) (0.0139) (0.0279) (0.0582) (0.0351) (0.0193) (0.0323) (0.0339) 
SP500_r -0.0618* 0.0893* 0.0184 -0.0409 -0.0645* -0.0758** 0.1383** 0.2705** 0.2244*** 0.1019*** 0.0737 0.1001* 
 (0.0347) (0.0460) (0.0386) (0.0257) (0.0336) (0.0339) (0.0568) (0.1148) (0.0582) (0.0374) (0.0647) (0.0580) 
RIR_f -0.0057 -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.0049 -0.0093** -0.0067* -0.0066 0.0048 -0.0022 -0.0070** -0.0100 -0.0045 
 (0.0035) (0.0061) (0.0045) (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0037) (0.0062) (0.0175) (0.0088) (0.0035) (0.0073) (0.0065) 
TED_r 0.0138*** -0.0093 0.0035 0.0022 0.0189*** 0.0242*** 0.0036 -0.0082 -0.0005 0.0039 0.0186* 0.0352*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0078) (0.0057) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0062) (0.0081) (0.0170) (0.0089) (0.0052) (0.0096) (0.0064) 
TWI_r -1.136*** -0.883*** -1.121*** -1.140*** -0.854*** -0.911*** -1.7202*** -1.560*** -1.709*** -1.473*** -1.311*** -1.231*** 
 (0.0759) (0.1058) (0.1038) (0.0669) (0.0891) (0.0923) (0.1476) (0.3267) (0.1473) (0.0989) (0.1463) (0.1395) 
BDI_r 0.0055 -0.0051 -0.0083 -0.0075 0.0138 0.0313* 0.0271 0.0798* 0.0045 0.0088 0.0361* 0.0530** 
 (0.0112) (0.0153) (0.0163) (0.0095) (0.0115) (0.0176) (0.0191) (0.0454) (0.0190) (0.0151) (0.0202) (0.0230) 
DotCom 0.0006 0.0017 0.0001 -0.0010 0.0008 0.0006 -0.0014 0.0038 0.0040 -0.0026 -0.0077* -0.011*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0068) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
GFC 0.0020 -0.0082 -0.0121** -0.0006 0.0177*** 0.0151*** 0.0029 -0.0125 -0.020*** 0.0049 0.0224** 0.0258*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0084) (0.0051) (0.0033) (0.0062) (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0215) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0095) (0.0067) 
EDC 0.0025 0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0010 0.0027 -0.0015 0.0073** 0.0075 0.0021 0.0059* 0.0081** 0.0052 
 (0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0051) (0.0037) (0.0095) (0.0058) (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0049) 
Constant 0.0007 -0.015*** -0.0070* -0.0008 0.0119*** 0.0157*** 0.0094** -0.032*** -0.023*** 0.0051 0.0303*** 0.0469*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0107) (0.0043) (0.0034) (0.0044) (0.0052) 
Obs. 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 
R2 0.237 0.212 0.192 0.137 0.151 0.185 0.199 0.182 0.152 0.099 0.148 0.173 
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A4.9 cont. 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Copper Platinum 
  Quantile  Quantile 
 OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th 
ESV -0.0010 -0.0160** -0.0079* -0.0022 0.0081* 0.0105       
 (0.0035) (0.0064) (0.0048) (0.0032) (0.0049) (0.0067)       
ESV_f       0.1180*** 0.0850** 0.1432*** 0.1004*** 0.1255*** 0.0347 
       (0.0225) (0.0384) (0.0323) (0.0222) (0.0339) (0.0531) 
LTC_r -0.0085 -0.0102 -0.0145* -0.0043 -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0065 -0.0134 -0.0078 -0.0033 0.0038 -0.0021 
 (0.0093) (0.0167) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0145) (0.0161) (0.0082) (0.0136) (0.0100) (0.0072) (0.0115) (0.0090) 
STC 0.0006** 0.0018*** 0.0008** 0.0008*** -0.0001 -0.0008** -0.0001 0.0003* 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003* -0.0004 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
ML -0.0007 -0.065*** -0.041*** -0.0108 0.0408*** 0.0299* -0.0187** -0.113*** -0.086*** -0.0215** 0.0463*** 0.0920*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0169) (0.0153) (0.0090) (0.0116) (0.0172) (0.0093) (0.0210) (0.0173) (0.0109) (0.0168) (0.0231) 
OI_r -0.0094 -0.0187 0.0074 0.0173 -0.0475 -0.0251 0.0124 0.0429* 0.0358 -0.0103 -0.0026 0.0245 
 (0.0192) (0.0285) (0.0241) (0.0161) (0.0297) (0.0264) (0.0148) (0.0226) (0.0218) (0.0138) (0.0181) (0.0222) 
SP500_r 0.4474*** 0.4739*** 0.4692*** 0.4399*** 0.2454*** 0.2441*** 0.1104* 0.1486* 0.1313** 0.1058*** 0.1005 0.0096 
 (0.0582) (0.0828) (0.0447) (0.0356) (0.0729) (0.0659) (0.0574) (0.0804) (0.0579) (0.0310) (0.0651) (0.0466) 
RIR_f 0.0010 0.0087 -0.0087 0.0020 0.0064 0.0085 -0.0139** -0.0174** -0.019*** -0.0016 -0.0122* -0.0076 
 (0.0071) (0.0093) (0.0078) (0.0039) (0.0086) (0.0070) (0.0055) (0.0076) (0.0062) (0.0030) (0.0070) (0.0050) 
TED_r -0.0018 -0.0033 -0.0049 -0.0043 0.0092 0.0091 -0.0037 0.0095 0.0001 -0.0037 -0.0035 -0.0078 
 (0.0071) (0.0109) (0.0094) (0.0060) (0.0107) (0.0127) (0.0065) (0.0104) (0.0093) (0.0062) (0.0101) (0.0083) 
TWI_r -1.001*** -0.903*** -0.891*** -0.964*** -0.791*** -0.592*** -0.949*** -0.712*** -0.767*** -0.962*** -0.852*** -0.870*** 
 (0.1267) (0.2080) (0.0940) (0.0991) (0.1582) (0.1950) (0.0914) (0.1794) (0.1311) (0.0827) (0.1383) (0.1455) 
BDI_r 0.0226 0.0432 0.0353 -0.0063 0.0207 0.0428 0.0288* 0.0450** 0.0315* 0.0167 0.0217 -0.0272 
 (0.0169) (0.0308) (0.0238) (0.0151) (0.0213) (0.0307) (0.0171) (0.0220) (0.0173) (0.0116) (0.0169) (0.0223) 
DotCom -0.0011 -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0039* -0.0052 -0.0083** 0.0009 -0.023*** -0.0079 0.0021 0.0050 0.0078*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0060) (0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0079) (0.0055) (0.0033) (0.0046) (0.0029) 
GFC 0.0022 -0.0364** -0.0177* 0.0012 0.0291*** 0.0264*** -0.0009 -0.050*** -0.035*** 0.0057* 0.0201** 0.0323*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0146) (0.0097) (0.0051) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0046) (0.0090) (0.0105) (0.0031) (0.0081) (0.0048) 
EDC 0.0001 0.0121* 0.0091* 0.0029 -0.0096* -0.0007 0.0012 0.0002 0.0017 0.0051 0.0082* 0.0038 
 (0.0032) (0.0070) (0.0052) (0.0029) (0.0053) (0.0134) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0032) (0.0044) (0.0043) 
Constant -0.0043 -0.049*** -0.034*** -0.0037 0.0313*** 0.0512*** 0.0046** -0.023*** -0.017*** 0.0057*** 0.0241*** 0.0298*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0056) (0.0043) (0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0052) (0.0018) (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0042) 
Obs. 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 
R2 0.191 0.161 0.144 0.098 0.089 0.106 0.160 0.212 0.159 0.094 0.116 0.125 
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A4.9 cont. 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Natural Gas Crude Oil 
  Quantile  Quantile 
 OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th OLS 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th 
ESV_f 0.0370*** 0.0056 0.0242** 0.0251** 0.0750*** 0.0974*** 0.0140*** 0.0047 0.0184*** 0.0135*** 0.0168*** 0.0192*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0194) (0.0121) (0.0108) (0.0140) (0.0211) (0.0053) (0.0084) (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0044) 
LTC_r -0.0144 -0.0432 -0.0221 -0.0508* 0.0559 0.0501 0.0241 -0.075*** -0.0251 0.0248 0.0309*** 0.0380 
 (0.0273) (0.0565) (0.0312) (0.0273) (0.0406) (0.0392) (0.0175) (0.0264) (0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0106) (0.0253) 
STC -0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0009*       
 (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005)       
STC_r       -0.0117 0.0688*** 0.0162 -0.0329** -0.0069 -0.0109 
       (0.0170) (0.0250) (0.0150) (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0189) 
ML 
0.0892*** 0.0210 -0.0367 0.0857*** 0.1724*** 0.1367*** -0.0296** 
-
0.1039*** -0.0868*** -0.0146 0.0474*** 0.0242** 
 (0.0245) (0.0428) (0.0253) (0.0250) (0.0298) (0.0318) (0.0135) (0.0264) (0.0091) (0.0123) (0.0112) (0.0119) 
OI_r -0.0011 0.1706 0.0371 0.0383 -0.1810** -0.1194 0.0259 0.0048 0.0541 -0.0218 0.0301 -0.1103* 
 (0.0617) (0.1231) (0.0710) (0.0620) (0.0784) (0.0751) (0.0539) (0.0696) (0.0418) (0.0400) (0.0449) (0.0602) 
SP500_r 0.1868** 0.1901 0.2014* 0.1518 0.0919 0.2322 0.2901*** 0.2294** 0.3850*** 0.3049*** 0.3010*** 0.3417*** 
 (0.0889) (0.1618) (0.1073) (0.0967) (0.1137) (0.1424) (0.0753) (0.1045) (0.0754) (0.0620) (0.0490) (0.0913) 
RIR_f -0.0079 -0.0078 0.0087 0.0042 -0.0122 -0.0009 -0.0194** -0.0046 -0.0123 -0.0178** -0.0083 0.0051 
 (0.0132) (0.0167) (0.0159) (0.0059) (0.0109) (0.0218) (0.0078) (0.0137) (0.0102) (0.0075) (0.0070) (0.0091) 
TED_r 0.0333* 0.0825** 0.0372** 0.0236 0.0316 0.0461** 0.0113 -0.0138 0.0024 0.0105 -0.0149 -0.0040 
 (0.0175) (0.0357) (0.0180) (0.0156) (0.0202) (0.0204) (0.0118) (0.0183) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0094) (0.0137) 
TWI_r -0.709*** 0.1299 -0.1422 -0.5482** -1.116*** -1.468*** -0.809*** -0.2191 -0.559*** -0.807*** -0.891*** -0.595*** 
 (0.2287) (0.3922) (0.2595) (0.2139) (0.2572) (0.2745) (0.1885) (0.2291) (0.1476) (0.1523) (0.1459) (0.1742) 
BDI_r 0.0345 0.1048*** 0.1329*** 0.0121 0.0118 0.1167** 0.0334 0.0170 0.0615*** 0.0247 -0.0148 -0.0388 
 (0.0277) (0.0360) (0.0357) (0.0310) (0.0212) (0.0564) (0.0210) (0.0488) (0.0171) (0.0212) (0.0200) (0.0278) 
DotCom 0.0096 0.0022 -0.0017 0.0107 0.0325*** 0.0189*** 0.0016 -0.0185** -0.015*** 0.0031 0.0055 0.0157** 
 (0.0066) (0.0179) (0.0106) (0.0087) (0.0118) (0.0071) (0.0046) (0.0076) (0.0039) (0.0048) (0.0055) (0.0079) 
GFC 0.0002 -0.0196* -0.0361** 0.0011 -0.0012 0.0018 0.0019 -0.0242* -0.0093 -0.0011 0.0061 0.0177 
 (0.0080) (0.0113) (0.0155) (0.0091) (0.0069) (0.0112) (0.0077) (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0063) (0.0090) (0.0174) 
EDC -0.0093 0.0101 0.0081 -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.0180* 0.0042 0.0176** 0.0222*** 0.0026 -0.018*** -0.024*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0115) (0.0067) (0.0056) (0.0065) (0.0102) (0.0037) (0.0081) (0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0038) 
Constant -0.0142** -0.121*** -0.075*** -0.0153** 0.0564*** 0.0948*** 0.0092** -0.036*** -0.027*** 0.0065 0.0398*** 0.0622*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0169) (0.0091) (0.0060) (0.0094) (0.0129) (0.0040) (0.0066) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0051) 
Obs. 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157 
R2 0.051 0.031 0.028 0.025 0.078 0.090 0.085 0.140 0.119 0.042 0.081 0.082 
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A4.10: Least Squares with Bai-Perron Structural Breaks – Signalling Effect 
Commodity Futures Returns 
 Commodity Price Peaks Post-Peak 
Corn 16/6/2006 – 
7/11/2008 
18/11/2006 – 
23/7/2010 
30/7/2010 – 
6/4/2012 
13/4/2012 – 
15/11/2013 
22/11/2013 – 
10/7/2015 
17/7/2015 – 
10/3/2017 
FE[ESV] 0.0408*** 0.0011 0.0252* 0.0362* 0.0203*** 0.0067 
LTC 0.0060 -0.0042 0.0116** -0.0261*** -0.0048** -0.0092* 
STC_r 0.1298 0.0944 -0.1414 -0.1983 0.2039 0.2398*** 
Soybeans 16/6/2006 – 
18/1/2008 
25/1/2008 – 
28/8/2009 
4/9/2009 – 
22/4/2011 
29/4/2011 – 
15/2/2013 
22/2/2013 – 
26/9/2014 
3/10/2014 – 
10/3/2017 
FE[ESV] 0.0363** 0.0518 0.0175 0.0213 0.0172 0.0117* 
LTC 0.0054** -0.0005 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0055 -0.0013 
STC_r 0.0288 -0.1143 0.1016 0.0568 0.1036* -0.0156 
Sugar 16/6/2006 – 10/3/2017 
FE[ESV] 0.0135** 
LTC -0.0006 
STC 0.0000 
Cotton 16/6/2006 – 10/3/2017 
FE[ESV] 0.0189* 
LTC -0.0002 
STC 0.0004 
Gold 16/6/2006 – 10/3/2017 
FE[ESV] 0.0076*** 
LTC 0.0002 
STC -0.0002 
Silver 16/6/2006 – 
1/2/2008 
8/2/2008 – 
11/9/2009 
18/9/2009 – 
29/4/2011 
6/5/2011 – 
7/12/2012 
14/12/2012 – 
19/12/2014 
26/12/2014 – 
10/3/2017 
FE[ESV] 0.04316 0.0373 -0.0296 0.1695 0.1338* 0.0930*** 
LTC_r -0.0618 0.0048 0.0629 -0.0223 -0.0402 0.0330 
STC -0.0012 -0.0034* -0.0003 0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0012 
Copper 16/6/2006 – 7/1/2011 14/1/2011 – 10/3/2017 
FE[ESV] 0.0859** 0.0282* 
LTC 0.0008 0.0006 
STC_r -0.0493* 0.0322* 
Platinum 16/6/2006 – 
17/10/2008 
24/10/2008 – 
16/7/2010 
23/7/2010 – 
13/4/2012 
20/4/2012 – 
22/11/2013 
29/11/2013 – 
3/7/2015 
10/7/2015 – 
10/3/2017 
FE[ESV] 0.4200** -0.3475** 0.0280 0.2043*** 0.1503*** 0.2585*** 
LTC_r 0.0118 -0.0011 -0.0681*** -0.0167 -0.0050 0.00051 
STC 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0000 
Natural Gas 16/6/2006 – 
25/1/2008 
1/2/2008 – 
4/9/2009 
11/9/2009 – 
15/4/2011 
22/4/2011 – 
23/11/2012 
30/11/2012 – 
7/11/2014 
14/11/2014 – 
10/3/2017 
FE[ESV] 0.0626 0.0142 -0.0189 0.0012 0.0217 -0.0004 
LTC_r 0.1214 0.0542 0.1510 0.1351 0.0613 0.1048 
STC -0.0086* 0.0029** -0.0090*** 0.0023 0.0000 -0.0006 
Crude Oil 16/6/2006 – 
12/12/2008 
19/12/2008 – 
20/8/2010 
27/8/2010 – 
13/4/2012 
20/4/2012 – 
22/11/2013 
29/11/2013 – 
3/7/2015 
10/7/2015 – 
10/3/2017 
FE[ESV] -0.0042 -0.0389 0.019 0.0095 0.0001 0.0245*** 
LTC 0.0034 0.0062 0.0006 0.0018 0.0020** 0.0029 
STC -0.0016 -0.0051* -0.0011 -0.0049*** -0.0011 -0.0051* 
Notes: This table illustrates the results of the least squares regression with Bai-Perron structural breaks and Newey-West standard errors 
for the individual commodities between June 2006 and March 2017. With FE[ESV], LTC, and STC as focus variables.  
The model is defined as: 
𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
with α, μ, δ as coefficients, CFR as commodity-specific futures log returns, SPEC as speculative measures vector consisting of SPEC = 
[FE[ESV], LTC, STC], F as vector of fundamental explanatory variables and dummies with OI as changes in total open interest per 
commodity, TWI as changes in the trade-weighted USD index, SP500 as changes in the S&P 500 composite index, TED as changes in 
the TED spread, RIR as first difference of the real 3-month USD interbank interest rate, ML as commodity-specific market liquidity, BDI 
as changes in the Baltic Dry Index, and ε as error term at time t.  
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A4.11: EGARCH (1,1) – Signalling Effect 
Volatility of Commodity Futures Returns 
    Corn Corn Soybeans Soybeans Cotton Cotton Gold Gold Copper Copper Platinum Platinum NatGas NatGas Crude Crude 
M
ea
n
 
Constant -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0032** 0.0034** 0.0019 0.0019 0.0012 0.0020* -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0012 -0.0011 
  (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
V
ar
ia
n
ce
 E
q
u
at
io
n
 
ESV 0.0130**      -0.0991  0.0276*        
 (0.0064)      (0.0680)  (0.0158)        
ESV_f   -0.3918***  -0.2191      0.2658  0.4587**  -0.0600  
   (0.1268)  (0.1801)      (1.1479)  (0.1897)  (0.0639)  
FE[ESV]  -0.1809***  -0.5164***  -0.1435  -0.5712**  0.8779***  -0.0005  0.5333**  -0.0708 
  (0.0615)  (0.1597)  (0.1993)  (0.2456)  (0.2427)  (0.9053)  (0.2162)  (0.0644) 
LTC -0.0162 -0.0107 -0.0112 -0.0098 -0.0134** -0.0138** -0.0967** -0.0779* -0.0012 -0.0025     -0.0050* -0.0051* 
 (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0087) (0.0081) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0436) (0.0437) (0.0029) (0.0029)     (0.0028) (0.0028) 
LTC_r           -0.0184 -0.0161 1.2448 1.2265   
           (0.2578) (0.2577) (0.9382) (0.9323)   
STC     0.0004 0.0005 -0.0037 -0.0118   -0.0633*** -0.0632*** -0.0030 -0.0028 -0.0004 -0.0004 
     (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0136) (0.0104)   (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
STC_r -3.6823*** -3.2681*** -0.1132 -0.1145     -0.8349** -0.9667***       
 (0.9159) (0.9286) (0.7288) (0.7120)     (0.3348) (0.2936)       
Constant -0.6543*** -0.5554*** -0.6205*** -0.5511*** -0.2918** -0.2868** -5.6445*** -5.4779*** -0.0975 -0.0834 -11.1787*** -11.1783*** -0.6139** -0.6098** -0.1600* -0.1604* 
  (0.1959) (0.1655) (0.2193) (0.2064) (0.1210) (0.1219) (0.8968) (0.9338) (0.0669) (0.0534) (0.3851) (0.3863) (0.2719) (0.2707) (0.0882) (0.0881) 
E
A
R
C
H
 T
er
m
s 
L.earch 0.0240 0.1190*** 0.1070** 0.1085** -0.0030 -0.0129 -0.0209 0.0456 -0.0955*** -0.1320*** -0.0074 -0.0035 -0.0280 -0.0311 -0.0867*** -0.0856*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0412) (0.0471) (0.0466) (0.0335) (0.0327) (0.0611) (0.0670) (0.0177) (0.0211) (0.0301) (0.0307) (0.0420) (0.0421) (0.0238) (0.0240) 
L.earch_a 0.1853*** 0.2639*** 0.3708*** 0.3565*** 0.1728*** 0.1755*** 0.4446*** 0.4733*** 0.1202*** 0.0985*** 0.1420*** 0.1395*** 0.2962*** 0.2930*** 0.1488*** 0.1485*** 
 (0.0434) (0.0531) (0.0674) (0.0656) (0.0439) (0.0453) (0.1034) (0.1029) (0.0308) (0.0309) (0.0478) (0.0481) (0.0745) (0.0736) (0.0312) (0.0312) 
L.egarch 0.8777*** 0.8952*** 0.8906*** 0.9033*** 0.9321*** 0.9327*** 0.0735 0.1397 0.9825*** 0.9833*** -0.8126*** -0.8125*** 0.8745*** 0.8762*** 0.9581*** 0.9583*** 
 (0.0364) (0.0293) (0.0396) (0.0370) (0.0275) (0.0276) (0.1456) (0.1496) (0.0123) (0.0105) (0.0453) (0.0458) (0.0536) (0.0532) (0.0187) (0.0187) 
Notes: This table illustrates the results of the EGARCH (1,1) model (Nelson, 1991) with a constant only mean equation for the signalling effect of commodity futures returns between June 2006 and 7th March 2017 totalling 561 
observations for each commodity. With _f and _r indicating first difference and log returns respectively. With ESV, LTC, STC, and FE[…] indicating the forecast error for each of the series, estimating by either AR (10) for 
stationary or ARIMA (10,1,0) for non-stationary time-series as focus variables in the variance equation. Note that the EGARCH analysis is limited to eight commodities, as I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the errors are 
not autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic based on the ARCH-LM test for silver and sugar. With L.earch as the asymmetric term that tests the asymmetry in the model (i.e. how positive innovations affect CFR compared 
to negative innovations), L.earch_a as the symmetric term, and L.egarch as the EGARCH term, all at lag t-1. * indicates the statistical significance, with *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1.  
The model is defined as: 
𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿
′𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡   where 𝜀𝑡 = 𝜎𝑡𝜂𝑡      ln(𝜎𝑡
2) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ln(𝜎𝑡−1
2 ) + 𝛾2𝑔(𝜂𝑡−1) + 𝜏1𝐸𝑆𝑉𝑡 + 𝜏2𝐹[𝐸𝑆𝑉]𝑡 + 𝜏3𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑡 + 𝜏4𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑡     𝑔(𝜂𝑡−1) = 𝜃𝜂𝑡−1 + 𝜆[|𝜂𝑡−1| − E(|𝜂𝑡−1|)] 
with α, δ, γ, τ, θ, and λ as coefficients, CFR as the weekly CFR at time t, F as vector of weekly returns of control variables and dummies at time t, ε as error term at time t, σ2 as the conditional variance, η as a generalised error 
distribution, and ESV, FE[ESV], LTC, and STC as explanatory variables in the variance equation, where FE[ESV] represents the forecast error of ESV. 
